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| COURT FILE NUMBER: | 2303 12261 |
| COURT: | COURT OF KING'S BENCH OF ALBERTA |
| JUDICIAL CENTRE: | EDMONTON |
| PLAINTIFF: | KV CAPITAL INC. |
| DEFENDANTS: | JASPER SUMMERLEA SHOPPING CENTER LTD. and JUDY CHEN |
| DOCUMENT: | **BRIEF OF MNP LTD.** |
| ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT: | **PARLEE McLAWS LLP**<br>Barristers & Solicitors<br>Patent & Trade-Mark Agents<br>1700 Enbridge Centre<br>10175 – 101 Street NW<br>Edmonton, Alberta T5J 0H3<br>Attention: Steven A. Rohatyn<br>Phone: 780-423-8177<br>Fax: 780-423-2870<br>File No: 839-64/SRO |

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## PART I BACKGROUND

1. The facts contained herein are a summary derived with reference to the 8th Report of the Receiver (the "**Eighth Report**") and the Confidential Appendices thereto (the "**CA**"). Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein carry the meaning ascribed to them in the Eighth Report.

2. MNP Ltd. ("**MNP**" or the "**Receiver**") was appointed as the Receiver of all current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever (the "**Property**") of Jasper Summerlea Shopping Center Ltd. ("**Summerlea**"), an Alberta corporation, by Order of pronounced by this Honourable Court on August 17, 2023 (the "**Receivership Order**").

3. The Receivership Order authorizes and empowers the Receiver to, *inter alia*, market and solicit offers in respect of the Property or any part thereof with the approval of this Honourable Court, and to apply for any vesting or other orders (including, without limitation, confidentiality or sealing orders) necessary to convey the same to a purchaser free and clear of any liens or encumbrances.

4. This Bench Brief is submitted to assist this Honourable Court in its determination of the Receiver's application for the following items of relief:

    (i) The approval of the sale of the Land, as identified below;

    (ii) The approval of a Restricted Court Access Order in connection with the CA;

    (iii) The approval of the interim fees of the Receiver and those of its counsel;

    (iv) The approval of the Receiver's activities as described in its First through Eighth Reports (collectively, the "**Reports**");

    (v) The approval of the interim distributions recommended in the Eighth Report;

    (vi) An Order varying paragraph 18 of the Receivership Order to increase the charge granted thereby from $200,000.00 to $400,000.00; and

(vii) An order declaring the Imax Lien, as defined in the Eight Report, to be invalid and unenforceable.

## PART II THE LAND AND THE RECEIVER'S MARKETING EFFORTS

5. The Property includes land located immediately north of the West Edmonton Mall (the "**Land**") improved by a recently constructed single story restaurant building leased to a well-known fast-food chain, as well as a five-story hotel comprised of 48 apartment style suites, three main-floor commercial units, and an underground parkade.

6. As noted in the Eight Report, the Receiver engaged with a construction contractor to complete the construction of the hotel located on the Land (the "**Hotel Project**").

7. Following a request for sales and marketing proposals to several real estate brokers, the Receiver ultimately engaged Marcus & Millichap (the "**Brokerage**") to assist with the marketing and sale of the Land. Extensive information regarding the Land was compiled and made available to prospective purchasers on a confidential basis.

8. The Brokerage's marketing efforts commenced on December 5, 2023, with a list price of $19,500,000.00 and a bid deadline of January 30, 2024.

9. As of the bid deadline, the Receiver had received three offers for the Land. One of which was an all-cash conditional offer to purchase the Land (the "**Agreement**") received from West Edmonton Truckland Ltd. ("**Truckland**").

10. The Receiver has accepted the Agreement, subject to the approval of this Honourable Court. All conditions favouring Truckland have subsequently been waived.

11. Pursuant to the terms of the lease between Summerlea and Honeybee Foods (Canada) Corporation ("**Honeybee**"), which grant it a right of first refusal (the "**ROFR**"), the Receiver provided notice of the Agreement. Honeybee did not exercise the ROFR.

## PART III SAVO

***The Approval of the Agreement***

12. Section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* permits the Court to appoint a Receiver to do any of the following:

> (i) Take possession of all or substantially all of the property of an insolvent person used in relation to the business carried on by the insolvent person;
>
> (ii) exercise any control that the Court considers advisable over the property and over the insolvent person's business; and
>
> (iii) take any other action that the Court considers advisable.

- *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3, s. 243 (**"BIA"**) **[TAB 1].**

13. The Receivership Order authorizes and empowers the Receiver to, *inter alia*, market and solicit offers in respect of the Property or any part thereof with the approval of this Honourable Court, and to apply for any vesting or other orders (including, without limitation, confidentiality or sealing orders) necessary to convey the same to a purchaser free and clear of any liens or encumbrances affecting such Property.

14. A Court-appointed Receiver's fundamental duties are to be kept firmly in mind when conducting a review of the proposed exercise of the powers granted to a Receiver under its Order of appointment, particularly the power to sell.

15. A Receiver is an officer of the Court. Its duties are owed not only to the Court, but to all parties interested in the assets, property and undertakings placed under its control, including but not limited to creditors of all forms, guarantors, and shareholders. The Receiver has a duty to exercise such reasonable care, supervision, and control over that property as an ordinary person would give to his or her own and must deal with it in a commercially reasonable manner.

- BIA, s. 247 [**TAB 1**].
- *Jaycap Financial Ltd v Snowdon Block Inc*, 2019 ABCA 47 at para 28 [**TAB 2**].

16. *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* enumerates the well-known criteria to be applied when considering an application to approve a sales transaction proposed by a Receiver. The above-mentioned duties, although not forming part of the Court's express reasoning in

*Soundair*, are nonetheless layered within the criteria it instructs courts to consider and determine on such an application. Those criteria are as follows:

(i) Whether the Receiver made sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

(ii) The interests of all parties;

(iii) The efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers were obtained; and

(iv) Whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

- *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CanLII 2727 at para 16 ("**Soundair**") [**TAB 3**].

17. The Alberta Court of Appeal has regularly cited the *Soundair* test with approval, including very recently.

- *River Rentals Group Ltd. v Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa*, 2010 ABCA 16 at para 12 ("**River Rentals**") **[TAB 4].**
- *PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd.*, 2019 ABCA 433 at para 10 ("**PwC**") [**TAB 5**].
- *1705221 Alberta Ltd v Three M Mortgages Inc*, 2021 ABCA 144 at para 19 ("**Three M**") [**TAB 6**].

18. A Receiver plays a leading role in receivership proceedings. As an officer of the Court, it relies upon the advice and guidance of those it engages to assist in the sale of the assets in question, as well as its own commercial expertise in accepting an offer subject to Court approval. In exercising its power of sale, and in keeping with its general duties, a Receiver must act in a commercially reasonable manner with a view towards obtaining the best price having regards to the competing interests of the parties. With that in mind, it is the reviewing Court's function to ensure that these duties have been complied with, "not to consider whether a Receiver has failed to get the best price".

- PwC at paras 13-14 [**TAB 5**].
- Three M at paras 22 and 32 [**TAB 6**].

19. Our Court of Appeal has held that, if the Court is satisfied that a Receiver has acted providently in its efforts to market and sell the assets in question, the proposed transaction should be approved. Although a Court approving a sale recommended by a Receiver "is not engaged in a perfunctory, rubberstamp exercise", deference is nonetheless owed to a Court-appointed Receiver provided that its course of action and recommendation is appropriate, and nothing to the contrary is shown in the evidence. To order otherwise risks calling into question the Receiver's expertise (as well as that of those it has engaged to assist in the marketing process) and its authority in the receivership process, thereby weakening its central role and purpose, compromising the integrity of the sales process, and undermining commercial certainty. That said, "[i]t is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of businesspersons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies" the *Soundair* principles.

- Soundair at para 14, 43 and 72 **[TAB 3]**.
- River Rentals at paras 18 and 19 **[TAB 4].**
- PwC at paras 10, and 12-14 **[TAB 5]**.
- Three M at para 22 **[TAB 6]**.

20. Addressing each prong in turn, the Receiver submits that the *Soundair* test is satisfied.

***The Receiver has made sufficient efforts to obtain the best price***

21. In considering the first prong of the *Soundair* test, the Court is to have regard to the following factors:

    (i) Whether the offer is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic;

    (ii) Whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids;

(iii) Whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; and

(iv) Whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the debtor.

- River Rentals at para. 13 [**TAB 4**]; PwC at paras. 11-12 [**TAB 5**].

22. In the present case, the Receiver submits that the marketing process leading to its entry into the Agreement was fair, impartial, provident, and has resulted in the best price having regard to the competing interest of all parties. In consideration of the *Soundair* test, the Receiver submits:

(i) Regarding the first factor, the Land was not appraised. However, in *PwC* the Court of Appeal cautioned that appraisals may in some instances be relegated to nothing more than a well-meant but inaccurate prediction, and that it is the market that sets the value of the asset. With this in mind, the marketing efforts made by the Brokerage were of sufficient length and breadth to expose the Land to a wide audience of potential purchasers. The market has loudly stated its support for the reliability of the appraisal. Further, the efforts that the Receiver made to ensure that sufficient efforts had been made throughout the listing, and to ensure that the purchase price on offer, if accepted, returns the best price possible, can lead only to the conclusion that it acted providently.

- PwC at paras. 16-17 [**TAB 5**].

(ii) Regarding the second factor, the Receiver submits that all stakeholders are well served by the Agreement. If approved, it provides for an efficient disposition of the Land without the need to incur additional costs and professional fees, while maximizing recovery to the creditors.

(iii) Regarding the third factor, the Receiver submits that the marketing process undertaken by the Brokerage, being a public listing, was by its very nature fair and targeted a wide audience.

(iv) Finally, regarding the fourth factor, the Receiver submits that there is neither any evidence nor any suggestion being made that the marketing process was other than fair, prudent and transparent.

23. Based upon the foregoing, the Receiver respectfully submits that the *Soundair* criteria are satisfied, and that this Honourable Court should accordingly grant an Order approving the Receiver's acceptance of the Agreement and vest the Land accordingly.

## PART IV RESTRICTED COURT ACCESS ORDER

24. The Court's authority to grant a Restricted Court Access Order, otherwise known as a Sealing Order, is grounded in its inherent jurisdiction, as supplemented pursuant to Rule 6.28 and Division 4 of Part 6 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*.

- *Alberta Rules of Court*, AR 124/2010, Division 4 of Part 6, including Rule 6.28 [**TAB 7**].

25. Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public. Such an Order may be granted only:

(i) Where it is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent that risk; and

(ii) Where the salutary effects of the confidentiality order outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

- *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41 at para 45 ("**Sierra Club**") [**TAB 8**].

26. In recasting this test without altering its essence, the Supreme Court of Canada has recently held that it must be established that:

(i) Court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

(ii) The order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and

(iii) As a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

- *Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25* at para 38 ("**Sherman Estate**") [**TAB 9**].

27. The sealing of commercially sensitive information such as marketing proposals, valuations, offers, and sales agreements has long been recognized as appropriate and indeed necessary when assets are being sold pursuant to a Court supervised insolvency process. This recognition is reflected by the terms of the template Receivership Order, which specifically contemplates that the Receiver may apply for such an Order in connection with its efforts to market the property to which the Order relates. This results primarily from the fact that further marketing efforts may be necessary where a proposed sale is approved but fails to close. Restricting access to information of this sort assures fair play by, for example, preventing future purchasers who may be savvy enough to obtain such information from the Court record from gaining an unfair advantage relative to others who may be less sophisticated.

- See e.g. *Romspen Investment Corporation v Hargate Properties Inc.*, 2012 ABQB 412 at paras 2, 10-13 [**TAB 10**].

- *Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd.*, 2014 ABQB 350 at para 54 [**TAB 11**], citing *Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corporation*, 2009 CanLII 71005 at para 17 (ONSC) [**TAB 12**].

28. Mindful of the foregoing jurisprudence, the Receiver submits that the CA ought to be sealed considering the commercial nature of the information contained therein, the fact that the order is being sought in an insolvency context, and the potential harm that could accrue to the commercial and privacy interests of Summerlea and its stakeholders, as well as those of the purchasers respectively named in the Agreements. The CA contains, *inter alia*, information that assisted the Receiver in determining a reasonable purchase price. If made public, any future sales process conducted by the Receiver could be compromised

to the irreparable detriment of Summerlea and its stakeholders should one become necessary in the event that the sale, if approved, fails to close.

29. In the Receiver's submission this approach is justified with reference to *Sierra Club* and *Sherman Estate*, each of which recognize that the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information is a sufficiently important interest because of its public character.

- Sierra Club at paras. 53 and 55 [**TAB 8**]; Sherman Estate at para. 41 [**TAB 9**].

30. The Receiver further submits that the salutary effects of the Order outweigh any potentially deleterious effects, and that the Order is necessary towards assisting the Receiver in keeping with the *Soundair* principles. Not only is the granting of the Order reasonable in the circumstances, but it is also, in the Receiver's submission, appropriate and necessary.

## PART V APPROVAL OF INTERIM FEES, RECEIVER'S ACTIVITIES, INCREASED CHARGE, AND THE IMAX LIEN

### *The Approval of Interim Fees*

31. Pursuant to s. 99 of the *Business Corporations Act*, the Court may make any Order it sees fit, including an Order approving a receiver or receiver-manager's accounts. Section 243(6) of the BIA provides that the Court may make any Order respecting the payment of the fees and disbursements of a Receiver appointed thereunder that it considers proper.

- BIA, s. 243(6) [**TAB 1**].
- *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9, s. 99(c) [**TAB 13**].

32. Reference must also be made to the Receivership Order, paragraph 18 of which provides that the Receiver and its counsel shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case incurred at their standard rates and charges. Paragraph 19 provides that the Receiver and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time.

33. The governing principle in assessing a Receiver's fees is that they should be measured by the fair and reasonable value of its services. The considerations applicable in determining

the reasonable remuneration to be paid to a Receiver include the nature, extent and value of the assets handled, the complications and difficulties encountered, the degree of assistance provided by the company, its officers or its employees, the time spent, the Receiver's knowledge, experience and skill, the diligence and thoroughness displayed, the responsibilities assumed, the results of the Receiver's efforts, and the cost of comparable services when performed in a prudent and economical manner.

- *Winalta Inc. (Re)*, 2011 ABQB 399 at para 25, citing Federal Business Development Bank v. Belyea, 1983 CanLII 4086244 at paras 3 and 9 ("**Winalta**") [**TAB 14**].
- See also *Piikani Nation v. Piikani Energy Corporation*, 2011 ABQB 450, wherein this Court applied the principles outlined in Winalta in the receivership context [**TAB 15**].
- And see *Servus Credit Union Ltd v Trimove Inc*, ("**Trimove**") [**TAB 16**].

34. The onus rests upon the Receiver to provide clear and cogent affidavit evidence that its fees, and those of its counsel, are fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

- Winalta at para 32 [**TAB 14**].
- Trimove at para 29, citing *Confectionately Yours Inc. (Re)*, 2002 CanLII 45059 (ON CA) as to the need for affidavit evidence [**TAB 16**].

35. Regard may be had to the level of fees the company covenanted to pay in its agreements with the appointing creditors. In this case, Summerlea covenanted to pay all fees, costs and expenses, including legal fees, incurred by a receiver in the enforcement of KV Capital's rights.

- Trimove at paras 41-45 [**TAB 16**].
- Affidavit of Colin Brenneis, filed August 10, 2023 (Exhibit "F" at Section 6.1; Exhibit "G" at Section 7.2).

36. The Reports broadly outline the activities of the Receiver since the date of its appointment. Its fees in addition to those of its counsel are verified in detail by the Fee Affidavit. The Receiver respectfully submits that it has provided cogent evidence that the professional fees incurred to date are fair and reasonable with due regard to the above-

referenced considerations adopted by this Honourable Court in *Winalta* and should therefore be approved.

***The Approval of a Receiver's Activities***

37. The principles applicable to the approval of the activities of a Court officer in the insolvency context were first discussed in *Target Canada (Re)*, a proceeding under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. It has since been held that the same principles apply in receivership proceedings.

- *Hanfeng Evergreen Inc., (Re)*, 2017 ONSC 7161 at para 15 ("**Hanfeng**") [**TAB 17**].

38. Court approval serves several important practical and policy purposes. Specifically, it:

(a) Allows the Receiver to move forward with next steps in the proceedings;

(b) Brings the Receiver's activities to the forefront;

(c) Allows an opportunity for the concerns of stakeholders to be addressed and, if necessary, rectified;

(d) Enables the Court to satisfy itself that the Receiver has acted in the prudent and diligent manner;

(e) Provides protection for the Receiver not otherwise provided by the *BIA*;

(f) Protects creditors from the delay and distribution that would be caused by the re-litigation of steps taken to date and potential indemnity claims by the Receiver.

- Hanfeng at para 17 [**TAB 17**].

***Increasing the Receiver's Charge***

39. This Honourable Court has the authority to grant the Receiver a charge against the Property for its fees and disbursements in priority to all other secured creditors. Section 243(6) of the BIA provides the following statement regarding a receiver's charge:

> If a receiver is appointed under subsection (1), the court may make any order respecting the payment of fees and disbursements of the receiver that it considers proper, including one that gives the receiver a charge, ranking ahead of any or all of the secured creditors, over all or part of the property of the insolvent person or bankrupt in respect of the receiver's claim for fees or disbursements, but the court may not make the order unless it is satisfied that the secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations.

- BIA, s. 243(6) [**TAB 1**] (emphasis added).

40. Paragraph 18 of the Receivership Order currently provides that the Receiver and its counsel have a charge on the Property (the "**Receiver's Charge**") in the aggregate amount of $200,000.00 as security for their professional fees and disbursements.

41. In discussing limits or caps on receivers' fees, the British Columbia Supreme Court provided the following statement regarding raising such caps:

> Such limits or caps provide some assurance to the stakeholders as to administration costs that may be charged to the estate. More often than not, such limits are increased by the court in the event that there are ongoing issues that need to be addressed which were not anticipated when the initial budgeted amount was set. Sometimes the budgeted amount proves to have been greatly underestimated.

- *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Rempel Copper Sky Development Ltd.*, 2015 BCSC 2183 [**TAB 18**].

42. This Honourable Court's power to vary the Receivership Order can be found in s. 187(5) of the *BIA*. Further, paragraph 33 of the Receivership Order permits any interested party to apply to this Honourable Court to vary or amend its terms.

43. As set forth in the Eighth Report, the fees incurred to date are much higher than could have reasonably been expected due to the need for the Receiver to pursue the Refund Recovery Action.

44. The assistance and involvement of insolvency professionals is a critical element to maximizing potential returns to Summerlea's stakeholders. The GST Refund represents a significant asset. The steps taken by the Receiver towards its recovery to date involved a

measure of complexity and a need for the Receiver and its counsel to act in an extremely time sensitive manner.

***The Imax Lien***

45. On February 20, 2024, a Statement of Lien was registered on title to the Land by Imax Electrical Service Inc. ("**Imax**") as Instrument No. 242 049 097 (the "**Imax Lien**"). The Imax Lien alleges that Imax completed electrical wiring work last furnished on January 2, 2024. Neither the Receiver nor the general contractor engaged for the completion of the Hotel Project contracted with Imax to that end. Imax had not been on site since the pronouncement of the Receivership Order.

46. An email from Imax attached a copy of its outstanding invoice and timesheet, which relates to work it purports to have completed in 2022. Section 41 of the *Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Act* provides for the registration of any lien arising thereunder within 60 days from the date of the last furnishing of materials or performance of services. The Receiver submits that the Imax Lien was registered well outside of this timeline, has accordingly ceased to exist, and is therefore invalid and unenforceable.

- *Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Act*, RSA 2000, c P-26.4, ss 41(1) and (2) **[TAB 19]**.

## PART VI CONCLUSION

47. The Receiver respectfully requests that this Honourable Court grant the relief sought on this Application.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of March, 2024.

**PARLEE MCLAWS LLP**



Per: _____
Steven A. Rohatyn, solicitors for MNP Ltd.

# TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

## Citation

1. *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3
2. *Jaycap Financial Ltd v Snowdon Block Inc*, 2019 ABCA 47
3. *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.*, 1991 CarswellOnt 205
4. *River Rentals Group Ltd. v Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa*, 2010 ABCA 16
5. *PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. v. 1905393 Alberta Ltd.*, 2019 ABCA 433
6. *1705221 Alberta Ltd v Three M Mortgages Inc*, 2021 ABCA 144
7. *Alberta Rules of Court*, AR 124/2010, Division 4 of Part 6
8. *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41
9. *Sherman Estate v. Donovan*, 2021 SCC 25
10. *Romspen Investment Corporation v Hargate Properties Inc.*, 2012 ABQB 412
11. *Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd.*, 2014 ABQB 350
12. *Look Communications Inc. v. Look Mobile Corporation*, 2009 CanLII 71005
13. *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9
14. *Winalta Inc. (Re)*, 2011 ABQB 399
15. *Piikani Nation v. Piikani Energy Corporation*, 2011 ABQB 450
16. *Servus Credit Union Ltd v Trimove Inc*, 2015 ABQB 745
17. *Hanfeng Evergreen Inc., (Re)*, 2017 ONSC 7161
18. *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Rempel Copper Sky Development Ltd.*, 2015 BCSC 2183
19. *Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Act*, RSA 2000, c P-26.4

# TAB 1

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

CODIFICATION

# Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act

# Loi sur la faillite et l'insolvabilité

R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3

L.R.C. (1985), ch. B-3

Current to February 20, 2024

Last amended on April 27, 2023

À jour au 20 février 2024

Dernière modification le 27 avril 2023

Published by the Minister of Justice at the following address:
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca

Publié par le ministre de la Justice à l'adresse suivante :
http://lois-laws.justice.gc.ca

## OFFICIAL STATUS OF CONSOLIDATIONS

Subsections 31(1) and (2) of the *Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act*, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as follows:

**Published consolidation is evidence**

**31 (1)** Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regulation and of its contents and every copy purporting to be published by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shown.

**Inconsistencies in Acts**

**(2)** In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the original statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the *Publication of Statutes Act*, the original statute or amendment prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.

## CARACTÈRE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les paragraphes 31(1) et (2) de la *Loi sur la révision et la codification des textes législatifs*, en vigueur le 1er juin 2009, prévoient ce qui suit :

**Codifications comme élément de preuve**

**31 (1)** Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiée ou d'un règlement codifié, publié par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi sur support papier ou sur support électronique, fait foi de cette loi ou de ce règlement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire donné comme publié par le ministre est réputé avoir été ainsi publié, sauf preuve contraire.

**Incompatibilité — lois**

**(2)** Les dispositions de la loi d'origine avec ses modifications subséquentes par le greffier des Parlements en vertu de la *Loi sur la publication des lois* l'emportent sur les dispositions incompatibles de la loi codifiée publiée par le ministre en vertu de la présente loi.

## LAYOUT

The notes that appeared in the left or right margins are now in boldface text directly above the provisions to which they relate. They form no part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference only.

## MISE EN PAGE

Les notes apparaissant auparavant dans les marges de droite ou de gauche se retrouvent maintenant en caractères gras juste au-dessus de la disposition à laquelle elles se rattachent. Elles ne font pas partie du texte, n'y figurant qu'à titre de repère ou d'information.

## NOTE

This consolidation is current to February 20, 2024. The last amendments came into force on April 27, 2023. Any amendments that were not in force as of February 20, 2024 are set out at the end of this document under the heading "Amendments Not in Force".

## NOTE

Cette codification est à jour au 20 février 2024. Les dernières modifications sont entrées en vigueur le 27 avril 2023. Toutes modifications qui n'étaient pas en vigueur au 20 février 2024 sont énoncées à la fin de ce document sous le titre « Modifications non en vigueur ».

province, if this Part is in force in the province immediately before that subsection comes into force, this Part applies in respect of the province.

R.S., 1985, c. B-3, s. 242; 2002, c. 7, s. 85; 2007, c. 36, s. 57.

s'appliquer à la province en cause, la présente partie s'applique à toute province dans laquelle elle était en vigueur à l'entrée en vigueur de ce paragraphe.

L.R. (1985), ch. B-3, art. 242; 2002, ch. 7, art. 85; 2007, ch. 36, art. 57.

## PART XI

# Secured Creditors and Receivers

### Court may appoint receiver

**243 (1)** Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers it to be just or convenient to do so:

**(a)** take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;

**(b)** exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or

**(c)** take any other action that the court considers advisable.

### Restriction on appointment of receiver

**(1.1)** In the case of an insolvent person in respect of whose property a notice is to be sent under subsection 244(1), the court may not appoint a receiver under subsection (1) before the expiry of 10 days after the day on which the secured creditor sends the notice unless

**(a)** the insolvent person consents to an earlier enforcement under subsection 244(2); or

**(b)** the court considers it appropriate to appoint a receiver before then.

### Definition of *receiver*

**(2)** Subject to subsections (3) and (4), in this Part, ***receiver*** means a person who

**(a)** is appointed under subsection (1); or

**(b)** is appointed to take or takes possession or control — of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a

## PARTIE XI

# Créanciers garantis et séquestres

### Nomination d'un séquestre

**243 (1)** Sous réserve du paragraphe (1.1), sur demande d'un créancier garanti, le tribunal peut, s'il est convaincu que cela est juste ou opportun, nommer un séquestre qu'il habilite :

**a)** à prendre possession de la totalité ou de la quasi-totalité des biens — notamment des stocks et comptes à recevoir — qu'une personne insolvable ou un failli a acquis ou utilisés dans le cadre de ses affaires;

**b)** à exercer sur ces biens ainsi que sur les affaires de la personne insolvable ou du failli le degré de prise en charge qu'il estime indiqué;

**c)** à prendre toute autre mesure qu'il estime indiquée.

### Restriction relative à la nomination d'un séquestre

**(1.1)** Dans le cas d'une personne insolvable dont les biens sont visés par le préavis qui doit être donné par le créancier garanti aux termes du paragraphe 244(1), le tribunal ne peut faire la nomination avant l'expiration d'un délai de dix jours après l'envoi de ce préavis, à moins :

**a)** que la personne insolvable ne consente, aux termes du paragraphe 244(2), à l'exécution de la garantie à une date plus rapprochée;

**b)** qu'il soit indiqué, selon lui, de nommer un séquestre à une date plus rapprochée.

### Définition de *séquestre*

**(2)** Dans la présente partie, mais sous réserve des paragraphes (3) et (4), ***séquestre*** s'entend de toute personne qui :

**a)** soit est nommée en vertu du paragraphe (1);

**b)** soit est nommément habilitée à prendre — ou a pris — en sa possession ou sous sa responsabilité, aux termes d'un contrat créant une garantie sur des biens, appelé « contrat de garantie » dans la présente partie,

business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt — under

**(i)** an agreement under which property becomes subject to a security (in this Part referred to as a "security agreement"), or

**(ii)** a court order made under another Act of Parliament, or an Act of a legislature of a province, that provides for or authorizes the appointment of a receiver or receiver-manager.

ou aux termes d'une ordonnance rendue sous le régime de toute autre loi fédérale ou provinciale prévoyant ou autorisant la nomination d'un séquestre ou d'un séquestre-gérant, la totalité ou la quasi-totalité des biens — notamment des stocks et comptes à recevoir — qu'une personne insolvable ou un failli a acquis ou utilisés dans le cadre de ses affaires.

**Definition of *receiver* — subsection 248(2)**

**(3)** For the purposes of subsection 248(2), the definition ***receiver*** in subsection (2) is to be read without reference to paragraph (a) or subparagraph (b)(ii).

**Définition de *séquestre* — paragraphe 248(2)**

**(3)** Pour l'application du paragraphe 248(2), la définition de ***séquestre***, au paragraphe (2), s'interprète sans égard à l'alinéa a) et aux mots « ou aux termes d'une ordonnance rendue sous le régime de toute autre loi fédérale ou provinciale prévoyant ou autorisant la nomination d'un séquestre ou d'un séquestre-gérant ».

**Trustee to be appointed**

**(4)** Only a trustee may be appointed under subsection (1) or under an agreement or order referred to in paragraph (2)(b).

**Syndic**

**(4)** Seul un syndic peut être nommé en vertu du paragraphe (1) ou être habilité aux termes d'un contrat ou d'une ordonnance mentionné à l'alinéa (2)b).

**Place of filing**

**(5)** The application is to be filed in a court having jurisdiction in the judicial district of the locality of the debtor.

**Lieu du dépôt**

**(5)** La demande de nomination est déposée auprès du tribunal compétent dans le district judiciaire de la localité du débiteur.

**Orders respecting fees and disbursements**

**(6)** If a receiver is appointed under subsection (1), the court may make any order respecting the payment of fees and disbursements of the receiver that it considers proper, including one that gives the receiver a charge, ranking ahead of any or all of the secured creditors, over all or part of the property of the insolvent person or bankrupt in respect of the receiver's claim for fees or disbursements, but the court may not make the order unless it is satisfied that the secured creditors who would be materially affected by the order were given reasonable notice and an opportunity to make representations.

**Ordonnances relatives aux honoraires et débours**

**(6)** Le tribunal peut, relativement au paiement des honoraires et débours du séquestre nommé en vertu du paragraphe (1), rendre toute ordonnance qu'il estime indiquée, y compris une ordonnance portant que la réclamation de celui-ci à l'égard de ses honoraires et débours est garantie par une sûreté de premier rang sur tout ou partie des biens de la personne insolvable ou du failli, avec préséance sur les réclamations de tout créancier garanti; le tribunal ne peut toutefois déclarer que la réclamation du séquestre est ainsi garantie que s'il est convaincu que tous les créanciers garantis auxquels l'ordonnance pourrait sérieusement porter atteinte ont été avisés à cet égard suffisamment à l'avance et se sont vu accorder l'occasion de se faire entendre.

**Meaning of *disbursements***

**(7)** In subsection (6), ***disbursements*** does not include payments made in the operation of a business of the insolvent person or bankrupt.

1992, c. 27, s. 89; 2005, c. 47, s. 115; 2007, c. 36, s. 58.

**Sens de *débours***

**(7)** Pour l'application du paragraphe (6), ne sont pas comptés comme débours les paiements effectués dans le cadre des opérations propres aux affaires de la personne insolvable ou du failli.

1992, ch. 27, art. 89; 2005, ch. 47, art. 115; 2007, ch. 36, art. 58.

forthwith provide a copy thereof to the Superintendent and

**(a)** to the insolvent person or the trustee (in the case of a bankrupt); and

**(b)** to any creditor of the insolvent person or the bankrupt who requests a copy at any time up to six months after the end of the receivership.

1992, c. 27, s. 89.

**a)** à la personne insolvable ou, en cas de faillite, au syndic;

**b)** à tout créancier de la personne insolvable ou du failli qui en fait la demande au plus tard six mois après que le séquestre a complété l'exercice de ses attributions en l'espèce.

1992, ch. 27, art. 89.

### Intellectual property — sale or disposition

**246.1 (1)** If the insolvent person or the bankrupt is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property that is included in a sale or disposition by the receiver, that sale or disposition does not affect that other party's right to use the intellectual property — including the other party's right to enforce an exclusive use — during the term of the agreement, including any period for which the other party extends the agreement as of right, as long as the other party continues to perform its obligations under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.

### Propriété intellectuelle — disposition

**246.1 (1)** Si la personne insolvable ou le failli est partie à un contrat qui autorise une autre partie à utiliser un droit de propriété intellectuelle qui est compris dans une disposition d'actifs par le séquestre, cette disposition n'empêche pas l'autre partie d'utiliser le droit en question ni d'en faire respecter l'utilisation exclusive, à condition que cette autre partie respecte ses obligations contractuelles à l'égard de l'utilisation de ce droit, et ce, pour la période prévue au contrat et pour toute prolongation de celle-ci dont elle se prévaut de plein droit.

### Intellectual property — disclaimer or resiliation

**(2)** If the insolvent person or the bankrupt is a party to an agreement that grants to another party a right to use intellectual property, the disclaimer or resiliation of that agreement by the receiver does not affect that other party's right to use the intellectual property — including the other party's right to enforce an exclusive use — during the term of the agreement, including any period for which the other party extends the agreement as of right, as long as the other party continues to perform its obligations under the agreement in relation to the use of the intellectual property.

2018, c. 27, s. 268.

### Propriété intellectuelle — résiliation

**(2)** Si la personne insolvable ou le failli est partie à un contrat qui autorise une autre partie à utiliser un droit de propriété intellectuelle, la résiliation de ce contrat par le séquestre n'empêche pas l'autre partie d'utiliser le droit en question ni d'en faire respecter l'utilisation exclusive, à condition que cette autre partie respecte ses obligations contractuelles à l'égard de l'utilisation de ce droit, et ce, pour la période prévue au contrat et pour toute prolongation de celle-ci dont elle se prévaut de plein droit.

2018, ch. 27, art. 268.

### Good faith, etc.

**247** A receiver shall

**(a)** act honestly and in good faith; and

**(b)** deal with the property of the insolvent person or the bankrupt in a commercially reasonable manner.

1992, c. 27, s. 89.

### Obligation de diligence

**247** Le séquestre doit gérer les biens de la personne insolvable ou du failli en toute honnêteté et de bonne foi, et selon des pratiques commerciales raisonnables.

1992, ch. 27, art. 89.

### Powers of court

**248 (1)** Where the court, on the application of the Superintendent, the insolvent person, the trustee (in the case of a bankrupt), a receiver or a creditor, is satisfied that the secured creditor, the receiver or the insolvent person is failing or has failed to carry out any duty imposed by sections 244 to 247, the court may make an order, on such terms as it considers proper,

### Pouvoirs du tribunal

**248 (1)** S'il est convaincu, à la suite d'une demande du surintendant, de la personne insolvable, du syndic — en cas de faillite —, du séquestre ou d'un créancier que le créancier garanti, le séquestre ou la personne insolvable ne se conforme pas ou ne s'est pas conformé à l'une ou l'autre des obligations que lui imposent les articles 244 à

# TAB 2

# In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

**Citation: Jaycap Financial Ltd v Snowdon Block Inc, 2019 ABCA 47**

**Date:** 20190204
**Docket:** 1701-0314-AC
**Registry:** Calgary



**Between:**

**Jaycap Financial Ltd.**

Respondent
(Plaintiff)

- and -

**Snowdon Block Inc., Neil John Richardson,
Hugh Daryl Richardson and Heritage Property Corporation**

Appellants
(Defendants)

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**The Court:**

**The Honourable Mr. Justice Brian O'Ferrall
The Honourable Madam Justice Barbara Lea Veldhuis
The Honourable Madam Justice Ritu Khullar**

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**Memorandum of Judgment**

Appeal from the Order by
The Honourable Madam Justice B.E.C. Romaine
Dated the 2nd day of November, 2017
Filed on the 2nd day of November, 2017
(Docket: 1601-01658)

## Memorandum of Judgment

**The Court:**

### Introduction

[1] This appeal arises in the context of insolvency proceedings. The guarantors appeal a chambers judge's decision vacating an earlier order and approving an agreement between the receiver and a nominee of the main secured creditor for the purchase of the debtor's assets. These parties had earlier entered into an agreement for the same assets and obtained a court order approving that sale. However, they terminated this agreement after court approval on the basis of a mistake about the purchase price. The parties then entered into a second asset purchase agreement for a lower purchase price, which exposed the guarantors to a significant deficiency judgment. The guarantors (and as discussed below, the court) were provided very little information about what transpired between the execution of first and second agreements. The guarantors were unsuccessful before the chambers judge in arguing that the first asset purchase agreement should not be rectified because mutual mistake was not established on the record. The guarantors appeal to this Court alleging errors with the chambers judge's finding of mutual mistake and that the receiver's conduct challenged the integrity of the process.

[2] We agree with the guarantors that there are some significant deficiencies with how the receiver proceeded and that the integrity of the process was seriously compromised. As a result, we allow the appeal.

### Background

[3] MNP Ltd. (the Receiver) was appointed receiver and manager of the debtor company, Snowdon Block Inc. (Snowdon) in February 2016. The only material asset of Snowdon was a parcel of land and a building in Calgary. In July 2016 the Receiver commenced a sales process to solicit offers for the assets. In October 2016 the Receiver finally received two offers for the assets and accepted a conditional offer from a third party. After months of extensions and negotiations, the would-be purchaser was unable to remove its conditions and the sale did not proceed.

[4] Jaycap Financial Ltd. (Jaycap) was the primary creditor of Snowdon and was financing the Receiver's costs. Over time Jaycap became concerned with the increasing costs and protecting its investment. The Receiver advised Jaycap that a credit bid would be a viable option to obtain title to the assets and bring the receivership to an end. On July 5, 2017 Jaycap emailed the Receiver that it would credit bid its "current costs" noted to be a certain amount. Jaycap arranged for a numbered company it controlled to be the purchaser, but for simplicity, we will refer to Jaycap's nominee as Jaycap.

[5] An asset purchase agreement was prepared and executed by Jaycap and the Receiver on August 2, 2017. The total debt was defined to be the amount contained in the July 5, 2017 email and that amount was also the purchase price.

[6] On August 2, 2017 a representative of the Receiver and a representative of Jaycap also emailed about a request from one of the guarantors, the appellant Mr. Richardson, about the pending transaction. As part of this exchange, the two sides set out their understanding of the purchase price and the impact on the guarantors' liability. This was their exchange:

> Reid [*Jaycap's representative*]. Neil Richardson [*one of the appellants*] has contacted us asking for an adjournment of the application next week as he is out of town. His concern is that he does not have any idea of what #Co's offer is and is concerned about his personal guarantee. As #Co is offering Jaycap's total indebtedness, Neil would not be exposed to any shortfall payable under his guarantee. We can't be giving him any legal or other advice but should you wish you could let Neil know that you would not be going after him for any amount. Otherwise we will likely have to adjourn the application until such time as he is available.
>
> Please let us know what you wish to do.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Vic [*Receiver's representative*]
>
> ….
>
> Vic, [*Receiver's representative*]
>
> I believe that is incorrect actually.
>
> Neil Richardson[*one of the appellants*] has guaranteed the debt which has been accruing.
>
> Our Numbered Co is offering our full debt (carrying value) *NOT everything* we are legally entitled to.
>
> Please don't adjourn and please don't communicate anything to [N]eil, we will do that.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Reid [*Jaycap's representative*]

[7] It appears from the record that the Receiver did not respond to this email nor did it obtain any clarification from Jaycap about what exactly was incorrect about its understanding of the purchase price and resulting impact on the guarantors.

[8] On August 21, 2017 the Receiver obtained an approval and vesting order approving the first asset purchase agreement. The guarantors did not oppose this application as they were not facing a deficiency.

[9] What happened next is a little unclear because of the lack of evidence and the Receiver's reliance on evidence from legal counsel about legal conclusions instead of the facts underlying those conclusions. The Receiver states in its third report that on August 28, 2017 counsel for Jaycap indicated that there was an error in the purchase price. The report then goes on to state that the Receiver was advised by its legal counsel that a common mistake occurred regarding the purchase price as set out in the first asset purchase agreement and that court approval was required to amend the mistake.

[10] It appears from the evidence of Jaycap that the asset purchase agreement was incorrect when it equated the purchase price (the amount contained in the July 5, 2017 email) to the total debt. The total debt was $1.3 million higher than the purchase price, and continued to accrue with interest and costs.

[11] The first asset purchase agreement did not close at the end of August 2017. On September 6, 2017 the Receiver and Jaycap entered into a second asset purchase agreement, which reduced the purchase price. On September 8, 2017 the Receiver filed an application to vacate the first approval and vesting order and sought approval of the second asset purchase agreement.

[12] The guarantors were served with this application and the appellant, Mr. Richardson, sent a series of letters to the Receiver's counsel asking for information and documents to support that a mistake had occurred. The Receiver's legal counsel provided answers to some, but not all, of these requests.

[13] The application was set for September 19, 2017 but adjourned and heard on October 26, 2017. The chambers judge reserved to consider the submissions and to review Mr. Richardson's materials which had not made it to the court file before the hearing. She issued her decision a week later and granted the second approval and vesting order. She found that she was not precluded from vacating the first order and issuing another. The first approval and vesting order did not direct the Receiver to close the transaction, but approved the terms of the asset purchase agreement and its execution by the Receiver. Pursuant to the termination clause, the agreement could be terminated by the parties if certain conditions were met.

[14] The chambers judge also found that the Receiver and Jaycap terminated the first asset purchase agreement since they had, by error, failed to revise the purchase price in the agreement in accordance with earlier correspondence. The chambers judge found that the parties met the

requirements for mutual mistake. She also found that they could rely on the termination provisions of the first asset purchase agreement.

[15] The chambers judge then considered the merits of the second asset purchase agreement and whether it met the criteria established in *Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corp* (1991), 4 OR (3d) 1, 83 DLR (4th) 76. She was satisfied the second asset purchase agreement was reasonable in the circumstances, and that the Receiver had made sufficient efforts to obtain the best price and was not acting improvidently. She noted the lack of offers, the inability to close an earlier conditional offer, the earlier order approving the sale, and the revised purchase price, which was still higher than the asset's appraised value.

[16] The guarantors now appeal stating that the chambers judge erred in finding mutual mistake. Further, given the lack of information and Jaycap's instructions in the August 2, 2017 email to the Receiver to conceal from the guarantors their liability under the guarantee, the guarantors argue that the Receiver's conduct casts doubt on the integrity of the process. They argue that the Receiver did not discharge its independent duty and was following instructions from Jaycap, who had a change of heart about the transaction and wanted a reduced price. As a result, the second approval and vesting order should be set aside, the first asset purchase agreement should be reinstated, and the guarantors should be relieved of their liability under the guarantee.

[17] Jaycap responds that the only real issue is whether the exercise of the court's discretion to accept the second asset purchase agreement was reasonable in the circumstances. Jaycap argues that notwithstanding the lengthy marketing process for the debtor's assets, there were no foreseeable offers. Further, there was no indication that relisting the assets would benefit either the secured creditors or the guarantors and that the chambers judge properly relied upon the Receiver's expertise in this regard.

[18] Jaycap also raises a number of contractual law difficulties with the guarantors' position. First, the termination provisions were duly exercised and the first asset purchase agreement no longer exists. Jaycap submits that neither this Court nor the court below can revive or reinstate a contract against the wishes of the actual parties or create a contract on their behalf. As a result, whether there was a mutual mistake or an error in finding mutual mistake is irrelevant. Second, the guarantors do not have standing to force a rectification as strangers to the contract.

**Standard of Review**

[19] The grounds of appeal that challenge facts and inferences are subject to palpable and overriding error: *Housen v Nikolaisen*, 2002 SCC 33 at paras 10 and 23, [2002] 2 SCR 235. Those issues which involve determining whether the facts satisfy a legal test are also reviewed for palpable and overriding error absent an extricable error of law: *Housen* at paras 36-37.

[20] The decision to approve the second asset purchase agreement was a matter of discretion. A discretionary decision will only be reversed where that court misdirected itself on the law, or came

to a decision that is so clearly wrong it amounts to an injustice, or where the court gave no, or insufficient, weight to relevant considerations: *Penner v Niagara (Regional Police Services Board)*, 2013 SCC 19 at para 27, [2013] 2 SCR 125.



**Analysis**

**There was no mutual mistake**

[21] We agree with the guarantors that the evidence does not establish mutual mistake and it was a palpable and overriding error for the chambers judge to conclude that the test was met. The evidence establishes that on August 2, 2017, the day the first asset purchase agreement was signed, the parties may have had *different* understandings about the purchase price and the Receiver's understanding of the purchase price was incorporated into the agreement. A different understanding is not a common misapprehension as to the facts: *Beazer v Tollestrup Estate*, 2017 ABCA 429 at para 28, [2018] 4 WWR 513.

[22] This difference was due, in part, to the imprecise language used by Jaycap in its communications with the Receiver about the amount. Jaycap described the purchase price as its "current cost" in July 2017, and later as the "full debt" and "carrying value" in August 2017. Jaycap's counsel could not explain the differences among these terms to this Court nor was he able to explain how the amounts were determined or what the $1.3 million difference was comprised of. As the guarantors went from facing no deficiency, to a deficiency of over a million dollars, the $1.3 million difference cried out for an explanation before this Court and the court below.

[23] While the guarantors are successful on this ground of appeal, this does not end the matter as mutual mistake was an alternative argument. The appeal cannot succeed unless the guarantors establish a reviewable error in the chambers judge's *Soundair* analysis.

**Lack of fairness and integrity of the process**

[24] The guarantors raise two issues supporting their allegation that the integrity of the process was compromised. First, the Receiver failed to disclose relevant and material documents about what transpired after August 2, 2017. Second, the Receiver did not appear to be acting independently of Jaycap.

[25] We agree that the Receiver's evidence about what transpired after August 2, 2017 is not satisfactory, even considering the evidence contained in the confidential supplement to the third report. Legal counsel's conclusion that there was a common mistake does not provide the evidentiary foundation to establish mutual mistake. That is for the court to decide.

[26] A number of the documents and information Mr. Richardson sought while the application was pending is exactly the information that ought to have been provided to the court in support of the Receiver's application. Certainly the different understandings of the parties about the purchase

price was put forward as a reason why the first transaction did not close. However, because the Receiver was seeking to vacate an earlier court order, some information about why the order needed to be vacated was required.

[27] Further, the Receiver provided little information about the critical August 2, 2017 email and why no further clarification was sought from Jaycap about what it meant before the court order approving the first transaction was obtained. There was enough information in that email to put the Receiver on notice that there was a misunderstanding. Had the Receiver been more diligent, this whole situation may well have been avoided.

[28] While insolvency proceedings are subject to special procedural rules and are understandably time sensitive in nature, these considerations do not relieve the Receiver from its basic obligations to the parties and the court. Nor do these considerations relieve the Receiver from providing evidence to meet its burden of proof to the requisite standard for each application that it brings. As summarized by the court in *Ravelston Corporation Limited (Re)*, 2007 CanLII 2663, 29 CBR (5th) 1 (ON SC):

> [60] A court-appointed receiver is an officer of the Court appointed to discharge certain duties prescribed by the appointment order. *Parsons et al. v. Sovereign Bank of Canada*, 1912 CanLII 365 (UK JCPC), [1913] A.C. 160 at 167 (J.C.P.C.).
>
> [61] When a court-appointed receiver is appointed in the normal course, "the receiver-manager is given exclusive control over the assets and affairs of the company and, in this respect, the board of directors is displaced." *TD Bank v. Fortin et al.* (1978), 1978 CanLII 1934 (BC SC), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 111 at 113 (B.C.S.C.). The essence of a receiver's power is to settle liabilities and liquidate assets.
>
> [62] It is well established that a court-appointed receiver owes duties not only to the Court, but also to all parties interested in the debtor's assets, property and undertakings. This includes competing secured claimants, guarantors, creditors or contingent creditors and shareholders. *Ostrander v. Niagra Helicopters Ltd.* (1974), 1973 CanLII 467 (ON SC), 1 O.R. (2d) 281 (Ont. H.C.J.) [*Ostrander*].
>
> [63] A receiver has the duty to exercise such reasonable care, supervision and control of the debtor's property as an ordinary person would give to his or her own. A receiver's duty is to discharge the receiver's powers honestly and in good faith. A receiver's duty is that of a fiduciary to all interested stakeholders involving the debtor's assets, property and undertaking. *Ostrander*, *supra* at 286.

[29] The Receiver's materials on their own do not provide the evidentiary basis to support the relief it was seeking. It was only several weeks later, when faced with serious opposition from Mr.

Richardson, that Jaycap filed an affidavit with more, although still incomplete, information about what transpired.

[30] The lack of information about what happened and the way the Receiver and Jaycap skirted around the issue in its application materials certainly did not help the perception of the Receiver's independence. The optics of the situation likely contributed to the guarantors' suspicion that what transpired merited further inquiries and that the Receiver was following Jaycap's instructions to conceal from the guarantors the true state of affairs. Jaycap and the Receiver were jointly represented before this Court, which was also unusual and unhelpful particularly when counsel for Jaycap could not answer questions the Receiver would be expected to know. During the hearing, the panel found that the guarantors' submissions were persuasive.

[31] The termination of the first asset purchase agreement was also left unexplained by the Receiver. Jaycap's evidence is that the Receiver failed to deliver closing documents, which allowed Jaycap to terminate. Jaycap signed a unilateral termination notice and the parties executed a mutual termination notice several weeks after the second asset purchase agreement was signed, and after Mr. Richardson launched his opposition. The chambers judge found that the first asset purchase agreement was terminated, but she did not explain in her reasons which termination was valid or why. Termination in these circumstances is not merely a matter between the parties as suggested by Jaycap. The circumstances surrounding the termination of the first asset agreement ought to have been canvassed as this remained a court-supervised sales process where the Receiver owed fiduciary duties to the parties to act fairly.

[32] The Receiver provided no evidence about termination nor did it explain why it failed to deliver the final closing documents, giving rise to termination, when the first asset purchase agreement reflected its understanding of the purchase price. Typically, sophisticated commercial parties who sign unambiguous agreements, drafted with the assistance of their legal counsel, will be held to their bargain. Had the Receiver sought to compel Jaycap to close the first asset purchase agreement, instead of abandoning it, its application may well have been successful.

[33] What is missing here is transparency. The process should be transparent. It should enable the court and interested parties to make an informed decision as to whether the sale can be considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances: *Toronto Dominion Bank v Canadian Starter Drives Inc*, 2011 ONSC 8004 at para 5, 2011 CarswellOnt 15140. Given the significant questions left unanswered by the Receiver, we have serious concerns about the efficacy, fairness and integrity of the process the Receiver followed between August 2, 2017 and the hearing of the application to approve the second asset purchase agreement. As a result, we disagree with the chambers judge that the Receiver met the requirements of *Soundair*.

**Conclusion**

[34] As an aside, and as a further indication of the parties' approach to procedure was the parties' approach to the sealing orders. The court record demonstrates that the parties failed to file

a sealing order, failed to file an affidavit they undertook to file, and failed to ensure that the Receiver's certificate met the requirements to release the bans and restore public access to the proceedings if that was the Receiver's intention in filing it.

[35] After the hearing concluded, and in preparation for filing this judgment, this Court was unable to discern the scope of the sealing orders, in part because of the missing information and the patchwork of numerous blanket orders that were taken over information that probably should not have been sealed. We asked for assistance from the parties and were provided with very little useful information.

[36] A review of the transcripts suggests to this Court that the parties ought to be more thoughtful in drafting their materials, in seeking bans, and in drafting those ban orders carefully, limiting public access to what is truly sensitive confidential information that could prejudice the insolvency process. The test for a sealing ban is set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 SCR 522 and is not merely the consent or non-objection of the parties. Sealing bans are the exception and not the rule because they engage *Charter* interests and materially impact the court's work. Better practices are required.

[37] The appeal is allowed, the order is set aside and the matter returned to Queen's Bench for a rehearing before a different judge.

Appeal heard on November 7, 2018

Written submissions received December 12, 2018 (re sealing orders)

Memorandum filed at Calgary, Alberta
this 4th day of February, 2019

O'Ferrall J.A.

Veldhuis J.A.

Khullar J.A.

**Appearances:**

A. Henderson
for the Respondent

K.W. Jesse
for the Appellants

# TAB 3

Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., Canadian Pension Capital Ltd. and Canadian Insurers Capital Corp.

Indexed as: Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp. (C.A.)

4 O.R. (3d) 1
[1991] O.J. No. 1137
Action No. 318/91

ONTARIO
Court of Appeal for Ontario
Goodman, McKinlay and Galligan JJ.A.
July 3, 1991

Debtor and creditor -- Receivers -- Court-appointed receiver accepting offer to purchase assets against wishes of secured creditors -- Receiver acting properly and prudently -- Wishes of creditors not determinative -- Court approval of sale confirmed on appeal.

Air Toronto was a division of Soundair. In April 1990, one of Soundair's creditors, the Royal Bank, appointed a receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. The receiver was authorized to sell Air Toronto to Air Canada, or, if that sale could not be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person. Air Canada made an offer which the receiver rejected. The receiver then entered into negotiations with Canadian Airlines International (Canadian); two subsidiaries of Canadian, Ontario Express Ltd. and Frontier Airlines Ltd., made an offer to purchase on March 6, 1991 (the OEL offer). Air Canada and a creditor of Soundair, CCFL, presented an offer to purchase to the receiver on March 7, 1991 through 922, a company formed for that purpose (the 922 offer). The receiver declined the 922 offer because it contained an unacceptable condition and accepted the OEL offer. 922 made a

second offer, which was virtually identical to the first one except that the unacceptable condition had been removed. In proceedings before Rosenberg J., an order was made approving the sale of Air Toronto to OEL and dismissing the 922 offer. CCFL appealed.

Held, the appeal should be dismissed.

Per Galligan J.A.: When deciding whether a receiver has acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer, and should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. The decision to sell to OEL was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Prices in other offers received after the receiver has agreed to a sale have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the accepted offer was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. If they do not do so, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If the 922 offer was better than the OEL offer, it was only marginally better and did not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was improvident.

While the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of creditors, a secondary but important consideration is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. The court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

The failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto did not result in the process being unfair, as there was no proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely

distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL.

The fact that the 922 offer was supported by Soundair's secured creditors did not mean that the court should have given effect to their wishes. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets (and therefore insulated themselves from the risks of acting privately) should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale by the receiver. If the court decides that a court-appointed receiver has acted providently and properly (as the receiver did in this case), the views of creditors should not be determinative.

Per McKinlay J.A. (concurring in the result): While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it was not a procedure which was likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

Per Goodman J.A. (dissenting): The fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. The creditors in this case were convinced that acceptance of the 922 offer was in their best interest and the evidence supported that belief. Although the receiver acted in good faith, the process which it used was unfair insofar as 922 was concerned and improvident insofar as the secured creditors were concerned.

Cases referred to

Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.); British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.); Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.); Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 22 C.P.C.

(2d) 131, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 320 (note), 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.); Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 65 A.R. 372, 59 C.B.R. (N.S.) 242, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.); Selkirk (Re) (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.); Selkirk (Re) (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.)

Statutes referred to

Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137
Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141



APPEAL from the judgment of the General Division, Rosenberg J., May 1, 1991, approving the sale of an airline by a receiver.

J.B. Berkow and Steven H. Goldman, for appellants.

John T. Morin, Q.C., for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and Lawrence E. Ritchie, for Royal Bank of Canada.

Sean F. Dunphy and G.K. Ketcheson for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of Soundair Corp., respondent.

W.G. Horton, for Ontario Express Ltd.

Nancy J. Spies, for Frontier Air Ltd.

GALLIGAN J.A.:-- This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991 (Gen. Div.). By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation (Soundair) is a corporation

engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the Royal Bank) is owed at least $65,000,000. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively called CCFL) are owed approximately $9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of $50,000,000 on the winding-up of Soundair.

On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the receiver) as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

> (b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person ...

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the receiver:

> (c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale

to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario

Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited (922) for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the 922 offers.

The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?

(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

I will deal with the two issues separately.

## I. DID THE RECEIVER ACT PROPERLY

IN AGREEING TO SELL TO OEL?

Before dealing with that issue there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person". The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.), at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. It should consider the interests of all parties.

3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over ten months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer which was acceptable, and the 922 offer which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 112 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R.:

> Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.
>
> If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

(Emphasis added)

I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A.

in Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

(Emphasis added)

On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

> 24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL. Air Canada had the benefit of an "exclusive" in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention to take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it

> contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

(Emphasis added)
I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second 922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the Receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R., discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

> No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a

sale should be considered by the court. The first is Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 247:

> If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

The second is Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 243:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

In Re Selkirk (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

> The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

(Emphasis added)

What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to

show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was, that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that

the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

The 922 offer provided for $6,000,000 cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of five years up to a maximum of $3,000,000. The OEL offer provided for a payment of $2,000,000 on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a five-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

> 24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced

that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the interests of all parties

It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, and Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra. However, as Saunders J. pointed out in Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, at p. 244 C.B.R., "it is not the only or overriding consideration".

In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra, Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, Re Selkirk (1987, McRae J.), supra, and Cameron, supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offer was obtained

While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to Re Selkirk (1986), supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.
>
> In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in Cameron v. Bank of N.S. (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:
>
> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a finding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard -- this would be an intolerable situation.

While those remarks may have been made in the context of a

bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

In Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.), at p. 61 Alta. L.R., p. 476 D.L.R., the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 124 O.R., pp. 562-63 D.L.R.:

> While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.

(Emphasis added)

It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways

in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of the circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated

purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

Moreover, I am not prepared top find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it

contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested, as a possible resolution of this appeal, that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within seven days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991, than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 O.R., p. 550 D.L.R.:

> It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this [at p. 31 of the reasons]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline

which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

## II. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPORT OF THE 922 OFFER BY THE TWO SECURED CREDITORS

As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work or change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as

to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But, if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtors' assets.

The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an interlender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the interlender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive $3,375,000 of the $6,000,000 cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the interlender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only $1,000,000 and the Royal Bank would receive $5,000,000 plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by

the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the interlender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline, if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that

Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-and-client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

MCKINLAY J.A. (concurring in the result):-- I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefrom), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in

no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

GOODMAN J.A. (dissenting):-- I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of Frontier Airlines Ltd. and Ontario Express Limited (OEL) and that of 922246 Ontario Limited (922), a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively CCFL) and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada (the Bank). Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to nor am I aware of any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

In British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 95 B.C.L.R., p. 30 C.B.R.:

> Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not having a roving commission to decide what

> is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately $50,000,000. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J., Gen. Div., May 1, 1991, that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If on the other hand he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons [pp. 17-18]:

> I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000. The Bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer, in effect, supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial downpayment on closing.

In Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority

of the court, said at p. 10 C.B.R., p. 312 N.S.R.:

> Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that the contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers nor are

they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. said at p. 243:

> This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

I agree with that statement of the law. In Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. heard an application for court approval for the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with the commercial efficacy and integrity.

I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in Cameron, supra, at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In Cameron, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a

deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons [p. 15]:

> On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The receiver at that time had no other

offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1. The receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on this appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase which was eventually refused by the receiver that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing Air Canada may have been playing "hard ball" as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position as it was entitled to do.

Furthermore there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event although it is clear that 922 and through it CCFL and Air Canada were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg

J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

I would also point out that, rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was no unconditional offer before it.

In considering the material and evidence placed before the court I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of $18,000,000. After the appointment of the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada", it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the Receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the month of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to 8.1 million dollars conditional upon there being $4,000,000 in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990 and was open for acceptance until June

29, 1990.

By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990 the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada in these circumstances was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990 Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto Division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990 in part as follows:

> Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

This statement together with other statements set forth in the letter was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990 the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between $10,000,000 and $12,000,000.

In August 1990 the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of $3,000,000 for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes but did not

include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

In December 1990 the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991 culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

On or before December, 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

By late January CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the Receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be

noted that exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers and specifically with 922.

It was not until March 1, 1991 that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at any time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL) it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid and, indeed, suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime by entering into the letter of intent with OEL it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

By letter dated March 1, 1991 CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an interlender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however,

contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately three months the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining:

> ... a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period.

The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

In effect the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

In my opinion the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991 to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991 and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to

negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver, then, on March 8, 1991 chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of three months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of three months notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

In his reasons Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said [p. 31]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of

its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "acceptable to them".

It should be noted that on March 13, 1991 the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991 and at the request of the receiver withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991 OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991 to submit a bid and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the interlender condition removed.

In my opinion the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes approximately two-thirds of the contemplated sale price whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000.

In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 C.B.R.:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the

law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J. the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as a fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors who have already been seriously hurt more unnecessary contingencies.

Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer and the court should so order.

Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and

procedure adopted by the receiver.

I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991 and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent, it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to

court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

In conclusion I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991 and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

For the above reasons I would allow the appeal with one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-and-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

Appeal dismissed.

# TAB 4

# In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

**Citation: River Rentals Group Ltd. v. Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa, 2010 ABCA 16**

**Date:** 20100118
**Docket:** 0903-0191-AC
0903-0236-AC
**Registry:** Edmonton



**Between:**

**Bank of Montreal**

Not a Party To the Appeal
(Plaintiff)

- and -

**River Rentals Group Ltd., Taves Contractors Ltd. and McTaves Inc.**

Respondent
(Defendant)

- and -

**Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa**

Appellant
(Other)

- and -

**Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc.**

Respondent
(Other)

- and -

**Don Warkentin**

Respondent
(Other)

**The Court:**

**The Honourable Mr. Justice Ronald Berger**
**The Honourable Madam Justice Patricia Rowbotham**
**The Honourable Mr. Justice R. Paul Belzil**

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**Memorandum of Judgment**

Appeal from the Orders by
The Honourable Chief Justice A.H. Wachowich
Dated the 2nd day of June, 2009 and
Dated the 17th day of June, 2009
(Docket: 0903 03233)

## Memorandum of Judgment

**The Court:**

[1] At the hearing of this appeal, we announced that the appeal is allowed with reasons to follow.

[2] Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc. is the court-appointed Interim Receiver and/or Receiver Manager of the corporate Respondents ("the Taves Group") by order dated March 5, 2009. Prior to that date, the Receiver had become Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Taves Group.

[3] The Receiver issued an information package and called for offers to purchase the assets of the Taves Group which included a property known as the Birch Hills Lands. The call for offers was dated April 17, 2009. The deadline for submission of offers was on or before May 7, 2009 (the tender closing date).

[4] On June 2, 2009, the Receiver brought an application before Wachowich C.J.Q.B. to approve the sale of the Birch Hills Lands to the Appellant. The Appellant's offer was $2,205,000. An appraisal concluded that the most probable sale price was $1,560,000. Counsel for the Receiver explained that "the Receiver did effect wide advertizing in local and national newspapers. Sent out 160 tender packages and made the tender package available on the Receiver's website." (A.B. Record Digest, 3/30-33)

[5] Fifteen offers were received on the Birch Hills Lands, six of which were for the entirety of the parcel.

[6] In his submission to the Chief Justice, counsel for the Receiver stated:

> "Now, what we have advised the party that we're looking to accept is that we can't put them in possession yet until the Court approves the offer. That has caused some angst given the time of year and it is agricultural land, but we're not in a position to put people on the land before we get court approval to do so. So - - and that's fine, they're still - - they're still at the table so we're good with that.
>
> The offer that the Receiver is recommending acceptance of is - - was from the Hutterite Church of Codesa. That offer was for $2,205,000 ... the offer is very significant ... it was an excellent offer."
>
> (A.B. Record Digest, 5/46 -6/19)

[7] In considering other tenders with respect to other portions of the property of the Taves Group, the Chief Justice expressed his views regarding the importance of adhering to the integrity of the tender process:

> "You know, we ran a tender process, tender process is meant to be - - there are certain rules. It is like, you do not change the rules of baseball or football during the middle of the game. This is the same thing except in this particular case the Court is prepared to exercise the - - its inherent jurisdiction to extend the time in Mr. Taves' position. But I - - you know, I could be the person who says no, Mr. Taves, you were late, I am sorry. Next time use Fed Ex."
>
> (Appeal Record Digest, 12/11-19)

And further:

> "We could be coming back right and left. I am inclined, you know, to grant the applications as submitted on these tenders because the tender process was followed properly. That was the market at the time, this is the people that - - this is how they bid. You know, circumstances change and when circumstances change, somebody is the beneficiary of it, some - - somebody is the loser on this. But the rules were adhered to and having the rules adhered to if, you know - - if you want to - - if you want to go to the Court of Appeal after the order is entered and say to the Court of Appeal, guess what, oil is now at $90, we want this one resubmitted. And if those five people are wise enough to accept that argument, then good luck to you but - - but you know, I am inclined to say we follow a process, the law has to be certain. The law has to be definite. This is what we did and we complied." (Appeal Record Digest, 12/40-13/8)

[8] One of the persons who had tendered an offer to purchase the Birch Hills Lands was the Respondent Don Warkentin. Counsel for the guarantor, Mr. Orrin Toews, addressed the Court. He explained that Mr. Warkentin had submitted an offer of $2.1 million "on the understanding that he would be receiving possession of the property sometime in the fall." Counsel further explained that "I believe it was the Receiver while during the initial auction, that it was brought to his attention on May 21st that he would in fact get possession of the property much earlier than he was anticipating. And on that basis he increased his bid by 200,000 which brings his offer to 2.3 million dollars cash." (A.B. Record Digest, 13/27-36) He submitted that Mr. Warkentin's offer be accepted.

[9] In response, counsel for the Receiver advised the Court that he had been in written communication with counsel for Mr. Warkentin "and there was no indication in that correspondence that he thought he would get [possession of the lands] in the fall." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/18-20) He added: "I think the tender package is clear that the way it was supposed to close is after the appeal periods on any order has expired. ... So how anybody could reasonably conceive that possession wouldn't be granted until the fall based on that escapes me." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/20-25) He further added: "But the bottom line was at the time tenders closed, Mr. [Warkentin]'s offer was found wanting." (Appeal Record Digest, 14/36-38)

[10] On the basis of that information, the Court ruled as follows:

> "Well, you know, rather than adjourning it to hear from Mr. Carter, what I am - - what I am inclined to do with that piece of property, because of - - is - - because of an uncertainty as to occupation, dates of occupation or potential lease or whatever it may be, it is too late to put in the crop right now anyway so - - ... Retender on this one and make it clear in the tender." (Appeal Record Digest, 15/7-19)

[11] Wachowich, C.J. then granted an order extending the deadline to submit revised offers to purchase the Birch Hills Lands; with submissions restricted to the Appellant and Warkentin. During this extension period, Warkentin submitted a bid higher than the Appellant's. The Appellant did not increase its original offer. Subsequently, on June 17, 2009, Wachowich, C.J. granted an order directing that the Birch Hills Lands be sold to Warkentin. An application by the Appellant to reconsider the June 17, 2009 order was dismissed. The Court also granted a stay order for parts of the June 2 order and the entirety of its June 17 order, pending the determination of the appeal of the June 2 order. The Appellant appealed the June 2 order on July 22, 2009; and appealed the June 17 order on August 13, 2009 (the appeals were consolidated on August 20, 2009).

[12] On applications by a Receiver for approval of a sale, the Court should consider whether the Receiver has acted properly. Specifically, the Court should consider the following:

(a) whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

(b) the interests of all parties;

(c) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and

(d) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

***Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.***, [1991] 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.) at para. 16

[13] The Court should consider the following factors to determine if the Receiver has acted improvidently or failed to get the best price:

(a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic;

(b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids;

(c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; or

(d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner.

***Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia*** (1981), 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.)
***Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal*** (1985), 65 A.R. 372 (C.A.) at para. 12.

[14] The central issue in this appeal is whether the chambers judge, mindful of the record before him, should have permitted rebidding and whether he should have thereafter entertained and accepted the higher offer of $2.51 million plus GST tendered by Mr. Warkentin during the extension period.

[15] The relevance of higher offers after the close of process was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in ***Royal Bank v. Soundair***, ***supra***. Upon review of the jurisprudence, the Court stated at para. 30:

> "What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. ..."

[16] The chambers judge made no such finding. Indeed, he made no assessment whatever of the conduct of the Receiver. The only evidence before the Court at the June 2, 2009 application was the Receiver's fifth report and the affidavit of Orrin Toews who proffered no evidence that the Receiver acted improvidently in accepting the offer of the Appellant.

[17] Moreover, the June 2, 2009 order neither considers the interests of the Appellant as the highest bidder nor the interests of others who made compliant, but unsuccessful, bids to purchase the Birch Hills Lands pursuant to the call for offers.

[18] This Court has consistently favoured an approach that preserves the integrity of the process. See ***Salima Investments Ltd.***, ***supra***, and ***Royal Bank of Canada v. Fracmaster Ltd.***, 1999 ABCA 178, 244 A.R. 93.

[19] That was also the view of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in ***Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia, supra***, at para. 35:

> "In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and a higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard - this would be an intolerable situation. ..."

[20] In addition, there was no cogent evidence before the chambers judge of any unfairness to Warkentin. On the contrary, the impugned order of June 2 conferred an advantage upon Warkentin who then knew the price that had previously been offered by the Appellant when re-tendering his offer.

[21] In cases involving the Court's consideration of the approval of the sale of assets by a court-appointed Receiver, decisions made by a chambers judge involve a measure of discretion and "are owed considerable deference". The Court will interfere only if it concludes that the chambers judge acted unreasonably, erred in principle, or made a manifest error.

[22] In our opinion, the chambers judge erred in principle and on insufficient evidence ordered that the property in question be the subject of an extended re-tendering process. The appeal is allowed. An order will go setting aside paras. 26 through 32 of the June 2, 2009 and the June 17, 2009 orders, and approving the tender of the Appellant on the terms and conditions upon which the Receiver originally sought approval.

Appeal heard on January 7, 2010

Memorandum filed at Edmonton, Alberta
this 18th day of January, 2010

Berger J.A.

As authorized: Rowbotham J.A.

As authorized: Belzil J.

**Appearances:**

D.R. Bieganek
for the Respondent - River Rentals Group, Taves Contractors Ltd. and McTaves Inc.
for the Respondent - Bill McCulloch and Associates Inc.

G.D. Chrenek
for the Appellant - Hutterian Brethren Church of Codesa

T.M. Warner
for the Respondent - Don Warkentin

# TAB 5

# In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

**Citation: Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v 1905393 Alberta Ltd, 2019 ABCA 433**

**Date:** 20191114
**Docket:** 1903-0134-AC
**Registry:** Edmonton



**Between:**

**Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as Receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.**

Respondent/Cross-Appellants
(Applicant)

- and -

**1905393 Alberta Ltd., David Podollan and Steller One Holdings Ltd.**

Appellants/Cross-Respondents
(Respondents)

- and -

**Servus Credit Union Ltd., Ducor Properties Ltd., Northern Electric Ltd. and Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd.**

Respondents
(Interested Parties)

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**The Court:**

**The Honourable Mr. Justice Thomas W. Wakeling**
**The Honourable Madam Justice Dawn Pentelechuk**
**The Honourable Madam Justice Jolaine Antonio**

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**Memorandum of Judgment**

Appeal from the Order by
The Honourable Madam Justice J.E. Topolniski
Dated the 21st day of May, 2019
Filed on the 22nd day of May, 2019
(Docket: 1803 13229)

## Memorandum of Judgment

**The Court:**

[1] The appellants appeal an Approval and Vesting Order granted on May 21, 2019 which approved a sale proposed in the May 3, 2019 Asset Purchase Agreement between the Receiver, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd ("Ducor"). The assets consist primarily of lands and buildings in Grande Prairie, Alberta described as a partially constructed 169 room full service hotel not currently open for business (the "Development Hotel") and a 63 room extended stay hotel ("Extended Stay Hotel") currently operating on the same parcel of land (collectively the "Hotels"). The Hotels are owned by the appellant, 1905393 Alberta Ltd. ("190") whose shareholder is the appellant, Stellar One Holdings Ltd, and whose president and sole director is the appellant, David Podollan.

[2] The respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd ("Servus"), is 190's largest secured creditor. Servus provided financing to 190 for construction of the Hotels. On May 16, 2018, Servus issued a demand for payment of its outstanding debt. As of June 29, 2018, 190 owed Servus approximately $23.9 million. That debt remains outstanding and, in fact, continues to increase because of interest, property taxes and ongoing carrying costs for the Hotels incurred by the Receiver.

[3] On July 20, 2018, the Receiver was appointed over all of 190's current and future assets, undertakings and properties. The appellants opposed the Receiver's appointment primarily on the basis that 190 was seeking to re-finance the Hotels. That re-financing has never materialized.

[4] As a result, the Receiver sought in October 2018 to liquidate the Hotels. In typical fashion, the Receiver obtained an appraisal of the Hotels, as did the respondents. After consulting with three national real estate brokers, the Receiver engaged the services of Colliers International ("Colliers"), which recommended a structured sales process with no listing price and a fixed bid submission date. While the sales process contemplated an exposure period of approximately six weeks between market launch and offer submission deadline, Colliers had contacted over 1,290 prospective purchasers and agents using a variety of mediums in the months prior to market launch, exposing the Hotels to national hotel groups and individuals in the industry, and conducted site visits and answered inquiries posed by prospective buyers. Prospective purchasers provided feedback to Colliers but that included concerns about the quality of construction on the Development Hotel.

[5] The Receiver also engaged the services of an independent construction consultant, Entuitive Corporation, to provide an estimate of the cost to complete construction on the Development Hotel and to assist in decision-making on whether to complete the Development Hotel. In addition, the Receiver contacted a major international hotel franchise brand to obtain input on prospective franchisees' views of the design and fixturing of the Development Hotel. The ability to brand the Hotels is a significant factor affecting their marketability. Moreover, some of

the feedback confirmed that energy exploration and development in Grande Prairie is down, resulting in downward pressure on hotel-room demand.

[6] Parties that requested further information in response to the listing were asked to execute a confidentiality agreement whereupon they were granted access to a "data-room" containing information on the Hotels and offering related documents and photos. Colliers provided confidential information regarding 190's assets to 27 interested parties.

[7] The deadline for offer submission yielded only four offers, each of which was far below the appraised valued of the Hotels. Three of the four offers were extremely close in respect of their stated price; the fourth offer was significantly lower than the others. As a result, the Receiver went back to the three prospective purchasers that had similar offers and asked them to re-submit better offers. None, however, varied their respective purchase prices in a meaningful manner when invited to do so. The Receiver ultimately accepted and obtained approval for Ducor's offer to purchase which, as the appellants correctly point out, is substantially less than the appraised value of the Hotels.

[8] The primary thrust of the appellants' argument is that an abbreviated sale process resulted in an offer which is unreasonably low having regard to the appraisals. They argue that the Receiver was improvident in accepting such an offer and the chambers judge erred by approving it. Approving the sale, they argue, would eliminate the substantial equity in the property evidenced by the appraised value and that the "massive prejudice" caused to them as a result materially outweighs any further time and cost associated with requiring the Receiver to re-market the Hotels with a longer exposure time. Mr. Podollan joins in this argument as he is potentially liable for any shortfall under personal guarantees to Servus for all amounts owed to Servus by 190. The other respondents, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd and Northern Electric Ltd, similarly echo the appellants' arguments as the shortfall may deprive them both from collecting on their builders' liens which, collectively, total approximately $340,000.

[9] The appellants obtained both a stay of the Approval and Vesting Order and leave to appeal pursuant to s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985, c B-3: ***1905393 Alberta Ltd v 1905393 Alberta Ltd (Receiver of),*** [2019] AJ No 895, 2019 ABCA 269. The issues around which leave was granted generally coalesce around two questions. First, whether the chambers judge applied the correct test in deciding whether to approve of the Receiver recommended sale; and second, whether the chambers judge erred in her application of the legal test to the facts in deciding whether to approve the sale and, in particular, erred in her exercise of discretion by failing to consider or provide sufficient weight to a relevant factor. The standard of review is correctness on the first question and palpable and overriding error on the second: ***Northstone Power Corp v RJK Power Systems Ltd***, 2002 ABCA 201 at para 4, 317 AR 192.

[10] As regards the first question, the parties agree that Court approval requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in ***Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corporation***, [1991] OJ No 1137 at para 16, 46 OAC 321 ("***Soundair***"). That test requires the Court to consider four factors: (i) whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently; (ii) whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of the debtor; (iii) the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained; and (iv) whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

[11] The appellants suggest that ***Soundair*** has been modified by our Court in ***Bank of Montreal v River Rentals Group Ltd,*** 2010 ABCA 16 at para 13, 469 AR 333, to require an additional four factors in assessing whether a receiver has complied with its duties: (a) whether the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; (b) whether the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids; (c) whether inadequate notice of sale by bid was given; and (d) whether it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interests of either the creditor or the owner. The appellants argue that, although the chambers judge considered the ***Soundair*** factors, she erred by failing to consider the additional ***River Rentals*** factors and, in so doing, in effect applied the "wrong law".

[12] We disagree. The chambers judge expressly referred to the ***River Rentals*** case. ***River Rentals***, it must be recalled, simply identified a subset of factors that a Court might also consider when considering the first prong of the ***Soundair*** test as to whether a receiver failed to get the best price and has not acted providently. Moreover, the type of factors that might be considered is by no means a closed category and there may be other relevant factors that might lead a court to refuse to approve a sale: ***Salima Investments Ltd v Bank of Montreal*** (1985), 65 AR 372 at paras 12-13. At its core, ***River Rentals*** highlights the need for a Court to balance several factors in determining whether a receiver complied with its duties and to confirm a sale. It did not purport to modify the ***Soundair*** test, establish a hierarchy of factors, nor limit the types of things that a Court might consider. The chambers judge applied the correct test. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

[13] At its core, then, the appellants challenge how the chambers judge applied and weighed the relevant factors in this case. The appellants suggest that the failure to obtain a price at or close to the appraised value of the Hotels is an overriding factor that trumps all the others in assessing whether the Receiver acted improvidently. That is not the test. A reviewing Court's function is not to consider whether a Receiver has failed to get the best price. Rather, a Receiver's duty is to act in a commercially reasonable manner in the circumstances with a view to obtaining the best price having regard to the competing interests of the interested parties: ***Skyepharma PLC v Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp*** (1999), 12 CBR ($4^{th}$) 84 at para 4, [1999] OJ No 4300, aff'd on appeal 15 CBR ($4^{th}$) 298 (ONCA).

[14] Nor is it the Court's function to substitute its view of how a marketing process should proceed. The appellants suggest that if the Hotels were re-marketed with an exposure period closer to that which the appraisals were based on, then a better offer might be obtained. Again, that is not

the test. The Receiver's decision to enter into an agreement for sale must be assessed under the circumstances then existing. The chambers judge was aware that the Receiver considered the risk of not accepting the approved offer to be significant. There was no assurance that a longer marketing period would generate a better offer and, in the interim, the Receiver was incurring significant carrying costs. To ignore these circumstances would improperly call into question a receiver's expertise and authority in the receivership process and thereby compromise the integrity of a sales process and would undermine the commercial certainty upon which court-supervised insolvency sales are based: ***Soundair*** at para 43. In such a case, chaos in the commercial world would result and "receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement": ***Soundair*** at para 22.

[15] The fact that three of the four offers came in so close together in terms of amount, with the fourth one being even lower, is significant. Absent evidence of impropriety or collusion in the preparation of those confidential offers – of which there is absolutely none – the fact that those offers were all substantially lower than the appraised value speaks loudly to the existing hotel market in Grande Prairie. Moreover, the appellants have not brought any fresh evidence application to admit cogent evidence that a better offer might materialize if the Hotels were re-marketed. Indeed, the appellants have indicated that they do not rely on what the leave judge described as a "fairly continuous flow of material", the scent of which was to suggest that there were better offers waiting in the wings but were prevented from bidding because of the Receiver's abbreviated marketing process. Clearly the impression meant to be created by that late flow of material was an important factor in the leave judge's decision to grant a stay and leave to appeal: 2019 ABCA 269 at para 13.

[16] Nor, as stated previously, have the appellants been able to re-finance the Hotels notwithstanding their assessment that there is still substantial equity in the Hotels based on the appraisals. At a certain point, however, it is the market that sets the value of property and appraisals simply become "relegated to not much more than well-meant but inaccurate predictions": ***Romspen Mortgage Corp v Lantzville Foothills Estates Inc***, 2013 BCSC 222 at para 20.

[17] The chambers judge was keenly alive to the abbreviated marketing period and the appraised values of the Hotels. Nevertheless, having regard to the unique nature of the property, the incomplete construction of the Development Hotel, the difficulties with prospective purchasers in branding the Hotels in an area outside of a major centre and an area which is in the midst of an economic downturn, she concluded that the Receiver acted in a commercially reasonable manner and obtained the best price possible in the circumstances. Even with an abbreviated period for submission of offers, the chambers judge reasonably concluded that the Receiver undertook an extensive marketing campaign, engaged a commercial realtor and construction consultant, and consulted and dialogued with the owner throughout the process, which process the appellants took no issue with, until the offers were received.

[18] We see no reviewable error. This ground of appeal is also dismissed.

[19] Finally, leave to appeal was also granted on whether s 193 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act***,** and specifically s 193(a) or (c) of the Act, creates a leave to appeal as of right in these circumstances or whether leave to appeal is required pursuant to s 193(e). As the appeal was also authorized under s 193(e), we find it unnecessary to address whether this case meets the criteria for leave as of right in s 193(a)-(d) of the Act.

Appeal heard on September 3, 2019

Memorandum filed at Edmonton, Alberta
this 14th day of November, 2019

Wakeling J.A.

Pentelechuk J.A.

Authorized to sign for Antonio J.A.

**Appearances:**

D.M. Nowak/J.M. Lee, Q.C.
for the Respondent, Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc. in its capacity as receiver of 1905393 Alberta Ltd.

D.R. Peskett/C.M. Young
for the Appellants

C.P. Russell, Q.C./R.T. Trainer
for the Respondent, Servus Credit Union Ltd.

S.A. Wanke
for the Respondent, Ducor Properties Ltd.

S.T. Fitzgerald (no appearance)
for the Respondent, Northern Electric Ltd.

H.S. Kandola
for the Respondent, Fancy Doors & Mouldings Ltd.

# TAB 6

# In the Court of Appeal of Alberta

**Citation: 1705221 Alberta Ltd v Three M Mortgages Inc, 2021 ABCA 144**

**Date:** 20210421
**Docket:** 2003-0076AC;
2003-0077AC
**Registry:** Edmonton

**Appeal No. 2003-0076AC**

**Between:**

**1705221 Alberta Ltd**

Appellant
(Plaintiff)

- and -

**Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation**

Respondents
(Plaintiffs)

- and -

**Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming**

(Defendants)

- and –

**BDO Canada Limited**

Interested Party

- and –

**Shelby Fehr**

Interested Party

**Appeal No. 2003-0077AC**



**And Between:**

**Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation**

Respondents
(Plaintiffs)

- and -

**Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming**

Appellants
(Defendants)

- and –

**BDO Canada Limited**

Interested Party

- and –

**Shelby Fehr**

Interested Party

**Restriction on Publication**

By Restricted Court Access Order dated February 27 and 28, 2020, by The Honourable Mr. Justice D.R. Mah, there shall be a temporary sealing and no publication of any information relating, without limitation, to the valuations and offers to purchase the subject lands, as contained in (a) either of the two unfiled affidavits, dated February 26 and 27, 2020 or (b) the first and/or second Confidential Supplement, until the sale of the subject lands has been completed in accordance with the Sale Agreement and the filing of a letter with the Clerk of the Court from the Receiver confirming the sale of same, or until such further Order of the Court.



---

**The Court:**

**The Honourable Mr. Justice Jack Watson**
**The Honourable Madam Justice Dawn Pentelechuk**
**The Honourable Mr. Justice Kevin Feehan**

---

**Memorandum of Judgment**

Appeal from the Judgment by
The Honourable Mr. Justice D.R. Mah
Dated the 28th day of February, 2020
Filed on the 2nd day of March, 2020

(Docket: 1603 02314)

## Memorandum of Judgment

**The Court:**

**Overview**

[1] These appeals involve challenges to a sale approval and vesting order granted by a chambers judge in the course of receivership proceedings. The appellant guarantors, Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming and the Estate of Albert Oeming (collectively, Oeming) seek to set aside the order approving the sale of lands to Shelby Fehr, as does an unsuccessful prospective purchaser, the appellant 1705221 Alberta Ltd (170).

[2] These appeals engage consideration of whether the Receiver, BDO Canada Limited, satisfied the well-known test for court approval outlined in ***Royal Bank of Canada v Soundair Corp*** (1991), 83 DLR (4th) 76, 4 OR (3d) 1 (CA) [***Soundair***]. The arguments of both appellants coalesce around the suggestion that the sale process lacked the necessary hallmarks of fairness, integrity and reasonableness.

[3] The chambers judge applied the correct test in deciding whether to approve the sale recommended by the Receiver; therefore, for either appeal to succeed, one or both appellants must demonstrate that the chambers judge erred in the exercise of his discretion in approving the sale. This attracts a high degree of deference. Since the chambers judge did not misdirect himself on the law, this Court will only interfere if his decision was so clearly wrong that it amounts to an injustice or where the chambers judge gave no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations: ***Jaycap Financial Ltd v Snowdon Block Inc***, 2019 ABCA 47 at para 20.

[4] We have concluded that neither Oeming nor 170 has demonstrated any error that would warrant setting aside the order. For the reasons that follow, the appeals are dismissed.

**Background**

[5] The genesis of this long-standing indebtedness is a loan granted by the Respondents, Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation (the creditors) to Al Oeming Investments Ltd (Oeming Investments), which was secured by a mortgage on lands owned by Oeming Investments. The loan was guaranteed by Oeming.

[6] In March 2015, the creditors foreclosed on the Oeming Investments lands, obtaining a deficiency judgment in the sum of $ 941,826.09. In February 2016, the creditors sued Oeming on the guarantees and in December 2018, obtained judgment in this amount.

[7] Oeming's assets included shares in Wild Splendor Development Inc, which company owned lands formerly known as the Alberta Game Farm, later Polar Park, in Strathcona County (the lands). These lands are the subject of the present appeals.

[8] The creditors enforced their judgment against Oeming by applying under the *Business Corporations Act*, RSA 2000, c B-9, the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000, c J-2 and the *Civil Enforcement Act*, RSA 2000, c C-15, for the appointment of BDO Canada Limited as Receiver of Wild Splendor. The Receivership/Liquidation Order was granted in June 2019. The Receiver moved to sell the lands, obtaining an order on October 10, 2019, authorizing it to list the lands for sale with Avison Young Canada Inc at a price of $1,950,000.

[9] Two parties were interested in purchasing the lands: 170 and Shelby Fehr, both adjacent landowners. 170 made an offer to purchase on January 11, 2020, but it was not in a form acceptable to the Receiver. 170 submitted a second offer on February 3, 2020 at a price slightly below what the Receiver advised it would accept. While 170 believed its offer would be accepted by the Receiver, it never was and 170 withdrew its offer on February 7, 2020 out of concern its offer was being "shopped".

[10] Fehr made an offer to purchase the lands on February 7, 2020. On Avison Young's recommendation of this "extremely strong offer", the Receiver promptly accepted it, subject to court approval.

[11] The Receiver filed an application for court approval of Fehr's offer, returnable February 27, 2020. On February 10, 2020, the Receiver invited 170 to submit an improved offer to purchase and to attend the upcoming application.

[12] At the application, spanning February 27-28, 2020, 170 raised concerns regarding the sale process. It urged the chambers judge to consider its third offer, dated February 18, 2020, or to establish a bid process to allow both Fehr and 170 to submit further offers.

[13] Oeming also opposed the application, seeking an adjournment on the basis that the County of Strathcona was scheduled in April 2020 to vote on a land use bylaw changing the zoning of the lands to seasonal recreational resort use, which Oeming said would dramatically increase the value of the lands. This re-zoning would in turn facilitate their ability to refinance. They also argued that the anticipated bylaw would result in Fehr experiencing a financial windfall. Oeming took issue with the appraisal relied on by the Receiver, suggesting the lands had been undervalued and the sale process rushed, all of which served to prejudice their interests.

**Decision of the Chambers Judge**

[14] The chambers judge declined to adjourn the application, noting that the anticipated land use bylaw question had been raised previously, including before the chambers judge who granted

the order approving the sale process. He also observed that there was no certainty the bylaw would be passed or when the lands would ever be permissibly developed.

[15] The chambers judge next considered whether the process should be re-opened to allow bids from 170 and Fehr. He found the Receiver's sale process to be adequate and found nothing in the evidence to warrant permitting further bids. The chambers judge concluded that "If receivership and the exercise of receivership powers by officers of the court are to have meaning, the court itself must abide by the process it has set out". However, the chambers judge permitted 170 to present its third offer to the court and adjourned the proceedings to the following day to allow 170, Oeming and the Receiver to put forward affidavit evidence on whether the sale process was unfair.

[16] On February 28, 2020, after reviewing the affidavit evidence and hearing full submissions, the chambers judge made the following findings:

- 170's February 3, 2020 offer was never accepted;
- There was no consensus between 170 and the Receiver regarding the structure of the purchase price; this was being negotiated;
- There was no evidence 170's offer was shopped around beyond the normal course;
- 170, through its realtor, was aware of other potential purchasers;
- 170's suspicion something untoward had happened was not grounded in the evidence.

[17] The chambers judge concluded that allowing 170's offer to be considered "would be manifestly unfair and lend uncertainty to the process of sales under receiverships, which would be untenable in the commercial community and would erode trust in that community and its confidence in the court-supervised receivership process". The sale to Fehr was approved.

[18] The chambers judge later granted a stay of the order pending appeal.

**The *Soundair* Test**

[19] Court approval of the sale requires the Receiver to satisfy the well-known test in ***Soundair***. As this Court summarized in ***Pricewaterhousecoopers Inc v 1905393 Alberta Ltd***, 2019 ABCA 433 at para 10 [***Pricewaterhousecoopers***], the test requires satisfaction of four factors:

i. Whether the Receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

ii. Whether the interests of all parties have been considered, not just the interests of the creditors of the debtor;

iii. The efficacy and integrity of the sale process by which offers are obtained; and

iv. Whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

[20] Although the grounds of appeal of 170 and Oeming differ, they all lead to the central question of whether the Receiver satisfied the ***Soundair*** requirements. 170 seeks to set aside the order and asks that a bid process involving 170 and Fehr be allowed, on the condition that neither party be allowed to submit an offer for less than their last and highest offer. Oeming asks that the order be set aside and that they be provided additional time to refinance or alternatively, that the lands be re-marketed for a minimum of six to nine months.

[21] We will address each of the four ***Soundair*** factors in turn, from the perspective of both 170 and Oeming.

*i. Sufficient Efforts to Sell*

[22] A court approving a sale recommended by a receiver is not engaged in a perfunctory, rubberstamp exercise. But neither should a court reject a receiver's recommendation on sale absent exceptional circumstances: ***Soundair*** at paras 21, 58. A receiver plays the lead role in receivership proceedings. They are officers of the court; their advice should therefore be given significant weight. To otherwise approach the proceedings would weaken the receiver's central purpose and function and erode confidence in those who deal with them: ***Crown Trust Co v Rosenberg*** (1986), 39 DLR (4th) 526, 60 OR (2d) 87 (ONSC) at p 551.

[23] Oeming argues that the chambers judge erred in relying on the Receiver's appraisal of the lands which was not appended to an affidavit and therefore constituted inadmissible hearsay. Oeming further alleges that the Receiver acted improvidently in listing the lands for sale at $1,950,000, an amount they insist is significantly below property value. They point to their appraisal from Altus Group, appended to the appraiser's affidavit, in support of their claim that the lands are worth far more than the amount suggested by the Receiver.

[24] These arguments cannot succeed. Neither the Receivership/Liquidation Order nor the Order Approving Receiver's Activities and Sale Process required the Receiver to submit its reports by way of affidavit. To the contrary, the Receivership/Liquidation Order was an Alberta template order containing the following provision expressly exempting the Receiver from reporting to the court by way of affidavit:

> 28. Notwithstanding Rule 6.11 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*, unless otherwise ordered by this Court, the Receiver/Liquidator will report to the Court from time to time, which reporting is not required to be in affidavit form and shall be considered by this Court as evidence...

[25] The draft Altus Group appraisal (identical in form to the signed appraisal appended to the affidavit) and the Glen Cowan appraisal obtained by the Receiver were included in the Receiver's First Report that was before the chambers judge who issued the Order Approving Receiver's Activities and Sale Process. No one, least of all Oeming, took exception to the appraisals being considered in this form at that time.

[26] Further, the Receiver addressed the disparity in valuations in its First Report. Briefly, the Altus Group appraisal included two parcels of land that were not part of the sale process. Of the three lots to be sold, Altus had a higher value per acre on Lots 1 and 2 which the Receiver advised was intrinsically related to the purchase of Lot 3 for the purposes of commercial/recreational development, which was not the zoning then existing.

[27] The Receiver also advised it had requested proposals from eight realtors, receiving four. It set out why it was recommending that Avison Young's proposal (suggesting a list price of $1,950,000) be accepted.

[28] The respondents argue this amounts to a collateral attack on this earlier-in-time order, which, notably, was never appealed. We agree. All of this information was before the chambers judge who granted the order approving the sale process. If his decision was unreasonable or amounted to a miscarriage of justice, Oeming should have appealed that order. It cannot now do so indirectly vis-à-vis the subsequent Sale Approval and Vesting Order.

[29] Before the chambers judge, 170 emphasized its perception that its second offer had been shopped, rendering the sale process unfair. This suggestion was roundly rejected by the chambers judge, who found no evidence that the amount of 170's offer had been disclosed, and any disclosure to Fehr that there was another interested party was in the normal course.

[30] For the first time on appeal, 170 focuses on Avison Young's listing proposal, found in the Confidential Supplement to the Receiver's First Report. It is unclear whether the Confidential Supplement was available to 170 when the chambers judge heard the application to approve the sale to Fehr, but it was requested by 170's appellate counsel and provided to him prior to these appeals. 170 argues the court-approved marketing proposal was not transparent and not followed by Avison Young and the Receiver, making the sale process unfair. 170 relies specifically on the following references found within the five-phase marketing strategy:

- Phase 2- Solicit Offers from Buyers (option to use template prior to bid date);
- Phase 3- Selection of preferred Buyer(s):
    - Potential to short list and request improved resubmission.

[31] 170 suggests the proposal *directed* a bid process and the opportunity to resubmit highest and best offers, similar to a formal tender process. As offers were not elicited through a bid process and no opportunity was given to the preferred buyers to resubmit a further, improved offer, 170 alleges the sale process was neither transparent, fair, nor commercially reasonable.

[32] Aside from concerns that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the argument fails on its merits. On a plain reading of the impugned portions of the marketing proposal, neither a bid process, nor the option to resubmit offers, is mandated; rather, they are framed as possible options Avison Young *could* employ. A receiver relies on the advice and guidance of the court-approved listing agent in how best to market and sell the asset in question and its own commercial expertise in accepting an offer subject to court approval. Avison Young's realtor deposed that in some circumstances, he will recommend a receiver seek "best and final offers" from interested purchasers. However, in this instance, given the nature of the lands, the present economy, the level of interest and the potential that the Fehr offer could be withdrawn at any moment, his advice to the Receiver was that the unconditional and irrevocable Fehr offer be accepted without delay.

[33] Second, prospective purchasers like 170 are not parties to the listing agreement. While 170 suggests it is entitled to the benefit of the marketing process, there are sound policy reasons militating against this proposition. The insolvency regime depends on expediency and certainty. It is untenable to suggest that a "bitter bidder" like 170 can, after another offer has been accepted, look to particulars of the agreement between the listing agent and the Receiver to mount an argument that the sale process was unfair. We agree with the chambers judge's conclusion that the court-approved sale process was followed and that there was nothing unfair about it.

[34] It must be remembered that the position of 170 as a bidder in this context is not analogous to the Contract A/Contract B reasoning in the law of tenders. Even if 170's disappointment stemming from its wishful optimism of being able to purchase the lands is understandable, this is not the same as 170 having an enforceable legal right arising from sales guidance of the listing agent. In any event, it would appear that 170 was not even aware of the guidance from the listing agent, which is now suggested to be a condition precedent to the Receiver accepting the Fehr offer.

[35] In this instance, it appears the chambers judge declined to consider 170's third offer in his determination of whether the sale to Fehr should be approved. On the present facts, we see no error in this approach. The Fehr offer was significantly better than 170's second offer and clearly reasonable given that it exceeded the appraised value of the lands. We are satisfied the Receiver demonstrated reasonable efforts to market the lands and did not act improvidently. Its acceptance of the Fehr offer was reasonable in the circumstances and unassailable.

*ii. Whether the Interests of All Parties Have Been Considered*

[36] This segues to the question of whether 170 has any standing to appeal. The Receiver raised this issue in its factum, but did not strenuously pursue it at the appeal hearing. We understand the Receiver's position is grounded by the fact the Receiver had invited 170 to participate in the

application to approve the sale and that 170's standing was not raised in the proceedings before the chambers judge, at least until the stay application pending appeal on March 12, 2020. 170 suggests its standing to appeal was given tacit approval.

[37] Given the position taken by the Receiver and the particular circumstances before us, we decline to comment on this issue at this time. However, we note that the issue of standing for an interested entity like 170 has not yet been decided by this Court and remains a live issue.

[38] We equally do not purport to define or delineate the scope of "party" for the purposes of determining whether a receiver has met the ***Soundair*** test. Under the current state of the law, what is and is not a "party" has yet to be resolved with absolute precision and clarity. Its definition is a matter of importance in the functionality of the four factors, and the conduct of receivership proceedings generally, and deserves proper debate best reserved for another day. As noted, the specific facts of this case have obviated the need to definitively and directly address this question.

[39] Nonetheless, it is helpful to examine the policy reasons why a prospective purchaser's ability to challenge a sale approval application should be closely circumscribed. As noted by the Ontario Court of Appeal in ***Skyepharma PLC*** v ***Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp*** (2000), 47 OR (3d) 234, 130 OAC 273 at paras 25-28, the prospective purchaser has no legal or proprietary right in the lands being sold. Normally, an examination of the sale process and whether the Receiver has complied with the ***Soundair*** principles, is focussed on those with a direct interest in the sale process, primarily the creditors.

[40] In that regard, the creditors acknowledge they will be paid in full through acceptance of either offer. It is the interests of Oeming that are front and center. Unfortunately, Oeming repeats the same themes they have raised throughout these proceedings. It may come to pass that the new land use bylaw will result in a dramatic increase in the land value but that is a speculative concept beyond this Court's proper consideration. The Receiver's decision to accept the Fehr offer must be assessed under the circumstances then existing: ***Pricewaterhousecoopers*** at para 14; ***Soundair*** at para 21. Challenges to a sale process based on after-the-fact information should generally be resisted.

[41] On the record before us, we agree with the chambers judge that the opportunity for Oeming to obtain refinancing has passed. While Oeming argues their efforts at refinancing have been hamstrung by the receivership proceedings, there is evidence the debt could have been paid through the Oeming estate, but decisions were made to distribute those funds elsewhere.

[42] Consideration must also be given to Fehr who negotiated an offer to purchase in good faith over a year ago, yet continues to live with uncertainty. Beyond affecting Fehr's interests, this also undermines the integrity of receivership proceedings generally. As neatly summarized in ***Soundair*** at para 69:

> I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

*iii. The Efficacy and Integrity of the Sale Process*

[43] In obtaining an order approving the sale process, the Receiver satisfied the court of its efforts to engage an appraiser to value the lands for sale. The Receiver also satisfied the court of its efforts to determine the best sale process and why it was recommending Avison Young from the list of four realtors submitting proposals. As we have indicated, the marketing proposal outlined by Avison Young was followed.

[44] Oeming also argues the marketing period was unduly rushed. Avison Young's marketing efforts included contacting 407 individual prospective buyers and brokers. It fielded inquiries from 15 interested parties and toured the lands with three interested parties. Signage visible from Highway 14 was placed on the lands and the listing was placed on Avison Young's website. The only offers received were from the two adjacent landowners. Marketing an asset is an unpredictable exercise. It is pure speculation that a longer marketing period would have generated additional, let alone better, offers.

[45] We are not persuaded that the integrity of the sale process was compromised. It bears repeating that 170's second offer was *below* the amount the Receiver advised it would accept. 170 had full autonomy over that decision. Its offer was never accepted. While 170 may have believed its offer was going to be accepted, it chose to withdraw its offer, suspecting that same was being shopped around. As the chambers judge found, there is no evidence to support that suspicion.

[46] The Fehr offer was significantly higher than 170's. Since it exceeded the appraised value of the land, was irrevocable and unconditional, it is hardly surprising that Avison Young recommended its immediate acceptance.

*iv. Whether there was Unfairness in the Working Out of the Process*

[47] While courts should avoid delving "into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver", courts must still ensure the process was fair: ***Soundair*** at para 49. The chambers judge afforded both Oeming and 170 the opportunity to make full submissions and tender further evidence before deciding to approve the sale to Fehr. Having concluded that both the sale process and the Fehr offer were fair and reasonable, there was no reason for the chambers judge to compare 170's third offer to the offer accepted, nor to enter into a new bid process.

**Conclusion**

[48] These proceedings have become long and unwieldy. Courts cannot lose sight of two of the overarching policy considerations that articulate bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings: urgency and commercial certainty. Delay fuels increased costs and breeds chaos and confusion, all of which risk adversely affecting the interests of parties with a direct and immediate stake in the sale process.

[49] The appeals are dismissed and the stay granted by order dated March 12, 2020 is lifted.



Appeal heard on April 1, 2021

Memorandum filed at Edmonton, Alberta
this 21st day of April, 2021

Watson J.A.

Pentelechuk J.A.

Feehan J.A.

**Appearances:**

D.R. Bieganek, Q.C.
for the Appellant, 1705221 Alberta Ltd

K.A. Rowan, Q.C.
for the Respondents, Three M Mortgages Inc and Avatex Land Corporation

K.G. Heintz
For the Respondents, Todd Oeming, Todd Oeming as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Albert Oeming, and the Estate of Albert Oeming

M.J. McCabe, Q.C.
For the Interested Party, BDO Canada Limited

B.G. Doherty
For the Interested Party, Shelby Fehr

# TAB 7


# ALBERTA

# RULES OF COURT



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# ALBERTA
# RULES OF COURT

Effective November 1, 2010

AR 124/2010
Includes changes from AR 126/2023

VOLUME ONE

Published February 2, 2024

## Division 4
## Restriction on Media Reporting and Public Access to Court Proceedings

### Application of this Division

**6.28** Unless an enactment otherwise provides or the Court otherwise orders, this Division applies to an application for an order

(a) to ban publication of court proceedings,

(b) to seal or partially seal a court file,

(c) permitting a person to give evidence in a way that prevents that person or another person from being identified,

(d) for a hearing from which the public is excluded, or

(e) for use of a pseudonym.

### Restricted court access applications and orders

**6.29** An application under this Division is to be known as a restricted court access application and an order made under this Division is to be known as a restricted court access order.

### When restricted court access application may be filed

**6.30** A person may file a restricted court access application only if the Court has authority to make a restricted court access order under an enactment or at common law.

AR 124/2010 s6.30;194/2020

### Timing of application and service

**6.31** An applicant for a restricted court access order must, 5 days or more before the date scheduled for the hearing, trial or proceeding in respect of which the order is sought,

(a) file the application in Form 32, and

(b) unless the Court otherwise orders, serve every party and any other person named or described by the Court.

### Notice to media

**6.32** When a restricted court access application is filed, a copy of it must be served on the court clerk, who must, in accordance with the direction of the Chief Justice, give notice of the application to

(a) the electronic and print media identified or described by the Chief Justice, and

(b) any other person named by the Court.

AR 124/2010 s6.32;163/2010

# TAB 8

**Atomic Energy of Canada Limited** *Appellant*

*v.*

**Sierra Club of Canada** *Respondent*

and

**The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada** *Respondents*

**Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée** *Appelante*

*c.*

**Sierra Club du Canada** *Intimé*

et

**Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada** *Intimés*



**INDEXED AS: SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA *v.* CANADA (MINISTER OF FINANCE)**

**Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.**

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

**RÉPERTORIÉ : SIERRA CLUB DU CANADA *c.* CANADA (MINISTRE DES FINANCES)**

**Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.**

Nº du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et LeBel.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

*Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of confidential material — Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.*

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

*Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire demandé par un organisme environnemental de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide financière à une société d'État pour la construction et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règle 151.*

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que

by the government triggered s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* ("*CEAA*"), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club's application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, *inter alia*, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL's application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

*Held*: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(*b*) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale* (« *LCÉE* ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l'aide financière, et que le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d'information technique concernant l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s'oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l'autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n'y donnant accès qu'aux parties et à la cour, mais n'imposant aucune restriction à l'accès du public aux débats. La demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d'appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

*Arrêt* : L'appel est accueilli et l'ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d'une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression. La cour doit s'assurer que l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l'accorder est conforme aux principes de la *Charte* parce qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2*b*). On ne doit l'accorder que (1) lorsqu'elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l'intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l'intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies

En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation compromettrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

**Cases Cited**

**Applied:** *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and*

sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

**Jurisprudence**

**Arrêts appliqués :** *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; **arrêts mentionnés :** *AB Hassle c.*

*Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

**Statutes and Regulations Cited**

*Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, ss. 1, 2(*b*).
*Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(*b*), 8, 54, 54(2)(*b*).
*Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

*J. Brett Ledger* and *Peter Chapin*, for the appellant.

*Timothy J. Howard* and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

*Graham Garton*, *Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. —

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important

*Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. nº 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

**Lois et règlements cités**

*Charte canadienne des droits et libertés*, art. 1, 2*b*).
*Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)*b*), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].
*Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. nº 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. nº 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

*J. Brett Ledger* et *Peter Chapin*, pour l'appelante.

*Timothy J. Howard* et *Franklin S. Gertler*, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

*Graham Garton*, *c.r.*, et *J. Sanderson Graham*, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to

droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable tout autant que la liberté d'expression militent en faveur du rejet de la requête en interdiction de publication. Ces droits ont été soupesés avec l'intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, en particulier la protection de la sécurité des policiers et le maintien de l'efficacité des opérations policières secrètes.

Malgré cette distinction, la Cour note que la méthode retenue dans *Dagenais* et *Nouveau-Brunswick* a pour objectif de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux d'ordonner des interdictions de publication n'est pas assujetti à une norme de conformité à la *Charte* moins exigeante que la norme applicable aux dispositions législatives. Elle vise cet objectif en incorporant l'essence de l'article premier de la *Charte* et le critère *Oakes* dans l'analyse applicable aux interdictions de publication. Comme le même objectif s'applique à l'affaire dont elle est saisie, la Cour adopte une méthode semblable à celle de *Dagenais*, mais en élargissant le critère énoncé dans cet arrêt (qui portait spécifiquement sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable) de manière à fournir un guide à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans les requêtes en interdiction de publication, afin de protéger tout aspect important de la bonne administration de la justice. La Cour reformule le critère en ces termes (au par. 32) :

> Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :
>
> a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque sérieux pour la bonne administration de la justice, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;
>
> b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur les droits et les intérêts des parties et du public, notamment ses effets sur le droit à la libre expression, sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable, et sur l'efficacité de l'administration de la justice.

La Cour souligne que dans le premier volet de l'analyse, trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous la notion de « nécessité ». En premier lieu, le risque en question doit être sérieux et bien étayé par la preuve. En deuxième lieu, l'expression « bonne administration de la justice » doit être interprétée

demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(*b*) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice", guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

51 Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

52 Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2*b*) de la *Charte* : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 22.

(3) Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux droits et intérêts des parties

53 Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

54 As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d'« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgation, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d'« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

# TAB 9

**Estate of Bernard Sherman and Trustees of the Estate and Estate of Honey Sherman and Trustees of the Estate** *Appellants*

*v.*

**Kevin Donovan and Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.** *Respondents*

and

**Attorney General of Ontario, Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Civil Liberties Association, Income Security Advocacy Centre, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, HIV Legal Network and Mental Health Legal Committee** *Interveners*

**Succession de Bernard Sherman et fiduciaires de la succession et Succession de Honey Sherman et fiduciaires de la succession** *Appelants*

*c.*

**Kevin Donovan et Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd.** *Intimés*

et

**Procureur général de l'Ontario, procureur général de la Colombie-Britannique, Association canadienne des libertés civiles, Centre d'action pour la sécurité du revenu, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, une division de Bell Média inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc., Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc., British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, Réseau juridique VIH et Mental Health Legal Committee** *Intervenants*

**INDEXED AS: SHERMAN ESTATE *v.* DONOVAN**

**2021 SCC 25**

File No.: 38695.

2020: October 6; 2021: June 11.

Present: Wagner C.J. and Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin and Kasirer JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO

*Courts — Open court principle — Sealing orders — Discretionary limits on court openness — Important public*

**RÉPERTORIÉ : SHERMAN (SUCCESSION) *c.* DONOVAN**

**2021 CSC 25**

N° du greffe : 38695.

2020 : 6 octobre; 2021 : 11 juin.

Présents : Le juge en chef Wagner et les juges Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Brown, Rowe, Martin et Kasirer.

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL DE L'ONTARIO

*Tribunaux — Principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires — Ordonnances de mise sous scellés — Limites*

*interest — Privacy — Dignity — Physical safety — Unexplained deaths of prominent couple generating intense public scrutiny and prompting trustees of estates to apply for sealing of probate files — Whether privacy and physical safety concerns advanced by estate trustees amount to important public interests at such serious risk to justify issuance of sealing orders.*

A prominent couple was found dead in their home. Their deaths had no apparent explanation and generated intense public interest. To this day, the identity and motive of those responsible remain unknown, and the deaths are being investigated as homicides. The estate trustees sought to stem the intense press scrutiny prompted by the events by seeking sealing orders of the probate files. Initially granted, the sealing orders were challenged by a journalist who had reported on the couple's deaths, and by the newspaper for which he wrote. The application judge sealed the probate files, concluding that the harmful effects of the sealing orders were substantially outweighed by the salutary effects on privacy and physical safety interests. The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal and lifted the sealing orders. It concluded that the privacy interest advanced lacked a public interest quality, and that there was no evidence of a real risk to anyone's physical safety.

*Held*: The appeal should be dismissed.

The estate trustees have failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest under the test for discretionary limits on court openness. As such, the sealing orders should not have been issued. Open courts can be a source of inconvenience and embarrassment, but this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption of openness. That said, personal information disseminated in open court can be more than a source of discomfort and may result in an affront to a person's dignity. Insofar as privacy serves to protect individuals from this affront, it is an important public interest and a court can make an exception to the open court principle if it is at

*discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires — Intérêt public important — Vie privée — Dignité — Sécurité physique — Décès inexpliqué d'un couple important suscitant une vive attention chez le public et amenant les fiduciaires des successions à demander la mise sous scellés des dossiers d'homologation — Les préoccupations en matière de vie privée et de sécurité physique soulevées par les fiduciaires des successions constituent-elles des intérêts publics importants qui sont à ce point sérieusement menacés qu'ils justifient le prononcé d'ordonnances de mise sous scellés?*

Un couple important a été retrouvé mort dans sa résidence. Les décès apparemment inexpliqués ont suscité un vif intérêt chez le public. À ce jour, l'identité et le mobile des personnes responsables demeurent inconnus, et les décès font l'objet d'une enquête pour homicides. Les fiduciaires des successions ont cherché à réfréner l'attention médiatique intense provoquée par les événements en sollicitant des ordonnances visant à mettre sous scellés les dossiers d'homologation. Les ordonnances de mise sous scellés ont au départ été accordées, puis ont été contestées par un journaliste qui avait rédigé des articles sur le décès du couple, ainsi que par le journal pour lequel il écrivait. Le juge de première instance a fait placer sous scellés les dossiers d'homologation, concluant que les effets bénéfiques des ordonnances de mise sous scellés sur les intérêts en matière de vie privée et de sécurité physique l'emportaient sensiblement sur leurs effets préjudiciables. La Cour d'appel à l'unanimité a accueilli l'appel et levé les ordonnances de mise sous scellés. Elle a conclu que l'intérêt en matière de vie privée qui avait été soulevé ne comportait pas la qualité d'intérêt public, et qu'il n'y avait aucun élément de preuve d'un risque réel pour la sécurité physique de quiconque.

*Arrêt* : Le pourvoi est rejeté.

Les fiduciaires des successions n'ont pas établi l'existence d'un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important en vertu du test applicable en matière de limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Par conséquent, les ordonnances de mise sous scellés n'auraient pas dû être rendues. La publicité des débats judiciaires peut être source d'inconvénients et d'embarras, mais ce désagrément n'est pas, en règle générale, suffisant pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption de publicité des débats. Cela dit, la diffusion de renseignements personnels dans le cadre de débats judiciaires publics peut être plus qu'une source de désagrément et peut aussi entraîner une atteinte

serious risk. In this case, the risks to privacy and physical safety cannot be said to be sufficiently serious.

Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public. Court openness is protected by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression and is essential to the proper functioning of Canadian democracy. Reporting on court proceedings by a free press is often said to be inseparable from the principle of open justice. The open court principle is engaged by all judicial proceedings, whatever their nature. Matters in a probate file are not quintessentially private or fundamentally administrative. Obtaining a certificate of appointment of estate trustee in Ontario is a court proceeding engaging the fundamental rationale for openness — discouraging mischief and ensuring confidence in the administration of justice through transparency — such that the strong presumption of openness applies.

The test for discretionary limits on court openness is directed at maintaining the presumption while offering sufficient flexibility for courts to protect other public interests where they arise. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that (1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest; (2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and (3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time and now extends generally to important public interests. The breadth of this category transcends the interests of the parties to the dispute and provides significant flexibility to address harm to fundamental values in our society that unqualified openness could cause. While there is no closed list of important public interests, courts must be cautious and alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule when they are identifying them.

à la dignité d'une personne. Dans la mesure où elle sert à protéger les personnes contre une telle atteinte, la vie privée constitue un intérêt public important et un tribunal peut faire une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires si elle est sérieusement menacée. Dans la présente affaire, on ne peut pas dire que le risque pour la vie privée et pour la sécurité physique est suffisamment sérieux.

Les procédures judiciaires sont présumées accessibles au public. La publicité des débats judiciaires, qui est protégée par la garantie constitutionnelle de la liberté d'expression, est essentielle au bon fonctionnement de la démocratie canadienne. On dit souvent de la liberté de la presse de rendre compte des procédures judiciaires qu'elle est indissociable du principe de publicité. Le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires s'applique dans toutes les procédures judiciaires, quelle que soit leur nature. Les questions soulevées dans un dossier d'homologation ne sont pas typiquement de nature privée ou fondamentalement de nature administrative. L'obtention d'un certificat de nomination à titre de fiduciaire d'une succession en Ontario est une procédure judiciaire qui met en cause la raison d'être fondamentale de la publicité des débats — décourager les actes malveillants et garantir la confiance dans l'administration de la justice par la transparence —, de sorte que la forte présomption de publicité s'applique.

Le test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires vise à maintenir la présomption tout en offrant suffisamment de souplesse aux tribunaux pour leur permettre de protéger d'autres intérêts publics lorsqu'ils entrent en jeu. Pour obtenir gain de cause, la personne qui demande au tribunal d'exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de façon à limiter la présomption de publicité doit établir ce qui suit : (1) la publicité des débats judiciaires pose un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important; (2) l'ordonnance sollicitée est nécessaire pour écarter ce risque sérieux pour l'intérêt mis en évidence, car d'autres mesures raisonnables ne permettront pas d'écarter ce risque; et (3) du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs.

La portée reconnue des intérêts qui pourraient justifier une exception discrétionnaire à la publicité des débats judiciaires s'est élargie au fil du temps et s'étend désormais en général aux intérêts publics importants. L'étendue de cette catégorie transcende les intérêts des parties au litige et offre une grande souplesse pour remédier à l'atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales de notre société qu'une publicité absolue des procédures judiciaires pourrait causer. Bien qu'il n'y ait aucune liste exhaustive des intérêts publics importants, les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de prudence

Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute. By contrast, whether that interest is at serious risk is a fact-based finding that is necessarily made in context. The identification of an important interest and the seriousness of the risk to that interest are thus theoretically separate and qualitatively distinct operations.

Privacy has been championed as a fundamental consideration in a free society, and its public importance has been recognized in various settings. Though an individual's privacy will be pre-eminently important to that individual, the protection of privacy is also in the interest of society as a whole. Privacy therefore cannot be rejected as a mere personal concern: some personal concerns relating to privacy overlap with public interests.

However, cast too broadly, the recognition of a public interest in privacy could threaten the strong presumption of openness. The privacy of individuals will be at risk in many court proceedings. Furthermore, privacy is a complex and contextual concept, making it difficult for courts to measure. Recognizing an important interest in privacy generally would accordingly be unworkable.

Instead, the public character of the privacy interest involves protecting individuals from the threat to their dignity. Dignity in this sense involves the right to present core aspects of oneself to others in a considered and controlled manner; it is an expression of an individual's unique personality or personhood. This interest is consistent with the Court's emphasis on the importance of privacy, but is tailored to preserve the strong presumption of openness.

Privacy as predicated on dignity will be at serious risk in limited circumstances. Neither the sensibilities of individuals nor the fact that openness is disadvantageous, embarrassing or distressing to certain individuals will generally on their own warrant interference with court openness. Dignity will be at serious risk only where the information that would be disseminated as a result of court openness is sufficiently sensitive or private such that openness can be shown to meaningfully strike at the individual's biographical core in a manner that threatens their

et avoir pleinement conscience de l'importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires lorsqu'ils les constatent. Déterminer ce qu'est un intérêt public important peut se faire dans l'abstrait sur le plan des principes généraux qui vont au-delà des parties à un litige donné. En revanche, la conclusion sur la question de savoir si un risque sérieux menace cet intérêt est une conclusion factuelle qui est nécessairement prise eu égard au contexte. Le fait de constater un intérêt important et celui de constater le caractère sérieux du risque auquel cet intérêt est exposé sont donc en théorie des opérations séparées et qualitativement distinctes.

La vie privée a été défendue en tant que considération fondamentale d'une société libre et son importance pour le public a été reconnue dans divers contextes. Bien que la vie privée d'une personne soit d'une importance primordiale pour celle-ci, la protection de la vie privée est également dans l'intérêt de la société dans son ensemble. La vie privée ne saurait donc être rejetée en tant que simple préoccupation personnelle : il y a chevauchement entre certaines préoccupations personnelles relatives à la vie privée et les intérêts du public.

Cependant, si la vie privée est définie trop largement, la reconnaissance d'un intérêt public en matière de vie privée pourrait menacer la forte présomption de publicité. La vie privée des personnes sera menacée dans de nombreuses procédures judiciaires. De plus, la vie privée est une notion complexe et contextuelle, de sorte qu'il est difficile pour les tribunaux de la mesurer. La reconnaissance d'un intérêt important à l'égard de la notion générale de vie privée serait donc irréalisable.

Le caractère public de l'intérêt en matière de vie privée consiste plutôt à protéger les gens contre la menace à leur dignité. La dignité en ce sens comporte le droit de présenter des aspects fondamentaux de soi-même aux autres de manière réfléchie et contrôlée; il s'agit de l'expression de la personnalité ou de l'identité unique d'une personne. Cet intérêt est conforme à l'accent mis par la Cour sur l'importance de la vie privée, tout en permettant de maintenir la forte présomption de publicité des débats.

Se fondant sur la dignité, la vie privée sera sérieusement menacée dans des circonstances limitées. Ni la susceptibilité des gens ni le fait que la publicité soit désavantageuse, embarrassante ou pénible pour certaines personnes ne justifieront généralement, à eux seuls, une atteinte à la publicité des débats judiciaires. La dignité ne sera sérieusement menacée que lorsque les renseignements qui seraient diffusés en raison de la publicité des débats sont suffisamment sensibles ou privés pour que l'on puisse démontrer que la publicité porte atteinte de

integrity. The question is whether the information reveals something intimate and personal about the individual, their lifestyle or their experiences.

In cases where the information is sufficiently sensitive to strike at an individual's biographical core, a court must then ask whether a serious risk to the interest is made out in the full factual context of the case. The seriousness of the risk may be affected by the extent to which information is disseminated and already in the public domain, and the probability of the dissemination actually occurring. The burden is on the applicant to show that privacy, understood in reference to dignity, is at serious risk; this erects a fact-specific threshold consistent with the presumption of openness.

There is also an important public interest in protecting individuals from physical harm, but a discretionary order limiting court openness can only be made where there is a serious risk to this important public interest. Direct evidence is not necessarily required to establish a serious risk to an important public interest, as objectively discernable harm may be identified on the basis of logical inferences. But this process of inferential reasoning is not a licence to engage in impermissible speculation. It is not just the probability of the feared harm, but also the gravity of the harm itself that is relevant to the assessment of serious risk. Where the feared harm is particularly serious, the probability that this harm materialize need not be shown to be likely, but must still be more than negligible, fanciful or speculative. Mere assertions of grave physical harm are therefore insufficient.

In addition to a serious risk to an important interest, it must be shown that the particular order sought is necessary to address the risk and that the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects as a matter of proportionality. This contextual balancing, informed by the importance of the open court principle, presents a final barrier to those seeking a discretionary limit on court openness for the purposes of privacy protection.

façon significative au cœur même des renseignements biographiques de la personne d'une manière qui menace son intégrité. Il faut se demander si les renseignements révèlent quelque chose d'intime et de personnel sur la personne, son mode de vie ou ses expériences.

Dans les cas où les renseignements sont suffisamment sensibles pour toucher au cœur même des renseignements biographiques d'une personne, le tribunal doit alors se demander si le contexte factuel global de l'affaire permet d'établir l'existence d'un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt en cause. La mesure dans laquelle les renseignements sont diffusés et font déjà partie du domaine public, ainsi que la probabilité que la diffusion se produise réellement, peuvent avoir une incidence sur le caractère sérieux du risque. Il incombe au demandeur de démontrer que la vie privée, considérée au regard de la dignité, est sérieusement menacée; cela permet d'établir un seuil, tributaire des faits, compatible avec la présomption de publicité des débats.

Il existe également un intérêt public important dans la protection des personnes contre un préjudice physique, mais une ordonnance discrétionnaire ayant pour effet de limiter la publicité des débats judiciaires ne peut être rendue qu'en présence d'un risque sérieux pour cet intérêt public important. Une preuve directe n'est pas nécessairement exigée pour démontrer qu'un intérêt public important est sérieusement menacé, car il est possible d'établir l'existence d'un préjudice objectivement discernable sur la base d'inférences logiques. Or, ce raisonnement inférentiel ne permet pas de se livrer à des conjectures inadmissibles. Ce n'est pas seulement la probabilité du préjudice appréhendé qui est pertinente lorsqu'il s'agit d'évaluer si un risque est sérieux, mais également la gravité du préjudice lui-même. Lorsque le préjudice appréhendé est particulièrement sérieux, il n'est pas nécessaire de démontrer que la probabilité que ce préjudice se matérialise est vraisemblable, mais elle doit tout de même être plus que négligeable, fantaisiste ou conjecturale. Le simple fait d'invoquer un préjudice physique grave n'est donc pas suffisant.

Il faut démontrer, outre un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, que l'ordonnance particulière demandée est nécessaire pour écarter le risque et que, du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs. Cette pondération contextuelle, éclairée par l'importance du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, constitue un dernier obstacle sur la route de ceux qui cherchent à faire limiter de façon discrétionnaire la publicité des débats judiciaires aux fins de la protection de la vie privée.

In the present case, the risk to the important public interest in privacy, defined in reference to dignity, is not serious. The information contained in the probate files does not reveal anything particularly private or highly sensitive. It has not been shown that it would strike at the biographical core of the affected individuals in a way that would undermine their control over the expression of their identities. Furthermore, the record does not show a serious risk of physical harm. The estate trustees asked the application judge to infer not only the fact that harm would befall the affected individuals, but also that a person or persons exist who wish to harm them. To infer all this on the basis of the deaths and the association of the affected individuals with the deceased is not a reasonable inference but is speculation.

Even if the estate trustees had succeeded in showing a serious risk to privacy, a publication ban — less constraining on openness than the sealing orders — would have likely been sufficient as a reasonable alternative to prevent this risk. As a final barrier, the estate trustees would have had to show that the benefits of any order necessary to protect from a serious risk to the important public interest outweighed the harmful effects of the order.

**Cases Cited**

**Applied:** *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522; **referred to:** *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Vancouver Sun (Re)*, 2004 SCC 43, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332; *Khuja v. Times Newspapers Ltd.*, [2017] UKSC 49, [2019] A.C. 161; *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442; *Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages)*, 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773; *Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 403; *R. v. Henry*, 2009 BCCA 86, 270 B.C.A.C. 5; *Attorney General of Nova Scotia v. MacIntyre*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175; *A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567; *Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario*, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188; *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)* (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 11; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *Otis v. Otis* (2004), 7 E.T.R.

En l'espèce, le risque pour l'intérêt public important en matière de vie privée, défini au regard de la dignité, n'est pas sérieux. Les renseignements contenus dans les dossiers d'homologation ne révèlent rien de particulièrement privé ni de très sensible. Il n'a pas été démontré qu'ils toucheraient au cœur même des renseignements biographiques des personnes touchées d'une manière qui minerait leur contrôle sur l'expression de leur identité. De plus, le dossier ne démontre pas l'existence d'un risque sérieux de préjudice physique. Les fiduciaires des successions ont demandé au juge de première instance d'inférer non seulement le fait qu'un préjudice serait causé aux personnes touchées, mais également qu'il existe une ou des personnes qui souhaitent leur faire du mal. Déduire tout cela en se fondant sur les décès et sur les liens unissant les personnes touchées aux défunts ne constitue pas une inférence raisonnable, mais une conjecture.

Même si les fiduciaires des successions avaient réussi à démontrer l'existence d'un risque sérieux pour la vie privée, une interdiction de publication — moins contraignante à l'égard de la publicité des débats que les ordonnances de mise sous scellés — aurait probablement été suffisante en tant qu'autre option raisonnable pour écarter ce risque. Comme dernier obstacle, les fiduciaires des successions auraient eu à démontrer que les avantages de toute ordonnance nécessaire à la protection contre un risque sérieux pour l'intérêt public important l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables.

**Jurisprudence**

**Arrêt appliqué :** *Sierra Club du Canada c. Canada (Ministre des Finances)*, 2002 CSC 41, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 522; **arrêts mentionnés :** *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Vancouver Sun (Re)*, 2004 CSC 43, [2004] 2 R.C.S. 332; *Khuja c. Times Newspapers Ltd.*, [2017] UKSC 49, [2019] A.C. 161; *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, 2001 CSC 76, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442; *Lavigne c. Canada (Commissariat aux langues officielles)*, 2002 CSC 53, [2002] 2 R.C.S. 773; *Dagg c. Canada (Ministre des Finances)*, [1997] 2 R.C.S. 403; *R. c. Henry*, 2009 BCCA 86, 270 B.C.A.C. 5; *Procureur général de la Nouvelle-Écosse c. MacIntyre*, [1982] 1 R.C.S. 175; *A.B. c. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 CSC 46, [2012] 2 R.C.S. 567; *Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. c. Ontario*, 2005 CSC 41, [2005] 2 R.C.S. 188; *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)* (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113; *R. c. Oakes*,

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*Chantelle Cseh* and *Timothy Youdan*, for the appellants.

*Iris Fischer* and *Skye A. Sepp*, for the respondents.

*Peter Scrutton*, for the intervener the Attorney General of Ontario.

*Jaqueline Hughes*, for the intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia.

*Ryder Gilliland*, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

*Ewa Krajewska*, for the intervener the Income Security Advocacy Centre.

*Robert S. Anderson*, *Q.C.*, for the interveners Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, a Division of Bell Media Inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc. and Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc.

*Adam Goldenberg*, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

*Khalid Janmohamed*, for the interveners the HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, the HIV Legal Network and the Mental Health Legal Committee.

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*Chantelle Cseh* et *Timothy Youdan*, pour les appelants.

*Iris Fischer* et *Skye A. Sepp*, pour les intimés.

*Peter Scrutton*, pour l'intervenant le procureur général de l'Ontario.

*Jaqueline Hughes*, pour l'intervenant le procureur général de la Colombie-Britannique.

*Ryder Gilliland*, pour l'intervenante l'Association canadienne des libertés civiles.

*Ewa Krajewska*, pour l'intervenant le Centre d'action pour la sécurité du revenu.

*Robert S. Anderson*, *c.r.*, pour les intervenants Ad IDEM/Canadian Media Lawyers Association, Postmedia Network Inc., CTV, une division de Bell Média inc., Global News, a division of Corus Television Limited Partnership, The Globe and Mail Inc. and Citytv, a division of Rogers Media Inc.

*Adam Goldenberg*, pour l'intervenante British Columbia Civil Liberties Association.

*Khalid Janmohamed*, pour les intervenants HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic Ontario, le Réseau juridique VIH et Mental Health Legal Committee.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

KASIRER J. —

I. Overview

[1] This Court has been resolute in recognizing that the open court principle is protected by the constitutionally-entrenched right of freedom of expression and, as such, it represents a central feature of a liberal democracy. As a general rule, the public can attend hearings and consult court files and the press — the eyes and ears of the public — is left free to inquire and comment on the workings of the courts, all of which helps make the justice system fair and accountable.

[2] Accordingly, there is a strong presumption in favour of open courts. It is understood that this allows for public scrutiny which can be the source of inconvenience and even embarrassment to those who feel that their engagement in the justice system brings intrusion into their private lives. But this discomfort is not, as a general matter, enough to overturn the strong presumption that the public can attend hearings and that court files can be consulted and reported upon by the free press.

[3] Notwithstanding this presumption, exceptional circumstances do arise where competing interests justify a restriction on the open court principle. Where a discretionary court order limiting constitutionally-protected openness is sought — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — the applicant must demonstrate, as a threshold requirement, that openness presents a serious risk to a competing interest of public importance. That this requirement is considered a high bar serves to maintain the strong presumption of open courts. Moreover, the protection of open courts does not stop there. The applicant must still show that the order is necessary to prevent the risk and that, as a matter of

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE KASIRER —

I. Survol

[1] La Cour a toujours fermement reconnu que le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est protégé par le droit constitutionnel à la liberté d'expression, et qu'il représente à ce titre un élément fondamental d'une démocratie libérale. En règle générale, le public peut assister aux audiences et consulter les dossiers judiciaires, et les médias — les yeux et les oreilles du public — sont libres de poser des questions et de formuler des commentaires sur les activités des tribunaux, ce qui contribue à rendre le système judiciaire équitable et responsable.

[2] Par conséquent, il existe une forte présomption en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Il est entendu que cela permet un examen public minutieux qui peut être source d'inconvénients, voire d'embarras, pour ceux qui estiment que leur implication dans le système judiciaire entraîne une atteinte à leur vie privée. Cependant, ce désagrément n'est pas, en règle générale, suffisant pour permettre de réfuter la forte présomption voulant que le public puisse assister aux audiences, et que les dossiers judiciaires puissent être consultés et leur contenu rapporté par une presse libre.

[3] Malgré cette présomption, il se présente des circonstances exceptionnelles où des intérêts opposés justifient de restreindre le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Lorsqu'un demandeur sollicite une ordonnance judiciaire discrétionnaire limitant le principe constitutionnalisé de la publicité des procédures judiciaires — par exemple, une ordonnance de mise sous scellés, une interdiction de publication, une ordonnance excluant le public d'une audience ou une ordonnance de caviardage —, il doit démontrer, comme condition préliminaire, que la publicité des débats en cause présente un risque sérieux pour un intérêt opposé qui revêt une importance pour le public. Le fait que cette condition soit considérée comme un seuil élevé vise à assurer

dignity dimension of their privacy is at "serious risk". For the purposes of the test for discretionary limits on court openness, this requires the applicant to show that the information in the court file is sufficiently sensitive such that it can be said to strike at the biographical core of the individual and, in the broader circumstances, that there is a serious risk that, without an exceptional order, the affected individual will suffer an affront to their dignity.

[36] In the present case, the information in the court files was not of this highly sensitive character that it could be said to strike at the core identity of the affected persons; the Trustees have failed to show how the lifting of the sealing orders engages the dignity of the affected individuals. I am therefore not convinced that the intrusion on their privacy raises a serious risk to an important public interest as required by *Sierra Club*. Moreover, as I shall endeavour to explain, there was no serious risk of physical harm to the affected individuals by lifting the sealing orders. Accordingly, this is not an appropriate case in which to make sealing orders, or any order limiting access to these court files. In the circumstances, the admissibility of the Toronto Star's new evidence is moot. I propose to dismiss the appeal.

A. *The Test for Discretionary Limits on Court Openness*

[37] Court proceedings are presumptively open to the public (*MacIntyre*, at p. 189; *A.B. v. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 SCC 46, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 567, at para. 11).

[38] The test for discretionary limits on presumptive court openness has been expressed as a two-step inquiry involving the necessity and proportionality of the proposed order (*Sierra Club*, at para. 53). Upon examination, however, this test rests upon three core prerequisites that a person seeking such a limit must show. Recasting the test around these three

qu'il y a un « risque sérieux » pour cette dimension de sa vie privée liée à sa dignité. Pour l'application du test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaire, le demandeur doit donc démontrer que les renseignements contenus dans le dossier judiciaire sont suffisamment sensibles pour que l'on puisse dire qu'ils touchent au cœur même des renseignements biographiques de la personne et, dans un contexte plus large, qu'il existe un risque sérieux d'atteinte à la dignité de la personne concernée si une ordonnance exceptionnelle n'est pas rendue.

[36] En l'espèce, les renseignements contenus dans les dossiers judiciaires ne revêtent pas ce caractère si sensible qu'on pourrait dire qu'ils touchent à l'identité fondamentale des personnes concernées; les fiduciaires n'ont pas démontré en quoi la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés met en jeu la dignité des personnes touchées. Je ne suis donc pas convaincu que l'atteinte à leur vie privée soulève un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important, comme l'exige *Sierra Club*. De plus, comme je tenterai de l'expliquer, il n'y avait pas de risque sérieux que les personnes visées subissent un préjudice physique en raison de la levée des ordonnances de mise sous scellés. Par conséquent, la présente affaire n'est pas un cas où il convient de rendre des ordonnances de mise sous scellés ni aucune ordonnance limitant l'accès aux dossiers judiciaires en cause. Dans les circonstances, la question de l'admissibilité des nouveaux éléments de preuve du Toronto Star est théorique. Je suis d'avis de rejeter le pourvoi.

A. *Le test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires*

[37] Les procédures judiciaires sont présumées accessibles au public (*MacIntyre*, p. 189; *A.B. c. Bragg Communications Inc.*, 2012 CSC 46, [2012] 2 R.C.S. 567, par. 11).

[38] Le test des limites discrétionnaires à la publicité présumée des débats judiciaires a été décrit comme une analyse en deux étapes, soit l'étape de la nécessité et celle de la proportionnalité de l'ordonnance proposée (*Sierra Club*, par. 53). Après un examen, cependant, je constate que ce test repose sur trois conditions préalables fondamentales dont une

prerequisites, without altering its essence, helps to clarify the burden on an applicant seeking an exception to the open court principle. In order to succeed, the person asking a court to exercise discretion in a way that limits the open court presumption must establish that:

(1) court openness poses a serious risk to an important public interest;

(2) the order sought is necessary to prevent this serious risk to the identified interest because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent this risk; and,

(3) as a matter of proportionality, the benefits of the order outweigh its negative effects.

Only where all three of these prerequisites have been met can a discretionary limit on openness — for example, a sealing order, a publication ban, an order excluding the public from a hearing, or a redaction order — properly be ordered. This test applies to all discretionary limits on court openness, subject only to valid legislative enactments (*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Ontario*, 2005 SCC 41, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 188, at paras. 7 and 22).

[39] The discretion is structured and controlled in this way to protect the open court principle, which is understood to be constitutionalized under the right to freedom of expression at s. 2(b) of the Charter (*New Brunswick*, at para. 23). Sustained by freedom of expression, the open court principle is one of the foundations of a free press given that access to courts is fundamental to newsgathering. This Court has often highlighted the importance of open judicial proceedings to maintaining the independence and impartiality of the courts, public confidence and understanding of their work and ultimately the legitimacy of the process (see, e.g., *Vancouver Sun*,

personne cherchant à faire établir une telle limite doit démontrer le respect. La reformulation du test autour de ces trois conditions préalables, sans en modifier l'essence, aide à clarifier le fardeau auquel doit satisfaire la personne qui sollicite une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Pour obtenir gain de cause, la personne qui demande au tribunal d'exercer son pouvoir discrétionnaire de façon à limiter la présomption de publicité doit établir que :

(1) la publicité des débats judiciaires pose un risque sérieux pour un intérêt public important;

(2) l'ordonnance sollicitée est nécessaire pour écarter ce risque sérieux pour l'intérêt mis en évidence, car d'autres mesures raisonnables ne permettront pas d'écarter ce risque; et

(3) du point de vue de la proportionnalité, les avantages de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets négatifs.

Ce n'est que lorsque ces trois conditions préalables sont remplies qu'une ordonnance discrétionnaire ayant pour effet de limiter la publicité des débats judiciaires — par exemple une ordonnance de mise sous scellés, une interdiction de publication, une ordonnance excluant le public d'une audience ou une ordonnance de caviardage — pourra dûment être rendue. Ce test s'applique à toutes les limites discrétionnaires à la publicité des débats judiciaires, sous réserve uniquement d'une loi valide (*Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. c. Ontario*, 2005 CSC 41, [2005] 2 R.C.S. 188, par. 7 et 22).

[39] Le pouvoir discrétionnaire est ainsi structuré et contrôlé de manière à protéger le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, qui est considéré comme étant constitutionnalisé sous le régime du droit à la liberté d'expression garanti par l'al. 2b) de la *Charte* (*Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 23). Reposant sur la liberté d'expression, le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est l'un des fondements de la liberté de la presse étant donné que l'accès aux tribunaux est un élément essentiel de la collecte d'information. Notre Cour a souvent souligné l'importance de la publicité pour maintenir l'indépendance et l'impartialité des tribunaux, la confiance du

at paras. 23-26). In *New Brunswick*, La Forest J. explained the presumption in favour of court openness had become "'one of the hallmarks of a democratic society'" (citing *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)* (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), at p. 119), that "acts as a guarantee that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner, according to the rule of law . . . thereby fostering public confidence in the integrity of the court system and understanding of the administration of justice" (para. 22). The centrality of this principle to the court system underlies the strong presumption — albeit one that is rebuttable — in favour of court openness (para. 40; *Mentuck*, at para. 39).

[40] The test ensures that discretionary orders are subject to no lower standard than a legislative enactment limiting court openness would be (*Mentuck*, at para. 27; *Sierra Club*, at para. 45). To that end, this Court developed a scheme of analysis by analogy to the *Oakes* test, which courts use to understand whether a legislative limit on a right guaranteed under the *Charter* is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society (*Sierra Club*, at para. 40, citing *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; see also *Dagenais*, at p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, at para. 30).

[41] The recognized scope of what interests might justify a discretionary exception to open courts has broadened over time. In *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. spoke of a requisite risk to the "fairness of the trial" (p. 878). In *Mentuck*, Iacobucci J. extended this to a risk affecting the "proper administration of justice" (para. 32). Finally, in *Sierra Club*, Iacobucci J., again writing for a unanimous Court, restated the test to capture any serious risk to an "important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation" (para. 53). He simultaneously clarified that the important interest must be expressed as a public interest. For example, on the facts of that

public à l'égard de leur travail et sa compréhension de celui-ci, et, au bout du compte, la légitimité du processus (voir, p. ex., *Vancouver Sun*, par. 23-26). Dans l'arrêt *Nouveau-Brunswick*, le juge La Forest a expliqué que la présomption en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires était devenue « [TRADUCTION] "l'une des caractéristiques d'une société démocratique" » (citant *Re Southam Inc. and The Queen (No.1)* (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113 (C.A.), p. 119), qui « fait en sorte que la justice est administrée de manière non arbitraire, conformément à la primauté du droit [. . .], situation qui favorise la confiance du public dans la probité du système judiciaire et la compréhension de l'administration de la justice » (par. 22). Le caractère fondamental de ce principe pour le système judiciaire sous-tend la forte présomption — quoique réfutable — en faveur de la tenue de procédures judiciaires publiques (par. 40; *Mentuck*, par. 39).

[40] Le test fait en sorte que les ordonnances discrétionnaires ne soient pas assujetties à une norme moins exigeante que la norme à laquelle seraient assujetties des dispositions législatives qui limiteraient la publicité des débats judiciaires (*Mentuck*, par. 27; *Sierra Club*, par. 45). À cette fin, la Cour a élaboré un cadre d'analyse par analogie avec le test de l'arrêt *Oakes*, que les tribunaux utilisent pour déterminer si une limite imposée par un texte de loi à un droit garanti par la *Charte* est raisonnable et si sa justification peut se démontrer dans le cadre d'une société libre et démocratique (*Sierra Club*, par. 40, citant *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; voir également *Dagenais*, p. 878; *Vancouver Sun*, par. 30).

[41] La portée reconnue des intérêts qui pourraient justifier une exception discrétionnaire à la publicité des débats judiciaires s'est élargie au fil du temps. Dans l'arrêt *Dagenais*, le juge en chef Lamer a parlé de la nécessité d'un risque « que le procès soit inéquitable » (p. 878). Dans *Mentuck*, le juge Iacobucci a étendu cette condition à un risque « pour la bonne administration de la justice » (par. 32). Enfin, dans *Sierra Club*, le juge Iacobucci, s'exprimant encore une fois au nom de la Cour à l'unanimité, a reformulé le test de manière à englober tout risque sérieux pour un « intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige » (par. 53). Il a en

case, a harm to a particular business interest would not have been sufficient, but the "general commercial interest of preserving confidential information" was an important interest because of its public character (para. 55). This is consistent with the fact that this test was developed in reference to the *Oakes* jurisprudence that focuses on the "pressing and substantial" objective of legislation of general application (*Oakes*, at pp. 138-39; see also *Mentuck*, at para. 31). The term "important interest" therefore captures a broad array of public objectives.

[42] While there is no closed list of important public interests for the purposes of this test, I share Iacobucci J.'s sense, explained in *Sierra Club*, that courts must be "cautious" and "alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule" even at the earliest stage when they are identifying important public interests (para. 56). Determining what is an important public interest can be done in the abstract at the level of general principles that extend beyond the parties to the particular dispute (para. 55). By contrast, whether that interest is at "serious risk" is a fact-based finding that, for the judge considering the appropriateness of an order, is necessarily made in context. In this sense, the identification of, on the one hand, an important interest and, on the other, the seriousness of the risk to that interest are, theoretically at least, separate and qualitatively distinct operations. An order may therefore be refused simply because a valid important public interest is not at serious risk on the facts of a given case or, conversely, that the identified interests, regardless of whether they are at serious risk, do not have the requisite important public character as a matter of general principle.

[43] The test laid out in *Sierra Club* continues to be an appropriate guide for judicial discretion in cases like this one. The breadth of the category of

même temps précisé que l'intérêt important doit être exprimé en tant qu'intérêt public. Par exemple, à la lumière des faits de cette affaire, le préjudice causé à un intérêt commercial particulier n'aurait pas été suffisant, mais « l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels » constituait un intérêt important en raison de son caractère public (par. 55). Cette conclusion est compatible avec le fait que ce test a été élaboré à l'égard de la jurisprudence relative à l'arrêt *Oakes*, laquelle met l'accent sur l'objectif « urgen[t] et rée[l] » d'un texte de loi d'application générale (*Oakes*, p. 138-139; voir également *Mentuck*, par. 31). L'expression « intérêt important » vise donc un large éventail d'objectifs d'intérêt public.

[42] Bien qu'il n'y ait aucune liste exhaustive des intérêts publics importants pour l'application de ce test, je partage l'opinion du juge Iacobucci, exprimée dans *Sierra Club*, selon laquelle les tribunaux doivent faire preuve de « prudence » et « avoir pleinement conscience de l'importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires », même à la toute première étape lorsqu'ils constatent les intérêts publics importants (par. 56). Déterminer ce qu'est un intérêt public important peut se faire dans l'abstrait sur le plan des principes généraux qui vont au-delà des parties à un litige donné (par. 55). En revanche, la conclusion sur la question de savoir si un « risque sérieux » menace cet intérêt est une conclusion factuelle qui, pour le juge qui examine le caractère approprié d'une ordonnance, est nécessairement prise eu égard au contexte. En ce sens, le fait de constater, d'une part, un intérêt important et celui de constater, d'autre part, le caractère sérieux du risque auquel cet intérêt est exposé sont, en théorie du moins, des opérations séparées et qualitativement distinctes. Une ordonnance peut donc être refusée du simple fait qu'un intérêt public important valide n'est pas sérieusement menacé au vu des faits de l'affaire ou, à l'inverse, parce que les intérêts constatés, qu'ils soient ou non sérieusement menacés, ne présentent pas le caractère public important requis sur le plan des principes généraux.

[43] Le test énoncé dans *Sierra Club* continue d'être un guide approprié en ce qui a trait à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans des

# TAB 10

# Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Romspen Investment Corporation v. Hargate Properties Inc., 2012 ABQB 412**

**Date:** 20120625
**Docket:** 1103 17749
**Registry:** Edmonton



**Romspen Investment Corporation**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Hargate Properties Inc., 1410973 Alberta Ltd., Voipus Canada Ltd., 1333183 Alberta Ltd., Bellavera Green Condominium Corp. and Kevyn Ronald Frederick Also Known As Kevyn Frederick, Kevin Frederic, Kevyn Sheldon Frederick or Kevin Frederick and Chateau Lacombe Capital Partners Ltd.**

Defendants

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**Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Donald Lee**

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## I. Background

[1] This is an application by the Receiver, D. Manning & Associates Inc. for a sealing order with respect to the Receiver's report dated June 4, 2012; as well as for directions with respect to the disbursement of certain funds recovered by the Receiver from the accounts of Chateau Lacombe Capital Partners Ltd. ["CLCPL"]. There is also an application by the primary creditor for a one day redemption order in a related foreclosure application.

[2] The Receiver's report dated June 4, 2012 provides details with respect to the ongoing sale process of the Chateau Lacombe Hotel in downtown Edmonton, including the realtors marketing reports and appraisal of the hotel. The Receiver submits that the protection of the commercial interest herein forms a proper basis for the issuance of a sealing order as there is an ongoing sales process. In the absence of the sealing order with respect to the appraisal and

marketing reports, it is submitted that there is a serious risk that the integrity of the sales process will be adversely affected and that all parties involved in this matter will suffer financially.

[3] The primary creditor in this matter, Romspen Investment Corporation ("Romspen"), supports the Receiver's application for a sealing order. Romspen is owed approximately 35 million dollars presently, and submits that the sealing order is required to protect the confidentiality of the sales process. The second mortgagee, Allied Hospitality Services Inc., ["Allied"] also supports the sealing order application.

[4] Opposing the sealing order, however, are counsel for Dr. Singh who has claimed a first mortgage on properties known as the "Church lands." The priority of Dr. Singh's claim as first mortgagee on the Church lands is in dispute as Romspen received an apparent postponement in it's favor from Dr. Singh when it financed the hotel purchase in 2010. These lands consist of 20 acres on Ellerslie Road located in a rapidly developing residential suburban area of Edmonton which the principal of CLCPL, Kevin Frederick, had purchased from the Victory Christian Church in August 2008, for 18 million dollars.

[5] Counsel for the Victory Christian Church also opposes the sealing order request, arguing that concept of "Marshalling" could be applicable with respect to the Church lands given that the Church has now received an assignment of the 12 million dollar vendor take-back mortgage given by Kevin Frederick in it's favor at the time of the 2008 purchase by his numbered company. The Victory Christian Church advises that at the present time as a result of the current developments in the case, the 20 acres of prime Edmonton real estate sold for 18 million dollars has resulted in no realisable funds to the Church. The Church is now also the subject of a potential removal proceeding from the lands that it uses for its worship services because of Romspen's present foreclosure application.

[6] Counsel for Dr. Singh, a retired dentist, and the Church submit that they must have access to the marketing and appraisal reports that the Receiver, Romspen, and Allied Properties already have with respect to the Chateau Lacombe Hotel site. Counsel for Dr. Singh and the Church submit that it is only through their receipt of these marketing reports and appraisal that they will be able to determine that the best price is being obtained for the Chateau Lacombe Hotel site.

[7] The present appraisal comes in at a price well below that which is owed to the creditors, so all counsel supporting the granting of the sealing order argue that no useful purpose would be served in disclosing this information any further. They further submit that it is inevitable, and in fact, they wish the Court to direct as part of another application presently before me that a redemption order for the Church property be issued setting the redemption period at one day.

[8] Counsel for Dr. Singh, the first mortgagee on the Church lands, points out that the City of Edmonton's current valuation of the Chateau Lacombe Hotel for municipal tax purposes is approximately 32 million dollars, and at the time the hotel was purchased in 2010 it was 38 million dollars. Based on three appraisals done in 2010, the Chateau Lacombe Hotel property

was worth between 57 to 70 million dollars. The property was purchased in October 2010 for 47.8 million dollars by Mr. Frederick's company, Hargate Properties Inc. ["Hargate"], with Romspen advancing 32 million dollars, a take-back second mortgage by Allied of 11+ million dollars, and Kevin Frederick's 6 million dollar contribution. The 6 million dollars appears to have come from Dr. Singh's first mortgage loan secured on the Church lands. The Church's 12 million dollar vendor take-back mortgage on its lands from Mr. Frederick has been defaulted on and it has been assigned back to the Church, although curiously, the purchase price for the Church lands was listed at Land Titles as 10 million dollars. The Marshalling concept as I understand it involves certain other Leduc properties owned by Kevin Frederick that are also under foreclosure currently.

[9] The argument then of counsel for Dr. Singh and for the Church is that the Chateau Lacombe Hotel property could or should have a value far greater than intimated by the Receiver presently, and if there are proper marketing efforts, all creditors and primarily Romspen would benefit. However, in order to ascertain the validity of the present appraisal and marketing efforts, counsel for Dr. Singh and for the Church need access to the most current reports, which to date has been refused by the Receiver

## II. Conclusion

[10] All parties agree that the relevant case law is found in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] S.C.J 42; [2002] 2 S.C.R 522 at paragraph 53 which reads as follows:

> A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be grated when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effect of the confidentiality order, including the effect on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[11] The commercial interest as stated in *Sierra Club* in presumed in the present case, but as the Supreme Court of Canada also stated at paragraph 57 "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider whether reasonable alternatives to the confidentiality order are available as well as to restrict the order as much as reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question. Counsel for the Receiver is not prepared to release the marketing and appraisals even to counsel for Dr. Singh and for the church on any basis.

[12] I conclude that the Receiver has already released the marketing reports and the appraisal to counsel for Rompsen, the primary creditor, and to counsel for the second mortgagee, Allied , with no adverse consequences, to the sales process as they are entitled to receive that information on a confidential basis. I conclude that counsel for Dr. Singh and for the Church should also be allowed to see those reports on the same confidential basis, and I am satisfied that there will be no adverse consequences as a result notwithstanding the objections of counsel for the Receiver, Romspen and Allied Properties. It is in everyone's financial interest amongst this group including Dr. Singh and the Church to see that the Chateau Lacombe Hotel property is sold for the most monies. The release of the requested sales process and appraisal reports is no reflection that there is anything deficient in the present sales efforts which appear to have been conducted quite efficiently. It is only a recognition of the legitimate financial interest in this process of Dr. Singh and the Church .

[13] The application to Seal is granted with the exception that the documents sealed, and future related documents, will be released to counsel for Dr. Singh and for the Church confidentially, in addition to them being released to Romspen and Allied. Pending the receipt of these reports and appraisal, including the results of the current final June 22 bidding round, the application for a one day redemption period on the Church lands pursuant to the foreclosure application presently before me, will be adjourned to July 5, 2012, at which point it will be considered.

## III. The CLCPL Application

[14] With respect to counsel for BDO Canada's issues regarding the Receiver's request to distribute all of the remaining funds in that company, I understand BDO's objection to be that the Canada Revenue Agency ["CRA"] has a secured priority claims under the Wage Earning Protection Program ("WEPP"), and with respect to certain unremitted employee source deductions.

[15] Hargate Properties Inc. purchased the hotel from the previous owner, Chateau Lacombe Limited Partnership in October 2010, financing the purchase in part by a 32 million dollar loan from Romspen. The assets purchased by Hargate formed a substantial part of the security taken by Romspen for the loan. Additional security came from the allegedly improper/fraudulent postponement of the first mortgage on the Church lands that Dr. Singh had advanced to a numbered company controlled by Kevin Frederick. Concurrent with Hargate's acquisition of the assets of the Chateau Lacombe Hotel, unbeknownst to Romspen even at the time I granted the original receivership order to Romspen, in apparent contradiction in the terms of Romspen's security documentation, CLCPL began operating the Chateau Lacombe Hotel.

[16] There were no formal agreements between Hargate and CLCPL with respect to the buyers use of Hargate's assets. CLCPL did not render any payments to Hargate for the use of the assets. CLCPL did not appear to have had any assets of its own, yet it received and retained all the revenues generated through the operation of the hotel (with the exception of some of the

revenues generated under a lease between Hargate and ImPark in relationship to the hotel's parkade.) Kevin Frederick was the principal and operating mind of both Hargate and CLCPL at all material times, and it is alleged that Mr. Frederick converted at least some of the revenues generated by the hotel to his own use.

[17] I have considered the concerns of the bankruptcy trustee of CLCPL BDO Canada Ltd. and I am satisfied that the CRA has properly been notified with respect to any priorities it may have in this matter. From the funds held by the Receiver of $632,110.26, there will be a $120,000 hold-back with respect to any protential WEPP claim made by the employees of CLCPL, although non-union employees were terminated by the Receiver upon his appointment. The Receiver has paid all outstanding wages since the date of their appointment, and has continued to pay vacation pay as it becomes due, payable to non-union and union employees. The hold back will also cover any costs of the Receiver-Manager prior to discharge. The Receiver shall pay $5,985.57 to the CRA in satisfaction of it's secured claim for unremitted source deductions.

[18] Additionally, the CRA shall provide the Receiver with notice of any opposition to the payout described above within 14 days of service of these directions.

[19] If the CRA does not provide notice to the Receiver within 14 days of service of these directions, then it shall be deemed forever barred from making or enforcing any claim, interest or right of any nature or kind whatsoever, whether arising by statute, at law or in equity (a "Claim") to the Funds, as well as any Claim(s) arising out of or relating to the Funds or the source of the Funds, and all such Claim(s) shall be forever extinguished, barred and released.

Heard on the 14th day of June, 2012.
**Dated** at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 22nd day of June, 2012.

**Donald Lee**
**J.C.Q.B.A.**

**Appearances:**

Schuyler V. Wensel, Q.C.
Witten LLP
for the Plaintiff

Lindsay Miller
Field LLP
for the Second Mortgagee, Allied Hospitalities Services Inc.

Scott Stevens
Owen Bird Law Corporation
for the Receiver, D. Manning & Associates Inc.

Russel A. Rimer
Duncan & Craig LLP
for BDO Canada Ltd.

Atul Omkar
Reynolds Mirth Richards & Farmer LLP
for Dr. Singh

Lyle Brookes
Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP
for the Victory Christian Centre Inc.

# TAB 11

# Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Alberta Treasury Branches v Elaborate Homes Ltd, 2014 ABQB 350**



**Date:** 20140611
**Docket:** 1103 02937
**Registry:** Edmonton

In the Matter of the Insolvency of Elaborate Homes Ltd. and Elaborate Developments Inc.

Between:

**Alberta Treasury Branches**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Elaborate Homes Ltd., Elaborate Developments Inc., Manjit (John) Nagra, Jaswinder Nagra**

Defendants

**Corrected judgment:** A corrigendum was issued on June 23, 2014; the corrections have been made to the text and the corrigendum is appended to this judgment.

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**Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice K.G. Nielsen**

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## I. Introduction

[1] PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. (PWC) was appointed as receiver of all current and future assets and property of Elaborate Homes Ltd. and Elaborate Developments Inc. (collectively referred to as Elaborate).

[2] Alco Industrial Inc. (Alco) seeks leave to commence proceedings against PWC in relation to matters arising in the receivership.

[48] Further, the Sale Order makes it clear that service of the Application was declared to be good and sufficient and that service of the Sale Order could be effected upon all affected persons by way of facsimile or electronic mail, and such service was constituted to be good and sufficient. Therefore, it appears that Belzil J. considered the matter of both service of the Application and the Sale Order. Again, Alco could have either appealed the Sale Order, or sought to set it aside on the basis of a lack of notice. It took neither of these steps.

[49] I would add that in today's world, electronic service is a reflection of practical realities. The *Alberta Rules of Court* and the *BIA Rules* recognize this reality. Perhaps there is no area of practice where electronic service of documents is more appropriate than the bankruptcy and insolvency area. I say this because of the volume of documents that are often produced in such matters, and the need for receivers, trustees, monitors and counsel to act expeditiously and often in the face of very short deadlines. Given the commercial and legal realities of bankruptcy and insolvency matters, there is an obvious need to exchange documents electronically. In my view, a party involved in such matters cannot ignore these realities by refusing to move effectively into the electronic age.

[50] In summary, I find nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that PWC through its counsel did not properly effect service of both the Application and the Sale Order on Alco by emailing those documents to Mr. Taubner at Alco. There is no factual basis to suggest that PWC was either grossly negligent, or that it wilfully misconducted itself, in effecting service of the documents by email.

**B. Sale Transaction**

[51] Alco also alleges that PWC breached its duties to Alco in the manner in which it conducted the sale of Elaborate's assets. Specifically, Alco alleges that PWC concealed the Bid Summary, and sold the Condo for an amount which was below its appraised value.

[52] The Second Report indicated that PWC preferred that the Bid Summary remain confidential until such time as the sale transaction had closed. Upon signing the Confidentiality Letter, the Bid Summary would be disclosed to the signatory on the basis that the information disclosed in the Bid Summary would not later be used by the signatory as a potential purchaser of Elaborate assets.

[53] Alco argues that PWC should not have required it to give up any right to make an offer on the Condo. Alco submits that its rights "ought not to have been extorted away under threat that otherwise the information necessary for it to respond to a court application would be kept hidden from view".

[54] It is common practice in the insolvency context for information in relation to the sale of the assets of an insolvent corporation to be kept confidential until after the sale is completed pursuant to a Court order. In ***Look Communications Inc v Look Mobile Corporation***, 2009 CarswellOnt 7952, [2009] OJ No 5440 (Sup Ct Just – Commercial List), Newbould J. explained the reasons for such confidentiality:

> 17 It is common when assets are being sold pursuant to a court process to seal the Monitor's report disclosing all of the various bids in case a further bidding process is required if the transaction being approved falls through. Invariably, no

> one comes back asking that the sealing order be set aside. That is because ordinarily all of the assets that were bid on during the court sale process end up being sold and approved by court order, and so long as the sale transaction or transactions closed, no one has any further interest in the information. In ***8857574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd***, (1994), 23 B.L.R. (2nd) 239, Farley J. discussed the fact that valuations submitted by a Receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval are normally sealed. He pointed out that the purpose of that was to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information while others have to rely on their own resources. In that context, he stated that he thought the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation materials remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction had closed.

[55] Alco alleges that PWC and its counsel ignored Alco, hid the Bid Summary and cloaked their activities in the receivership with secrecy. However, there is nothing in the material before the Court to suggest that PWC's preference to keep the Bid Summary confidential until the sale transaction had been approved and closed was for any purpose other than to ensure the integrity of the marketing process, and to avoid misuse of the information in the Bid Summary by a subsequent bidder to obtain an unfair advantage in the event it was necessary to remarket Elaborate's assets. Further, there is nothing to suggest that Belzil J. granted the Sealing Order for any other reason.

[56] Alco may have been in a unique position given that it held a second mortgage on the Condo. Given that unique position, it may very well have been entitled to receive information with respect to the offers received in relation to the Condo and, therefore, could have suggested revised terms to any required confidentiality agreement. However, Alco's position does not render PWC's actions inappropriate. There is nothing to suggest that PWC's actions in this regard were not in accordance with common, prudent and reasonable practice in receiverships, or that they reflect or resulted from gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of PWC.

[57] With respect to the manner in which the sale of the Condo was conducted, Alco submits that PWC breached a "fundamental duty of Receivers" in that it failed to act with an even hand towards classes of creditors and in accordance with recognised lawful priorities. Again, the law and the material before the Court do not support this contention.

[58] The obligations of a receiver in carrying out a sales transaction have been considered in numerous cases. In ***Royal Bank v Soundair Corp*** (1991), 7 CBR (3d) 1, [1991] OJ No 1137 at paras 27-29 (CA), Galligan J.A. cited with approval case law for the proposition that if a receiver's decision to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time, it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. Otherwise, chaos would result in the commercial world, and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement. Galligan J.A. concluded:

> 30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to

> confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered *bona fide* into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

[59] Galligan J.A. recognized that in considering a sale by a receiver, a court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver, and should assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. He summarized the duties of the court when deciding whether a receiver who has sold property acted properly as follows (at para 17):

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently;

2. It should consider the interests of all parties;

3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained;

4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

[60] In ***Skyepharma PLC v Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp*** (1999), 12 CBR (4th) 87, [1999] OJ No 4300 at para 4 (Sup Ct Just – Commercial List), Farley J. cited ***Soundair*** with approval, holding that a receiver's conduct is to be reviewed in light of the objective information the receiver had and not with the benefit of hindsight. Other offers are irrelevant unless they demonstrate that the price in the proposed sale was so unreasonably low that it shows the receiver acted improvidently in accepting it.

[61] In ***Re Scanwood Canada Ltd***, 2011 NSSC 189, 305 NSR (2d) 34, the receiver was of the view that the best realization of the assets in question would come from a sale *en bloc*. Hood J. held that the receiver's duty to act in the interests of the general body of creditors does not necessarily mean that the majority rules. Rather, the receiver must consider the interests of all creditors and then act for the benefit of the general body.

[62] PWC accepted the 160 Offer and recommended that the acceptance be approved by the Court on the basis that it was higher than other *en bloc* offers and was preferable from the overall perspective of Elaborate's creditors. The 160 Offer provided for the highest net recovery on the Condo of all of the *en bloc* offers and represented a recovery of 85% of the forced liquidation valuation of the Condo. Only one other offer in the marketing process undertaken by PWC assigned a purchase price for the Condo which was higher than the price assigned in the 160 Offer. This was an offer with respect to the Condo only.

[63] The law is clear to the effect that the receiver must not consider the interests of only one creditor, but must act for the benefit of the general body of creditors. PWC was under a duty to act in the interests of the general body of creditors and to conduct a fair and efficient marketing process.

[64] The excerpts from the cross-examination of Mr. Burnett on his Affidavit indicate that PWC did attempt to maximize the recovery on all of Elaborate's assets as it conducted negotiations with the various bidders in this regard.

[65] There is nothing before the Court to suggest that PWC did not make sufficient efforts to obtain the best price for the assets, nor that it acted improvidently. Alco has not put forward any factual foundation to support an inference that PWC did not act for the benefit of the general body of creditors.

[66] Alco submits that had it attended the hearing on June 3, 2011 before Belzil J., it would have been successful in arguing that Alco was deprived of a statutory right to recover its secured debt against the Condo. However, the contents of the Second Report undermine the argument that PWC's acceptance of the 160 Offer would not have been approved in the circumstances as known when the matter proceeded before Belzil J. Further, given my findings on the email service issue, PWC cannot be blamed for Alco's non-attendance at the hearing on June 3, 2011.

[67] Therefore, I conclude that Alco has not established a factual basis for the claim that PWC was either grossly negligent or wilfully misconducted itself in the manner that it marketed Elaborate's assets or in its reporting to the Court.

## IX. Conclusion

[68] The threshold test for leave in this case is low. However, PWC would only be liable if it acted with gross negligence or wilful misconduct. I have found no factual basis to suggest that PWC was either grossly negligent or wilfully misconducted itself as alleged by Alco.

[69] PWC is not entitled to protection against proper actions simply because it was court appointed. However, I am mindful of the bias against exposing a court appointed officer to unnecessary or unwarranted litigation. In my view, granting leave to Alco to proceed with the claim against PWC would expose it to a manifestly unmeritorious action.

[70] Therefore, Alco's application for leave to file the Statement of Claim against PWC is dismissed.

## X. Costs

[71] If the parties cannot otherwise agree on costs, they may appear before me within 60 days of the filing of these Reasons for Judgment.

Heard on the 14th day of May, 2014.
**Dated** at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 11th day of June, 2014.

**K.G. Nielsen**
**J.C.Q.B.A.**

**Appearances:**

Robert M. Curtis, Q.C.
McCuaig Desrochers LLP
for Alco Industrial Inc.

Michael J. McCabe, Q.C.
Reynolds Mirth Richards & Farmer LLP
for PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc.

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**Corrigendum of the Reasons for Judgment**
**of**
**The Honourable Mr. Justice K.G. Nielsen**

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Please note that the word "willful" has been replaced with "wilful" in the heading on page 9, in paras. 34, 50 and 56.

# TAB 12

**COURT FILE NO.:** 08-CL-7877
**DATE:** 20091218



**SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO**
**COMMERCIAL LIST**

**RE:** IN THE MATTER OF LOOK COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Applicant

LOOK MOBILE CORPORATION AND LOOK COMMUNICATIONS L.P.

Respondent

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION BY LOOK COMMUNICATIONS INC. UNDER SECTION 192 OF *THE BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.44, AS AMENDED

**BEFORE:** Justice Newbould

**COUNSEL:** *John T. Porter*, for Look Communications Inc.

*Aubrey E. Kauffman*, for Inukshuk Wireless Partnership

**DATE HEARD:** December 17, 2009

## E N D O R S E M E N T

[1] Look Communications Inc.(Look) moves for an order extending a sealing order under which bids made in a court approved sales process were sealed. The order is opposed by Inukshuk Wireless Partnership which is a joint venture between Rogers Communications Inc. and Bell Canada.

**Circumstances of Sealing Order**

[2] On December 1, 2008, Look was authorized by Pepall J. to conduct a special shareholder's meeting to pass resolutions (i) authorizing Look to establish a sales process for the sale of all or substantially all of its assets and to seek an order approving the sales process, and (ii) authorizing a plan of arrangement under section 192 of the CBCA which contemplated the sale of all or substantially all of Look's assets. The shareholders voted in favour of both a sales process and the arrangement.

[3] On January 21, 2009, Look obtained an order approving the sales process and Grant Thornton Limited was appointed as Monitor to manage and conduct the sales process with Look. The sales process provided for bids from interested persons for five assets of Look, which were substantially all of its assets, being (i) Spectrum, being approximately 100MHz of License Spectrum in Ontario and Quebec; (ii) a CRTC Broadcast License; (iii) Subscribers; (iv) a Network consisting of two network operating centers and (v) approximately $300 million in "tax attributes" or losses. Court approval was required for any sale.

[4] Under the sales process, a bidder was entitled to bid for any or all of the assets that were being sold, or a combination thereof. Pursuant to the sales process, four bids were received and Look and the Monitor engaged in discussions with each bidder. Look eventually accepted an offer from Inukshuk for the Spectrum and Broadcast License. It is agreed that while not all of the assets of Look were sold, what was sold to Inukshuk were substantially all of the assets of Look.

[5] The parties obtained a consent order on May 14, 2009 from Marrocco J. in which the sale of the Spectrum and Broadcast License to Inukshuk was approved. The order provided that the assets would vest in Inukshuk upon the Monitor filing a certificate with the court certifying as to the completion of the transaction. The sale contemplated a staged closing, with the first taking place immediately following the order of Marrocco J., the second being December 31, 2009 and the final taking place as late as what the sale agreement defined as the Outside Date, being the third anniversary of the date of the final order approving the transaction, i.e., May 14, 2012. I

am told that the reason for the staged dates was that it was anticipated that the necessary regulatory approvals for the sale of the Spectrum and License could take some time.

[6] As it turned out, the final closing took place much earlier than the Outside Date within a few months of the order of Marrocco J. On September 11, 2009, the Monitor filed its certificate with the Court certifying that the purchase price had been paid in full and that the conditions of closing had been satisfied. Thus the sold assets vested in Inukshuk. Under the terms of the plan of arrangement that was approved by the order of Marrocco J., once the certificate of the Monitor as to the completion of the transaction was delivered, the articles of arrangement became effective.

[7] In connection with the application to Marrocco J. to approve the arrangement and the sale to Inukshuk, the Monitor filed a redacted version of its First Report, as is usual in the Commercial List for sales carried out under a court process, redacting the information about the bids received in the sales process. The order of Marrocco J. provided that an unredacted version of the First Report was to be sealed and not form part of the public record until the Monitor's Certificate after the sale was completed was filed with the Court. That certificate, as I have said, was filed with the Court on September 11, 2009. Therefore under the order of Marrocco J. the unredacted First Report of the Monitor was no longer to be sealed.

[8] Look is now attempting to sell its remaining assets, which include a corporation which had been approved by the CRTC to hold a license and has $350 million of tax losses. Look is presently in discussions for the sale of its remaining assets with some of the same parties with whom discussions were held and bids were received under the previous sales process, including Rogers.

[9] In early November 2009 Inukshuk asked the Monitor for the information contained in the Monitor's First Report that was sealed under the order of Marrocco J. Look immediately obtained an *ex parte* order from Campbell J. on November 4, 2009 extending the sealing of the Monitor's First Report pending a determination of this motion.

**Analysis**

[10] Look seeks to extend the sealing order for six months while it completes the sale of its remaining assets. It has a concern that publication of the information could impede the sale process now underway and affect the amount received. Look is concerned that if the bids were disclosed, and with Rogers being one of the parties in discussions with Look for the purchase of Look's tax losses, other players in the telecommunications industry would not bid for the remaining assets.

[11] Inukshuk has filed no affidavit material as to why it is interested in the sealed information in the Monitor's First Report dealing with all of the bids that were received for all assets. Inukshuk's position in a nutshell is that the sales process previously approved by the Court is over and that the public interest in seeing an open court process should prevent any further sealing of the Monitor's First Report. Mr. Kauffman said that his clients are here in this motion "in their own interest as two members of the public" seeking access to the documents that were filed in the court process.

[12] It is understandable why Rogers would want the information. It has been negotiating with Look for the purchase of one or more of Look's remaining assets. Having access to prior bids in the prior sales process in which one or more of those remaining assets may have been the subject of a bid would obviously be of benefit to Rogers it in considering what price it is prepared to offer for the company with the tax loss benefits. While Mr. Kauffman pointed out that it is Inukshuk Wireless Partnership that is opposing the order sought, and that includes Bell as well as Rogers, the fact remains that the partnership does include Rogers which is in negotiations with Look. In any event, it is unrealistic to think that Bell, through its interest in Inukshuk, is funding at least in part the opposition to the extension of the sealing order out of altruistic or public purposes.

[13] Section 137 of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides that a court may order any document filed in a civil proceeding to be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. The fact that the plan of arrangement consummated under the court proceedings under s. 192 of the CBCA has now been finalized does not in itself mean that the court does not have jurisdiction to continue with the sealing order if it is otherwise appropriate to do so. There is no

limitation in section 137 limiting a sealing order to the time during which the litigation in question is ongoing.

[14] In *MacIntyre v. Nova Scotia*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175, it was held that sworn information to obtain a search warrant could not be made available to the public until the search warrant had been executed. In that case, Dixon J. (as he then was) for the majority noted that the case law did not distinguish between judicial proceedings which are part of a trial and those which are not, and that subject to a few well-recognized exceptions, all judicial proceedings should be in public. He held that the presumption was in favour of public access and the burden of contrary proof lay upon the person contending otherwise.

[15] In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Ministry of Finance*), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, the court authorized a confidentiality order. It stated that an order should be granted in only two circumstances, being (i) when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and (ii) when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right civil litigants to a fair trial, outweighs it deleterious effects, including the effects on the right of free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. In dealing with the notion of an important commercial interest, Iacobucci J. stated:

> In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness".

[16] Look points out that it is not a private company. It is a public company with stakeholders, being public shareholders. It is not the kind of private corporation that Iacobucci J. was discussing in *Sierra*.

[17] It is common when assets are being sold pursuant to a court process to seal the Monitor's report disclosing all of the various bids in case a further bidding process is required if the transaction being approved falls through. Invariably, no one comes back asking that the sealing order be set aside. That is because ordinarily all of the assets that were bid on during the court sale process end up being sold and approved by court order, and so long as the sale transaction or transactions closed, no one has any further interest in the information. In *8857574 Ontario Inc. v. Pizza Pizza Ltd*, (1994), 23 B.L.R. (2nd) 239, Farley J. discussed the fact that valuations submitted by a Receiver for the purpose of obtaining court approval are normally sealed. He pointed out that the purpose of that was to maintain fair play so that competitors or potential bidders do not obtain an unfair advantage by obtaining such information while others have to rely on their own resources. In that context, he stated that he thought the most appropriate sealing order in a court approval sale situation would be that the supporting valuation materials remain sealed until such time as the sale transaction had closed.

[18] This case is a little different from the ordinary. Some of the assets that were bid on during the sales process were not sold. However, because the assets that were sold constituted substantially all of the assets of Look, the arrangement under section 192 of the CBCA was completed. Those assets that were not sold remained, however, to be sold and it is in the context of that process that Rogers has been discussing purchasing one or more of these assets from Look.

[19] In this case, had the closing of the sale of the Spectrum and the License been drawn out to the maximum three year period provided for in the sale agreement, these remaining assets in all likelihood would have been sold before the maximum period ran out and during a period of time in which the Receiver's First Report remaining sealed. In those circumstances the effect of the sealing order would have been to protect the later sale process, a process which originally involved a sale of all of the assets of Look. While the remaining sales will not take place under

the original sale process that was conducted by Look and the Monitor, the commercial interest in seeing that the remaining assets are sold to the benefit of all stakeholders, including the public shareholders of Look, remains now as it did before.

[20] The advantage to Rogers in seeing what other bidders may have bid on the assets that have remained unsold is obvious. Rogers is in negotiations with Look regarding the acquisition of one or more of those assets. If other bidders previously bid on one or more of those assets, that information would be beneficial to Rogers. If the other bidders did not bid on any of those remaining assets, that too would be of interest to Rogers. As well, Look's concern that the disclosure of the sealed information could impede other bidders from coming forward is not without some merit.

[21] In *Sierra*, Iacobucci J said there were core values that should be considered in a motion such as this. *Sierra* involved an application by the Government of Canada for a confidentiality order protecting documents from public disclosure in litigation between the *Sierra Club* and the Government. Iacobucci J. stated that under the order sought, public access to the documents in question would be restricted, which would infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantees contained in section 2(b) of the *Charter*. He discussed the core values of freedom of expression and how they should be considered in a motion seeking confidentiality of documents. He stated:

> Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [page551] at p. 976; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, per Dickson C.J. Charter jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the Charter: Keegstra, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to Charter principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the

> core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify. (underlining added)

[22] Rogers, or Inukshuk, cannot, in my view, claim that there will be a substantial detrimental effect on these core values by a continuation of the sealing order for a further six months. What Rogers will lose will be access to information that it could use against the interests of Look and its stakeholders. In my view, the salutary effects of extending the sealing order for six months to permit the sale of the remaining assets of Look outweighs the deleterious effects of such order in this case.

[23] Inukshuk asks that if the extension order is made, there is no reason to seal the prior bids for the Spectrum that Inukshuk purchased and thus the order should permit that information to be made public. It is said by Mr. Kauffman that such information is of historical interest. I would not make this exception as requested by Inukshuk. Bidders under the prior sales process were entitled to bid on all of the assets either individually or together, and Mr. Porter points out that it may well be difficult to separate out the portion of any prior bid dealing with the Spectrum from a bid for other assets that are now sought to be sold. If the interest sought is only for historical purposes, a six month delay will not be of much or any consequence.

[24] In the circumstances, the order sought by Look shall go. Look is entitled to its costs of the motion against Inukshuk. If costs cannot be agreed, short submissions may be made within ten days by Look and reply submissions may be made within a further ten days by Inukshuk.

NEWBOULD J.

**DATE:** December 18, 2009

# TAB 13

Province of Alberta

# BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT

Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000
Chapter B-9

Current as of December 7, 2023

Office Consolidation



Alberta King's Printer
Suite 700, Park Plaza
10611 - 98 Avenue
Edmonton, AB T5K 2P7
Phone: 780-427-4952

E-mail: kings-printer@gov.ab.ca
Shop on-line at kings-printer.alberta.ca

## Note

All persons making use of this consolidation are reminded that it has no legislative sanction, that amendments have been embodied for convenience of reference only. The official Statutes and Regulations should be consulted for all purposes of interpreting and applying the law.

## Amendments Not in Force

This consolidation incorporates only those amendments in force on the consolidation date shown on the cover. It does not include the following amendments:

2023 c3 s5 amends ss156 and 159(1).

## Regulations

The following is a list of the regulations made under the *Business Corporations Act* that are filed as Alberta Regulations under the Regulations Act

| | **Alta. Reg.** | *Amendments* |
|---|---|---|
| **Business Corporations Act** | | |
| Business Corporations | 118/2000 | *231/2000, 191/2001, 206/2001, 251/2001, 83/2005, 218/2005, 35/2007, 68/2008, 104/2009, 31/2012, 105/2012, 170/2012, 125/2013, 146/2015, 115/2017, 10/2019, 128/2019, 86/2022, 216/2022, 98/2023* |

(b) deal with any property of the corporation in the receiver's or receiver-manager's possession or control in a commercially reasonable manner.

1981 cB-15 s94

**Powers of the Court**

**99** On an application by a receiver or receiver-manager, whether appointed by the Court or under an instrument, or on an application by any interested person, the Court may make any order it thinks fit including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any or all of the following:

(a) an order appointing, replacing or discharging a receiver or receiver-manager and approving the receiver's or receiver-manager's accounts;

(b) an order determining the notice to be given to any person or dispensing with notice to any person;

(c) an order fixing the remuneration of the receiver or receiver-manager;

(d) an order

(i) requiring the receiver or receiver-manager, or a person by or on behalf of whom the receiver or receiver-manager is appointed, to make good any default in connection with the receiver's or receiver-manager's custody or management of the property and business of the corporation;

(ii) relieving any of those persons from any default on any terms the Court thinks fit;

(iii) confirming any act of the receiver or receiver-manager;

(e) an order that the receiver or receiver-manager make available to the applicant any information from the accounts of the receiver's or receiver-manager's administration that the Court specifies;

(f) an order giving directions on any matter relating to the duties of the receiver or receiver-manager.

1981 cB-15 s95;1987 c15 s9

**Duties of receiver and receiver-manager**

**100** A receiver or receiver-manager shall

(a) immediately notify the Registrar of the receiver's or receiver-manager's appointment or discharge,

# TAB 14

# Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Winalta Inc. (Re), 2011 ABQB 399**

**Date:** 20110624
**Docket:** 1003 06865
**Registry:** Edmonton



In the *Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* R. S. C. 1985, c.C - 36, as amended

In the Matter of the Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Winalta Inc., Winalta Homes Inc., Winalta Carriers Inc., Winalta Oilfield Rentals Inc., Winalta Carlton Homes Inc., Winalta Holdings Inc., Winalta Construction Inc., Baywood Property Management Inc., and 916830 Alberta Ltd.

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**Memorandum of Decision**
**of the**
**Honourable Madam Justice J.E. Topolniski**

---

## I. Introduction

> Professional fees in a *CCAA* proceeding hold the potential to be behest with controversy as a result of various factors including lack of transparency, overreaching and conflicts of interest.
>
> (Professor Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Virginia Torres, "A Cost-Benefit Analysis: Examining Professional Fees in *CCAA* Proceedings," in Janis P. Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law 2009* (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008) 142 at p. 169)

[1] Deloitte & Touche Inc's. application for approval of its fees as a monitor under the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (*CCAA*) is opposed by the debtor

companies, whose allegations mimic the concerns expressed by Professor Ben-Ishai and Virginia Torres in the preceding quote.

[2] The Winalta companies (Winalta Group) obtained protection from their creditors under the provisions of the *CCAA* on April 26, 2010. At the time, three of nine of the Winalta Group were active. The Winalta Group's assets were worth about $9.5 million, while its liabilities exceeded $73 million.

[3] The *CCAA* proceedings moved swiftly at the behest of the primary secured creditor, HSBC Bank Canada (HSBC). It took just six months from the initiation of the proceedings to implementation of the plan.

[4] Deloitte & Touche Inc. now wants to be discharged and paid. The Winalta Group takes umbrage at its bill for $1,155,206.05 (Fee) and is asking for a $275,000.00 adjustment for alleged overcharging. It complains about the following:

(i) charges for support and professional staff other than partners' services/inadequately particularized services (Non-Partner Services);

(ii) duplication;

(iii) a six percent administration fee charged in lieu of disbursements ($50,000.00);

(iv) mathematical errors ($47,979.39); and

(v) charges for internal quality reviews described as something “required to be independent from the engagement” ($10,000.00).

[5] The Winalta Group also seeks a $75,000.00 reduction to the Fee as something “akin to punitive damages” for breach of fiduciary duty. It claims that the breach arose when Deloitte & Touche Inc. prepared and delivered a net realization value report to HSBC on September 2, 2010 (September NVR) that prompted HSBC to refuse funding costs to acquire takeout financing.

[6] Deloitte & Touche Inc. has agreed to deduct its $10,000.00 charge for the internal quality reviews, but rejects the suggestion that the Fee otherwise is unfair or unreasonable. It asserts that it acted within its mandate and in compliance with its fiduciary obligations. It contends there is no evidence to support the suggestion that HSBC withdrew or reduced its support for the restructuring after receiving the September NVR.

## II. A Quick Look Back

[7] A brief review of the relationship between the Winalta Group, HSBC and Deloitte & Touche Inc. is useful to better appreciate some of the dynamics at play in this application.

[8] The Winalta Group's operations and assets are located in Alberta, except for a small holding in Saskatchewan. Its head office is in Edmonton.

[9] In November 2009, HSBC entered into a forbearance agreement with the Winalta Group, which owed it in excess of $47 million (the "Forbearance Agreement"). The Winalta Group agreed to Deloitte & Touche Inc. being retained as HSBC's private monitor, commonly called a "look see" consultant. The Winalta group also agreed to give HSBC a consent receivership order that could be filed with no strings attached.

[10] The Winalta Group was not a party to the private monitor agreement between HSBC and Deloitte & Touche Inc., although it was responsible for payment of the private monitor's fees pursuant to the security held by HSBC. It was aware that the private monitor agreement provided for a six percent flat "administration fee" that would be charged by Deloitte & Touche Inc. in lieu of “customary disbursements such as postage, telephone, faxes, and routine photocopying.” Charges for “reasonable out of pocket expenses” for travel expenses were not included in the “administration fee.”

[11] Clearly, HSBC was in the position of power. It agreed to support the Winalta Group's restructuring and to fund its operations throughout the *CCAA* process on the following conditions:

(i) the monitor would be Deloitte & Touche Inc. (the Monitor) and a Vancouver partner of that firm, Jervis Rodriquez, would be the "partner in charge" of the file;

(ii) HSBC would be unaffected by the *CCAA* proceedings;

(iii) the initial order presented to the court for consideration would authorize the Monitor to report to HSBC; and

(iv) the Winalta's Group's indebtedness to HSBC would be retired by October 30, 2010.

[12] On April 26, 2010, the initial order was granted as the Winalta Group and HSBC had planned (Initial Order).

[13] HSBC continued to provide operating and overdraft facilities to the Winalta Group during the *CCAA* process, as outlined in the Initial Order, which also provided that the Monitor could report to HSBC on certain matters, the details of which are discussed in the context of the Winalta Group’s allegation that the Monitor breached its fiduciary duties.

[14] The Winalta Group did not seek DIP financing. Its quest for takeout financing to meet the October 30, 2010 cutoff imposed by HSBC was frustrated when HSBC refused to fund the costs

associated with obtaining replacement financing without a three million dollar guarantee. A stakeholder came to the rescue. The Winalta Group is of the view that HSBC's refusal to pay the costs is directly attributable to the Monitor's actions in connection with the September NVR.

[15] There is nothing in the evidence or the submissions made at the hearing of this application that hints at a strained relationship between the Winalta Group and the Monitor before the Winalta Group learned when it examined a Deloitte & Touche Inc. partner in the context of this application that the Monitor had provided HSBC with the September NVR.

[16] The Monitor's interim accounts were sent at regular intervals. They described activities typical of a monitor in a *CCAA* restructuring, including intense activity in the early phases tapering off as the process unfolded, with a spike around the time of the claims bar date and creditors' meeting. There is no suggestion that the Winalta Group voiced concern about the Monitor's interim accounts. Up until the present application, it seems to have been squarely focused on the goal of obtaining a positive creditor vote and paying its debt to HSBC by the cutoff date.

[17] In its twentieth report to the court, the Monitor stated that its Fee is for services rendered in response to "the required and necessary duties of the Monitor hereunder, and are reasonable in the circumstances."

## III. Analysis

### A. Proper Charges

#### 1. General Principles

[18] There is a scarcity of judicial commentary relating specifically to the fees of court-appointed monitors, which likely is attributable to the limited number of opposed applications for passing of their accounts.

[19] In their article "A Cost-Benefit Analysis: Examining Professional Fees in *CCAA* Proceedings," the authors discuss their (qualified) survey of insolvency practitioners, stating at p. 168:

> Several answers noted the court's tendency has been to "rubber stamp" professional fees in non-contentious cases. This lack of judicial scrutiny was concerning to some participants, who stated that an increased degree of oversight would be helpful to ensure the legitimacy of the work completed and fees charged.

[20] At pp. 146-147, they review certain cases addressing *CCAA* monitors' fees. Most of these cases, rather than focussing on general considerations in determining what constitutes a monitor's "reasonable fee," deal with specific concerns about professional fees, such as:

(i) approval of Canadian and American counsel fees in a cross-border insolvency (***Re Muscletech Research & Development Inc.*** (2007), 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59 (Ont. S.C.J.)); or

(ii) approval of "special" or "premium fees" for an administrator under a *CCAA* plan of arrangement (***Confederation Financial Services (Canada) Ltd. v. Confederation Treasury Services Ltd.*** (2003), 40 C.B.R. (4th) 10 (Ont. S.C.J.)).

[21] In ***Community Pork Ventures Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce,*** 2005 SKQB 24 at para. 10, 8 C.B.R. (5th) 34, Kyle J. commented in the context of opposed applications to extend a stay under the CCAA on the significant amount of anticipated professional fees, noting that: "... the court must be on guard against any course of action which would render the process futile."

[22] On a different application in the same proceeding (2005 SKQB 252), Kyle J. reiterated a concern about the burgeoning professional fees (at para.5), saying that they might "sink the company's chances of survival." He also was critical (at paras. 11-12) of the monitor's "excellent though useless" report, its practices of recording minimum half-hour blocks of time and billing for discussions with junior staff. The final criticism (para. 15) was that the monitor's fees were offside the local practice.

[23] In ***Re Triton Tubular Components Corp.*** (2006), 20 C.B.R. (5th) 278 at para. 83 (Ont. S.C.J.), additional reasons at 2006 CarswellOnt 1029 (S.C.J.), Madam Justice Mesbur's criteria in scrutinizing the propriety of a monitor's counsel's fee was that which "...one would expect from a resistant client."

[24] Given the paucity of judicial commentary on the fees of *CCAA* monitors generally, guidance often is sought from analogous case law dealing with the fees of receivers and trustees in bankruptcy.

[25] One of the cases most often cited is ***Federal Business Development Bank v. Belyea*** (1983), 46 C.B.R. (N.S.) 244 at paras. 3 and 9, 44 N.B.R. (2d) 248 (C.A.), which set out the following principles and considerations that apply in assessing a receiver's fees:

> …The governing principle appears to be that the compensation allowed a receiver should be measured by the fair and reasonable value of his services and while sufficient fees should be paid to induce competent persons to serve as receivers, receiverships should be administered as economically as reasonably possible. Thus, allowances for services performed must be just, but nevertheless moderate rather than generous ...

> . . .The considerations applicable in determining the reasonable remuneration to be paid to a receiver should, in my opinion, include the nature, extent and value of the assets handled, the complications and difficulties encountered, the degree of assistance provided by the company, its officers or its employees, the time spent, the receiver's knowledge, experience and skill, the diligence and thoroughness displayed, the responsibilities assumed, the results of the receiver's efforts, and the cost of comparable services when performed in a prudent and economical manner.

[26] In ***Re Agristar Inc***., 2005 ABQB 431, 12 C.B.R. (5th) 1, Hart J. applied the factors articulated in ***Belyea*** in determining the fairness of the fees charged by a *CCAA* monitor which had been replaced part way through the proceedings. In that case, the court had the benefit of the replacement monitor's accounts to use as a direct comparator.

[27] Referee Funduk in ***Northland Bank v. G.I.C. Industries Ltd.*** (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 217, 73 A.R. 372 refused (at para. 18) to place a receiver's account under a microscope and to engage in a minute examination of its work. He opined (at para. 35) that: "... parties should not expect to get the services of a chartered accountant at a cheap rate," citing ***Prairie Palace Motel Ltd. v. Carlson*** (1980), 35 C.B.R. (N.S.) 312 (Sask. Q.B.) and ***Peat***, ***Marwick Ltd. v. Farmstart*** (1983), 51 C.B.R. (N.S.) 127 (Sask. Q.B.) in support.

[28] In ***Re Hess*** (1977), 23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 215 (Ont. S.C.), Henry J. considered the following factors in taxing a trustee in bankruptcy's accounts:

(a) allowing the trustee a fair compensation for his services;

(b) preventing unjustifiable payments for fees to the detriment of the estate and the creditors; and

(c) encouraging efficient, conscientious administration of the estate.

[29] Similar to the caution given in ***Northland Bank***, Henry J. warned consumers (at para. 11) that: "...it should be borne in mind that the labourer is worthy of his hire. The creditors and the public are entitled to the best services from professional trustees and must expect to pay for them."

[30] In my view, the appropriate focus on an application to approve a *CCAA* monitor's fees is no different than that in a receivership or bankruptcy. The question is whether the fees are fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances. The concerns are ensuring that the monitor is fairly compensated while safeguarding the efficiency and integrity of the *CCAA* process. As with any inquiry, the evidence proffered will be important in making those determinations.

[31] The Monitor in the present case takes the position that the Winalta Group has failed to present cogent evidence to show that the Fee is neither fair nor reasonable. In essence, it asks that the court apply a presumption of regularity.

[32] I am not aware of any reported authority supporting the proposition that there is a presumption of regularity that applies to a monitor's fees. This application is no different than any other. The applicant, here the Monitor, bears the onus of making out its case. A bald assertion by the Monitor that the Fee is reasonable does not necessarily make it so. The Monitor must provide the court with cogent evidence on which the court can base its assessment of whether the Fee is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances.



### 2. Non-Partner Services

[33] The Fee includes charges for eighteen support staff, a number which the Winalta Group wryly notes equals that of its own staff complement. The support staff involved included those in clerical, website maintenance, analysis, managerial and senior management positions, with (discounted) hourly billing rates ranging from $65.89 per hour (clerical services) to $460.79 per hour (senior management services).

[34] The Winalta Group urges that the (discounted) hourly rate of $588.00 charged by the two partners, Messrs. Jervis and Keeble, should have included any work performed by support staff, as is the typical billing practice for lawyers.

#### (a) *Clerical, administrative, and IT staff*

[35] In ***Peat, Marwick Ltd.*** at para. 9, Vancise J. ruled that the charges for secretarial and clerical staff should properly form part of the firm's overhead and, therefore, should not be included in the account for professional services.

[36] Referee Funduk in ***Northland Bank*** refused to follow that aspect of the ***Peat, Marwick Ltd.*** decision as it rested on what he referred to as an "erroneous presumption" that chartered accountants necessarily employ the same billing format as lawyers. Referee Funduk found that the receiver in that case had used the standard billing format for chartered accountants, in which support staff were charged separately. He expressed the view (at para. 30) that it is wrong to compare a chartered accountant's hourly charges to those of a lawyer and to conclude that there is enough profit in the accountant's charges so that work undertaken by staff should not be charged separately. He said that the two operations are not the same and the inquiry should focus on the standard billing format and practice of the profession in question.

[37] The Alberta Court of Appeal weighed in on the topic in ***Columbia Trust Company v. Coopers & Lybrand Ltd.*** (1986), 76 A.R. 303, Stevenson J.A. stating at para. 8:

> ... the propriety of charges for secretarial and accounting services must be reviewed to determine if they are properly an "overhead" component that should

> be or was included or absorbed within the hourly fee charged by some of the professionals who rendered services. The Court, moreover, must be satisfied that the services were reasonably necessary having regard to the amounts involved.

[38] In the result, the court in ***Columbia Trust Company*** elected not to make an arbitrary award but rather to return the matter for "the application of proper principles."

[39] In ***Bank of Montreal v. Nican Trading Co.***, (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 85 at 93, 43 B.C.L.R. (2d) 315, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that, having regard to the evidence in that case, it was appropriate for the receiver to have charged separately for the secretarial and support staff. Taggart J.A., for the court, observed that ***Columbia Trust*** qualified but did not overrule ***Northland Bank*** as the Alberta Court of Appeal simply referred the matter back for review to ensure there was no duplication.

[40] The law is no different as it concerns a *CCAA* monitor. While the court should avoid microscopic examination of the Monitor's work, the ***Columbia Trust*** requirements nevertheless apply. To a degree, I concur with Referee Funduk's observation in ***Northland Bank*** that the appropriate comparator of a monitor's charges is not the legal profession, as the Winalta Group urges. While mindful that insolvency professionals typically have a chartered accountant's designation, I do not agree with Referee Funduk that the standard billing format for chartered accountants is necessarily the correct comparator. The billing practices for chartered accounts engaged in non-insolvency work may, for a host of reasons, be based on different considerations. What matters is the standard billing practice in the Monitor's own specialized profession - that of the insolvency practitioner.

[41] In the present case, the Initial Order specified that: "[t]he Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, by the Applicants as part of the costs of these proceedings." I interpret this to mean the Monitor's standard rates and charges applied in its insolvency practice.

[42] Concerning the charges for IT staff, the law required the Monitor to maintain a website (*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Regulation*, SOR/2009-219, s. 7). However, that does not derogate from the Monitor's burden to establish that the service should be a permissible separate charge. Practically, the evidence in this regard should say whether the partners' hourly billing rates have been adjusted specifically to address the legislated requirement to maintain a website.

[43] The Monitor has not met the evidentiary burden required of it. It must adduce sufficient evidence to show that in its insolvency practice its industry standard is to charge out secretarial, administrative and IT staff separately rather than to include or absorb those charges as part of the hourly fee charged by the professional staff. If that is its standard practice, it must show that the rates charged were its standard (or discounted) rates. It must also establish that the services were reasonably necessary having regard to the amounts involved.

[44] The Monitor is to present affidavit evidence within the next 60 days to address the issues discussed, failing which the charges will be disallowed. This material will be prepared at the Monitor's own cost and the costs of any further application will be addressed at the appropriate time.



### (b) *Professional staff (non-partner)*

[45] The Winalta Group contends that there was a duplication of work by non-partner professional staff and that inadequate billing information has been provided. It points to certain entries that are terse, non-specific descriptions of services.

[46] Like Hall J. in ***Re Hickman Equipment (1985) Ltd.*** (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 203 at para. 20, 214 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 126, I consider many of the descriptions of services in the Monitor's accounts to be "singularly laconic." The party responsible for paying a monitor's bill is entitled to more. That said, I find the Winalta Group's suggestion of punishing the Monitor for this infraction by reducing the Fee to be unduly harsh.

[47] Despite the cursory nature of certain entries, the work of the Monitor’s subordinate professional staff appears to have been appropriate and in furtherance of the ultimate goal of restructuring the Winalta Group's affairs. There seems to be nothing blatantly untoward or unusual about the work undertaken by these individuals.

[48] Engaging less senior professionals and other subordinate staff to report to and discuss their findings with more senior professionals is not unusual and does not "constitute any type of double teaming of a nature that would be obviously inappropriate" (***Re Hickman Equipment (1985) Ltd.*** at para. 26).

[49] Consideration of the factors articulated in ***Belyea*** supports the finding that it was acceptable for the Monitor to engage less senior professional staff. In my view, it is relevant that the *CCAA* proceedings moved quickly; the restructuring involved multiple entities, including a publically traded parent; liabilities far outweighed asset values; an intensive sales campaign was initiated to shed redundant asset; and there were numerous claims and disallowances (all but one of which was resolved without the need for court intervention).

[50] There is no evidence suggesting that the Monitor's non-partner professional staff was anything but knowledgeable, thorough and diligent, or that their services were excessive, duplicative or unnecessary. While there may have been some degree of professional overlap with the partners, given typical reporting structures, that is facially neither unusual nor inappropriate. The result achieved was positive - a 100 percent vote in favour of the plan of arrangement.

[51] I am mindful that the Winalta Group was a co-operative debtor.

## 3. <u>Duplication of work by partners</u>

[52] The Winalta Group also contends that there was duplication of work by two of Deloitte & Touche Inc.’s partners, Messrs. Keeble and Rodriquez.

[53] HSBC held a figurative Sword of Damocles over the Winalta Group's head before and during the *CCAA* proceedings. Many concessions were made by the Winalta Group, including its agreement to Mr. Rodriguez being the partner "in charge" for the Monitor, despite his residence being in Vancouver while the Winalta Group's assets and operations were located in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Freed from HSBC's control, the Winalta Group belatedly questions Mr. Rodriguez's general involvement.

[54] It is undisputed that Mr. Keeble was the Monitor’s "hands on" partner. Mr. Rodriquez, who was familiar to HSBC's special credits branch located in Vancouver, doubtless performed many useful tasks, but as the known entity and more experienced partner, his main raison d'être was to liaise with and provide comfort to HSBC.

[55] Both Messrs. Rodriquez and Keeble signed (and presumably carefully prepared or, at a minimum, carefully considered) all twenty of the Monitor's reports to the court. Report preparation underwent three stages. The initial drafts were prepared by the Winalta Group (at the Monitor's request). Next, a review was conducted by one or two of the Monitor's managers. Finally, the reports were delivered to Messrs. Rodriquez and Keeble.

[56] The Monitor's accounts do not specify what portion of the fees charged for Mr. Rodriquez ($127,000.00) and for Mr. Keeble ($209,992.00) relates solely to report preparation. Similarly, the Monitor’s accounts do not aid in determining if there was any other duplication of work by the two partners.

[57] The Winalta Group is entitled to know exactly what it is paying for. That said, it thoroughly questioned the Monitor about the respective roles of Messrs. Rodriquez and Keeble. No evidence was presented to show that there was, in fact, any duplication or that any of the work that they undertook was unreasonable. These charges, therefore, are approved.

### 4. The administration charge

[58] The Winalta Group contends that the Monitor's $50,000.00 administration charge (calculated as six percent of all accounts) in lieu of “customary disbursements” is an unfair "upcharge" with no correlation to reality. In response, The Monitor submits that the Winalta Group implicitly agreed to the administration charge. It further argues that the Winalta Group bears the onus of showing that this charge is offside current industry practice.

[59] The Monitor did not inform the Winalta Group of its intention to charge on the same basis as it had billed HSBC. It simply picked up as the *CCAA* monitor where it had left off as HSBC's private monitor. The Monitor points to the Forbearance Agreement, which referred to the administration fee in the Monitor's retainer letter with HSBC as some evidence of the

Winalta Group's knowledge and implicit agreement to pay any administration charge in the *CCAA*.

[60] Under the terms of HSBC's security, the Winalta Group was liable for the charges of the private monitor. However, it was not a party to the agreement between Deloitte & Touche Inc. and HSBC. In any event, there is no basis for imputing any agreement on the part of the Winalta Group to pay the administration charge in the context of Deloitte & Touche Inc.'s work as *CCAA* Monitor. Even if it were otherwise, I am far from satisfied that such charges are fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances.

[61] A "disbursement" is defined as "the payment of money from a fund" or "a payment, especially one made by a solicitor to a third party and then claimed back from the client" (*Oxford Dictionaries Online*).

[62] The administration charge may be more or less than the Monitor's actual disbursements. While it may be convenient for the Monitor to apply a flat percentage charge rather than keep track of disbursements, that does not mean that it is fair and reasonable. Indeed, even if a *CCAA* debtor expressly agreed to the administration charge, such agreement and the circumstances in which it was made simply are factors that the court should consider in determining whether the administrative charge is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances.

[63] The Monitor has failed to establish that the administration charge is fair and reasonable in all of the circumstances. The Monitor shall issue an account to the Winalta Group for actual disbursements incurred within 60 days. Whether the Winalta Group will be pleasantly surprised or disappointed will then be seen.

[64] The disbursement account will be prepared at the Monitor's own cost.

### 5. Mathematical errors

[65] The parties have resolved the alleged mathematical errors.

### 6. Internal quality reviews

[66] At the hearing of this matter, the Monitor quite properly conceded that the $10,000.00 charged for internal quality reviews should be deducted from its Fees.

## B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Conflict of Interest

[67] A monitor appointed under the *CCAA* is an officer of the court who is required to perform the obligations mandated by the court and under the common law. A monitor owes a fiduciary duty to the stakeholders; is required to account to the court; is to act independently; and must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, including creditors, the debtor and its shareholders.

[68] Kevin P. McElcheran describes the monitor's role in the following terms in *Commercial Insolvency in Canada* (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at p. 236 :

> The monitor is an officer of the court. It is the court's eyes and ears with a mandate to assist the court in its supervisory role. The monitor is not an advocate for the debtor company or any party in the *CCAA* process. It has a duty to evaluate the activities of the debtor company and comment independently on such actions in any report to the court and the creditors.

[69] The Winalta Group contends that the Monitor breached its fiduciary duty (and implicitly placed itself in a conflict of interest position) by providing HSBC with the September NVR without its knowledge or consent. The onus of establishing the allegation of breach of fiduciary duty lies with the Winalta Group.

[70] The September NVR was sent to HSBC via e-mail. It included a summary of the Monitor’s analysis and backup spreadsheets for the following two scenarios:

(1) the bank appoints a receiver for all companies on September 7, 2010;

(2) the bank supports the company through the *CCAA* and is paid out on October 31, 2010 through a refinancing of the assets of Oilfield and Carriers.

The author of the e-mail asked the recipient to confirm his availability to discuss the scenarios with Messrs. Rodriquez and Keeble the next day.

[71] Mr. Keeble’s responses to questioning, filed March 18, 2011, reference three other reports from the Monitor to HSBC dated June 7, August 12, and August 18, 2010, all of which discussed the estimated value of HSBC’s security in various scenarios (Other NVRs). The Winalta Group neither complained of nor referred to the Other NVRs in its evidence or submissions. In the absence of any complaint and evidence, the sole focus of this inquiry is on the September NVR.

[72] The Winalta Group's complaints concerning the September NVR are that it was prepared and issued without its knowledge and it lead to HSBC’s refusal to fund its takeout financing costs. Articulated in the language used to describe a *CCAA* monitor's duties, the Winalta Group is saying that the Monitor favoured HSBC (placing it in an advantageous position over other creditors) and failed to avoid an actual or perceived conflict of interest.

[73] Accusations of bias and breach of fiduciary duty can harm the public's confidence in the insolvency system and, if unfounded, the insolvency practitioner's good name. A careful investigation into allegations of misconduct is, therefore, essential. The process should entail the following steps:

1. A review of the monitor's duties and powers as defined by the *CCAA* and court orders relevant to the allegation.

2. An assessment of the monitor's actions in the contextual framework of the relevant provisions of the *CCAA* and court orders.

3. If the monitor failed to discharge its duties or exceeded its powers, the court should then:

   (a) determine if damage is attributable to the monitor's conduct, including damage to the integrity of the insolvency system; and

   (b) ascertain the appropriate fee reduction (bearing in mind that other bodies are charged with the responsibility of ethical concerns arising from a *CCAA* monitor's conduct).

**Step 1: <u>Reviewing the monitor's duties and powers as defined by the *CCAA* and court orders relevant to the allegation</u>**

**(a) *The monitor's fiduciary and ethical duties***

[74] Section 25 of the *CCAA* provides that:

> 25. In exercising any of his or her powers in performing any of his or her duties and functions, the monitor must act honestly and in good faith and comply with the *Code of Ethics* referred to in section 13.5 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

[75] Section 13.5 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, 1985 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 ("*BIA*") provides that a trustee shall comply with the prescribed *Code of Ethics*. The *Code of Ethics* is found in Rules 34 to 53 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency General Rules*, C.R.C., c. 368 under the *BIA*. These Rules provide in part that:

(a) Every trustee shall maintain the high standards of ethics that are central to the maintenance of public trust and confidence in administration of the Act (Rule 34).

(b) Trustees shall be honest and impartial and shall provide interested parties with full and accurate information as required by the Act with respect to the professional engagements of the trustees (Rule 39).

(c) Trustees who are acting with respect to any professional engagement shall avoid any influence, interest or relationship that impairs, or appears in the

> opinion of an informed person to impair, their professional judgment (Rule 44).

[76] In addition, *CCAA* monitors are subject to the ethical standards imposed on them by their governing professional bodies.

[77] A recurring theme found in the case law is that the monitor's duty is to ensure that no creditor has an advantage over another (see ***Siscoe & Savoie v. Royal Bank of Canada*** (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d) 1 at 8 (N.B.C.A.); ***Re Laidlaw Inc.*** (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 72 at para. 2 (Ont. S.C.J.); ***Re United Used Auto & Truck Parts Ltd.*** (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 at para. 20 (B.C.S.C.); and ***Re 843504 Alberta Ltd.***, 2003 ABQB 1015 at para. 19, 351 A.R. 223). The following observations made by Farley J. in ***Re Confederation Treasury Services Ltd.***, (1995), 37 C.B.R. (3d) 237 at 247 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) about a bankruptcy trustee's duty of impartiality resonate:

> The appointment is not a franchise to make money (although a trustee should be rewarded for its efforts on behalf of the estate) nor to favour one party or one side. The trustee is an impartial officer of the Court; woe be to it if it does not act impartially towards the creditors of the estate.

[78] In his article, *Conflicts of Interest and the Insolvency Practitioner: Keeping up Appearances* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 56, Eric O. Peterson tackles the issue of conflict of interest in circumstances where an insolvency practitioner wears two hats. At p. 74, he states:

> ... The duties of a *CCAA* monitor are defined by standard terms in the court order, and are typically owed to the court, the creditors and the debtor company. Therefore, a private monitor or receiver would have a potential conflict of interest in accepting an engagement as *CCAA* monitor of the same debtor. The engagements are at cross purposes.

[79] Mr. Peterson cautions (at p. 75) that even if an experienced business person consents to the insolvency practitioner wearing two hats, the insolvency practitioner should bear in mind Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo's statement that a fiduciary must be held to something stricter than the morals of the marketplace.

[80] Not surprisingly, there may be heightened sensitivity about the work of a *CCAA* monitor who has chosen to wear two hats. Unfounded accusations may be made due to an honestly held suspicion about where the monitor's loyalties lie rather than out of spite or malice.

[81] Common sense dictates that *CCAA* monitors should conduct their affairs in an open and transparent fashion in all of their dealings with the debtor and the creditors alike. The reason is simple. Transparency promotes public confidence and mitigates against unfounded allegations of bias. Secrecy breeds suspicion.

[82] Public confidence in the insolvency system is dependent on it being fair, just and accessible. Bias, whether perceived or actual, undermines the public's faith in the system. In order to safeguard against that risk, a *CCAA* monitor must act with professional neutrality, and scrupulously avoid placing itself in a position of potential or actual conflict of interest.



### (b) *The Monitor's legislated and court ordered duties*

[83] One of a monitor's functions is to serve as a conduit of information for the creditors. This did not, however, give the Monitor here *carte blanche* to conduct the analysis in the September NVR and issue it to HSBC. Such authority must be found in the *CCAA* or the court orders made in the proceeding.

[84] Subsections 23(h) and (i) of the *CCAA* deal with the monitor's duty to report to the court. Subsection 23(h) requires the monitor to promptly advise the court if it is of the opinion that it would be more beneficial to the creditors if *BIA* proceedings were taken. Section 23(i) requires the monitor to advise the court on the reasonableness and fairness of any compromise or arrangement that is proposed between the debtor and its creditors. Typically, this report is shared with the creditors just before or at the creditors' meeting to vote on the proposed compromise or arrangement.

[85] The provisions in the Initial Order describing the Monitor's reporting functions are central to this inquiry. They must be read contextually.

[86] HSBC was an unaffected creditor that continued to provide financing to the Winalta Group by an operating line of credit and overdraft facility. There was no DIP financing as HSBC was, in effect, the interim financier. Clause 22 of the Initial Order speaks to HSBC's role as a financier during the *CCAA* process.

[87] Clause 28(d) of the Initial Order reads, in part, as follows:

> 28. The Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the *CCAA*, is hereby directed and empowered to:
>
> (d) advise the Applicants in their preparation of the Applicant's cash flow statements and reporting required by HSBC or any DIP lender, which information shall be reviewed with the Monitor and delivered to HSBC or any DIP lender and its counsel on a periodic basis, but not less than weekly, or as otherwise agreed to by HSBC and any DIP lender. [Emphasis added.]

[88] Clause 30 of the Initial Order states:

> The Monitor shall provide HSBC and any other creditor of the Applicants' and any DIP Lender with information provided by the Applicants in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicants is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by the Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicants may agree. [Emphasis added.]

[89] The Monitor's capacity to report to HSBC was limited to the parameters of these provisions.

**Step 2: Assessing the Monitor's actions**

**(a) *Principles of interpretation***

[90] The interpretation of clauses 28(d) and 30 of the Initial Order lies at the heart of this stage of the analysis. Before undertaking that task, it is helpful to review the principles governing interpretation of the *CCAA* and *CCAA* orders.

[91] In ***Smoky River Coal Ltd.***, 2001 ABCA 209, 299 A.R. 125, the Alberta Court of Appeal cautioned that as *CCAA* orders become the roadmap for the proceedings, they must be drafted with clarity and precision, and the purpose of the legislation must be kept at the forefront in both drafting and interpreting *CCAA* orders (at para. 16).

[92] The issue in ***Smoky River Coal Ltd.*** was the scope of a provision in an order that did not define a post-petition trade creditor's charge. The court stressed (at para. 17) the importance of clearly defining the scope of charges created by the order. Since the parties had failed to do so, the court balanced the parties' interests, presuming that creditors would understand the purpose of the *CCAA* and would expect that the disputed charge would be interpreted to accord with the commercial reality that the debtor would be operating in its ordinary course. In the circumstances, the court interpreted that requirement on "commercially reasonable terms" (at para. 19).

[93] The provision at issue in ***Re Afton Food Group Ltd.*** (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 102, 18 B.L.R. (4th) 34 (Ont. S.C.J.) was the scope of a director's and officers' indemnification. At para. 23, Spies J. ruled that the ***Smoky River Coal Ltd.*** considerations (a liberal interpretation, consideration of the purpose of the *CCAA*, the attempt to balance the parties' interests, and a commercially reasonable interpretation) apply only if the provision is ambiguous, or if there is a gap or omission. In all other circumstances, the court should:

(i) assume that the parties carefully drafted the terms of the order;

(ii) assume that the terms of the order reflect the parties' agreement within the parameters imposed by the court, and that such agreement was codified in the order and approved by the court; and

(iii) interpret a clear and unambiguous provision in accordance with its plain meaning.

[94] The different approaches employed by the courts in ***Smoky River Coal Ltd.*** and ***Afton Food Group Ltd.*** are easily reconciled given the degree of ambiguity in and the nature of the provisions being interpreted in each case.

[95] In my view, the interpretation of *CCAA* orders requires a case-specific and contextual approach. In interpreting *CCAA* orders, the court should consider the objects of the *CCAA*, recognizing that the importance of the objects will vary with the circumstances of the case at bar. Other considerations include the degree of clarity of the provision, its nature, and its consequences for affected parties.

[96] I adopt the reasoning in ***Afton Food Group Ltd.*** that the words of the provision should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, that the court is entitled to assume that the terms of orders [granted as presented] reflect negotiated agreements, and that the terms were crafted carefully. I add to this that the provision being interpreted should be read in the context of the order as a whole, not in isolation.

[97] The modern approach to statutory analysis was summarized as follows by Elmer A. Driedger in his text, *The Construction of Statutes*, 2d ed.(Toronto: Butterworths, 1983 ) at p. 87, as cited in many cases, including ***Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex,*** 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 at para. 26:

> Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

**(b)** ***Interpreting the relevant provisions of the Initial Order and the CCAA***

[98] The object of the *CCAA* is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or to otherwise deal with their assets so that a plan of arrangement or compromise can be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. While this object does not play as significant a role in interpreting clauses 28(d) and 30 of the Initial Order as it might in other cases, nevertheless it is relevant.

[99] Section 23 of the *CCAA* sets out certain reporting requirements for a court- appointed monitor. None of these authorized the Monitor in this case to provide HSBC with the analysis

contained in the September NVR, without the knowledge and consent of the Winalta Group or the court.

[100] Clause 28(d) of the Initial Order empowers and obliges the Monitor to give advice to the Winalta Group about its preparation of cash flow statements and reports required of it by HSBC or any DIP lender. It is clear from the plain and ordinary language of the provision that it applies to instances where the Winalta Group reports to HSBC. It is the Winalta Group's job to do the reporting. The Monitor's job is to assist the Winalta Group and to review the reports before they are delivered to the relevant lender. A contrary finding would render the words "and reviewed with the Monitor" nonsensical.

[101] If there is any ambiguity in clause 28(d), it is about who is to deliver the reports. The use of the word "and" after the words "shall be reviewed with the Monitor" is open to the interpretation that the Monitor is to deliver the reports. As nothing turns on that point, I need not decide it.

[102] I am entitled to and do assume that the parties' affected by clause 28(d) carefully crafted that provision and agreed to its terms. Had they intended the Monitor to undertake the analysis contained in the September NVR and to provide it to HSBC, they would have said so. Whether such a provision would have been granted is another question altogether.

[103] This interpretation is supported by contrasting clause 28(d) with the unambiguous language of clause 30, which refers to the Monitor providing information to HSBC (given to the Monitor by the Winalta Group and declared by it to be non-confidential). Unlike clause 28(d), clause 30 absolves the Monitor of responsibility and liability for its acts. Presumably, the parties would have included similar protection in clause 28(d) if it was intended that the Monitor have the authority it claims.

[104] Interpreting clause 28(d) as referring to reports by the Winalta Group rather than the Monitor also is supported by reading the Initial Order as a whole. Clause 22 speaks to HSBC continuing to provide operating and overdraft facilities to the Winalta Group. As HSBS, in effect, is an interim lender, it is logical that the Winalta Group is obliged under the Initial Order to provide it (and any DIP lender) with cash flow statements and any other required reports on a weekly basis (after having the information reviewed by the Monitor, presumably for accuracy).

[105] Finally, this interpretation is supported by reference to the object of the *CCAA*, which is to have debtors remain in and control their business operations throughout the term of the restructuring. The debtor is the party that reports to its interim lenders.

[106] The Monitor's interpretation of clause 28(d) as authorizing it to prepare and deliver the September NVR to HSBC does not withstand scrutiny. That clause neither expressly nor implicitly authorized the Monitor's conduct in that regard. If the Monitor had any hesitation about the scope of its authority under this clause (which I am of the clear view it ought to have had), its obligation was to seek clarification from the court before proceeding as it did.

[107] Clause 30 is unambiguous. To a degree, it supports the Monitor's action as its plain and ordinary language permits the Monitor to release to HSBC (or any DIP lender) information provided by the Winalta Group which it did not declare to be confidential. The Monitor's notes to the September NVR refer to estimated asset realizations, closing dates for certain transactions, and accounts receivable. Presumably, the Monitor obtained that information from the Winalta Group.

[108] However, the Monitor's estimate of receivership fees, its various calculations, and its analysis stand on a completely different footing. By definition, that is not “information provided by the Winalta Group." Clause 30 does not authorize the Monitor to take information legitimately obtained from the Winalta Group and to use it as the basis for preparing and issuing the type of analysis contained in the September NVR report. Presumably, this provision (which was granted as presented) reflects a negotiated agreement and was carefully crafted.

[109] The Monitor says that it would have prepared and given any creditor the type of analysis contained in the September NVR on demand, irrespective of the creditor’s stake. That may be so (or not), but it does not mean that it is authorized or appropriate for it to do so, particularly without the knowledge and consent of the Winalta Group.

[110] The Monitor's interpretation of clause 30 as authorizing it to prepare and deliver the September NVR to HSBC fails to withstand full scrutiny. Clause 30 did not authorize the Monitor to provide anything over and above the information provided by the Winalta Group. Again, if the Monitor had any hesitation about the scope of its authority under this clause (which I am of the clear view it ought to have had), its obligation was to seek clarification from the court before proceeding as it did.

[111] Read contextually, neither the express language nor the spirit of clauses 28(d) and 30 of the Initial Order authorized the Monitor to issue certain of the information contained in the September NVR. Its authority was limited to relaying non-confidential raw data obtained from the Winalta Group. HSBC could then have interpreted the data (alone or with the assistance of another insolvency practitioner).

[112] The Monitor was not transparent in its dealings with HSBC surrounding the September NVR.

[113] Regrettably, and despite any well intentioned motivation that might be imputed to the Monitor, I find that theMonitor lost sight of the bright line separating its duties as an impartial court officer and a private consultant to HSBC when it provided HSBC with the analysis in the September NVR, thereby creating a perception of bias.

[114] In circumstances where the Monitor ought to have been keenly attuned to heightened sensitivity about perceptions of bias, it should have sought clarification of the reporting provisions in the Initial Order before conducting the analysis in the September NVR and issuing it

to HSBC. The Monitor failed to recognize the need to do so. Instead, it elected to rely on an unsustainable interpretation of clauses 28(d) and 30 of the Initial Order.

**Step 3**

**(a) Determining if damage is attributable to the Monitor's conduct, including damage to the integrity of the insolvency system**

[115] HSBC's refusal to fund the Winalta Group's costs for procuring takeout financing appears to have fallen on the heels of it receiving the September NVR. Whether that was a mere coincidence or not has not been established by the Winalta Group.

[116] No authority was cited for the proposition that the court is entitled to reduce a court-appointed monitor's fees on a basis "akin to punitive damages." However, ***Murphy v. Sally Creek Environs Corp. (Trustee of)***, 2010 ONCA 312, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 161 is informative, although distinguishable on its facts.

[117] ***Murphy*** concerned the reduction of a trustee in bankruptcy's fees for misconduct where the relationship between the trustee and largest unsecured creditor had spoiled. The trustee rationalized acting without the approval of two inspectors he considered to be the "handmaidens" of the largest unsecured creditor. At times, the trustee acted contrary to the inspectors' express wishes. Concluding that the trustee had sided against it, the creditor complained to various regulatory bodies, alleging serious wrongdoing and mismanagement by the trustee.

[118] On taxation, the registrar found the trustee guilty of 15 acts of misconduct ranging from multiple breaches of statutory duties to lying to regulatory bodies about the conduct of the estate. The registrar reduced the trustee's fees from $240,000.00 to $1.00 and disallowed or reduced many disbursements. The registrar's decision was appealed to Ontario's Superior Court of Justice and, in turn, to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which directed (at para. 125) that in preventing unjustifiable payments, the court should begin by considering discrete deductions for misconduct that cost the estate quantifiable amounts. The court also directed (at para. 126) that the court should consider the degree and extent of the misconduct, and its effect on the estate, the affected creditors, and the integrity of the bankruptcy process in general.

[119] These directives apply equally to a court-appointed *CCAA* monitor.

[120] In the present case, there is no quantifiable loss, nor is there evidence of damage to the estate. However, the Monitor's failure to scrupulously avoid a conflict of interest negatively impacts the integrity of the insolvency system.

**(b) Ascertaining the appropriate fee reduction**

[121] There is very little guidance on how the court is to assess an appropriate fee reduction where there is no quantifiable loss (***Re Nelson*** (2006), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 40 at para. 31 (Ont. S.C.J.)).

[122] Reducing a court-appointed officer's fee is not intended to be punitive, but rather is an expression of the court's refusal to endorse the misconduct (***Murphy*** at para. 112; ***Re Nelson*** at para. 31).

[123] Placing a value on the erosion of the public's confidence is an extremely difficult task, particularly given that the object of the exercise is not to punish the offending party. Arbitrarily choosing a figure as a means of refusing to endorse the misconduct is unfair. In the circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the fairer approach is to deprive the Monitor of any charges associated with its misconduct.

[124] Accordingly, the Monitor is to provide affidavit evidence within 60 days particularizing all charges associated with its analysis in the September NVR, following which I will determine the appropriate fee reduction. Should the Monitor fail to provide this information, I will have no alternative but to reduce the Fee otherwise.

## IV. Conclusions

[125] The onus on this application rested with the Monitor to establish that its Fee was fair and reasonable. It has fallen short of doing so in a number of respects.

[126] The Monitor exceeded it statutory and court ordered authority by conducting the analysis in the September NVR and providing it to HSBC. The Monitor failed to act with transparency in its dealings with its former client and blurred the bright line dividing its duties as a court-appointed *CCAA* monitor and a private monitor.

[127] In the result:

(i) The Monitor will be afforded a further opportunity to provide better evidence concerning the separate charges for clerical, administrative and IT staff, as discussed above, failing which the charges are disallowed.

(ii) The Monitor is to provide affidavit evidence within 60 days particularizing all charges associated with the analysis in the September NVR, failing which I will otherwise reduce the Fee.

(iii) All affidavits will be prepared at the Monitor's own cost, and the costs of any further application will be addressed at the appropriate time.

(iv) The administration charge is disallowed, and the Monitor will issue an account for actual disbursements within 60 days.

(v) The $10,000.00 charged for internal quality reviews is to be deducted from the Fee.

(vii) Subject to reductions for work connected with the analysis in the September NVR, charges for (non-partner and partner) professional services are approved.

(viii) If the parties cannot agree on costs, they may speak to me at the next application or within 120 days, whichever occurs first.



Heard on the 21st day of March, 2011
**Dated** at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 24th day of June, 2011.

J.E. Topolniski
J.C.Q.B.A.

**Appearances:**

Kentigern Rowan
For Deloitte & Touche Inc.

Darren Bieganek
For the Winalta Group

# TAB 15

# Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Piikani Nation v. Piikani Energy Corporation, 2011 ABQB 450**

**Date:** 20110719
**Docket:** 0901 18791, 0901 15297
**Registry:** Calgary



Between:

0901 18791

**Piikani Nation**

Plaintiff

- and -

**Piikani Energy Corporation**

Defendant

And Between

0901 15297

**Piikani Nation and Chief Crow Shoe**

Plaintiff

-and-

**Piikani Investment Corporation**

Defendant

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**Memorandum of Decision**
**of the**
**Honourable Mr. Justice R.A. Graesser**

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**Introduction**

[1] This decision follows an application for approval of the Receiver's accounts covering the period May 20, 2010 to March 31, 2011.

[2] Alger & Associates Inc. (Alger) was appointed Receiver of Piikani Energy Corporation (PEC) on May 20, 2010, having previously been appointed Interim Conservator on December 21, 2009. Alger had undertaken an investigation of the financial affairs of PEC in its role as Investigator of Piikani Investment Corporation (PIC).

[3] Alger had submitted accounts totaling $66,616.52 representing its fees and disbursements over that period. Additionally, accounts from its solicitors in a similar amount were submitted for approval.

[4] No objection was taken to the accounts by counsel for PEC, or by the CIBC as Trustee of the Piikani Trust, or by the Piikani Nation, the ultimate shareholder of PEC. Its board of directors, however, objected to the accounts on a number of bases:

1. The Receiver has not pursued the Chief and Council of Piikani Nation for repayment of funds owed to PEC by the Nation;
2. The Receiver has not pursued recovery of funds the directors claim are owed to PEC arising out of its investment in the Oldman Hydro Project;
3. The Receiver should not be compensated (and its lawyers should not be paid) for the unsuccessful attempt to assign PEC into bankruptcy because of the position taken by the Superintendent of Bankruptcy or the application to amend the Receivership Order to expressly authorize the Receiver to make an assignment into bankruptcy;
4. The Receiver (and its lawyers) should not be compensated for attempts to pursue fraudulent preference claims against Mr. McMullen or Ms. Ho Lem as the reasonableness of such pursuit has been called into question, or at a minimum, any decision on those portions of the fees relating to the fraudulent preference claims should be deferred until a decision has been made on the claims themselves;
5. The Receiver has improperly communicated with counsel for the Nation regarding the fraudulent preference claims; and
6. The time charges by the Receiver are not supported by the description of services.

**Relevant Law**

[5] Counsel for the directors referred me to:

- s. 39(2) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, which provides that Trustees' remuneration is not to exceed 7.5% of receipts, subject to the discretion of the court under (5) to increase or reduce the remuneration;
- Frank Bennett, *Bennett on Receiverships* 2nd Edition, Toronto: Carswell Thomson Professional Publishing, 1999 at pp. 459-460, 463, 471;
- ***Belyea v. Federal Business Development Bank***, [1983] N.B.J. No. 41 (C.A.);
- ***Columbia Trust Cop. v. Coopers & Lybrand Ltd.***, 1986 CarswellAlta 259 (C.A.);
- ***Re Omni Data Supply Ltd.***, 2002 CarswellBC 3111 (S.C.); and
- ***Re Au (Bankrupt)***, 2001 ABQB 966 (Master).

[6] I take from these authorities that the 7.5% calculation is a guideline, but not a rule. Just as with solicitors' accounts, the accounts of trustees and receivers are subject to judicial scrutiny and they must be "fair and reasonable".

[7] A determination of fairness and reasonableness is a contextual assessment, and interested parties have status to make complaints about calculations, whether the services were authorized, complaints about alleged negligence or misconduct or the lack of reasonable prudence, or whether the administration has been unnecessarily expensive.

[8] As noted in *Bennett* at p. 471, the general principles of taxation apply, which include: the work done, the responsibility imposed, the time spent in doing the work, the reasonableness of the time expended, the necessity of doing the work and the results obtained.

[9] The court is required to "put a fair value on the receiver's efforts without regard to the realization and distribution to the creditors".

[10] ***Belyea*** holds at para. 3, that:

> There is no fixed rate or settled scale for determining the amount of compensation to be paid a receiver. He is usually allowed either a percentage upon his receipts or a lump sum based upon the time, trouble and degree of responsibility involved. The governing principle appears to be that the compensation allowed a receiver should be measured by the fair and reasonable value of his services and while sufficient fees should be paid to induce competent persons to serve as receivers, receiverships should be administered as economically as reasonably possible. Thus, allowances for services performed must be just, but nevertheless moderate rather than generous.

[11] There, the Court noted a general reluctance to award remuneration based solely upon the time spent (at para. 12), although those comments must be viewed in the context of the era and practices of the day.

[12] In ***Columbia Trust***, the Alberta Court of Appeal rejected the ability of the receiver to recover overhead in addition to that expected to be included in the hourly rates of professionals.

[13] ***Omni Data*** holds at paras. 24 and 25:

> 24 *Re Hess* (1977), 23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 215 sets out the principles to be applied when taxing trustee's fees. These include:
>
> 1. The trustee is entitled to fair compensation for its services.
>
> 2. One object of the taxation is to encourage the efficient, conscientious administration of the bankrupt estate for the benefit of the creditors and in the interests of the proper carrying-out of the objectives of the BIA.
>
> 3. The court should take into account the views of the creditors or the inspectors if they are expressed. Considerable weight should be given to their approval or disapproval.
> 4. The trustee should not be allowed fees for services not clearly performed or for work based on errors in judgment.
>
> 25 It is not disputed that the onus is on the trustee to satisfy the court that the remuneration claimed is justified.

[14] In ***Au***, Master Quinn reduced the trustee's account applying the 7.5% rule and on the basis that $80.00 per hour attributed to non-professional employees was "exorbitant".

**Analysis**

[15] I gave oral reasons at the hearing on July 5, 2011 in relation to the first 5 items of objection. By way of summary, I ruled that complaints 1 and 2, relating to work that the receiver did not do, were not valid reasons to object to remuneration for work actually done. Had the receiver carried out the steps suggested by the directors, the time spent and charges for such services would have been much greater than contained in the existing accounts.

[16] With regard to the so-called 7.5% rule, I noted that relates to bankruptcies and while it may be a useful reference point, it is not binding on the court when asked to approve accounts.

[17] As to complaint 3, I ruled that the Receiver was not negligent in making the initial assignment into bankruptcy. A judgment call was made that the existing order granted sufficient power to do so. If correct, the Receiver would have avoided having to come back to court for a variation. Ultimately, the Superintendent required a variation to the order. In my view, the

Receiver's judgment call was reasonable, and he (and his solicitors) should be compensated for such efforts.

[18] As to complaint 4, I am well familiar, as the judge case managing this receivership and the proceedings relating to Piikani Investment Corporation, with the circumstances surrounding the allegations of fraudulent preferences. A hearing on the merits is scheduled for July 25, 2011. The Receiver's accounts are to the end of March, 2011. In my view, it was reasonable for the Receiver to pursue the fraudulent preference claims. That does not mean that I have prejudged the matter in any way, but the timing and circumstances of the payments made were suspicious to the Receiver, and one of his duties it to pursue claims that, in his professional judgment, have a reasonable prospect of success. The claims here are not frivolous. Thus the Receiver (and his lawyers) should be compensated for services to the end of March for pursuing those claims.

[19] Whether the claims are successful or not may be considered in relation to the Receiver's (and lawyers') accounts starting in April, 2011. There have been cross-examinations and exchanges of information since that time. Briefs of law and argument are to be submitted shortly. I may at some later stage have to determine whether the Receiver's actions after March 31 have been reasonable and warrant compensation, but the uncertainty of the claims is no valid reason for me to withhold approval of the Receiver's and solicitors' accounts to the end of March.

[20] As to complaint 5, that the Receiver and his lawyers have communicated with the Nation about the alleged fraudulent preferences, I see nothing improper or nefarious about that. The Nation is the ultimate shareholder of PEC, and is the shareholder of PIC, which is a major creditor of PEC's. Communications between the Receiver, his lawyers and the Nation would be expected. This is not a valid ground of complaint.

[21] As to complaint 6, that the time records do not support the charges, Mr. Alger was cross-examined on his affidavit in support of this application. The Alger accounts were rendered on a time basis, and the accounts break down the time spent by each Alger employee working on the matter. I am satisfied that the employees recording time on the file were not performing work that would be characterized as "overhead" - routine typing, filing, reception, etc. No objection was taken with respect to the accuracy or description of Mr. Alger's time charges. The cross-examination focused on the time logged by "GEB", who was described as an "associate".

[22] GEB was the employee most heavily involved in the "leg work" of this receivership. His time charges total more than half of Alger's total fees: $35,005 of $66,616.52.

[23] In argument (supported by excerpts from the cross-examination and documents referred to at the cross-examination), Mr. Fitzpatrick for the directors pointed out that the minimum time recorded by GEB was half an hour. Time was recorded for tasks which (confirmed by Mr. Alger) could not have taken that long by themselves. Mr. Alger's explanation for the apparent discrepancies was three-fold: firstly that GEB did not give very detailed descriptions of his services, secondly that he must have been doing other things during the recorded time interval, without recording the details of the services; and that since GEB was working on the PIC

Receivership at the same time, he must have broken his time between the two files by way of an estimate.

[24] Mr. Alger expressed confidence that GEB's time was accurately recorded, even if the services were not. As to the estimating of time between the two files, Mr. Fitzpatrick pointed out that there were no similar time entries for the relevant times in July, 2010 in the PIC accounts (which were also before the Court for approval, and which were approved without objection).

[25] When time times hourly rate is the basis for a professional account, and in the absence of agreement to the contrary, time is time. It has been well accepted that a minimum "billing unit" of a tenth of an hour is practical. That means if it takes a minute or two to read an email or leave a phone message, it is legitimate to record a tenth of an hour for that service. But if reading the email and replying to it take a total of 5 minutes, it is not legitimate to record time as if there were two separate services of a minimum billing unit each. Time is time, and five minutes does not equal a fifth of an hour.

[26] Some firms have minimum billing units greater than that a tenth of an hour. They may also have a practice that has the time recorder record at least a minimum billing unit for each service (such that .1 would be recorded for receiving and reviewing the email, and another .1 would be recorded for replying). But if such practices are to be enforced, or approved by the courts, the client must have agreed in advance to such practices.

[27] If accounts are to be rendered on a time basis, the reasonable expectation of the client is that the time spent will be accurately logged, and services will be accurately described so that the client will know what it is being charged for and why. Any element of value billing (urgency, difficulty, results, etc.) cannot honestly be done by way of increasing or exaggerating the amount of time actually spent.

[28] Mr. Fitzpatrick was critical of GEB's recording. It would be unfair for the court to make any assumptions or draw any conclusions about the records. Suffice it to say that Mr. Fitzpatrick was successful in creating doubt as to the accuracy of GEB's records. Mr. Alger's assumption that GEB must have done other file-related things, otherwise he would not have recorded more time than would be expected for the task described, and his confidence in his employee, do not give the court a sufficient basis on which to "put a fair value" on GEB's efforts.

[29] The overall accounts do not seem unreasonable having regard to the nature of the work required of Alger & Associates, the complexity of it, and the difficulty they have had getting information and records. Had the accounts been rendered other than on the basis of hours times hourly rates, the amounts claimed might have been approved as reasonable compensation.

[30] However, the chosen method was to keep track of time and bill for the time. I endorse that practice, as it involves discipline on the part of the time recorder, and provides a basis for anyone looking at the accounts to assess their reasonableness. But when choosing that practice, it

is essential that the time be accurately recorded, with sufficient description to justify the time spent on the task.

[31] Here, GEB's records do not provide sufficient justification for the charges. I make no finding that the time was not accurately recorded; rather, the time recorded was not accurately or sufficiently explained. It is clear that GEB performed the majority of the work on the receivership to March 31, 2011. Mr. Alger was satisfied with his work on the file. But the onus remains on the receiver to establish the reasonableness of its fees. It has, in my view, failed to do so.

[32] Topolniski J. recently considered the reasonableness of a court-appointed monitor's fees in ***Winalta Inc. (Re)***, 2011 ABQB 399. She conducted an extensive review of cases on trustees' and receivers' compensation including ***Bulyea***, ***Hess***, and ***Columbia Trust*** cited by the directors here. In that case, she remitted the accounts back to the monitor (at its expense) for further evidence and substantiation, rather than making any seemingly arbitrary adjustments to the accounts. Topolniksi J. cited with approval the decision of Kyle J. in ***Community Pork Ventures Inc. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce***, 2005 SKQB 252 where he was critical of the monitor's practices of recording minimum half-hour blocks of time and billing for discussions with junior staff.

[33] Having regard to the lack of detail given, I would be inclined to reduce the portions of the accounts relating to GEB's work by 15%, namely $5250.75. However, in fairness to him and to Alger & Associates, they may prefer to submit further evidence to the court on the subject of GEB's time charges. If they intend to do so, I would expect to receive any such evidence by July 22, 2011.

**Conclusion**

[34] The Caron & Partners accounts are approved as submitted. The Alger & Associates accounts are not approved as submitted. They may submit further evidence as to the time recorded by GEB by July 22, 2011. Otherwise, the accounts will be approved but subject to a reduction of $5250.75 plus applicable GST.

Heard on the 05th day of July, 2011.
**Dated** at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 8th day of July, 2011.

**R.A. Graesser**
**J.C.Q.B.A.**

**Appearances:**

Rick Gilborn
Caron & Partners LLP
for Alger & Associates Inc.

P. D. Fitzpatrick
Burstall Winger LLP
for Piikani Energy Corporation directors

Mark Klassen (no submissions)
McMillan LLP
for Piikani Investment Corporation

Ryan Zahara (no submissions
Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP
for CIBC Trust

Scott C. Chimuk (no submissions)
Miller Thomson LLP
for Dale McMullen

K.L. Fellowes (no submissions)
Davis LLP
for 607385 Alberta Ltd.

J.N. Thom, Q.C. (no submissions)
Miller Thomson LLP
for Raymond James (related action)

# TAB 16

# Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

**Citation: Servus Credit Union Ltd v Trimove Inc, 2015 ABQB 745**



**Date:** 20151125
**Docket:** 1503 06388
**Registry:** Edmonton

Between:

**Servus Credit Union Ltd**

Applicant

- and -

**Trimove Inc. and Geeta Luthra**

Respondents

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**Memorandum of Decision**
**of the**
**Honourable Madam Justice J.B. Veit**

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**Summary**

[1] The court-appointed receiver asks for approval of its, and its lawyer's, fees.

[2] The debtors claim that both the receiver's fees and the receiver's lawyer's fees are excessive. They do not provide any evidence in support of their argument.

[3] The court granted to Servus Credit Union Ltd. a without notice interim receivership, subsequently extended to a full receivership, of Trimove Inc. By the time of the granting of the full receivership, it was apparent that the debtors were insolvent: not only could they not pay Servus' demand claims, they could not pay their employees' salaries, etc. As of the date of the current application to distribute proceeds and award costs, the debtors owed Servus Credit Union approximately $1.2 million. The instruments creating the secured debt include a contractual obligation on Trimove Inc. and the guarantor Luthra to pay all costs and expense of enforcing the security, including legal fees on "a solicitor-and-his-own-client full indemnity basis". The

receiver recovered a total of approximately $1.1 million, of which approximately $863,000.00 was available to distribute to Trimove's secured creditors. The receiver proposes that Servus receive approximately $298,000.00 of that fund. The fees claimed by the receiver and the receiver's lawyer total approximately $82,000.00.

[4] The debtors propose that the court appoint an independent expert in receiverships to assess the costs claimed and report to the court; they propose that the maximum fee payable for that work be $3,000.00.

[5] The debtors' application for the appointment of an expert to give an opinion on fees is denied. The applicant's request for approval of its, and its lawyers' fees, is granted.

[6] Receivers and receivers' lawyers' fees are tested according to well-established legal principles as set out, for example, in ***Belyea***, ***Bakemates*** and ***Diemer***.

[7] Here, the receiver has set out detailed dockets and an explanation of the multiplicand basis for its fee. Not only have the debtors not provided any evidence that the hourly fees charged were excessive, they have not established that the work undertaken was excessive. On the contrary, in light of the principal's early comment to the receiver, 'We'll make sure you get nothing", the nature of the assets – rolling stock, and the documented failure of the debtors to provide reliable information on such crucial assets as accounts receivable, there is no evidence that the time spent by the receiver in tracking down assets was unreasonable.

[8] While the claim for lawyer's fees was set out in only two lines of information and was not verified by affidavit as is recommended in ***Bakemates***, the debtors contracted to pay all legal costs associated with recovery "on an indemnity basis"; that contract does not limit fees to what is reasonable. There is no suggestion of duress or equivalent in the negotiation of the lawyer's fee contract; as indicated by Farley J., in the absence of duress, an "agreement as to the fees should be conclusive.":***BT-PR Realty Holdings***. In any event, however, neither of the two main secured creditors, who are the only parties whose recovery deficit would be ameliorated if the fees were reduced, nor the court, in the exercise of its oversight responsibility, discern any excess in the fees claimed by the receiver's lawyers.

[9] If there were a basis for review of the receivers' fees, the court would not hire an outside expert; rather it would engage in the process outlined in ***Bakemates***.

**Cases and authority cited**:

[10] **By the debtors**: ***Federal Business Development Bank v Belyea*** [1983] N.B.J. No. 41; ***Bank of Nova Scotia v Diemer (c.o.b. Cornacre Cattle Co.)*** 2014 ONCA 851.

[11] **By the court**: ***Bakemates International Inc. (Re)*** [2002] O.J. No. 3569***; BT-PR Realty Holdings Inc. v Coopers & Lybrand*** [1997] O.J. No. 1097***; 911502 Alberta Ltd. v. Elephant Enterprises Inc.***2014 ABCA 437; ***Sidorsky v CFCN Communications Ltd.*** [1995] A.J. No. 174 (Q.B.); ***Trinier v Shurnaik*** 2011 ABCA 314.

## 1. Background

[12] Trimove is a transport company specializing in the delivery of heavy crude oil in the Vermilion area of Alberta; it also operates in the United States.

[13] Servus Credit Union Ltd. issued a demand overdraft loan, and demand term loans, to Trimove Inc.; those facilities totalled approximately $1.1 million. As a representative example,

in the $700,000.00 Demand Commercial Mortgage issued on June 12, 2013 to Trimove by Servus, Trimove agreed to the following conditions of credit:

> 1) The Borrower agrees to pay all expenses, fees and charges incurred by Servus Credit Union in relation to the loans; the preparation and registration of security, enforcement or preservation of Servus Credit union's rights and remedies; whether or not any such documentation is completed or any funds are advanced, including but not limited to legal expenses (on a solicitor-and-his-own-client full indemnity basis), cost of accountants, engineers, architects, consultants, appraisers and cost of searches and registration.

[14] Geeta Luthra guaranteed the repayment of those facilities.

[15] Neither the demand for repayment of the facilities nor the demand for payment of the guarantee, each of which was made on or about April 25, 2015, was met. Servus therefore initiated an *ex parte* receivership application as a result of which MNP Ltd was appointed as interim receiver on May 1, 2015. In support of that application, Servus filed an affidavit from one of its senior relationship managers of commercial special loans which included the following assertion:

> On April 29, 2015, due to Trimove's significantly worsening margining position, I advised Karan Luthra, a principal and director of Trimove, that Servus was no longer agreeable to the forbearance arrangements previously discussed . . . . In response to this statement Karan stated that "We'll make sure you get nothing".

[16] When the matter came back before the court, on notice, on May 8, the court confirmed the receivership order, but, in response to the submissions of the debtors, required an undertaking from Servus not to file the order until May 22; the delay was intended to give the debtors time to retain an insolvency lawyer, to arrange alternate financing, and to comply with the terms of the Interim Receivership Order. On that date, the court explicitly reminded the debtors of their obligation to cooperate with the receiver. Up to that point, the debtors had received at least informal legal advice from Luthra Law Group.

[17] On May 15, 2015, Trimove had insufficient funds to meet its payroll obligations. Trimove also had $146,480.00 in outstanding accounts payable and no funds to pay them.

[18] On May 19, 2015, Servus went back to court and obtained an order authorizing the immediate use of the receivership order in order to protect both Trimove's estate and the interests of Servus and the other creditors. Servus' application asserted that representatives of Trimove had not been fully cooperative with the receiver in that they failed to provide financial information and to identify and locate equipment. The interim receiver had been forced to send a letter to Trimove threatening a contempt application before cooperation was improved, "but there still appears to be information that has not yet been provided to the Interim Receiver". Trimove never did retain an expert insolvency lawyer; nor did it obtain alternative financing.

[19] On May 19, the debtor filed an affidavit from Vishal Luthra attempting to demonstrate that Trimove had been cooperative with the receiver. Mr. Luthra swore:

> [the receiver] demanded that we release to him all the data and mentioned that his team is out and about looking for our equipment. I assured him at that point, that equipment is safe and there is no risk for the lender's security. . . .

> Eric Sirrs gave me 2 hours to compile information for him to satisfy his court order demands. . . . I provided him the following items . . . list of equipment, I recalled from my memory and locations . . .

[20] Another example of the kind of lack of cooperation complained of is the failure of Trimove, even up to and including the date of this application, to explain how the payment of a Trimove account receivable ended up in the hands of a stranger. At this hearing, the debtors explained that they owned a separate entity, with a very similar name to Trimove Inc., and there had perhaps been a typing error in naming the payee of the cheque.

[21] Another example of the problems experienced by the receiver relates to the failure of Trimove to satisfactorily explain the transfer of two of its serial numbered pieces of equipment to a third party who asserted that he had done machinist's work for Trimove over a period of a year and not been paid. That stranger, Khullar, has provided information to the receiver, but management has failed to do so.

[22] Another example of the debtor's failure to provide accurate, timely information relates to the failure of Trimove to provide GPS locations for some of its equipment moving on highways even when, by May 12, one unit was still out of the country.

[23] Finally, in respect of the Aarbro issue, the debtors filed evidence at this hearing concerning their interest in that property. In light of that late dispute relating to ownership of the company owning the ranch property in question, the disposition of the Aarbro claim is deferred to a separate hearing.

[24] In support of the claim for its fees, MNP filed an affidavit attaching docketed time allocations for work done on the receivership, together with an outline of the individuals who worked on the receivership and their billable cost. MNP also approved as part of its receivership expenses the fees of its lawyer.

[25] The legal fees claimed are not the subject of an affidavit. There is, however, reference in the law firm's two line claim to invoices relating to the totals claimed. There is no evidence that the debtors ever asked for information about the invoices themselves.

## 2. Testing receivers' and lawyers' fees

[26] I agree with the debtors that general guidance to receivers', and their lawyers', fees can be found in ***Belyea*** and ***Diemer***.

[27] In addition to those authorities, I bring to the debtors' attention two additional cases, the first of which is ***Bakemates***, which expands on some of the topics relating to the testing of fees and provides a useful outline of the processes by which any necessary examination of fees will be conducted.

[28] The other case to which I must refer is ***BT-PR Realty Holdings.*** That decision is important in the circumstances here where there is a contract relating to fees, specifically the lawyer's fees. A court's general approach to fees must also take into account, not only the general principles as set out in decisions such as ***Diemer***, but also any contract in relation to legal fees. As Farley J. said***:***

> I do not particularly quarrel with the list of factors set out in the Bank of Montreal v. Nicar Trading Co. (1990), 78 C.B.R. (N.S.) 85 (B.C.C.A.):

(a) the nature extent and value of the cases;

(b) the complications and difficulties encountered;

(c) the degree of assistance provided by the parties;

(d) time spent by the receiver;

(e) the receiver's knowledge, experience and skill;

(f) diligence and thoroughness;

(g) responsibilities assumed;

(h) results achieved; and,

(i) the cost of comparable services.

However I would add

(j) other material considerations –

for example in this case:

(i) the April 12 agreement to the fees;

(ii) the priority receivership of the Bank in this co-receivership relationship; and
(iii) the apparent diversionary and distracting excessive hands on requirements of Miller who all the while is demanding efficiency (more accurately a low fee at any price).

I would think however that where there is a retainer given which indicates that the fee will be based upon the multiplicand of hourly rates and time expended this factor should receive special emphasis as it is what the parties bargained for. See above for my views about allowing the taxi meter to run without taking the passenger along the appropriate route. In the subject case C&L charged on the multiplicand basis. Given their explanation and the lack of any credible and reliable evidence to the contrary, I see no reason to interfere with that charge. It would also seem to me that on balance C&L scores neutrally as to the other factors and of course, the agreement as to the fees should be conclusive if there is no duress or equivalent.

In other words, in ***BT-PR Realty Holdings***, Farley J. emphasized that while an outrageous departure from the norm, such as a taxi driver "[taking] his fare from the Courthouse to the Royal York Hotel via Oakville", or, in Edmonton terms, taking a fare from the Law Courts to the MacDonald Hotel via Spruce Grove, will not be tolerated, an agreement about fees is usually conclusive.

**3. Applying the principles in this case**

*a) Receiver's fees*

[29] Information about the receiver's fees is attached to an affidavit in the manner recommended by ***Bakemates.*** The debtors do not provide any evidence on the issue of fees.

[30] It's true, of course, that this was not a technically complicated receivership. The receiver sold most of the debtors' assets by auction. However, even settling on that procedure entailed

some work by the receiver as there were competing offers from auction businesses and the receiver had to do some research to determine why it should prefer one auctioneer's offer to the other.

[31] More important than the way in which the receiver disposed of most of the assets is the unfortunate response of the debtor to the initial approach by the receiver, coupled with the nature of the debtor's assets; those two factors justify what the debtors consider to be excessive scrutiny by the receiver.

[32] In addition to this main problem, which is represented by the docket in the greater expenditures at the outset of the receivership, there are the continuing problems over the course of the receivership.

[33] The debtors never did retain an insolvency expert; therefore, the receiver was dealing with them personally. Dealing with self-represented litigants takes more time and care and provides less comfort than dealing with professionals.

[34] Also, Mr. Luthra's affidavit of May 19, 2015 illustrates the gulf which Trimove did not recognize between verifiable information and opinion.

[35] Problems of the type exemplified by the cheque which was attempted to be cashed by a stranger caused additional administration expenses since it precipitated a mail re-direction notice which then required the receiver to return mail which it received to a law firm which shared the mailing address of Trimove.

[36] It's also true that, over time, Trimove and its representatives did become more cooperative without ever seeming to completely realize the importance from the receiver's perspective of getting accurate, substantiated, information promptly. Nonetheless, the failure to simply and promptly provide the information and documents required by the receiver caused the receiver to spend more time on the administration of this receivership than would otherwise be necessary.

[37] Against the receiver's docketed multiplicand, the debtors have raised arguments of the "I can deliver goods to Texas for $3,000.00 so how come did it cost the receiver so much to go around to the yard I was renting to check my equipment" variety.

[38] In summary with respect to the receiver's fees, the receiver has provided detailed information about its activities and the individuals, and their rates, who have undertaken those activities. The amount of work undertaken by the receiver must be assessed in light of all of the circumstances of this case, including the unfortunate attitude expressed by the debtor at the outset, the difficulties of accounting for rolling stock, and the ongoing failure of the debtors to provide timely, accurate, information. For their part, the debtors have not provided any evidence. Given the role of court-appointed receivers, and all of the information provided about this particular receivership, the court concludes that no basis has been established for any substantive challenge to the receiver's fees. The receiver's fees are therefore approved.

*b) Lawyer's fees*

[39] The receiver's lawyers' fees have not been submitted by way of affidavit in the manner suggested in ***Bakemates***: see, paras 38 ff. Indeed, the only information about the lawyer's fees is contained in two lines which set out the total amount of fees claimed.

[40] However, there is no suggestion that the debtors attempted to learn more about the lawyers' fees by asking for copies of the invoices which are referred to in the two lines of information.

[41] More importantly, the debtors contracted to pay any lawyers' fees on a full indemnity basis. It is important to note that the contract concerning fees was clear: the language referred explicitly to "solicitor-and-his-own-client full indemnity basis". Therefore, there is no uncertainty about the level of fees the debtor agreed to pay of the type identified by our Court of Appeal in ***Elephant Enterprises.***

[42] As to what a contract means when one party agrees to pay "solicitor and his own client full indemnity" fees, we obtain assistance from McMahon J. in ***Sidorsky***, at para. 5 where that judge, who was an expert in the matter of fees having chaired a provincial committee on the setting of Schedule C fee items, said:

> 5 There are three levels of costs that may be payable by one party to another:
>
> 1. Party and party costs: calculated on the basis of Schedule C of the Alberta Rules of Court or some multiple thereof, plus reasonable disbursements.
>
> 2. Solicitor and client costs: which provide for indemnity to the party to whom they are awarded for costs that can be said to be essential to and arising within the four corners of the litigation.
>
> 3. Solicitor and his own client costs: sometimes referred to as complete indemnity for costs. These are costs which a solicitor could tax against a resisting client and may include payment for services which may not be strictly essential to the conduct of the litigation.

[43] As to whether there is any capacity for a court to depart from a contract term that obliges one party to pay an indemnity of legal fees, I note our Court of Appeal's decision in ***Trinier***:

> G. Any Discretion?
>
> 39 It was argued before us that the chambers judge now appealed from had a "discretion" to deny solicitor-client costs. Given the covenants here, it is doubtful.
>
> 40 But even if a discretion existed as to certain items, there is no proper legal ground to exercise such a discretion here. No misconduct or sharp practice by the appellants is even alleged. They ultimately lost no step, in my view. They did not churn, and did not pursue trivia in order to incur huge solicitor-client costs. And most of the steps whose costs were in issue had already been the subject of previous costs decisions.
>
> 41 If there was any discretion as to costs, at best it was as to the costs of the "side issue" about contribution for the first $100,000 paid by the appellants before the suit. But any such discretion was that of the first judge (Lewis J.), not the (second) chambers judge now under appeal. So the second judge was not entitled to revisit that. And so even if he was, the Court of Appeal owes him no deference on further appeal on that topic. He purported to sit on appeal from the taxing officer who taxed solicitor-client costs.
>
> 42 Besides, the covenants here are for solicitor-and-own-client costs, so a mere immoderate amount of costs or of the appellants' steps would likely not remove the right to such costs.

This, of course, echoes the comments of Farley J. to the effect that a contract with respect to fees should be conclusive in the absence of any argument that the contract itself is invalid: ***BT-Pr Realty Holdings Inc.***

[44] In summary on the legal interpretation of the contract the debtors executed, the debtors agreed to pay even for legal services which may not have been strictly essential to the conduct of the receivership.

[45] However, and importantly, there is no suggestion whatever that the legal fees in the circumstances here even exceeded those which could be said to be essential to and arising within the four corners of the litigation. On the contrary, the two main creditors of Trimove, creditors who have hundreds of thousands of dollars of shortfall in their secured claims against Trimove and who are the only persons who might conceivably have their financial position improved by any reduction of the legal fees, have both accepted the legal fees claimed by the receiver's lawyer. As Farley J. said all those years ago, even if a party agreed to indemnify a lawyer for their fees, the court would then, and would still step in to prevent an injustice if there were some outrageous fee claim made by a lawyer. There is no such basis for interference here. The receiver's lawyer's fees are therefore approved.

## 4. Proposal to hire an expert to review the receiver's fees

[46] If there had been a basis on which either the receiver's or the receiver's lawyer's fees should be reviewed, the court would have followed the procedure recommended in ***Bakemates*** rather than the proposal made by the debtors. Since the debtors did not establish the required basis, the ***Bakemates*** procedure does not arise.

## 5. Costs

[47] The debtors were unsuccessful in their application to reduce the receivership fees. If the parties are not agreed on costs, I can be spoken to within 30 days of the release of this decision.

Heard on the 18th day of November, 2015.
**Dated** at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 24th day of November, 2015.

**J.B. Veit**
**J.C.Q.B.A.**

**Appearances:**

Kentigern A. Rowan, QC, Ogilive LLP
for the Receiver MNP Ltd.

Thomas Gusa, Miller Thompson LLP
for the Applicant, Servus Credit Union Ltd.

Darren R. Bieganek, QC, Duncan Craig LLP
for AFSC (Agricultural Financial Service Corporation)

Vishal Luthra and Geeta Luthra
own their own behalfs

# TAB 17

**CITATION**: Hanfeng Evergreen Inc., (Re), 2017 ONSC 7161
**COURT FILE NO.:** CV-14-10667-00CL
**DATE:** 20171130

**ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE**
**(COMMERCIAL LIST)**

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 101 OF THE *COURTS OF JUSTICE ACT*, R.S.O. c.C.43 (as amended)

AND IN THE MATTER OF HANFENG EVERGREEN INC.

Applicant

**BEFORE:** F.L. Myers J.

**COUNSEL:** *Daniel S. Murdoch and Haddon Murray,* counsel for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver
*David C. Moore and Karen M. Mitchell*, counsel for the Lei Lo and Xinduo Yu

**HEARD:** November 20, 2017

## ENDORSEMENT

[1] Ernst & Young Inc. moves for approval of its activities as receiver and manager of Hanfeng Evergreen Inc. as described in the Supplement to its First Report, its Fourth Report, and its Fifth Report. It also seeks approval of its fees and disbursements including the fees and disbursements of its counsel here and abroad.

[2] Xinduo Yu, the founder and former CEO of Henfeng Evergreen Inc. and his spouse Lei Li oppose the approval of the receiver's reports at this time. They seek, at minimum, the imposition of conditions to protect their positions in separate litigation that the receiver has brought against them. They also argue that the receiver has failed or refused to deliver sufficient evidence to support its claim for approval of its fees and disbursements. They invite the court to require the receiver to engage in a document disclosure process so as to create a sufficient factual record on which they can make submissions and the court can meaningfully assess the fees and disbursements of the receiver and its counsel.

[3] For the reasons that follow the receiver's motion is granted on the terms set out below.

### Brief Background

[4] Hanfeng Evergreen Inc. is an Ontario public corporation. Henfeng was a financing vehicle to raise money from investors who were interested in investing in the fertilizer business operated by a subsidiary in the People's Republic of China. By 2014, Henfeng's sole operations were limited to the fertilizer business.

[5] When this proceeding began, Mr. Yu was a member of the board of directors of Henfeng. He was a principal contact for the receiver. He controlled Chinese management of the business.

[6] The receiver advises that in 2011, Henfeng's biggest customer was a company run by the state in China. It sought to buy 30% of the fertilizer business to ensure its control over its supply. By February, 2013, an agreement had been prepared whereby Henfeng would sell its shares in the fertilizer subsidiary to a company controlled by Mr. Yu. Mr. Yu agreed to sell 30% of that company's shares to the state actor. The transactions were expected to close in April, 2013.

[7] The deal did not close as expected. Eventually Henfeng established a special committee representing shareholders independent of management. Acrimony developed between the special committee and Mr. Yu. In December, 2013, the purchaser terminated the transaction. The board of directors proceeded to fire Mr. Yu.

[8] A proxy battle ensured. During the proxy battle, Henfeng's auditor KPMG resigned. Thereupon, the rest of the board of directors resigned. Ultimately, Mr. Yu regained control of the public corporation.

[9] In April, 2014, Mr. Yu brought forward a transaction to sell the operating subsidiary to an established third party business in China for a price of approximately $40 million. The transaction would have provided meaningful recovery to shareholders. The transaction required shareholder approval. However, without an auditor, Henfeng could not produce the material required to call a shareholders' meeting under Ontario securities laws. Therefore, this receivership was proposed as a way to convey title in a solvent transaction.

[10] Negotiations with the buyer proved difficult. The receiver retained the Mayer Brown law firm to help it obtain a deposit of approximately $2.4 million required by the agreement and to deal with some Chinese regulatory matters that arose. The purchaser was also supposed to put funds in escrow. With Mayer Brown's assistance some funds were escrowed. But then they were released back to the purchaser by the escrow agent ostensibly with Mr. Yu's cooperation. In addition, the receiver says that the buyer's name seems to have changed subtly in the documents over time. While initially Mr. Yu represented that the buyer was an established third party, the ultimate buyer may have been a company with a similar name that is actually a shell controlled by Mr. Yu. Further, the receiver alleges that while the transaction was playing out, Mr. Yu obtained very substantial loans in China on the credit of the subsidiary so that they he has effectively taken the value of the business leaving the other shareholders with nothing.

[11] The receiver has sued Mr. Yu and Ms. Li for damages exceeding $100 million.

[12] In addition, the ostensible purchaser has sued the receiver in China for the return of the $2.4 million deposit. Mr. Yu is a defendant in that case as he is a guarantor under the terms of the relevant agreement. Whether he is also behind the plaintiff/purchaser remains to be proven.

[13] The purchaser succeeded against the receiver at first instance in China. But an appellate court overruled the first decision. As of this moment therefore, the deposit has been forfeited and

is properly counted among the funds realized by the receiver. The purchaser has appealed from that decision however and the further appeal is pending.

[14] In this receivership proceeding, Mr. Yu is concerned to ensure that the receiver does not consume the deposit on its own fees and disbursements in case it is required to return the deposit to the purchaser by the ultimate appeal court in China. If the purchaser succeeds in China, there may be a priorities dispute between the purchaser and the receiver over which has a better claim to the deposit funds in the receiver's hands. In any event, Mr. Yu argues that as guarantor of the return of the deposit, he has an interest in protecting the deposit in the receiver's hands and in minimizing or delaying the receiver's use of the deposit to pay its fees and disbursements until the Chinese litigation ends.

**Approval of the Receiver's Activities**

[15] In *Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 7574 (CanLII), Morawetz RSJ discussed the process for approval of the reports of a court officer. In that case the court dealt with a Monitor under the CCAA. The same principles apply in a receivership in my view.

[16] In *Target*, Morawetz RSJ recognized that the effect of the approval of the reports of a court officer varies with the context. Where a report is delivered for a specific purpose, such as a sale transaction, express findings of fact may be required to support the relief being sought. An affidavit may be delivered to support the findings or not. In either case, the court is called up to address squarely specific facts and to make specific findings that will be binding in future.

[17] However, the context of a general approval of activities, such as the motion that is currently before me, is different. As discussed by Morawetz RSJ:

> [20] The Monitor has in its various reports provided commentary, some based on its own observations and work product and some based on information provided to it by the Applicant or other stakeholders. Certain aspects of the information provided by the Monitor has not been scrutinized or challenged in any formal sense. In addition, for the most part, no fact-finding process has been undertaken by the court.
>
> [21] In circumstances where the Monitor is requesting approval of its reports and activities in a general sense, it seems to me that caution should be exercised so as to avoid a broad application of res judicata and related doctrines. The benefit of any such approval of the Monitor's reports and its activities should be limited to the Monitor itself. To the extent that approvals are provided, the effect of such approvals should not extend to the Applicant or other third parties.
>
> [22] I recognized there are good policy and practical reasons for the court to approve of Monitor's activities and providing a level of protection for Monitors during the CCAA process. These reasons are set out in paragraph [12] above. However, in my view, the protection should be limited to the Monitor in the manner suggested by counsel to Rio Can and KingSett.

[23] By proceeding in this manner, Court approval serves the purposes set out by the Monitor above. Specifically, Court approval:

> (a) allows the Monitor to move forward with the next steps in the CCAA proceedings;
>
> (b) brings the Monitor's activities before the Court;
>
> (c) allows an opportunity for the concerns of the stakeholders to be addressed, and any problems to be rectified,
>
> (d) enables the Court to satisfy itself that the Monitor's activities have been conducted in prudent and diligent manners;
>
> (e) provides protection for the Monitor not otherwise provided by the CCAA; and
>
> (f) protects the creditors from the delay and distribution that would be caused by:
>
> > (i) re-litigation of steps taken to date, and
> >
> > (ii) potential indemnity claims by the Monitor.

[24] By limiting the effect of the approval, the concerns of the objecting parties are addressed as the approval of Monitor's activities do not constitute approval of the activities of parties other than the Monitor.

[18] In this case, Mr. Yu and Ms. Li do not want the approval of the receiver's activities to impact on their litigation with the receiver including their desire to counterclaim against the receiver in that litigation. Apparently they have sought directions regarding a possible counterclaim although no motion for leave to proceed has been heard as yet. Regional Senior Justice Morawetz held that the general approval of a court officer's activities should not affect third party dealings generally. He accepted however that the approval of the receiver's activities does affect the court officer's own status. For example, there is case law suggesting that a stronger showing on the merits is required to obtain leave to sue a receiver in respect of activities that have been approved than for unapproved activities.[1]

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[1] Compare and contrast for example, *Bank of America Canada v Wilann Investments Ltd*. (1993), 23 CBR (3d) 98 (Ont. Gen. Div) with *GMAC Commercial Credit Corporation - Canada v.*

[19] Mr. Yu and Ms. Li argue that if they are prejudiced by the approval of the receiver's activities, then they would be required to contest in this motion the substance of their concerns in order to protect themselves in their other litigation. I agree that it is not the purpose of this summary proceeding to engage in fact finding that might prejudge or affect the fact finding process in other litigation. As such, there is no need to delve deeply into the concerns raised by the objectors with the receiver's characterization of their behaviour or the other details of specific issues of fact that may become the subject matter of proceedings later. There will be no findings of contested facts that might bind Mr. Yu or Ms. Li elsewhere.

[20] The receiver argues that it seeks broad, general approval for its decisions to bring litigation against Mr. Yu and Ms. Li and to defend the litigation in China. It notes that its prior activities have already been approved in relation to the approval of its earlier reports.

[21] Under the terms of its appointment order, the receiver is already authorized to litigate on behalf of the debtor generally. As such, Mr. Yu and Ms. Li argue that it does not need any further approval of its litigation activities. But, I agree with Morawetz RSJ that there are additional proposes to a court officer's reporting and the court's approval functions such as those listed in para. 23 of T*arget* above. In this case for example, concerns of stakeholders can be considered and addressed in real time rather than waiting until matters are concluded some years hence. Moreover, stakeholders are given an opportunity to bring to the fore any concerns with the receiver's prudence and diligence in the issues under consideration. Here, for example, no one – not even Mr. Yu or Ms. Li - contest the prudence of the receiver's decisions to defend the deposit in China or to commence the litigation here against Mr. Yu and Ms. Li.

[22] The receiver also argues that is wants its activities approved so as to protect it from personal liability for costs in the event that it is later determined that the deposit must be returned to the purchaser with the result that the receiver may not have any assets left in the estate to fund any costs liability that it may incur. The receiver refers to the decision of Pattillo J. in *Essery Estate (Trustee of) v Essery*, 2016 ONSC 321. At para. 72 of that decision, Pattillo J. wrote:

> [72] In receiverships, the general rule is that costs are awarded against a receiver personally in rare cases. Where a receiver engages in litigation in its capacity as receiver in the normal course of the receivership, is it is subject to the costs in accordance with s. 131 of the CJA and Rule 57.01. To the extent that costs are awarded against a receiver they are normally covered by receivership funds or by an indemnity agreement with a

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*T.C.T. Logistics Inc.*, 2006 SCC 35 (CanLII). See also: Houlden, Morawetz & Sarra, *The 2007 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, (Thomson Reuters, Toronto) at L§26. Whether *Wilann* remains good law after *TCT* is an issue that is not before the court today.

> secured creditor. It is only when the receiver embarks on a course of action extraneous to the credit-driven relationship which effectively undermines its neutral position as an officer of the court and turn itself into a "real litigant' [*sic*] that a receiver exposes itself to costs personally: see *Akagi v Synergy Group (2000)*, 2015 ONCA 771 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 18.

[23] In my view, the receiver reads too much into this quotation. I do not read *Essery* as altering the receiver's risk of personal liability for costs. Rather, Pattillo J. explains the court's historic hesitation to award costs against receivers because they can bear personal liability for costs. In my view *Essery* does not create any special protection for receivers' costs liability. Neither does the approval of a receiver's activities provide it with any special protection in relation to costs awards in subsequent litigation. That is the reason that Pattillo J. noted that before undertaking litigation, receivers typically will consider the sufficiency of the assets under their charge to meet a costs award or obtain an indemnity from a creditor to protect themselves from the risk of adverse costs.

[24] It is clear therefore that in approving the receiver's general activities broadly and summarily in this motion, I am not finding any facts beyond expressing satisfaction with the general scope and direction of the receiver's activities as set out in the three reports that are before me. However, if the law post-*TCT* still provides that the approval of a receiver's conduct raises the bar for those who seek to sue a receiver, as referenced in the footnote above, that is indeed a consequence of approval and nothing I say or do not say should affect that outcome. The fact that approval may have some effect is not a basis to withhold or deny approval. Rather it reflects the intention of the law as it applies in circumstances where the court is satisfied with the activities undertaken by its officer and with the protections that the law affords court officers in such circumstances as discussed by Morawetz RSJ above.

[25] I also do not see the existence of an outstanding appeal in China as a basis to defer or withhold approval of the receiver's activities, especially its activities in defending and participating fully in that case. Approval does not affect the ongoing litigation in China. Neither does it affect the priorities in the deposit or authorize or embolden the receiver to distribute to itself or to its counsel funds that it currently holds. If the court in China rules that the funds are a deposit that are to be returned to the purchaser, legal results flow. As noted above, if that creates a priority issue here, that issue may have to be determined.

[26] As argument of this aspect of the motion was drawing to a close, it appeared that counsel might be able to agree upon language to resolve the issues in dispute. I invited them to advise me within 48 hours if they reached agreement. On November 22, 2017, counsel advised that while they had not agreed to resolve the objections of Mr Yu and Ms. Li, they had agreed upon some language to limit the relief granted should I determine to approve the receiver's activities.

[27] The term agreed upon by counsel reflects the limitations that I have discussed above as follows:

> THIS COURT ORDERS that the approval of the Fourth Report and the Fifth Report shall be without prejudice to any of the procedural or substantive rights of the Receiver, Xinduo Lu and Lei Li in respect of Action No. CV-16-11325-00CL, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, shall be deemed not to constitute any finding or determination of any kind whatsoever in respect of any allegations, issues or defences in said Action.

[28] While this term does not satisfy all of the concerns of Mr. Yu and Ms. Li, it does satisfy mine. Accordingly, it is appropriate to approve the activities of the receiver as set out in the three reports that are before the court on the term set out in the immediately preceding paragraph.

**Receiver's Fees**

[29] In accordance with the principles set out in *Confectionately Yours Inc. (Re)*, 2002 CanLII 45059 (ON CA), the receiver delivered affidavits supporting its fees and disbursements including those of its counsel. Cross-examinations ensued. Mr. Yu and Ms. Li argue that there is insufficient disclosure of information to enable the court to determine the reasonableness of the receiver's fees and disbursements. They say they have delivered letter after letter for months seeking production of documents relating to matters set out in the receiver's invoices so as to be able to understand the work performed by the receiver and to make proper submissions on the fees and disbursements sought in relation to the work. In addition, the receiver delivered dockets (belatedly in some cases) that are heavily redacted to prevent disclosure of the subject matter of much of the work that is the subject of the docket entries.

[30] The receiver argues that the scope of its discussions with its counsel and the work being performed by its counsel on its behalf are privileged – both under lawyer client privilege and litigation privilege. I agree. Disclosing the subject matter of a meeting is essentially disclosing the communication from client to lawyer (or vice versa) concerning the topic on which advice was being sought or given. That does not mean however that the receiver is entitled to approval of its fees or disbursements without providing proper supporting evidence. If the claims of privilege prevent the court from making the assessment required, then the motion will not succeed until sufficient evidence is duly adduced to meet the required standard.

[31] In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer*, 2014 ONCA 851 (CanLII), the Court of Appeal discussed the test for assessment of a receiver's fees as follows:

> [32] In *Bakemates*, this court described the purpose of the passing of a receiver's accounts and also discussed the applicable procedure. Borins J.A. stated, at para. 31, that there is an onus on the receiver to prove that the compensation for which it seeks approval is fair and reasonable. This includes the compensation claimed on behalf of its counsel. At para. 37, he observed that the accounts must disclose the total charges for each of the categories of services rendered. In addition:
>
> > The accounts should be in a form that can be easily understood by those affected by the receivership (or by the judicial officer required to assess the accounts) so that such

> person can determine the amount of time spent by the receiver's employees (and others that the receiver may have hired) in respect to the various discrete aspects of the receivership.

[33] The court endorsed the factors applicable to receiver's compensation described by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in *Belyea*: *Bakemates*, at para. 51. In *Belyea*, at para. 9, Stratton J.A. listed the following factors:

- the nature, extent and value of the assets;
- the complications and difficulties encountered;
- the degree of assistance provided by the debtor;
- the time spent;
- the receiver's knowledge, experience and skill;
- the diligence and thoroughness displayed;
- the responsibilities assumed;
- the results of the receiver's efforts; and
- the cost of comparable services when performed in a prudent and economical manner.

These factors constitute a useful guideline but are not exhaustive: *Bakemates*, at para. 51.

[32] The Court of Appeal also noted in *Diemers* that while the calculation of billable hours times hourly rates is not the most desirable metric for conducting this review, it is the predominant methodology in the case law. Moreover, while counsel for Mr. Yu and Ms. Li submitted that this is not to be a mathematical exercise, the bulk of their complaints are essentially directed to the question of whether there has been duplication in the dockets or, more specifically, whether the claims of privilege prevent them and the court from determining with any degree of precision whether there is duplication in the dockets that ought to be excluded from the value calculus. While I certainly do not dismiss the risk of duplication in an assessment of the reasonableness of the fees, it is but one factor and not an especially important one in my view. Duplication might suggest a lack of value-added but not necessarily so in a holistic review. If an issue takes time to resolve, there may be several docket entries that look similar. That does not make them duplicative. More than one person may be involved providing different services and docket to the same issue – either at different levels of seniority or different subject matters. Reading brief docket descriptions years after complex work is performed is a poor method to learn precisely what was accomplished by any single person on any given day. A full assessment of the file accompanied by oral narrative is required to assess professional accounts. That is what

assessment officers routinely do in formal cost assessment hearings. But that is not what is anticipated or even desirable in fee approval hearings of this type.

[33] It is not lost on me that what was also at play on Mr. Yu's side of the table is possibly a desire for discovery in the other litigation or at least opening up a threat to the receiver's remuneration as a strategy to provide bargaining leverage. Thus, rather than responding to the receiver's request for the specifics of documents required or bringing their own motion (or 9:30 appointment) seeking production of documents that they actually need, Mr. Yu and Ms. Li were content to make request after request and then graciously offer to allow the receiver an adjournment to give it time to make yet further production. I have little doubt that were any further documents produced, Mr. Yu and Ms. Li would just ask for more. After all, if you want to assess what every person acting for counsel and the receiver have done every day, then every draft of every document and communication is ostensibly relevant. The eight, non-exhaustive *Belyea* factors do not require or anticipate a full fee assessment process. Mr. Yu and Ms. Li's digging for more and ever more documents ostensibly to allow them to review in minute detail the receiver's fees was misdirected from the outset.

[34] Mr. Yu and Ms. Li make much of the fact that the receiver's Ontario counsel had 27 billers on the file over a period of three years. Counsel for the receiver took me through each biller's name and role. Apart from a few students, there was one partner and an associate in each relevant area at each time. The associate generally performed the bulk of the work. As the project evolved from a consensual corporate transaction to contested litigation, the identities and focus of the partners involved changed. There is nothing untoward or even suspicious in the identification of the lawyers engaged despite the effort to evoke an emotional reaction to the overall number of billers. I am perfectly satisfied that given the complexity and evolution of the matter over time, staffing raises no significant concerns. Given the limited numbers of people involved in each specialty area, and the swing from corporate to contested litigation, duplication is not a significant issue in my view.

[35] The receiver has not provided docket level evidence of activities from its litigation counsel in China. However that lawyer was retained on a fixed fee of $100,000. The litigation involved securing the receiver's right to keep the deposit of approximately $2.4 million. A fee of 4% of the fund whose preservation is in issue strikes me as quite reasonable. Dockets would not assist the understanding of the flat fee account in this circumstance.

[36] Other counsel were retained for other specific purposes. Each had to be briefed so, once again, it is not surprising to see docket entries where people discuss similar things. They are instructing or reporting back to each other. Mr. Yu and Ms. Li pointed to docket entries in which telephone inter-firm communications are set out but only by one firm. The unstated implication is that unless both sides docketed the call, then the docket that was recorded is suspect and may be fraudulent. I do not know a more innocent word to characterize a docket of a call that did not happen. But Mr. Yu and Ms. Li forgot to account for the International Date Line. When one looks to see if telephone calls from this side of the globe were docketed in China on the next day, many of the calls were indeed recorded. I cannot draw an inference of fraud, or even suspicion from noting that a firm did not record every single telephone call it ostensibly received or made.

Docketing practices can differ. I did not look to see if the calls that were not recorded by both sides were recorded as being short or long duration for example. In any event, I do not see how a few calls has much impact on the assessment of the *Belyea* factors.

[37] The receiver's counsel has provided a lengthy assessment of the *Belyea* factors in para. 60 of its factum. Again, without making findings of fact on the level of cooperation or the lack thereof by Mr. Yu and Ms. Li, in my view in para. 60 the receiver provided a very fair analysis of the relevant factors and I adopt it in full.

[38] In all, I am satisfied that the fees and disbursement of the receiver, including those of its counsel, are fair, reasonable and ought to be approved as sought.

[39] Costs should be agreed upon. Barring exceptional circumstances, I would expect them to follow the event on a partial indemnity basis. If counsel cannot agree on costs then they should exchange Costs Outlines and schedule a telephone case conference through my Assistant for oral argument of costs.

F.L. Myers J.

**Date:** November 30, 2017

# TAB 18

# IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Citation: *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Rempel Copper Sky Development Ltd.,* 2015 BCSC 2183

Date: 20151126
Docket: 88952
Registry: Kelowna

Between:

**Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and BCMP Mortgage Investment Corporation**

Petitioners

And

**Rempel Copper Sky Development Ltd., Rempel Development Group Ltd., John Rempel, Travelers Guarantee Corporation of Canada, Desert Crete Ltd., For Less Disposal Inc., D.E. Pilling & Assoc. Ltd., Quantus Electric Ltd., Central Okanagan Clean Sweep Ltd., Interior Masonry Ltd., Barry's Construction, BC General Contracting Inc., Circle Developments Ltd., Snow Pine Ventures Inc., Madge Contracting Ltd., Armada Steel Corp. Multi Exteriors Ltd., Excel Wall Systems Inc., Tri-Wik Fire Protection Inc., Floors Modern Kelowna Ltd., Qualico Painting Ltd., ESI Enterprises Inc., Structurlam Products Ltd., Ensign Bros. Enterprises Ltd., Cdn Roof Doctor Ltd., Kelowna Ready Mix Inc., Bricor Mechanical Ltd., Ploutos Enterprises Ltd., Dave Russel Derrickson, National Leasing Group Inc., Trasolini Pools Ltd., AJ Construction Ltd., A.J. Wiens Development Group Ltd., Rise and Run Manufacturing Inc., Pro Builders Supply Ltd., Empire Drywall Ltd., Aqua-Coast Engineering Ltd., Westside Sales & Rentals (2007) Ltd., Oakmont Industries Ltd., Friction Fit Insulation Inc., and Donald's Machine Works Ltd.**

Respondents

Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Fitzpatrick

## Reasons for Judgment

The Registrar noted that the third issue was not before him since that matter required an interpretation of the First and Second Orders. That matter is now raised on this application.

[19] The Registrar issued his report on February 20, 2015 after considering the well-known factors found in *Bank of Montreal v. Nican Trading Company Ltd.* (1990), 43 B.C.L.R. (2d) 315 (C.A.) at para. 21. Subject to a determination of the "cap" issue, the Registrar found the fees to be "fair and reasonable" and recommended that the Bowra Group's fees and disbursements be allowed, as claimed, in the amount of $221,896.13, which included fees of approximately $195,000.



## Discussion and Analysis

### The Fee Limit or "Cap"

[20] The First Order provided for a $100,000 limit or "cap" on the receiver's fees and its legal fees and disbursements that could be charged:

> 13. THIS COURT ORDERS that any expenditure or liability which shall properly be made or incurred by the Receiver, including the fees of the Receiver and the fees and disbursements of its legal counsel, incurred at the standard rates and charges of the Receiver and its counsel, provided that this amount does not exceed $ 100,000 (or such greater amount as this Court may by further Order authorize) shall be allowed to it in passing its accounts and shall form a charge on the Property … [Emphasis added]

[21] Such a provision is not unusual in insolvency proceedings. Such limits or caps provide some assurance to the stakeholders as to administration costs that may be charged to the estate. More often than not, such limits are increased by the court in the event that there are ongoing issues that need to be addressed which were not anticipated when the initial budgeted amount was set. Sometimes the budgeted amount proves to have been greatly underestimated.

[22] In this case, the $100,000 limit was proposed by Gowlings, the Bowra Group's counsel. I surmise that the proposed limit or "cap" was in recognition that the Bowra Group's mandate was somewhat limited under the First Order.

[23] The Second Order also addressed the fees of the Bowra Group and the fees and disbursements of its legal counsel. The Second Order did not, however, refer to any limit as did the First Order:

> 17. Any expenditure or liability which shall properly be made or incurred by the Receiver, including the fees of the Receiver and the fees and disbursements of its legal counsel, incurred at the standard rates and charges of the Receiver and its counsel, shall be allowed to it in passing its accounts and shall form a charge on the Property …

[24] The essential question that arises is the proper interpretation of the Second Order. Did it, per BCMP, have no effect on the limit or "cap" in the First Order such that the Bowra Group is limited to claiming $100,000 in the period between October 8 and November 26, 2010; or, was the limit or "cap" in the First Order, per the Bowra Group, subsumed by and overridden by the provision in the Second Order which had no such limit or "cap"?

[25] During the course of submissions, I referred counsel to the recent decision in *Yu v. Jordan*, 2012 BCCA 367, which addresses the approach of the Court in the interpretation of its own orders. The Court stated:

> [53] In my view, the interpretation of a court order is not governed by the subjective views of one or more of the parties as to its meaning after the order is made. Rather an order, whether by consent or awarded in an adjudicated disposition, is a decision of the court. As such, it is the court, not the parties, that determines the meaning of its order. In my view, the correct approach to interpreting the provisions of a court order is to examine the pleadings of the action in which it is made, the language of the order itself, and the circumstances in which the order was granted.

[26] The Court of Appeal in *Yu,* at para. 55, described the above matters - the pleadings, the language in the order, and the circumstances in which the order was granted - as "objective indicia" to be considered in interpreting the order, and commented negatively on the court relying on the parties' own interpretation. That did not, however, stop either BCMP or the Bowra Group from presenting evidence and arguments on the latter point.

[27] Mr. McLean, of Gowlings, was the person acting on behalf of the Bowra Group throughout its tenure as receiver. BCMP was, at that time, represented by John Fiddick of Clark Wilson. Mr. McLean asserted that he had various discussions with Mr. Fiddick in the time leading up to the Second Order, and that certain agreements were reached concerning how the limit or "cap" would be addressed in the Second Order. Despite Mr. McLean indicating to BCMP's counsel, in late 2014, that he would be putting forward his evidence in that respect, he did no such thing. Rather, the "evidence" was to be found in Mr. Chivers' affidavit #3 in the form of hearsay statements made to him by Mr. McLean as to his discussions with Mr. Fiddick.

[28] Understandably, BCMP objected to the admissibility of this evidence. I agree with that objection. If Mr. McLean intended to rely on such contested evidence, he should have put that evidence in his own affidavit and, in that event, of course, it would have been improper for him to speak to that affidavit. In these circumstances, I entirely disregard Mr. Chivers' evidence on this point. Mr. McLean's statements concerning his discussions with Mr. Fiddick are not evidence as to the truth of his or Mr. Fiddick's statements.

[29] Direct evidence from Mr. Fiddick is before me but is not helpful. He also confirms having discussions with Mr. McLean from September to December 2010. Unfortunately, Mr. Fiddick does not recall having any specific discussion with Mr. McLean regarding the "cap". At best, he can only speculate about what might have occurred and how he, as counsel, might have considered the interplay between the First and Second Orders.

[30] That leads me to a consideration of the more relevant evidence, namely, the circumstances in which the Second Order was granted.

[31] What emerges as an important fact is that BCMP was more than aware, by the time of the Second Order, that the Bowra Group's fees had substantially exceeded $100,000. Mr. Chivers confirms that the fees exceeded that amount by as

early as October 27, 2010. In addition, the November 10, 2010 account, referred to above, which was forwarded to BCMP, indicated fees alone of $114,549.

[32] At no time did BCMP register any objection to the Bowra Group's accounts leading up to the time of the Second Order, even after receiving the November 2010 account. In my view, it would be anomalous that BCMP would sit silent and allow the Bowra Group to continue to accrue fees without doing so. I have already mentioned that one salutary effect of imposing a limit or "cap" is to impose discipline on those seeking fees to abide by the "cap" or seek an amendment. This allows notice to the stakeholders as to the amounts actually being incurred, and allows those stakeholders to reconsider the costs of the proceedings in terms of what is being achieved or is hoped to be achieved.

[33] The Bowra Group did give notice that the "cap" amount was being exceeded. As a major stakeholder, if BCMP was going to take the position that the Bowra Group could only claim $100,000, then I would have expected it to say so at the time. In that event, the Bowra Group's choice would be clear - either obtain an amendment of the First Order or seek a discharge as receiver. No one would have expected the Bowra Group to continue to work, essentially without compensation, in these circumstances. I expect that BCMP raised no objection because they knew that the tasks being completed by the receiver had gone beyond what was anticipated, yet they were happy to see those services being provided for their own benefit in terms of addressing the assets against which they held security.

[34] BCMP's position is even more inexplicable because on January 18, 2011, its counsel couriered a cheque to Gowlings in the amount of $248,125.91, which included the fee amounts claimed by the Bowra Group in the period of time between October 8 and November 26, 2010, and which clearly exceeded the "cap" amount. This is consistent with an interpretation of the Second Order as advanced by the Bowra Group.

[35] I have also considered the language of the Second Order. The provisions of the Second Order were, in large part, a complete iteration of what one would expect

in a receivership order. It was stated to be supplemental to the First Order, which was referenced as the "Interim Order". However, in reality, the Second Order was a stand-alone order that, in my view, encapsulated the earlier provisions found in the First Order with amendments as were appropriate to the new circumstances that arose from the acceptance of the Bowra Group's recommendations in its First Report as to how to proceed to deal with the assets.

[36] Indeed, the Bowra Group points to a further provision in the Second Order:

> 31. THIS COURT ORDERS that this Order is supplemental to the Interim Order and in the event of any conflict between the provisions of this Order and the Interim Order, the terms of this Order shall prevail.

[37] I accept the submissions of the Bowra Group that the Second Order had the effect of superseding the First Order as to the fees that might be charged by the receiver, such that it removed the limit or "cap" found in the First Order. Accordingly, to the extent that the First Order remained extant, the limit or "cap" is in conflict with the Second Order, in which case the latter prevails.

[38] While not necessary given my conclusion above, I would also have acceded to the position of the Bowra Group that the First Order should be amended to remove the limit or "cap". Paragraph 13 of the First Order expressly provides for the limit "or such greater amount as this Court may by further Order authorize". BCMP was well-aware of the increased costs throughout. Finally, the Registrar's report indicates that the fees and disbursements claimed in the period leading up to November 26, 2010 were properly incurred by the Bowra Group as receiver. No aspects of unfairness arise by such an amendment that would dictate a different result, such as found in *Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. 620357 Saskatchewan Ltd.*, 2008 SKQB 300, at para. 25.

**The Gowlings Account**

[39] The Bowra Group was replaced as receiver on January 14, 2011. The day before, on January 13, Gowlings forwarded an email to BCMP's counsel confirming that the receiver's accounts and Gowlings' accounts were then outstanding in the

# TAB 19

Province of Alberta

# PROMPT PAYMENT AND CONSTRUCTION LIEN ACT

Revised Statutes of Alberta 2000
Chapter P-26.4

Current as of November 16, 2022

Office Consolidation



Alberta King's Printer
Suite 700, Park Plaza
10611 - 98 Avenue
Edmonton, AB T5K 2P7
Phone: 780-427-4952

E-mail: kings-printer@gov.ab.ca
Shop on-line at kings-printer.alberta.ca

## Note

All persons making use of this consolidation are reminded that it has no legislative sanction, that amendments have been embodied for convenience of reference only. The official Statutes and Regulations should be consulted for all purposes of interpreting and applying the law.

## Regulations

The following is a list of the regulations made under the *Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Act* that are filed as Alberta Regulations under the Regulations Act

| | **Alta. Reg.** | *Amendments* |
|---|---|---|
| **Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Act** | | |
| Prompt Payment and Adjudication | 23/2022 | |
| Prompt Payment and Construction Lien Forms | 51/2002 | *108/2004, 217/2009, 164/2010, 227/2011, 130/2012, 124/2015, 114/2020, 46/2021, 22/2022, 218/2022, 98/2023* |
| Prompt Payment and Construction Lien (Prescribed Persons, Entities and Project Agreements) | 122/2023 | |

(a) on receipt of a notice of change of address for service, and

(b) on receipt of the proper fee,

enter the notice of change of address in the day book and make a memorandum setting out the new address for service on the registered statement of lien.

RSA 1980 cB-12 s28

**Wrongful registration**

**40** In addition to any other grounds on which the person may be liable, a person who registers a lien against a particular estate or interest in land or a particular parcel of land

(a) for an amount grossly in excess of the amount due to the person or that the person expects to become due to the person, or

(b) when the person knows or ought reasonably to know that the person does not have a lien,

is liable for legal and other costs and damages incurred as a result of it unless that person satisfies the court that the registration of the lien was made or the amount of the lien was calculated in good faith and without negligence.

RSA 1980 cB-12 s29;1985 c14 s15

**Time for registration**

**41(1)** A lien for materials may be registered at any time within the period commencing when the lien arises and

(a) subject to clauses (b) and (c), terminating 60 days from the day that the last of the materials is furnished or the contract to furnish the materials is abandoned,

(b) with respect to improvements to an oil or gas well or to an oil or gas well site, terminating 90 days from the day that the last of the materials is furnished or the contract to furnish the materials is abandoned, or

(c) with respect to improvements primarily related to the furnishing of concrete as a material or work done in relation to concrete, terminating 90 days from the day that the last of the materials is furnished or the contract to furnish the materials is abandoned.

**(2)** A lien for the performance of services may be registered at any time within the period commencing when the lien arises and

(a) subject to clauses (b) and (c), terminating 60 days from the day that the performance of the services is completed or the contract to provide the services is abandoned,

(b) with respect to improvements to an oil or gas well or to an oil or gas well site, terminating 90 days from the day that the performance of the services is completed or the contract to provide the services is abandoned, or

(c) with respect to improvements primarily related to the furnishing of concrete as a material or work done in relation to concrete, terminating 90 days from the day that the performance of the services is completed or the contract to provide the services is abandoned.

**(3)** A lien for wages may be registered at any time within the period commencing when the lien arises and

(a) subject to clauses (b) and (c), terminating 60 days from the day that the work for which the wages are claimed is completed or abandoned,

(b) with respect to improvements to an oil or gas well or to an oil or gas well site, terminating 90 days from the day that the work for which the wages are claimed is completed or abandoned, or

(c) with respect to improvements primarily related to the furnishing of concrete as a material or work done in relation to concrete, terminating 90 days from the day that the work for which the wages are claimed is completed or abandoned.

**(4)** In cases not referred to in subsections (1) to (3), a lien in favour of a contractor or subcontractor may be registered at any time within the period commencing when the lien arises and

(a) subject to clauses (b) and (c), terminating 60 days from the day the contract or subcontract, as the case may be, is completed or abandoned,

(b) with respect to improvements to an oil or gas well or to an oil or gas well site, terminating 90 days from the day the contract or subcontract, as the case may be, is completed or abandoned, or

(c) with respect to improvements primarily related to the furnishing of concrete as a material or work done in relation to concrete, terminating 90 days from the day the

contract or subcontract, as the case may be, is completed or abandoned.

**(5)** Notwithstanding subsections (1) to (4), the time limited by this section for registering a lien is not extended by reason only that something improperly done or omitted to be done in respect of work done or materials furnished is corrected or done, as the case may be, at a later date.

RSA 2000 cB-7 s41;2001 c20 s11;2020 c30 ss20,27

## Part 7
## Expiry and Discharge of Lien

### Expiry of unregistered lien

**42** If a lien is not registered within the time limited by section 41, the lien ceases to exist.

RSA 1980 cB-12 s31

### Expiry of registered lien

**43(1)** A lien that has been registered ceases to exist unless, within 180 days from the date it is registered,

(a) an action is commenced under this Act

(i) to realize on the lien, or

(ii) in which the lien may be realized,

and

(b) the lien claimant registers a certificate of lis pendens in respect of the claimant's lien in the appropriate land titles office.

**(2)** A court clerk in the judicial centre in which an action is begun may grant a certificate of lis pendens to any lienholder who is a party to the proceedings.

**(3)** Any lienholder who is a party to the proceedings may cause a certificate of lis pendens to be registered in the appropriate land titles office.

**(4)** On receiving

(a) a certificate from a court clerk stating that proceedings for which a certificate of lis pendens was granted are discontinued, or