

Court File No. 32-2480036
Estate File No. 32-2480036

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY

**IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF FT ENE CANADA INC., OF THE CITY OF
BRANTFORD, IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO**

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF FINETEX ENE, INC.
(Motion returnable September 26, 2019)

September 25, 2019

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Most Negative Treatment: Check subsequent history and related treatments.

2008 CarswellOnt 3523
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**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT Involving Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., 6932819 Canada Inc. and 4446372 Canada Inc., Trustees of the Conduits Listed In Schedule "A" Hereto

THE INVESTORS REPRESENTED ON THE PAN-CANADIAN INVESTORS COMMITTEE FOR THIRD-PARTY STRUCTURED ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER LISTED IN SCHEDULE "B" HERETO (Applicants) and METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 6932819 CANADA INC. AND 4446372 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (Respondents)

C. Campbell J.

Heard: May 12-13, 2008; June 3, 2008

Judgment: June 5, 2008

Docket: 08-CL-7440

Counsel: B. Zarnett, F. Myers, B. Empey, for Applicants

Donald Milner, Graham Phoenix, Xeno C. Martis, David Lemieux, Robert Girard, for Respondents, Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp.

Aubrey Kauffman, Stuart Brotman, for Respondents, 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc., as Issuer Trustees

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

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Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

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Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co. (1982), 25 C.P.C. 72, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 559, (sub nom. *Dalton Cartage Ltd. v. Continental Insurance Co.*) 40 N.R. 135, [1982] I.L.R. 1-1487, 1982 CarswellOnt 372, 1982 CarswellOnt 719 (S.C.C.) — considered

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U.S. v. Energy Resources Co. (1990), 495 U.S. 545, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 90-1078, 58 U.S.L.W. 4609, 109 L.Ed.2d 580, 110 S.Ct. 2139 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) — considered

Vicwest, Re (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 3600 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 5 — referred to

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — referred to

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21

s. 10 — considered

Negligence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. N.1

Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

fraud

The definition of fraud in a corporate context in the common law of Canada starts with the proposition that it must be made (1) knowingly; (2) without belief in its truth; (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. . . . It is my understanding that while expressed somewhat differently, the above-noted ingredients form the basis of fraud claims in the civil law of Quebec, although there are differences.

APPLICATION for approval of Plan of Compromise and Arrangement under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* to address liquidity crisis in market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper.

C. Campbell J.:

1 This decision follows a sanction hearing in parts in which applicants sought approval of a Plan under the *Companies Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA.") Approval of the Plan as filed and voted on by Noteholders was opposed by a number of corporate and individual Noteholders, principally on the basis that this Court does not have the jurisdiction under the CCAA or if it does should not exercise discretion to approve third party releases.

History of Proceedings

2 On Monday, March 17, 2008, two Orders were granted. The first, an Initial Order on essentially an *ex parte* basis and in a form that has become familiar to insolvency practitioners, granted a stay of proceedings, a limitation of rights and remedies, the appointment of a Monitor and for service and notice of the Order.

3 The second Order made dated March 17, 2008 provided for a meeting of Noteholders and notice thereof, including the sending of what by then had become the Amended Plan of Compromise and Arrangement. Reasons for Decision were issued on April 8, 2008 elaborating on the basis of the Initial Order.

4 No appeal was taken from either of the Orders of March 17, 2008. Indeed, on the return of a motion made on April 23, 2008 by certain Noteholders (the moving parties) to adjourn the meeting then scheduled for and held on April 25, 2008, no challenge was made to the Initial Order.

5 Information was sought and provided on the issue of classification of Noteholders. The thrust of the Motions was and has been the validity of the releases of various parties provided for in the Plan.

6 The cornerstone to the material filed in support of the Initial Order was the affidavit of Purdy Crawford, O.C., Q.C., Chairman of the Applicant Pan Canadian Investors Committee. There has been no challenge to Mr. Crawford's description of the Asset Backed Commercial Paper ("ABCP") market or in general terms the circumstances that led up to the liquidity crisis that occurred in the week of August 13, 2007, or to the formation of the Plan now before the Court.

7 The unchallenged evidence of Mr. Crawford with respect to the nature of the ABCP market and to the development of the Plan is a necessary part of the consideration of the fairness and indeed the jurisdiction, of the Court to approve the form of releases that are said to be integral to the Plan.

8 As will be noted in more detail below, the meeting of Noteholders (however classified) approved the Plan overwhelmingly at the meeting of April 25, 2008.

Background to the Plan

9 Much of the description of the parties and their relationship to the market are by now well known or referred to in the earlier reasons of March 17 or April 4, 2008.

10 The focus here will be on that portion of the background that is necessary for an understanding of and decision on, the issues raised in opposition to the Plan.

11 Not unlike a sporting event that is unfamiliar to some attending without a program, it is difficult to understand the role of various market participants without a description of it. Attached as Appendix 2 are some of the terms that describe the parties, which are from the Glossary that is part of the Information Statement, attached to various of the Monitor's Reports.

12 A list of these entities that fall into various definitional categories reveals that they comprise Canadian chartered banks, Canadian investment houses and foreign banks and financial institutions that may appear in one or more categories of conduits, dealers, liquidity providers, asset providers, sponsors or agents.

13 The following paragraphs from Mr. Crawford's affidavit succinctly summarize the proximate cause of the liquidity crisis, which since August 2007 has frozen the market for ABCP in Canada:

[7] Before the week of August 13, 2007, there was an operating market in ABCP. Various corporations (referred to below as "Sponsors") arranged for the Conduits to make ABCP available as an investment vehicle bearing interest at rates slightly higher than might be available on government or bank short-term paper.

[8] The ABCP represents debts owing by the trustees of the Conduits. Most of the ABCP is short-term commercial paper (usually 30 to 90 days). The balance of the ABCP is made up of commercial paper that is extendible for up to 364 days and longer-term floating rate notes. The money paid by investors to acquire ABCP was used to purchase a portfolio of financial assets to be held, directly or through subsidiary trusts, by the trustees of the Conduits. Repayment of each series of ABCP is supported by the assets held for that series, which serves as collateral for the payment obligations. ABCP is therefore said to be "asset-backed."

[9] Some of these supporting assets were mid-term, but most were long-term, such as pools of residential mortgages, credit card receivables or credit default swaps (which are sophisticated derivative products). Because of the generally long-term nature of the assets backing the ABCP, the cash flow they generated did not match the cash flow required to repay maturing ABCP. Before mid-August 2007, this timing mismatch was not a problem because many investors did not require repayment of ABCP on maturity; instead they reinvested or "rolled" their existing ABCP at maturity. As well, new ABCP was continually being sold, generating funds to repay maturing ABCP where investors required payment. Many of the trustees of the Conduits also entered into back-up liquidity arrangements with third-party lenders ("Liquidity Providers") who agreed to provide funds to repay maturing ABCP in certain circumstances.

[10] In the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market froze. The crisis was largely triggered by market sentiment, as news spread of significant defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. In large part, investors in Canadian ABCP lost confidence because they did not know what assets or mix of assets backed their ABCP. Because of this lack of transparency, existing holders and potential new investors feared that the assets backing the ABCP might include sub-prime mortgages or other overvalued assets. Investors stopped buying new ABCP, and holders stopped "rolling" their existing ABCP. As ABCP became due, Conduits were unable to fund repayments through new issuances or replacement notes. Trustees of some Conduits made requests for advances under the back-up

arrangements that were intended to provide liquidity; however, most Liquidity Providers took the position that the conditions to funding had not been met. With no new investment, no reinvestment, and no liquidity funding available, and with long-term underlying assets whose cash flows did not match maturing short-term ABCP, payments due on the ABCP could not be made — and no payments have been made since mid-August.

14 Between mid-August 2007 and the filing of the Plan, Mr. Crawford and the Applicant Committee have diligently pursued the object of restructuring not just the specific trusts that are part of this Plan, but faith in a market structure that has been a significant part of the broader Canadian financial market, which in turn is directly linked to global financial markets that are themselves in uncertain times.

15 The previous reasons of March 17, 2008 that approved for filing the Initial Plan, recognized not just the unique circumstances facing conduits and their sponsors, but the entire market in Canada for ABCP and the impact for financial markets generally of the liquidity crisis.

16 Unlike many CCAA situations, when at the time of the first appearance there is no plan in sight, much less negotiated, this rescue package has been the product of painstaking, complicated and difficult negotiations and eventually agreement.

17 The following five paragraphs from Mr. Crawford's affidavit crystallize the problem that developed in August 2007:

[45] Investors who bought ABCP often did not know the particular assets or mix of assets that backed their ABCP. In part, this was because ABCP was often issued and sold before or at about the same time the assets were acquired. In addition, many of the assets are extremely complex and parties to some underlying contracts took the position that the terms were confidential.

[46] Lack of transparency became a significant problem as general market fears about the credit quality of certain types of investment mounted during the summer of 2007. As long as investors were willing to roll their ABCP or buy new ABCP to replace maturing notes, the ABCP market was stable. However, beginning in the first half of 2007, the economy in the United States was shaken by what is referred to as the "sub-prime" lending crisis.

[47] U.S. sub-prime lending had an impact in Canada because ABCP investors became concerned that the assets underlying their ABCP either included U.S. sub-prime mortgages or were overvalued like the U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The lack of transparency into the pools of assets underlying ABCP made it difficult for investors to know if their ABCP investments included exposure to U.S. sub-prime mortgages or other similar products. In the week of August 13, that concern intensified to the point that investors stopped rolling their maturing ABCP, and instead demanded repayment, and new investors could not be found. Certain trustees of the Conduits then tried to draw on their Liquidity Agreements to repay ABCP. Most of the Liquidity Providers did not agree that the conditions for liquidity funding had occurred and did not provide funding, so the ABCP could not be repaid. Deteriorating conditions in the credit market affected all the ABCP, including ABCP backed by traditional assets not linked to sub-prime lending.

[48] Some of the Asset Providers made margin calls under LSS swaps on certain of the Conduits, requiring them to post additional collateral. Since they could not issue new ABCP, roll over existing ABCP or draw on their Liquidity Agreements, those Conduits were not able to post the additional collateral. Had there been no standstill arrangement, as described below, these Asset Providers could have unwound the swaps and ultimately could have liquidated the collateral posted by the Conduits.

[49] Any liquidation of assets under an LSS swap would likely have further depressed the LSS market, creating a domino effect under the remaining LSS swaps by triggering their "mark-to-market" triggers for additional margin calls, ultimately leading to the sale of more assets, at very depressed prices. The standstill arrangement has, to date, through successive extensions, prevented this from occurring, in anticipation of the restructuring.

18 The "Montreal Accord," as it has been called, brought together various industry representatives, Asset Providers and

Liquidity Providers who entered into a “Standstill Agreement,” which committed to the framework for restructuring the ABCP such that (a) all outstanding ABCP would be converted into term floating rate notes maturing at the same time as the corresponding underlying assets. This was intended to correct the mismatch between the long-term nature of the financial assets and the short-term nature of the ABCP; and (b) margin provisions under certain swaps would be changed to create renewed stability, reducing the likelihood of margin calls. This contract was intended to reduce the risk that the Conduits would have to post additional collateral for the swap obligations or be subject to having their assets seized and sold, thereby preserving the value of the assets and of the ABCP.

19 The Investors Committee of which Mr. Crawford is the Chair has been at work since September to develop a Plan that could be implemented to restore viability to the notes that have been frozen and restore liquidity so there can be a market for them.

20 Since the Plan itself is not in issue at this hearing (apart from the issue of the releases), it is not necessary to deal with the particulars of the Plan. Suffice to say I am satisfied that as the Information to Noteholders states at p. 69, “The value of the Notes if the Plan does not go forward is highly uncertain.”

The Vote

21 A motion was held on April 25, 2008, brought by various corporate and individual Noteholders seeking:

- a) changing classification each in particular circumstances from the one vote per Noteholder regime;
- b) provision of information of various kinds;
- c) adjourning the vote of April 25, 2008 until issues of classification and information were fully dealt with;
- d) amending the Plan to delete various parties from release.

22 By endorsement of April 24, 2008 [2008 CarswellOnt 2653 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] the issue of releases was in effect adjourned for determination later. The vote was not postponed, as I was satisfied that the Monitor would be able to tally the votes in such a way that any issue of classification could be dealt with at this hearing.

23 I was also satisfied that the Applicants and the Monitor had or would make available any and all information that was in existence and pertinent to the issue of voting. Of understandable concern to those identified as the moving parties are the developments outside the Plan affecting Noteholders holding less than \$1 million of Notes. Certain dealers, Canaccord and National Bank being the most prominent, agreed in the first case to buy their customers’ ABCP and in the second to extend financing assistance.

24 A logical conclusion from these developments outside the Plan is that they were designed (with apparent success) to obtain votes in favour of the Plan from various Noteholders.

25 On a one vote per Noteholder basis, the vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the Plan approximately 96%. At a case conference held on April 29, 2008, the Monitor was asked to tabulate votes that would isolate into Class A all those entities in any way associated with the formulation of the Plan, whether or not they were Noteholders or sold or advised on notes, and into Class B all other Noteholders.

26 The results of the vote on the Restructuring Resolution, tabulated on the basis set out in paragraph 30 of the Monitor’s 7th Report and using the Class structure referred to in the preceding paragraph, are summarized below:

	Number	Dollar Value	
Class A			
Votes FOR the Restructuring Resolution	1,572 99.4%	\$23,898, 232,639	100.0 %
Votes AGAINST the Restructuring —Resolution	9 0.6%	\$867,666	0.0%

CLASS B

Votes FOR the Restructuring Resolution	289	80.5%	\$5,046, 951,989	81.2%
Votes AGAINST the Restructuring— Resolution	70	19.5%	\$1,168, 136,123	18.8%

27 I am satisfied that reclassification would not alter the strong majority supporting the Restructuring. The second request made at the case conference on April 29 was that the moving parties provide the Monitor with information that would permit a summary to be compiled of the claims that would have been made or anticipated to be made against so-called third parties, including Conduits and their trustees.

28 The information compiled by the Monitor reveals that the primary defendants are or are anticipated to be banks, including four Canadian chartered banks and dealers (many associated with Canadian banks). In the case of banks, they and their employees may be sued in more than one capacity.

29 The claims against proposed defendants are for the most part claims in tort, and include negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/adviser, acting in conflict of interest and in a few instances, fraud or potential fraud.

30 Again in general terms, the claims for damages include the face value of notes plus interest and additional penalties and damages that may be allowable at law. It is noteworthy that the moving parties assume that they would be able to mitigate their claim for damages by taking advantage of the Plan offer without the need to provide releases.

31 The information provided by the potential defendants indicates the likelihood of claims over against parties such that no entity, institution or party involved in the Restructuring Plan could be assured being spared from likely involvement in lawsuits by way of third party or other claims over.

32 The chart prepared by the Monitor that is Appendix 3 to these Reasons shows graphically the extent of those entities that would be involved in future litigation.

Law and Analysis

33 Some of the moving parties in their written and oral submissions assumed that this Court has the power to amend the Plan to allow for the proposed lawsuits, whether in negligence or fraud. The position of the Applicants and supporting parties is that the Plan is to be accepted on the basis that it satisfies the criteria established under the CCAA, or it will be rejected on the basis that it does not.

34 I am satisfied that the Court does not have the power to amend the Plan. The Plan is that of the Applicants and their supporters. They have made it clear that the Plan is a package that allows only for acceptance or rejection by the Court. The Plan has been amended to address the concerns expressed by the Court in the May 16, 2008 [2008 CarswellOnt 2820 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])] endorsement.

35 I am satisfied and understand that if the Plan is rejected by the Court, either on the basis of fairness (i.e., that claims should be allowed to proceed beyond those provided for in the Plan) or lack of jurisdiction to compel compromise of claims, there is no reliable prospect that the Plan would be revised.

36 I do not consider that the Applicants or those supporting them are bluffing or simply trying to bargain for the best position for themselves possible. The position has been consistent throughout and for what I consider to be good and logical reasons. Those parties described as Asset or Liquidity Providers have a first secured interest in the underlying assets of the Trusts. To say that the value of the underlying assets is uncertain is an understatement after the secured interest of Asset Providers is taken into account.

37 When one looks at the Plan in detail, its intent is to benefit ALL Noteholders. Given the contribution to be made by those supporting the Plan, one can understand why they have said forcefully in effect to the Court, ‘We have taken this as far as we can, particularly given the revisions. If it is not accepted by the Court as it has been overwhelmingly by Noteholders,

we hold no prospect of another Plan coming forward.’

38 I have carefully considered the submissions of all parties with respect to the issue of releases. I recognize that to a certain extent the issues raised chart new territory. I also recognize that there are legitimate principle-based arguments on both sides.

39 As noted in the Reasons of April 8, 2008 and as reflected in the March 17, 2008 Order and May 16 Endorsement, the Plan represents a highly complex unique situation.

40 The vehicles for the Initial Order are corporations acting in the place of trusts that are insolvent. The trusts and the respondent corporations are not directly related except in the sense that they are all participants in the Canadian market for ABCP. They are each what have been referred to as issuer trustees.

41 There are a great number of other participants in the ABCP market in Canada who are themselves intimately connected with the Plan, either as Sponsors, Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, participating banks or dealers.

42 I am satisfied that what is sought in this Plan is the restructuring of the ABCP market in Canada and not just the insolvent corporations that are issuer trustees.

43 The impetus for this market restructuring is the Investors Committee chaired by Mr. Crawford. It is important to note that all of the members of the Investors Committee, which comprise 17 financial and investment institutions (see Schedule B, attached), are themselves Noteholders with no other involvement. Three of the members of that Committee act as participants in other capacities.

44 The Initial Order, which no party has appealed or sought to vary or set aside, accepts for the purpose of placing before all Noteholders the revised Plan that is currently before the Court.

45 Those parties who now seek to exclude only some of the Release portions of the Plan do not take issue with the legal or practical basis for the goal of the Plan. Indeed, the statement in the Information to Noteholders, which states that ...as of August 31, 2007, of the total amount of Canadian ABCP outstanding of approximately \$116.8 billion (excluding medium-term and floating rate notes), approximately \$83.8 billion was issued by Canadian Schedule I bank-administered Conduits and approximately \$33 billion was issued by non-bank administered conduits)¹ is unchallenged.

46 The further description of the ABCP market is also not questioned:
ABCP programs have been used to fund the acquisition of long-term assets, such as mortgages and auto loans. Even when funding short-term assets such as trade receivables, ABCP issuers still face the inherent timing mismatch between cash generated by the underlying assets and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP. Maturing ABCP is typically repaid with the proceeds of newly issued ABCP, a process commonly referred to as “rolling”. Because ABCP is a highly rated commercial obligation with a long history of market acceptance, market participants in Canada formed the view that, absent a “general market disruption”, ABCP would readily be saleable without the need for extraordinary funding measures. However, to protect investors in case of a market disruption, ABCP programs typically have provided liquidity back-up facilities, usually in amounts that correspond to the amount of the ABCP programs typically have provided liquidity back-up facilities, usually in amounts that correspond to the amount of the ABCP outstanding. In the event that an ABCP issuer is unable to issue new ABCP, it may be able to draw down on the liquidity facility to ensure that proceeds are available to repay any maturing ABCP. As discussed below, there have been important distinctions between different kinds of liquidity agreements as to the nature and scope of drawing conditions which give rise to an obligation of a liquidity provider to fund²

47 The activities of the Investors Committee, most of whom are themselves Noteholders without other involvement, have been lauded as innovative, pioneering and essential to the success of the Plan. In my view, it is entirely inappropriate to classify the vast majority of the Investors Committee, and indeed other participants who were not directly engaged in the sale of Notes, as third parties.

48 Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.

49 In these circumstances, it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring.

50 The insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper - restructuring that involves the commitment and participation of all parties. The Latin words *sui generis* are used to mean something that is "one off" or "unique." That is certainly the case with this Plan.

51 The Plan, including all of its constituent parts, has been overwhelmingly accepted by Noteholders no matter how they are classified. In the sense of their involvement I do not think it appropriate to label any of the participants as Third Parties. Indeed, as this matter has progressed, additions to the supporter side have included for the proposed releases the members of the Ad Hoc Investors' Committee. The Ad Hoc group had initially opposed the release provisions. The Committee members account for some two billion dollars' worth of Notes.

52 It is more appropriate to consider all participants part of the market for the restructuring of ABCP and therefore not merely third parties to those Noteholders who may wish to sue some or all of them.

53 The benefit of the restructuring is only available to the debtor corporations with the input, contribution and direct assistance of the Applicant Noteholders and those associated with them who similarly contribute. Restructuring of the ABCP market cannot take place without restructuring of the Notes themselves. Restructuring of the Notes cannot take place without the input and capital to the insolvent corporations that replace the trusts.

54 A hearing was held on May 12 and 13 to hear the objections of various Noteholders to approval of the Plan insofar as it provided for comprehensive releases.

55 On May 16, 2008, by way of endorsement the issue of scope of the proposed releases was addressed. The following paragraphs from the endorsement capsulize the adjournment that was granted on the issue of releases:

[10] I am not satisfied that the release proposed as part of the Plan, which is broad enough to encompass release from fraud, is in the circumstances of this case at this time properly authorized by the CCAA, or is necessarily fair and reasonable. I simply do not have sufficient facts at this time on which to reach a conclusion one way or another.

[11] I have also reached the conclusion that in the circumstances of this Plan, at this time, it may well be appropriate to approve releases that would circumscribe claims for negligence. I recognize the different legal positions but am satisfied that this Plan will not proceed unless negligence claims are released.

56 The endorsement went on to elaborate on the particular concerns that I had with releases sought by the Applicants that could in effect exonerate fraud. As well, concern was expressed that the Plan might unduly bring hardship to some Noteholders over others.

57 I am satisfied that based on Mr. Crawford's affidavit and the statements commencing at p. 126 of the Information to Noteholders, a compelling case for the need for comprehensive releases, with the exception of certain fraud claims, has been made out.

The Released Parties have made comprehensive releases a condition of their participation in the Plan or as parties to the Approved Agreements. Each Released Party is making a necessary contribution to the Plan without which the Plan cannot be implemented. The Asset Providers, in particular, have agreed to amend certain of the existing contracts and/or enter into new contracts that, among other things, will restructure the trigger covenants, thereby increasing their risk of

loss and decreasing the risk of losses being borne by Noteholders. In addition, the Asset Providers are making further contributions that materially improve the position of Noteholders generally, including through forbearing from making collateral calls since August 15, 2007, participating in the MAV2 Margin Funding Facility at pricing favourable to the Noteholders, accepting additional collateral at par with respect to the Traditional Assets and disclosing confidential information, none of which they are contractually obligated to do. The ABCP Sponsors have also released confidential information, co-operated with the Investors Committee and its advisors in the development of the Plan, released their claims in respect of certain future fees that would accrue to them in respect of the assets and are assisting in the transition of administration services to the Asset Administrator, should the Plan be implemented. The Original Issuer Trustees, the Issuer Trustees, the Existing Note Indenture Trustees and the Rating Agency have assisted in the restructuring process as needed and have co-operated with the Investors Committee in facilitating an essential aspect of the court proceedings required to complete the restructuring of the ABCP Conduits through the replacement of the Original Issuer Trustees where required.

In many instances, a party had a number of relationships in different capacities with numerous trades or programs of an ABCP Conduit, rendering it difficult or impracticable to identify and/or quantify any individual Released Party's contribution. Certain of the Released Parties may have contributed more to the Plan than others. However, in order for the releases to be comprehensive, the Released Parties (including those Released Parties without which no restructuring could occur) require that all Released Parties be included so that one Person who is not released by the Noteholders is unable to make a claim-over for contribution from a Released Party and thereby defeat the effectiveness of the releases. Certain entities represented on the Investors Committee have also participated in the Third-Party ABCP market in a variety of capacities other than as Noteholders and, accordingly, are also expected to benefit from these releases.

The evidence is unchallenged.

58 The questions raised by moving parties are (a) does the Court have jurisdiction to approve a Plan under the CCAA that provides for the releases in question?; and if so, (b) is it fair and reasonable that certain identified dealers and others be released?

59 I am also satisfied that those parties and institutions who were involved in the ABCP market directly at issue and those additional parties who have agreed solely to assist in the restructuring have valid and legitimate reasons for seeking such releases. To exempt some Noteholders from release provisions not only leads to the failure of the Plan, it does likely result in many Noteholders having to pursue fraud or negligence claims to obtain any redress, since the value of the assets underlying the Notes may, after first security interests be negligible.

Restructuring under the CCAA

60 This Application has brought into sharp focus the purpose and scope of the CCAA. It has been accepted for the last 15 years that the issue of releases beyond directors of insolvent corporations dates from the decision in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*³ where Paperny J. said:

[87] Prior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company. In 1997, section 5.1 was added to the CCAA. Section 5.1 states:

5.1 (1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that:

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

(3) The Court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

61 The following paragraphs from that decision are reproduced at some length, since, in the submission principally of Mr. Woods, the releases represent an illegal or improper extension of the wording of the CCAA. Mr. Woods takes issue with the reasoning in the *Canadian Airlines* decision, which has been widely referred to in many cases since. Mme Justice Paperny continued:

[88] Resurgence argued that the form of release does not comply with section 5.1 of the CCAA insofar as it applies to individuals beyond directors and to a broad spectrum of claims beyond obligations of the Petitioners for which their directors are “by law liable”. Resurgence submitted that the addition of section 5.1 to the CCAA constituted an exception to a long standing principle and urged the court to therefore interpret s. 5.1 cautiously, if not narrowly.

...

[92] While it is true that section 5.2 of the CCAA does not authorize a release of claims against third parties other than directors, it does not prohibit such releases either. The amended terms of the release will not prevent claims from which the CCAA expressly prohibits release. Aside from the complaints of Resurgence, which by their own submissions are addressed in the amendment I have directed, and the complaints of JHHD Aircraft Leasing No. 1 and No. 2, which would also be addressed in the amendment, the terms of the release have been accepted by the requisite majority of creditors and I am loathe to further disturb the terms of the Plan, with one exception. [Emphasis added.]

[93] Amex Bank of Canada submitted that the form of release appeared overly broad and might compromise unaffected claims of affected creditors. For further clarification, Amex Bank of Canada’s potential claim for defamation is unaffected by the Plan and I am prepared to order Section 6.2(2)(ii) be amended to reflect this specific exception.

[94] In determining whether to sanction a plan of arrangement under the CCAA, the court is guided by two fundamental concepts: “fairness” and “reasonableness”. While these concepts are always at the heart of the court’s exercise of its discretion, their meanings are necessarily shaped by the unique circumstances of each case, within the context of the Act and accordingly can be difficult to distill and challenging to apply. Blair J. described these concepts in *Olympia and York Dev. Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.*⁴ at page 9:

”Fairness” and “reasonableness” are, in my opinion, the two keynote concepts underscoring the philosophy and workings of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act. Fairness is the quintessential expression of the court’s equitable jurisdiction - although the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the legislation which make its exercise an exercise in equity - and “reasonableness” is what lends objectivity to the process.

[95] The legislation, while conferring broad discretion on the court, offers little guidance. However, the court is assisted in the exercise of its discretion by the purpose of the CCAA: to facilitate the reorganization of a debtor company for the benefit of the company, its creditors, shareholders, employees and, in many instances, a much broader constituency of affected persons. Parliament has recognized that reorganization, if commercially feasible, is in most cases preferable, economically and socially, to liquidation: *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.*, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566 at 574 (Alta.Q.B.); *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 at 368 (B.C.C.A.).

[96] The sanction of the court of a creditor-approved plan is not to be considered as a rubber stamp process. Although the majority vote that brings the plan to a sanction hearing plays a significant role in the court’s assessment, the court will consider other matters as are appropriate in light of its discretion. In the unique circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to consider a number of additional matters:

- a. The composition of the unsecured vote;
- b. What creditors would receive on liquidation or bankruptcy as compared to the Plan;
- c. Alternatives available to the Plan and bankruptcy;
- d. Oppression;
- e. Unfairness to Shareholders of CAC; and
- f. The public interest.

[97] As noted above, an important measure of whether a plan is fair and reasonable is the parties' approval and the degree to which it has been given. Creditor support creates an inference that the plan is fair and reasonable because the assenting creditors believe that their interests are treated equitably under the plan. Moreover, it creates an inference that the arrangement is economically feasible and therefore reasonable because the creditors are in a better position than the courts to gauge business risk. As stated by Blair J. at page 11 of *Olympia & York Developments Ltd.*, *supra*:

As other courts have done, I observe that it is not my function to second guess the business people with respect to the "business" aspect of the Plan or descending into the negotiating arena or substituting my own view of what is a fair and reasonable compromise or arrangement for that of the business judgment of the participants. The parties themselves know best what is in their interests in those areas.

62 The liberal interpretation to be given to the CCAA was and has been accepted in Ontario. In *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*⁵, Blair J. (as he then was) has been referred to with approval in later cases:

[45] It is very common in CCAA restructurings for the Court to approve the sale and disposition of assets during the process and before the Plan if formally tendered and voted upon. There are many examples where this had occurred, the recent Eaton's restructuring being only one of them. The CCAA is designed to be a flexible instrument, and it is that very flexibility which gives it its efficacy. As Farley J said in *Dylex Ltd.* *supra* (p. 111), "the history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation". It is not infrequently that judges are told, by those opposing a particular initiative at a particular time, that if they make a particular order that is requested it will be the first time in Canadian jurisprudence (sometimes in global jurisprudence, depending upon the level of the rhetoric) that such an order has made! Nonetheless, the orders are made, if the circumstances are appropriate and the orders can be made within the framework and in the spirit of the CCAA legislation. Mr. Justice Farley has well summarized this approach in the following passage from his decision in *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31, which I adopt:

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4,5,7,8 and 11 of the CCAA (a lengthy list of authorities cited here is omitted).

The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do

so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA (citations omitted)

[Emphasis added]

63 In a 2006 decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*⁶, which adopted the *Canadian Airlines* test, Ground J. said:

[7] With respect to the relief sought relating to Claims against Third Parties, the position of the Objecting Claimants appears to be that this court lacks jurisdiction to make any order affecting claims against third parties who are not applicants in a CCAA proceeding. I do not agree. In the case at bar, the whole plan of compromise which is being funded by Third Parties will not proceed unless the plan provides for a resolution of all claims against the Applicants and Third Parties arising out of “the development, advertising and marketing, and sale of health supplements, weight loss and sports nutrition or other products by the Applicants or any of them” as part of a global resolution of the litigation commenced in the United States. In his Endorsement of January 18, 2006, Farley J. stated:

the Product Liability system vis-à-vis the Non-Applicants appears to be in essence derivative of claims against the Applicants and it would neither be logical nor practical/functional to have that Product Liability litigation not be dealt with on an all encompassing basis.

64 This decision is also said to be beyond the Court’s jurisdiction to follow.

65 In a later decision⁷ in the same matter, Ground J. said in 2007:

[18] It has been held that in determining whether to sanction a plan, the court must exercise its equitable jurisdiction and consider the prejudice to the various parties that would flow from granting or refusing to grant approval of the plan and must consider alternatives available to the Applicants if the plan is not approved. An important factor to be considered by the court in determining whether the plan is fair and reasonable is the degree of approval given to the plan by the creditors. It has also been held that, in determining whether to approve the plan, a court should not second-guess the business aspects of the plan or substitute its views for that of the stakeholders who have approved the plan.

[19] In the case at bar, all of such considerations, in my view must lead to the conclusion that the Plan is fair and reasonable. On the evidence before this court, the Applicants have no assets and no funds with which to fund a distribution to creditors. Without the Contributed Funds there would be no distribution made and no. Plan to be sanctioned by this court. Without the Contributed Funds, the only alternative for the Applicants is bankruptcy and it is clear from the evidence before this court that the unsecured creditors would receive nothing in the event of bankruptcy.

[20] A unique feature of this Plan is the Releases provided under the Plan to Third Parties in respect of claims against them in any way related to “the research, development, manufacture, marketing, sale, distribution, application, advertising, supply, production, use or ingestion of products sold, developed or distributed by or on behalf of” the Applicants (see Article 9.1 of the Plan). It is self-evident, and the Subject Parties have confirmed before this court, that the Contributed Funds would not be established unless such Third Party Releases are provided and accordingly, in my view it is fair and reasonable to provide such Third Party releases in order to establish a fund to provide for distributions to creditors of the Applicants. With respect to support of the Plan, in addition to unanimous approval of the Plan by the creditors represented at meetings of creditors, several other stakeholder groups support the sanctioning of the Plan, including lovate Health Sciences Inc. and its subsidiaries (excluding the Applicants) (collectively, the “lovate Companies”), the Ad Hoc Committee of Muscle Tech Tort

Claimants, GN Oldco, Inc. f/k/a General Nutrition Corporation, Zurich American Insurance Company, Zurich Insurance Company, HVL, Inc. and XL Insurance America Inc. It is particularly significant that the Monitor supports the sanctioning of the Plan.

[21] With respect to balancing prejudices, if the Plan is not sanctioned, in addition to the obvious prejudice to the creditors who would receive nothing by way of distribution in respect of their claims, other stakeholders and Third Parties would continue to be mired in extensive, expensive and in some cases conflicting litigation in the United States with no predictable outcome.

66 I recognize that in *Muscletech*, as in other cases such as *Vicwest, Re*,⁸ there has been no direct opposition to the releases in those cases. The concept that has been accepted is that the Court does have jurisdiction, taking into account the nature and purpose of the CCAA, to sanction release of third parties where the factual circumstances are deemed appropriate for the success of a Plan.⁹

67 The moving parties rely on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.*¹⁰ for the proposition that compromise of claims in negligence against those associated with a debtor corporation within a CCAA context is not permitted.

68 The claim in that case was by NBD as a creditor of Algoma Steel, then under CCAA protection against its parent Dofasco and an officer of both Algoma and Dofasco. The claim was for negligent misrepresentation by which NBD was induced to advance funds to Algoma shortly before the CCAA filing.

69 In the approved CCAA order only the debtor Algoma was released. The Court of Appeal held that the benefit of the release did not extend to officers of Algoma or to the parent corporation Dofasco or its officers.

70 Rosenberg J.A. writing for the Court said:

[51] Algoma commenced the process under the CCAA on February 18, 1991. The process was a lengthy one and the Plan of Arrangement was approved by Farley J. in April 1992. The Plan had previously been accepted by the overwhelming majority of creditors and others with an interest in Algoma. The Plan of Arrangement included the following term:

6.03 Releases

From and after the Effective Date, each Creditor and Shareholder of Algoma prior to the Effective Date (other than Dofasco) will be deemed to forever release Algoma from any and all suits, claims and causes of action that it may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors. [Emphasis added.]

...

[54] In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that “are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors”. L. W. Houlden and C. H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being

forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Reference omitted]

71 In my view, there is little factual similarity in *NBD* to the facts now before the Court. In this case, I am not aware of any claims sought to be advanced against directors of Issuer Trustees. The release of Algoma in the *NBD* case did not on its face extend to Dofasco, the third party. Accordingly, I do not find the decision helpful to the issue now before the Court. The moving parties also rely on decisions involving another steel company, Stelco, in support of the proposition that a CCAA Plan cannot be used to compromise claims as between creditors of the debtor company.

72 In *Stelco Inc., Re*,¹¹ Farley J., dealing with classification, said in November 2005:

[7] The CCAA is styled as “An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors” and its short title is: *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company. See *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (S.C.) at paras. 24-25; *Royal Bank of Canada v. Gentra Canada Investments Inc.*, [2000] O.J. No. 315 (S.C.J.) at para. 41, appeal dismissed [2001] O.J. No. 2344 (C.A.); *Re 843504 Alberta Ltd.*, [2003] A.J. No. 1549 (Q.B.) at para. 13; *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 709 (Gen. Div.) at para. 24; *Re Royal Oak Mines Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 864 (Gen. Div.) at para. 1.

73 The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from that decision.¹² Blair J.A., quoting Paperny J. in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re, supra*, said:

[23] In *Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. Q.B.), Paperny J. nonetheless extracted a number of principles to be considered by the courts in dealing with the commonality of interest test. At para. 31 she said:

In summary, the cases establish the following principles applicable to assessing commonality of interest:

1. Commonality of interest should be viewed based on the non-fragmentation test, not on an identity of interest test;
2. The interests to be considered are the legal interests that a creditor holds qua creditor in relationship to the debtor company prior to and under the plan as well as on liquidation.
3. The commonality of interests are to be viewed purposively, bearing in mind the object of the C.C.C.A., namely to facilitate reorganizations if possible.
4. In placing a broad and purposive interpretation on the C.C.C.A., the court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable plans.
5. Absent bad faith, the motivations of creditors to approve or disapprove [of the Plan] are irrelevant.
6. The requirement of creditors being able to consult together means being able to assess their legal entitlement *as creditors* before or after the plan in a similar manner.

[24] In developing this summary of principles, Paperny J. considered a number of authorities from across Canada, including the following: *Sklar-Pepler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20 (Alta. Q.B.); *Re Fairview Industries Ltd.* (1991), 11 C.B.R. (3d) 71 (N.S.T.D.); *Re Woodward’s Ltd.* 1993 CanLII 870 (BC S.C.) (1993), 84 B.C.L.R. (2d) 206 (B.C.S.C.); *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 166 (B.C.S.C.);

Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C.C.A.); *Re NsC Diesel Power Inc.* (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1 (N.S.T.D.); *Savage v. Amoco Acquisition Co.* (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 154, (sub nom. *Amoco Acquisition Co. v. Savage*) (Alta. C.A.); *Re Wellington Building Corp.* (1934), 16 C.B.R. 48 (Ont. H.C.J.). Her summarized principles were cited by the Alberta Court of Appeal, apparently with approval, in a subsequent *Canadian Airlines decision: Re Canadian Airlines Corp.* 2000 ABCA 149 (CanLII), (2000), 19 C.B.R. (4th) 33 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 27.

[32] First, as the supervising judge noted, the CCAA itself is more compendiously styled “An act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors”. There is no mention of dealing with issues that would change the nature of the relationships as between the creditors themselves. As Tysoe J. noted in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada*, [2001] B.C.J. No. 2580 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 24 (after referring to the full style of the legislation):

[The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

[33] In this particular case, the supervising judge was very careful to say that nothing in his reasons should be taken to determine or affect the relationship between the Subordinate Debenture Holders and the Senior Debt Holders.

[34] Secondly, it has long been recognized that creditors should be classified in accordance with their contract rights, that is, according to their respective interests in the debtor company: see Stanley E. Edwards, “Reorganizations Under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act” (1947) 25 Can. Bar. Rev. 587, at p. 602.

[35] Finally, to hold the classification and voting process hostage to the vagaries of a potentially infinite variety of disputes as between already disgruntled creditors who have been caught in the maelstrom of a CCAA restructuring, runs the risk of hobbling that process unduly. It could lead to the very type of fragmentation and multiplicity of discrete classes or sub-classes of classes that judges and legal writers have warned might well defeat the purpose of the Act: see Stanley Edwards, “Reorganizations under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act”, *supra*; Ronald N. Robertson Q.C., “Legal Problems on Reorganization of Major Financial and Commercial Debtors”, Canadian Bar Association - Ontario Continuing Legal Education, 5th April 1983 at 19-21; *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleum Ltd.*, *supra*, at para. 27; *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, *supra*; *Sklar-Peppler*, *supra*; *Re Woodward Ltd.*, *supra*.

[36] In the end, it is important to remember that classification of creditors, like most other things pertaining to the CCAA, must be crafted with the underlying purpose of the CCAA in mind, namely facilitation of the reorganization of an insolvent company through the negotiation and approval of a plan of compromise or arrangement between the debtor company and its creditors, so that the debtor company can continue to carry on its business to the benefit of all concerned. As Paperny J. noted in *Re Canadian Airlines*, “the Court should be careful to resist classification approaches that would potentially jeopardize viable Plans.”

74 In 2007, in *Stelco Inc., Re*¹³, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a further appeal and held:

[44] We note that this approach of delaying the resolution of inter-creditor disputes is not inconsistent with the scheme of the CCAA. In a ruling made on November 10, 2005, in the proceedings relating to Stelco reported at 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, Farley J. expressed this point (at para. 7) as follows:

The CCAA is styled as “An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors” and its short title is: *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*. Ss. 4, 5 and 6 talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors *vis-à-vis* the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company.

[45] Thus, we agree with the motion judge's interpretation of s. 6.01(2). The result of this interpretation is that the Plan extinguished the provisions of the Note Indenture respecting the rights and obligations as between Stelco and the Noteholders on the Effective Date. However, the Turnover Provisions, which relate only to the rights and obligations between the Senior Debt Holders and the Noteholders, were intended to continue to operate.

75 I have quoted from the above decisions at length since they support rather than detract from the basic principle that in my view is operative in this instance.

76 I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors "that does not directly involve the Company." Those who support the Plan and are to be released are "directly involved in the Company" in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties' claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.

77 This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn't change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes. The only contract between creditors in this case relates directly to the Notes.

U.S. Law

78 Issue was taken by some counsel for parties opposing the Plan with the comments of Justice Ground in *Muscletech* [2007]¹⁴ at paragraph 26, to the effect that third party creditor Releases have been recognized under United States bankruptcy law. I accept the comment of Mr. Woods that the U.S. provisions involve a different statute with different language and therefore different considerations.

79 That does not mean that the U.S. law is to be completely ignored. It is instructive to consideration of the release issue under the CCAA to know that there has been a principled debate within judicial circles in the United States on the issue of releases in a bankruptcy proceeding of those who are not themselves directly parties in bankruptcy.

80 A very comprehensive article authored by Joshua M. Silverstein of Emory University School of Law in 2006, [23 Bank. Dev. J. 13](#), outlines both the line of U.S. decisions that hold that bankruptcy courts may not use their general equitable powers to modify non-bankruptcy rights, and those that hold that non-bankruptcy law is not an absolute bar to the exercise of equitable powers, particularly with respect to third party releases.

81 The author concludes at paragraph 137 that a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *U.S. v. Energy Resources Co.*, [495 U.S. 545](#) (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1990) offers crucial support for the pro-release position.

82 I do not take any of the statements to referencing U.S. law on this topic as being directly applicable to the case now before this Court, except to say that in resolving a very legitimate debate, it is appropriate to do so in a purposive way but also very much within a case-specific fact-contextual approach, which seems to be supported by the United States Supreme Court decision above.

Steinberg Decision

83 Against the authorities referred to above, those opposed to the Plan releases rely on the June 16, 1993 decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*¹⁵

84 Mr. Woods for some of the moving parties urges that the decision, which he asserts makes third party releases illegal, is still good law and binding on this Court, since no other Court of Appeal in Canada has directly considered or derogated from the result. (It appears that the decision has not been reported in English, which may explain some of the absence of comment.)

85 The Applicants not surprisingly take an opposite view. Counsel submits that undoubtedly in direct response to the *Steinberg* decision, Parliament added s. 5.1 (see above paragraph [60]) thereby opening the door for the analysis that has followed with the decisions of *Canadian Airlines*, *Muscletech* and others. In other words, it is urged the caselaw that has developed in the 15 years since *Steinberg* now provide a basis for recognition of third party releases in appropriate circumstances.

86 The *Steinberg* decision dealt directly with releases proposed for acts of directors. The decision appears to have focused on the nature of the contract created and binding between creditors and the company when the plan is approved. I accept that the effect of a Court-approved CCAA Plan is to impose a contract on creditors.

87 Reliance is placed on the decision of Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) at the following paragraphs of the *Steinberg* decision:

[54] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.

[57] If the arrangement is imposed on the dissenting creditors, it means that the rules of civil law founded on consent are set aside, at least with respect to them. One cannot impose on creditors, against their will, consequences that are attached to the rules of contracts that are freely agreed to, like releases and other notions to which clauses 5.3 and 12.6 refer. Consensus corresponds to a reality quite different from that of the majorities provided for in section 6 of the Act and cannot be attributed to dissenting creditors.

[59] Under the Act, the sanctioning judgment is required for the arrangement to bind all the creditors, including those who do not consent to it. The sanctioning cannot have as a consequence to extend the effect of the Act. As the clauses in the arrangement founded on the rules of the Civil Code are foreign to the Act, the sanctioning cannot have any effect on them.

[68] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with its creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.

[74] If an arrangement is imposed on a creditor that prevents him from recovering part of his claim by the effect of the Act, he does not necessarily lose the benefit of other statutes that he may wish to invoke. In this sense, if the Civil Code provides a recourse in civil liability against the directors or officers, this right of the creditor cannot be wiped out, against his will, by the inclusion of a release in an arrangement.

88 If it were necessary to do so, I would accept the position of the Applicants that the history of judicial interpretation of the CCAA at both the appellate and trial levels in Canada, along with the change to s. 5.1, leaves the decision in *Steinberg* applicable to a prior era only.

89 I do not think it necessary to go that far, however. One must remember that *Steinberg* dealt with release of claims against directors. As Mme. Justice Deschamps said at paragraph 54, “[A] plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement.”

90 In this case, all the Noteholders have a common claim, namely to maximize the value obtainable under their notes. The anticipated increase in the value of the notes is directly affected by the risk and contribution that will be made by asset and liquidity providers.

91 In my view, depriving all Noteholders from achieving enhanced value of their notes to permit a few to pursue negligence claims that do not affect note value is quite a different set of circumstances from what was before the Court in *Steinberg*. Different in kind and quality.

92 The sponsoring parties have accepted the policy concern that exempting serious claims such as some frauds could not be regarded as fair and reasonable within the context of the spirit and purpose of the CCAA.

93 The sponsoring parties have worked diligently to respond to that concern and have developed an exemption to the release that in my view fairly balances the rights of Noteholders with serious claims, with the risk to the Plan as a Whole.

Statutory Interpretation of the CCAA

94 Reference was made during argument by counsel to some of the moving parties to rules of statutory interpretation that would suggest that the Court should not go beyond the plain and ordinary words used in the statute.

95 Various of the authorities referred to above emphasize the remedial nature of the legislation, which leaves to the greatest extent possible the stakeholders of the debtor corporation to decide what Plan will or will not be accepted with the scope of the statute.

96 The nature and extent of judicial interpretation and innovation in insolvency matters has been the subject of recent academic and judicial comment.

97 Most recently, Madam Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,”¹⁶ wrote:

The paper advances the thesis that in addressing the problem of under-inclusive or skeletal legislation, there is a hierarchy or appropriate order of utilization of judicial tools. First, the courts should engage in statutory interpretation to determine the limits of authority, adopting a broad, liberal and purposive interpretation that may reveal the authority. We suggest that it is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial tool box. Examination of the statutory language and framework of the legislation may reveal a discretion, and statutory interpretation may determine the extent of the discretion or statutory interpretation may reveal a gap. The common law may permit the gap to be filled; if it does, the chambers judge still has a discretion as to whether he or she invokes the authority to fill the gap. The exercise of inherent jurisdiction may fill the gap; if it does, the chambers judge still has a discretion as to whether he or she invokes the authority revealed by the discovery of inherent jurisdiction. This paper considers these issues at some length.¹⁷

Second, we suggest that inherent jurisdiction is a misnomer for much of what has occurred in decision making under the CCAA. Appeal court judgments in cases such as *Skeena Cellulose Inc.* and *Stelco* discussed below, have begun to articulate this view. As part of this observation, we suggest that for the most part, the exercise of the court’s authority is frequently, although not exclusively, made on the basis of statutory interpretation.¹⁸

Third, in the context of commercial law, a driving principle of the courts is that they are on a quest to do what makes sense commercially in the context of what is the fairest and most equitable in the circumstances. The establishment of specialized commercial lists or rosters in jurisdictions such as Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan are aimed at the same goal, creating an expeditious and efficient forum for the fair resolution of commercial disputes effectively and on a timely basis. Similarly, the standards of review applied by appellate courts, in the context of commercial matters, have regard to the specialized expertise of the court of first instance and demonstrate a commitment to effective processes for the resolution of commercial disputes.¹⁹ [cities omitted]

98 The case now before the Court does not involve confiscation of any rights in Notes themselves; rather the opposite: the opportunity in the business circumstances to maximize the value of the Notes. The authors go on to say at p. 45:

Iacobucci J., writing for the Court in *Rizzo Shoes*, reaffirmed Driedger’s Modern Principle as the best approach to interpretation of the legislation and stated that “statutory interpretation cannot be founded on the wording of the legislation alone”. He considered the history of the legislation and the benefit-conferring nature of the legislation and examined the purpose and object of the Act, the nature of the legislation and the consequences of a contrary finding, which he labeled an absurd result. Iacobucci J. also relied on s. 10 of the *Interpretation Act*, which provides that every

Act “shall be deemed to be remedial” and directs that every Act “shall accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning and spirit”. The Court held:

23 Although the Court of Appeal looked to the plain meaning of the specific provisions in question in the present case, with respect, I believe that the court did not pay sufficient attention to the scheme of the ESA, its object or the intention of the legislature; nor was the context of the words in issue appropriately recognized. I now turn to a discussion of these issues.

...

40 As I see the matter, when the express words of ss. 40 and 40a of the ESA are examined in their entire context, there is ample support for the conclusion that the words “terminated by the employer” must be interpreted to include termination resulting from the bankruptcy of the employer. Using the broad and generous approach to interpretation appropriate for benefits-conferring legislation, I believe that these words can reasonably bear that construction.

Thus, in *Rizzo Shoes* we see the Court extending the legislation or making explicit that which was implicit only, as it were, by reference to the Modern Principle, the purpose and object of the Act and the consequences of a contrary result. No reference is made to filling the legislative gap, but rather, the Court is addressing a fact pattern not explicitly contemplated by the legislation and extending the legislation to that fact pattern.

Professor Cote also sees the issue of legislative gaps as part of the discussion of “legislative purpose”, which finds expression in the codification of the mischief rule by the various Canadian interpretation statutes. The ability to extend the meaning of the provision finds particular expression when one considers the question posed by him: “can the purposive method make up for lacunae in the legislation”. He points out, as does Professor Sullivan, that the courts have not provided a definitive answer, but that for him there are two schools of thought. One draws on the “literal rule” which favours judicial restraint, whereas the other, the “mischief rule”, “posits correction of the text to make up for lacunae.” To temper the extent of the literal rule, Professor Cote states:

First, the judge is not legislating by adding what is already implicit. The issue is not the judge’s power to actually add terms to a statute, but rather whether a particular concept is sufficiently implicit in the words of an enactment for the judge to allow it to produce effect, and if so, whether there is any principle preventing the judge from making explicit what is already implicit. Parliament is required to be particularly explicit with some types of legislation such as expropriation statutes, for example.

Second, the Literal Rule suggests that as soon as the courts play any creative role in settling a dispute rather than merely administering the law, they assume the duties of Parliament. But by their very nature, judicial functions have a certain creative component. If the law is silent or unclear, the judge is still required to arrive at a decision. In doing so, he [she] may quite possibly be required to define rules which go beyond the written expression of the statute, but which in no way violate its spirit.

In certain situations, the courts may refuse to correct lacunae in legislation. This is not necessarily because of a narrow definition of their role, but rather because general principles of interpretation require the judge, in some areas, to insist on explicit indications of legislative intent. It is common, for example, for judges to refuse to fill in the gaps in a tax statute, a retroactive law, or legislation that severely affects property rights. [Emphasis added. Footnotes omitted.]²⁰

99 The modern purposive approach is now well established in interpreting CCAA provisions, as the authors note. The phrase more than any other with which issue is taken by the moving parties is that of Paperny J. that s. 5 of the CCAA does not preclude releases other than those specified in s. 5.1.

100 In this analysis, I adopt the purposive language of the authors at pp 55-56:

It may be that with the increased codification in statutes, courts have lost sight of their general jurisdiction where there is

a gap in the statutory language. Where there is a highly codified statute, courts may conclude that there is less room to undertake gap-filling. This is accurate insofar as the Parliament or Legislative Assembly has limited or directed the court's general jurisdiction; there is less likely to be a gap to fill. However, as the Ontario Court of Appeal observed in the above quote, the court has unlimited jurisdiction to decide what is necessary to do justice between the parties except where legislators have provided specifically to the contrary.

The court's role under the CCAA is primarily supervisory and it makes determinations during the process where the parties are unable to agree, in order to facilitate the negotiation process. Thus the role is both procedural and substantive in making rights determinations within the context of an ongoing negotiation process. The court has held that because of the remedial nature of the legislation, the judiciary will exercise its jurisdiction to give effect to the public policy objectives of the statute where the express language is incomplete. The nature of insolvency is highly dynamic and the complexity of firm financial distress means that legal rules, no matter how codified, have not been fashioned to meet every contingency. Unlike rights-based litigation where the court is making determinations about rights and remedies for actions that have already occurred, many insolvency proceedings involve the court making determinations in the context of a dynamic, forward moving process that is seeking an outcome to the debtor's financial distress.

The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger's "one principle", that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Quebec* as a manifestation of the judge's overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge's task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

101 I accept the hierarchy suggested by the authors, namely statutory interpretation (which in the case of the CCAA has inherent in it "gap filling"), judicial discretion and thirdly inherent jurisdiction.

102 It simply does not make either commercial, business or practical common sense to say a CCAA plan must inevitably fail because one creditor cannot sue another for a claim that is over and above entitlement in the security that is the subject of the restructuring, and which becomes significantly greater than the value of the security (in this case the Notes) that would be available in bankruptcy. In CCAA situations, factual context is everything. Here, if the moving parties are correct, some creditors would recover much more than others on their security.

103 There may well be many situations in which compromise of some tort claims as between creditors is not directly related to success of the Plan and therefore should not be released; that is not the case here.

104 I have been satisfied the Plan cannot succeed without the compromise. In my view, given the purpose of the statute and the fact that this Plan is accepted by all appearing parties in principle, it is a reasonable gap-filling function to compromise certain claims necessary to complete restructuring by the parties. Those contributing to the Plan are directly related to the value of the notes themselves within the Plan.

105 I adopt the authors' conclusion at p. 94:

On the authors' reading of the commercial jurisprudence, the problem most often for the court to resolve is that the legislation in question is under-inclusive. It is not ambiguous. It simply does not address the application that is before the court, or in some cases, grants the court the authority to make any order it thinks fit. While there can be no magic formula to address this recurring situation, and indeed no one answer, it appears to the authors that practitioners have available a number of tools to accomplish the same end. In determining the right tool, it may be best to consider the

judicial task as if in a hierarchy of judicial tools that may be deployed. The first is examination of the statute, commencing with consideration of the precise wording, the legislative history, the object and purposes of the Act, perhaps a consideration of Driedger's principle of reading the words of the Act in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament, and a consideration of the gap-filling power, where applicable. It may very well be that this exercise will reveal that a broad interpretation of the legislation confers the authority on the court to grant the application before it. Only after exhausting this statutory interpretive function should the court consider whether it is appropriate to assert an inherent jurisdiction. Hence, inherent jurisdiction continues to be a valuable tool, but not one that is necessary to utilize in most circumstances.

Fraud Claims

106 I have concluded that claims of fraud do fall into a category distinct from negligence. The concern expressed by the Court in the endorsement of May 16, 2008 resulted in an amendment to the Plan by those supporting it. The Applicants amended the release provisions of the Plan to in effect "carve out" some fraud claims.

107 The concern expressed by those parties opposed to the Plan — that the fraud exemption from the release was not sufficiently broad — resulted in a further hearing on the issue on June 3, 2008. Those opposed continue to object to the amended release provisions.

108 The definition of fraud in a corporate context in the common law of Canada starts with the proposition that it must be made (1) knowingly; (2) without belief in its truth; (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.²¹ It is my understanding that while expressed somewhat differently, the above-noted ingredients form the basis of fraud claims in the civil law of Quebec, although there are differences.

109 The more serious nature of a civil fraud allegation, as opposed to a negligence allegation, has an effect on the degree of probability required for the plaintiff to succeed. In *Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co.*²², Laskin J. wrote:

There is necessarily a matter of judgment involved in weighing evidence that goes to the burden of proof, and a trial judge is justified in scrutinizing evidence with greater care if there are serious allegations to be established by the proof that is offered. I put the matter in the words used by Lord Denning in *Bater v. Bater*, *supra*, at p. 459, as follows:

It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases the charge must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof within that standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear. So also in civil cases. The case may be proved by a preponderance of probability, but there may be degrees of probability within that standard. The degree depends on the subject-matter. A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will naturally require a higher degree of probability than that which it would require if considering whether negligence were established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which is commensurate with the occasion.

I do not regard such an approach as a departure from a standard of proof based on a balance of probabilities nor as supporting a shifting standard. The question in all civil cases is what evidence with what weight that is accorded to it will move the court to conclude that proof on a balance of probabilities has been established.

110 The distinction between civil fraud and negligence was further explained by Finch J.A. in *Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co.*²³

[101] Whether a representation was made negligently or fraudulently, reliance upon that representation is an issue of fact as to the representee's state of mind. There are cases where the representee may be able to give direct

evidence as to what, in fact, induced him to act as he did. Where such evidence is available, its weight is a question for the trier of fact. In many cases however, as the authorities point out, it would be reasonable to expect such evidence to be given, and if it were it might well be suspect as self-serving. This is such a case.

[102] The distinction between cases of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation is that proof of a dishonest or fraudulent frame of mind on the defendant's part is required in actions of deceit. That, too, is an issue of fact and one which may also, of necessity, fall to be resolved by way of inference. There is, however, nothing in that which touches on the issue of the plaintiff's reliance. I can see no reason why the burden of proving reliance by the plaintiff, and the drawing of inferences with respect to the plaintiff's state of mind, should be any different in cases of negligent misrepresentation than it is in cases of fraud.

111 In *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)*²⁴, Winkler J. (as he then was) reviewed the leading common law cases:

[477] Fraud is the most serious civil tort which can be alleged, and must be both strictly pleaded and strictly proved. The main distinction between the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation has been touched upon above, namely the dishonest state of mind of the representor. The state of mind was described in the seminal case *Derry v. Peek (1889)*, 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L.) which held fraud is proved where it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it is true or false. The intention to deceive, or reckless disregard for the truth is critical.

[478] Where fraudulent misrepresentation is alleged against a corporation, the intention to deceive must still be strictly proved. Further, in order to attach liability to a corporation for fraud, the fraudulent intent must have been held by an individual person who is either a directing mind of the corporation, or who is acting in the course of their employment through the principle of *respondeat superior* or vicarious liability. In *B. G. Checo v. B. C. Hydro (1990)*, 4 C.C.L.T. (2d) 161 at 223 (Aff'd, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 12), Hinkson J.A., writing for the majority, traced the jurisprudence on corporate responsibility in the context of a claim in fraudulent misrepresentation at 222-223:

Subsequently, in *H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. v. T.J. Graham & Sons Ltd.*, [1957] 1 Q.B. 159, [1956] 3 All E.R. 624 (C.A.), Denning L.J. said at p. 172:

A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law as such. So you will find that in cases where the law requires personal fault as a condition of liability in tort, the fault of the manager will be the personal fault of the company. That is made clear by Lord Haldane's speech in *Leonard's Carrying Co. Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.*

It is apparent that the law in Canada dealing with the responsibility of a corporation for the tort of deceit is still evolving. In view of the English decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the *Dredging* case, supra, it would appear that the concept of vicarious responsibility based upon *respondent superior* is too narrow a basis to determine the liability of a corporation. The structure and operations of corporations are becoming more complex. However, the fundamental proposition that the plaintiff must establish an intention to deceive on the part of the defendant still applies.

See also: *Standard Investments Ltd. et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (1985)*, 52 O.R. (2d) 473 (C.A.) (Leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada refused Feb. 3, 1986).

[479] In the case of fraudulent misrepresentation, there are circumstances where silence may attract liability. If a material fact which was true at the time a contract was executed becomes false while the contract remains executory, or if a statement believed to be true at the time it was made is discovered to be false, then the representor has a duty to disclose the change in circumstances. The failure to do so may amount to a fraudulent misrepresentation. See: P. Perell, "False Statements" (1996), 18 *Advocates' Quarterly* 232 at 242.

[480] In *Rainbow Industrial Caterers Ltd. v. Canadian National Railway Co.* (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 43 (B.C.C.A.) (Aff'd on other grounds [1991] 3 S.C.R. 3), the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the trial judge's finding of fraud through non-disclosure on the basis that the defendant did not remain silent as to the changed fact but was simply slow to respond to the change and could only be criticized for its "communications arrangements." In so doing, the court adopted the approach to fraud through silence established by the House of Lords in *Brownlie v. Campbell* (1880), 5 App. Cas. 925 at 950. Esson J.A. stated at 67-68:

There is much emphasis in the plaintiffs submissions and in the reasons of the trial judge on the circumstance that this is not a case of fraud "of the usual kind" involving positive representations of fact but is, rather, one concerned only with non-disclosure by a party which has become aware of an altered set of circumstances. It is, I think, potentially misleading to regard these as different categories of fraud rather than as a different factual basis for a finding of fraud. Where the fraud is alleged to arise from failure to disclose, the plaintiff remains subject to all of the stringent requirements which the law imposes upon those who allege fraud. The authority relied upon by the trial judge was the speech of Lord Blackburn in *Brownlie v. Campbell*.... The trial judge quoted this excerpt:

... when a statement or representation has been made in the bona fide belief that it is true, and the party who has made it afterwards comes to find out that it is untrue, and discovers what he should have said, he can no longer honestly keep up that silence on the subject after that has come to his knowledge, thereby allowing the other party to go on, and still more, inducing him to go on, upon a statement which was honestly made at the time at which it was made, but which he has not now retracted when he has become aware that it can be no long honestly perservered [sic] in.

The relationship between the two bases for fraud appears clearly enough if one reads that passage in the context of the passage which immediately precedes it:

I quite agree in this, that whenever a man in order to induce a contract says that which is in his knowledge untrue with the intention to mislead the other side, and induce them to enter into the contract, that is downright fraud; in plain English, and Scotch also, it is a downright lie told to induce the other party to act upon it, and it should of course be treated as such. I further agree in this: that when a statement or representation...

[481] Fraud through "active non-disclosure" was considered by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Abel v. McDonald*, [1964] 2 O.R. 256 (C.A.) in which the court held at 259: "By active non-disclosure is meant that the defendants, with knowledge that the damage to the premises had occurred actively prevented as far as they could that knowledge from coming to the notice of the appellants.

112 I agree with the comment of Winkler J. in *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of) supra*, that the law in Canada for corporate responsibility for the tort of deceit is evolving. Hence the concern expressed by counsel for Asset Providers that a finding as a result of fraud (an intentional tort) could give rise to claims under the *Negligence Act* to extend to all who may be said to have contributed to the "fault."²⁵

113 I understand the reasoning of the Plan supporters for drawing the fraud "carve out" in a narrow fashion. It is to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that they fear would result if a broader "carve out" were to be allowed. Those opposed urged that quite simply to allow the restrictive fraud claim only would be to deprive them of a right at law.

114 The fraud issue was put in simplistic terms during the oral argument on June 3, 2008. Those parties who oppose the restrictions in the amended Release to deal with only some claims of fraud, argue that the amendments are merely cosmetic and are meaningless and would operate to insulate many individuals and corporations who *may* have committed fraud.

115 Mr. Woods, whose clients include some corporations resident in Quebec, submitted that the “carve out,” as it has been called, falls short of what would be allowable under the civil law of Quebec as claims of fraud. In addition, he pointed out that under Quebec law, security for costs on a full indemnity basis would not be permitted.

116 I accept the submission of Mr. Woods that while there is similarity, there is no precise equivalence between the civil law of Quebec and the common law of Ontario and other provinces as applied to fraud.

117 Indeed, counsel for other opposing parties complain that the fraud carve out is unduly restrictive of claims of fraud that lie at common law, which their clients should be permitted in fairness to pursue.

118 The particular carve out concern, which is applicable to both the civil and common law jurisdictions, would limit causes of actions to authorized representatives of ABCP dealers. “ABCP dealers” is a defined term within the Plan. Those actions would proceed in the home province of the plaintiffs.

119 The thrust of the Plan opponents’ arguments is that as drafted, the permitted fraud claims would preclude recovery in circumstances where senior bank officers who had the requisite fraudulent intent directed sales persons to make statements that the sales persons reasonably believed but that the senior officers knew to be false.

120 That may well be the result of the effect of the Releases as drafted. Assuming that to be the case, I am not satisfied that the Plan should be rejected on the basis that the release covenant for fraud is not as broad as it could be.

121 The Applicants and supporters have responded to the Court’s concern that as initially drafted, the initial release provisions would have compromised all fraud claims. I was aware when the further request for release consideration was made that any “carve out” would unlikely be sufficiently broad to include any possibility of all deceit or fraud claims being made in the future.

122 The particular concern was to allow for those claims that might arise from knowingly false representations being made directly to Noteholders, who relied on the fraudulent misrepresentation and suffered damage as a result.

123 The Release as drafted accomplishes that purpose. It does not go as far as to permit all possible fraud claims. I accept the position of the Applicants and supporters that as drafted, the Releases are in the circumstances of this Plan fair and reasonable. I reach this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. I am satisfied that the Applicants and supporters will not bring forward a Plan that is as broad in permitting fraud claims as those opposing urge should be permitted.
2. None of the Plan opponents have brought forward particulars of claims against persons or parties that would fall outside those envisaged within the carve out. Without at least some particulars, expanded fraud claims can only be regarded as hypothetical or speculative.
3. I understand and accept the position of the Plan supporters that to broaden fraud claim relief does risk extensive complex litigation, the prevention of which is at the heart of the Plan. The likelihood of expanded claims against many parties is most likely if the fraud issue were open-ended.
4. Those who wish to claim fraud within the Plan can do so in addition to the remedies on the Notes that are available to them and to all other Noteholders. In other words, those Noteholders claiming fraud also obtain the other Plan benefits.

124 Mr. Sternberg on behalf of Hy Bloom did refer to the claims of his clients particularized in the Claim commenced in the Superior Court of Quebec. The Claim particularizes statements attributed to various National Bank representatives both before and after the August 2007 freeze of the Notes. Mr. Sternberg asked rhetorically how could the Court countenance the compromise of what in the future might be found to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of the Canadian and foreign banks.

125 The response to Mr. Sternberg and others is that for the moment, what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada. The Applicants and supporters have brought forward a Plan to alleviate and attempt to fix that liquidity crisis.

126 The Plan does in my view represent a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud.

127 I leave to others the questions of all the underlying causes of the liquidity crisis that prompted the Note freeze in August 2007. If by some chance there is an organized fraudulent scheme, I leave it to others to deal with. At the moment, the Plan as proposed represents the best contract for recovery for the vast majority of Noteholders and hopefully restoration of the ABCP market in Canada.

Hardship

128 As to the hardship issue, the Court was apprised in the course of submissions that the Plan was said by some to act unfairly in respect of certain Noteholders, in particular those who hold Ironstone Series B notes. It was submitted that unlike other trusts for which underlying assets will be pooled to spread risk, the underlying assets of Ironstone Trust are being “siload” and will bear the same risk as they currently bear.

129 Unfortunately, this will be the case but the result is not due to any particular directive purpose of the Plan itself, but rather because the assets that underlie the trust have been determined to be totally “Ineligible Assets,” which apparently have exposure to the U.S. residential sub-prime mortgage market.

130 I have concluded that within the context of the Plan as a whole it does not unfairly treat the Ironstone Noteholders (although their replacement notes may not be worth as much as others’.) The Ironstone Noteholders have still voted by a wide majority in favour of the Plan.

131 Since the Initial Order of March 17, there have been a number of developments (settlements) by parties outside the Plan itself of which the Court was not fully apprised until recently, which were intended to address the issue of hardship to certain investors. These efforts are summarized in paragraphs 10 to 33 of the Eighth Report of the Monitor.

132 I have reviewed the efforts made by various parties supporting the Plan to deal with hardship issues. I am satisfied that they represent a fair and reasonable attempt to deal with issues that result in differential impact among Noteholders. The pleas of certain Noteholders to have their individual concerns addressed have through the Monitor been passed on to those necessary for a response.

133 Counsel for one affected Noteholder, the Avrith family, which opposes the Plan, drew the Court’s attention to their particular plight. In response, counsel for National Bank noted the steps it had taken to provide at least some hardship redress.

134 No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

135 The information available satisfies me that business judgment by a number of supporting parties has been applied to deal with a number of inequities. The Plan cannot provide complete redress to all Noteholders. The parties have addressed the concerns raised. In my view, the Court can ask nothing more.

Conclusion

136 I noted in the endorsement of May 16, 2008 my acceptance and understanding of why the Plan Applicants and sponsors required comprehensive releases of negligence. I was and am satisfied that there would be the third and fourth claims they anticipated if the Plan fails. If negligence claims were not released, any Noteholder who believed that there was value to a tort claim would be entitled to pursue the same. There is no way to anticipate the impact on those who support the Plan. As a result, I accept the Applicants' position that the Plan would be withdrawn if this were to occur.

137 The CCAA has now been accepted as a statute that allows for judicial flexibility to enable business people by the exercise of majority vote to restructure insolvent entities.

138 It would defeat the purpose of the statute if a single creditor could hold a restructuring Plan hostage by insisting on the ability to sue another creditor whose participation in and contribution to the restructuring was essential to its success. Tyranny by a minority to defeat an otherwise fair and reasonable plan is contrary to the spirit of the CCAA.

139 One can only speculate on what response might be made by any one of the significant corporations that are moving parties and now oppose confirmation of this Plan, if any of those entities were undergoing restructuring and had their Plans in jeopardy because a single creditor sought to sue a financing creditor, which required a release as part of its participation.

140 There are a variety of underlying causes for the liquidity crisis that has given rise to this restructuring.

141 The following quotation from the May 23, 2008 issue of The Economist magazine succinctly describes the problem:

If the crisis were simply about the creditworthiness of underlying assets, that question would be simpler to answer. The problem has been as much about confidence as about money. Modern financial systems contain a mass of amplifiers that multiply the impact of both losses and gains, creating huge uncertainty.

142 The above quote is not directly about the ABCP market in Canada, but about the potential crisis to the worldwide banking system at this time. In my view it is applicable to the ABCP situation at this time. Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal.

143 I have as a result addressed a number of questions in order to be satisfied that in the specific context of this case, a Plan that includes third party releases is justified within CCAA jurisdiction. I have concluded that all of the following questions can be answered in the affirmative.

1. Are the parties to be released necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor?
2. Are the claims to be released rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it?
3. Can the Court be satisfied that without the releases the Plan cannot succeed?
4. Are the parties who will have claims against them released contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan?
5. Is the Plan one that will benefit not only the debtor but creditor Noteholders generally?
6. Have the voting creditors approved the Plan with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases?
7. Is the Court satisfied that in the circumstances the releases are fair and reasonable in the sense that they are not overly broad and not offensive to public policy?

144 I have concluded on the facts of this Application that the releases sought as part of the Plan, including the language exempting fraud, to be permissible under the CCAA and are fair and reasonable.

145 The motion to approve the Plan of Arrangement sought by the Application is hereby granted on the terms of the draft Order filed and signed.

146 One of the unfortunate aspects of CCAA real time litigation is that it produces a tension between well-represented parties who would not be present if time were not of the essence.

147 Counsel for some of those opposing the Plan complain that they were not consulted by Plan supporters to “negotiate” the release terms. On the other side, Plan supporters note that with the exception of general assertions in the action on behalf of Hy Bloom (who claims negligence as well), there is no articulation by those opposing of against whom claims would be made and the particulars of those claims.

148 It was submitted on behalf of one Plan opponent that the limitation provisions are unduly restrictive and should extend to at least two years from the date a potential plaintiff becomes aware of an Expected Claim.

149 The open-ended claim potential is rejected by the Plan supporters on the basis that what is needed now, since Notes have been frozen for almost one year, is certainty of claims and that those who allege fraud surely have had plenty of opportunity to know the basis of their evidence.

150 Other opponents seek to continue a negotiation with Plan supporters to achieve a resolution with respect to releases satisfactory to each opponent.

151 I recognize that the time for negotiation has been short. The opponents’ main opposition to the Plan has been the elimination of negligence claims and the Court has been advised that an appeal on that issue will proceed.

152 I can appreciate the desire for opponents to negotiate for any advantage possible. I can also understand the limitation on the patience of the variety of parties who are Plan supporters, to get on with the Plan or abandon it.

153 I am satisfied that the Plan supporters have listened to some of the concerns of the opponents and have incorporated those concerns to the extent they are willing in the revised release form. I agreed that it is time to move on.

154 I wish to thank all counsel for their cooperation and assistance. There would be no Plan except for the sustained and significant effort of Mr. Crawford and the committee he chairs.

155 This is indeed hopefully a unique situation in which it is necessary to look at larger issues than those affecting those who feel strongly that personal redress should predominate.

156 If I am correct, the CCAA is indeed a vehicle that can adequately balance the issues of all those concerned.

157 The Plan is a business proposal and that includes the releases. The Plan has received overwhelming creditor support. I have concluded that the releases that are part of the Plan are fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

158 The form of Order that was circulated to the Service List for comment will issue as signed with the release of this decision.

Schedule "A"

Conduits

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust
Aurora Trust
Comet Trust
Encore Trust
Gemini Trust
Ironstone Trust
MMAI-I Trust
Newshore Canadian Trust
Opus Trust
Planet Trust
Rocket Trust
Selkirk Funding Trust
Silverstone Trust
Slate Trust
Structured Asset Trust
Structured Investment Trust III
Symphony Trust
Whitehall Trust

Schedule "B"

Applicants

ATB Financial
Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
Canaccord Capital Corporation
Canada Post Corporation
Credit Union Central of Alberta Limited
Credit Union Central of British Columbia
Credit Union Central of Canada
Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan
 Desjardins Group
 Magna International Inc.
 National Bank Financial Inc./National Bank of Canada
 NAV Canada
 Northwater Capital Management Inc.
 Public Sector Pension Investment Board
 The Governors of the University of Alberta

Application granted.

APPENDIX 1

Parties & Their Counsel

Counsel

Benjamin Zarnett Fred Myers Brian Empey
 Donald Milner Graham Phoenix,
 Xeno C. Martis David Lemieux
 Robert Girard

 Aubrey Kauffman Stuart Brotman
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 Henry Juroviesky Eliezer Karp
 Jay A. Swartz Nathasha MacParland
 James A. Woods Mathieu Giguere
 Sébastien Richemont Marie-Anne Paquette

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 George S. Glezos Lisa C. Munro
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 Virginie Gauthier Mario Forte
 Kevin P. McElcheran Malcolm M. Mercer Geoff R. Hall
 Harvey Chaiton
 S. Richard Orzy Jeffrey S. Leon

Party Represented

Applicants: Pan-Canadian Investors Committee for Third-Party Structured Asset-Backed Commercial Paper
 Respondents: Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp.
 Respondents: 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc., as Issuer Trustees
 Monitor: Ernst & Young Inc.

 Ad Hoc Committee and PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
 Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
 Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
 Administrator of Aria Trust, Encore Trust, Newshore Canadian Trust and Symphony Trust
 Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montreal Inc., Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., L'Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Domtar Inc., Domtar Pulp and Paper Products Inc., Giro Inc., Vetements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Services Hypothécaires La Patrimoniale Inc. and Jazz Air LLP
 Asset Providers/Liquidity Suppliers: Bank of America, N.A.; Citibank, N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merrill Lynch Capital Services Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
 Becmar Investments Ltd, Dadrex Holdings Inc. and JTI-Macdonald Corp.
 Blackrock Financial Management, Inc.
 Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
 Canadian Banks: Bank of Montreal, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada, The Bank of Nova Scotia and The Toronto-Dominion Bank
 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
 CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY

Margaret L. Waddell	Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees Cinar Corporation, Cinar Productions (2004) and Cookie Jar Animation Inc., ADR Capital Inc. and GMAC Leaseco Corporation
Robin B. Schwill James Rumball	Coventree Capital Inc. and Nereus Financial Inc.
J. Thomas Curry Usman M. Sheikh	Coventree Capital Inc.
Kenneth Kraft	DBRS Limited
David E. Baird, Q.C. Edmond	Desjardins Group
Lamek Ian D. Collins	
Allan Sternberg Sam R. Sasso	Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgages Services Inc.
Catherine Francis Phillip Bevans	Individual Noteholder
Howard Shapray, Q.C. Stephen Fitterman	Ivanhoe Mines Inc.
Kenneth T. Rosenberg Lily Harmer Massimo Starnino	Jura Energy Corporation, Redcorp Ventures Ltd. and as agent to Ivanhoe Mines Inc.
Joel Vale	I. Mucher Family
John Salmas	Natcan Trust Company, as Note Indenture Trustee
John B. Laskin Scott Bomhof	National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada
Robin D. Walker Clifton Prophet	NAV Canada
Junior Sirivar	
Timothy Pinos	Northern Orion Canada Pampas Ltd.
Murray E. Stieber	Paquette & Associés Huissiers en Justice, s.e.n.c. and André Perron
Susan Grundy	Public Sector Pension Investment Board
Dan Dowdall	Royal Bank of Canada
Thomas N.T. Sutton	Securitus Capital Corp.
Daniel V. MacDonald Andrew Kent	The Bank of Nova Scotia
James H. Grout	The Goldfarb Corporation
Tamara Brooks	The Investment Dealers Association of Canada and the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada
Sam R. Sasso	Travelers Transportation Services Inc.
Scott A. Turner	WebTech Wireless Inc. and Wynn Capital Corporation Inc.
Peter T. Linder, Q.C. Edward H. Halt, Q.C.	West Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., UTS Energy Corporation, Nexstar Energy Ltd., Sabre Tooth Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Alliance Pipeline Ltd., Standard Energy Inc. and Power Play Resources Limited
Steven L. Graff	Woods LLP
Gordon Capern Megan E. Shortreed	Xceed Mortgage Corporation

APPENDIX 2

Terms

"*ABCP Conduits*" means, collectively, the trusts that are subject to the Plan, namely the following: Apollo Trust, Apsley Trust, Aria Trust, Aurora Trust, Comet Trust, Encore Trust, Gemini Trust, Ironstone Trust, MMAI-I Trust, Newshore Canadian Trust, Opus Trust, Planet Trust, Rocket Trust, SAT, Selkirk Funding Trust, Silverstone Trust, SIT III, Slate Trust, Symphony Trust and Whitehall Trust, and their respective satellite trusts, where applicable.

"*ABCP Sponsors*" means, collectively, the Sponsors of the ABCP Conduits (and, where applicable, such Sponsors' affiliates) that have issued the Affected ABCP, namely, Coventree Capital Inc., Quanto Financial Corporation, National Bank Financial Inc., Nereus Financial Inc., Newshore Financial Services Inc. and Securitus Capital Corp.

"*Ad Hoc Committee*" means those Noteholders, represented by the law firm of Miller Thomson LLP, who sought funding from the Investors Committee to retain Miller Thomson and PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., to assist it in starting to form a view on the restructuring. The Investors Committee agreed to fund up to \$1 million in fees and facilitated the entering into of confidentiality agreements among Miller Thomson, PwC, the Asset Providers, the Sponsors, JPMorgan and E&Y so that Miller Thomson and PwC, could carry out their mandate. Chairman Crawford met with representatives of Miller Thomson and PwC, and the Committee's advisors answered questions and discussed the proposed restructuring with them.

"*Applicants*" means, collectively, the 17 member institutions of the Investors Committee in their respective capacities as

Noteholders.

"*CCAA Parties*" means, collectively, the Issuer Trustees in respect of the Affected ABCP, namely 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp. and the ABCP Conduits.

"*Conduit*" means a special purpose entity, typically in the form of a trust, used in an ABCP program that purchases assets and funds these purchases either through term securitizations or through the issuance of commercial paper.

"*Issuer Trustees*" means, collectively, the issuer trustees of each of the ABCP Conduits, namely, 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp. and Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp. and "*Issuer Trustee*" means any one of them. The Issuer Trustees, together with the ABCP Conduits, are sometimes referred to, collectively, as the "*CCAA Parties*".

"*Liquidity Provider*" means like asset providers, dealer banks, commercial banks and other entities often the same as the asset providers who provide liquidity to ABCP, or a party that agreed to provide liquidity funding upon the terms and subject to the conditions of a liquidity agreement in respect of an ABCP program. The Liquidity Providers in respect of the Affected ABCP include, without limitation: ABN AMRO Bank N.V., Canada Branch; Bank of America N.A., Canada Branch; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Citibank Canada; Citibank, N.A.; Danske Bank A/S; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA National Association; Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Merrill Lynch International; Royal Bank of Canada; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; The Bank of Nova Scotia; The Royal Bank of Scotland plc and UBS AG.

"*Noteholder*" means a holder of Affected ABCP.

"*Sponsors*" means, generally, the entities that initiate the establishment of an ABCP program in respect of a Conduit. Sponsors are effectively management companies for the ABCP program that arrange deals with Asset Providers and capture the excess spread on these transactions. The Sponsor approves the terms of an ABCP program and serves as administrative agent and/or financial services (or securitization) agent for the ABCP program directly or through its affiliates.

"*Traditional Assets*" means those assets held by the ABCP Conduits in non-synthetic securitization structures such as trade receivables, credit card receivables, RMBS and CMBS and investments in CDOs entered into by third-parties.

APPENDIX 3

[Missing text]

Footnotes

- ¹ Information Statement, p. 18
- ² Information Statement, p. 18
- ³ *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, [2000] A.J. No. 771, 2000 ABQB 442, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 265 A.R. 201, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 334 (Alta. Q.B.).
- ⁴ *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
- ⁵ *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re*, [1998] O.J. No. 3306, 72 O.T.C. 99, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 932 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List])
- ⁶ *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*, [2006] O.J. No. 4087, 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 152 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16, 2006 CarswellOnt 6230 (Ont. S.C.J.)
- ⁷ *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*, [2007] O.J. No. 695, 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

- 8 *Vicwest, Re* (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) per Pepall J. at paragraph 23
- 9 The Court was provided with copies of 12 Plan approvals under the CCAA in which releases were granted. In various instances these included officers, directors and creditors. The moving parties note that no objection to the nature or extent of release was taken.
- 10 *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.*, [1999] O.J. No. 4749, 46 O.R. (3d) 514, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 127 O.A.C. 338, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 67, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 391 (Ont. C.A.)
- 11 *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 4814, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297, 143 A.C.W.S. (3d) 623, 2005 CarswellOnt 6483 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])
- 12 *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2005] O.J. No. 4883 (Ont. C.A.)
- 13 *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2007] O.J. No. 2533, 2007 ONCA 483, 226 O.A.C. 72, 32 B.L.R. (4th) 77, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 174, 158 A.C.W.S. (3d) 877, 2007 CarswellOnt 4108 (Ont. C.A.)
- 14 *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*, 30 C.B.R. (5th) 59, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22, 2007 CarswellOnt 1029 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])
- 15 *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, 1993 CanLII 3991, [1993 CarswellQue 229 (Que. C.A.)]
- 16 Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007 Thomson, Carswell. Janis Sarra edition
- 17 Ibid, p. 42
- 18 Ibid, pp. 44-45
- 19 Ibid, p. 45
- 20 Ibid pp 49-51
- 21 *Peek v. Derry* (1889), 14 A.C. 337 (U.K. H.L.)
- 22 *Continental Insurance Co. v. Dalton Cartage Co.*, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 164, 131 D.L.R. (3d) 559 (S.C.C.)
- 23 *Kripps v. Touche Ross & Co.*, [1997] 6 W.W.R. 421, 89 B.C.A.C. 288 (B.C. C.A.)
- 24 *Toronto Dominion Bank v. Leigh Instruments Ltd. (Trustee of)* (1998), 40 B.L.R. (2d) 1, 63 O.T.C. 1 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 25 See *Ecolab Ltd. v. Greenspace Services Ltd.*, [1996] O.J. No. 3528 (Ont. Gen. Div.) per Ground J.

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Most Negative Treatment: Check subsequent history and related treatments.

2008 ONCA 587
Ontario Court of Appeal

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.

2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 2008 ONCA 587, [2008] O.J. No. 3164, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 698, 240 O.A.C. 245, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, 92 O.R. (3d) 513

**IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE AND ARRANGEMENT INVOLVING METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO

THE INVESTORS REPRESENTED ON THE PAN-CANADIAN INVESTORS COMMITTEE FOR THIRD-PARTY STRUCTURED ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER LISTED IN SCHEDULE "B" HERETO (Applicants / Respondents in Appeal) and METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS II CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS III CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS V CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XI CORP., METCALFE & MANSFIELD ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS XII CORP., 4446372 CANADA INC. AND 6932819 CANADA INC., TRUSTEES OF THE CONDUITS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A" HERETO (Respondents / Respondents in Appeal) and AIR TRANSAT A.T. INC., TRANSAT TOURS CANADA INC., THE JEAN COUTU GROUP (PJC) INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL INC., AÉROPORTS DE MONTRÉAL CAPITAL INC., POMERLEAU ONTARIO INC., POMERLEAU INC., LABOPHARM INC., DOMTAR INC., DOMTAR PULP AND PAPER PRODUCTS INC., GIRO INC., VÊTEMENTS DE SPORTS R.G.R. INC., 131519 CANADA INC., AIR JAZZ LP, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION COMPANY LIMITED, PETRIFOND FOUNDATION MIDWEST LIMITED, SERVICES HYPOTHÉCAIRES LA PATRIMONIALE INC., TECSYS INC. SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE FINANCEMENT DU QUÉBEC, VIBROSYSTEM INC., INTERQUISA CANADA L.P., REDCORP VENTURES LTD., JURA ENERGY CORPORATION, IVANHOE MINES LTD., WEBTECH WIRELESS INC., WYNN CAPITAL CORPORATION INC., HY BLOOM INC., CARDACIAN MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC., WEST ENERGY LTD., SABRE ENERTY LTD., PETROLIFERA PETROLEUM LTD., VAQUERO RESOURCES LTD. and STANDARD ENERGY INC.
(Respondents / Appellants)

J.I. Laskin, E.A. Cronk, R.A. Blair J.J.A.

Heard: June 25-26, 2008
Judgment: August 18, 2008*
Docket: CA C48969

Proceedings: affirming *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: Benjamin Zarnett, Frederick L. Myers for Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
Aubrey E. Kauffman, Stuart Brotman for 4446372 Canada Inc., 6932819 Canada Inc.
Peter F.C. Howard, Samaneh Hosseini for Bank of America N.A., Citibank N.A., Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity, Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Bank Canada, HSBC Bank USA, National Association, Merrill Lynch International, Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc., Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation, UBS AG

Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation, Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
Craig J. Hill, Sam P. Rappos for Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
Jeffrey C. Carhart, Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc., National Bank of Canada
Thomas McRae, Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
Howard Shapray, Q.C., Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
Kevin P. McElcheran, Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia, T.D. Bank
Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada, BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees
Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.
Allan Sternberg, Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd., Hy Bloom Inc., Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service
James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont, Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc., Jazz Air LP
Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XVII Practice and procedure in courts

XVII.7 Appeals

XVII.7.b To Court of Appeal

XVII.7.b.ii Availability

XVII.7.b.ii.D Miscellaneous cases

Bankruptcy and insolvency

XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act

XIX.3 Arrangements

XIX.3.b Approval by court

XIX.3.b.iv Miscellaneous

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *R.A. Blair J.A.*:

Air Canada, Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 1842, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5319, 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), [2000] 10 W.W.R. 269, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 1, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 9, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 41, 2000 CarswellAlta 662, 2000 ABQB 442, 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2000), 2000 CarswellAlta 919, [2000] 10 W.W.R. 314, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 46, 84 Alta. L.R. (3d) 52, 9 B.L.R. (3d) 86, 2000 ABCA 238, 266 A.R. 131, 228 W.A.C. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Canadian Airlines Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellAlta 888, 2001 CarswellAlta 889, 275 N.R. 386 (note), 293 A.R. 351 (note), 257 W.A.C. 351 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Cineplex Odeon Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 1258, 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Country Style Food Services Inc., Re (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30, 2002 CarswellOnt 1038 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) — followed

Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106, 1995 CarswellOnt 54 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd. (1976), 1976 CarswellQue 32, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 84, 75 D.L.R. (3d) 63, (sub nom. *Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1969) Ltd.*) 14 N.R. 503, 1976 CarswellQue 25 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Fotinis Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd. (1998), 1998 CarswellBC 543, 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Guardian Assurance Co., Re (1917), [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (Eng. C.A.) — referred to

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 1990 CarswellBC 394, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, (sub nom. *Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*) [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231, 2006 CarswellOnt 6230 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 4077, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 1, 181 D.L.R. (4th) 37, 46 O.R. (3d) 514, 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 213, 127 O.A.C. 338, 15 C.B.R. (4th) 67 (Ont. C.A.) — distinguished

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1990 CarswellOnt 139, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 1, (sub nom. *Olympia & York Developments Ltd., Re*) 12 O.R. (3d) 500, 1993 CarswellOnt 182 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada (2001), 2001 BCSC 1721, 2001 CarswellBC 2943, 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Bélanger (Trustee of) (1928), 1928 CarswellNat 47, [1928] A.C. 187, [1928] 1 W.W.R. 534, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 945, (sub nom. *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Larue*) 8 C.B.R. 579 (Canada P.C.) — referred to

Ravelston Corp., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 2114, 2007 ONCA 268, 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) (1934), [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75, 1934 CarswellNat 1, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.) — considered

Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces (1933), [1934] 1 D.L.R. 43, 1933 CarswellNat 47, [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces (1935), [1935] 1 W.W.R. 607, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 1, 1935 CarswellNat 2, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) — considered

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 1, 1998 CarswellOnt 2, 50 C.B.R. (3d) 163, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, 33 C.C.E.L. (2d) 173, 154 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 36 O.R. (3d) 418 (headnote only), (sub nom. *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re*) 221 N.R. 241, (sub nom. *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Bankrupt), Re*) 106 O.A.C. 1, (sub nom. *Adrien v. Ontario Ministry of Labour*) 98 C.L.L.C. 210-006 (S.C.C.) — considered

Royal Penfield Inc., Re (2003), 44 C.B.R. (4th) 302, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157, 2003 CarswellQue 1711, [2003] G.S.T.C. 195 (C.S. Que.) — referred to

Skydome Corp., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 5914, 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage (2000), 2000 CarswellOnt 4120, 20 C.B.R. (4th) 160, 50 O.R. (3d) 688, 137 O.A.C. 74 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud (1993), [1993] R.J.Q. 1684, 55 Q.A.C. 298, 1993 CarswellQue 229, 1993 CarswellQue 2055, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (C.A. Que.) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6483, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 6818, 204 O.A.C. 205, 78 O.R. (3d) 241, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 368, 11 B.L.R. (4th) 185, 15 C.B.R. (5th) 307 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2006), 210 O.A.C. 129, 2006 CarswellOnt 3050, 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

T&N Ltd., Re (2006), [2007] Bus. L.R. 1411, [2007] 1 All E.R. 851, [2006] Lloyd's Rep. I.R. 817, [2007] 1 B.C.L.C. 563, [2006] B.P.I.R. 1283 (Eng. Ch. Div.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16
s. 182 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44
s. 192 — referred to

Code civil du Québec, L.Q. 1991, c. 64
en général — referred to

Companies Act, 1985, c. 6
s. 425 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 4 — considered

s. 5.1 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 122] — considered

s. 6 — considered

Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5

s. 91 ¶ 21 — referred to

s. 92 — referred to

s. 92 ¶ 13 — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

arrangement

”Arrangement” is broader than “compromise” and would appear to include any scheme for reorganizing the affairs of the debtor.

APPEAL by opponents of creditor-initiated plan from judgment reported at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 74 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), granting application for approval of plan.

R.A. Blair J.A.:

A. Introduction

1 In August 2007 a liquidity crisis suddenly threatened the Canadian market in Asset Backed Commercial Paper (“ABCP”). The crisis was triggered by a loss of confidence amongst investors stemming from the news of widespread defaults on U.S. sub-prime mortgages. The loss of confidence placed the Canadian financial market at risk generally and was reflective of an economic volatility worldwide.

2 By agreement amongst the major Canadian participants, the \$32 billion Canadian market in third-party ABCP was frozen on August 13, 2007 pending an attempt to resolve the crisis through a restructuring of that market. The Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, chaired by Purdy Crawford, C.C., Q.C., was formed and ultimately put forward the creditor-initiated Plan of Compromise and Arrangement that forms the subject-matter of these proceedings. The Plan was sanctioned by Colin L. Campbell J. on June 5, 2008.

3 Certain creditors who opposed the Plan seek leave to appeal and, if leave is granted, appeal from that decision. They raise an important point regarding the permissible scope of a restructuring under the *Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended (“CCAA”): can the court sanction a Plan that calls for creditors to provide releases to third parties who are themselves solvent and not creditors of the debtor company? They also argue that, if the answer to this question is yes, the application judge erred in holding that this Plan, with its particular releases (which bar some claims even in fraud), was fair and reasonable and therefore in sanctioning it under the CCAA.

Leave to Appeal

4 Because of the particular circumstances and urgency of these proceedings, the court agreed to collapse an oral hearing for leave to appeal with the hearing of the appeal itself. At the outset of argument we encouraged counsel to combine their submissions on both matters.

5 The proposed appeal raises issues of considerable importance to restructuring proceedings under the CCAA Canada-wide. There are serious and arguable grounds of appeal and — given the expedited time-table — the appeal will not unduly delay the progress of the proceedings. I am satisfied that the criteria for granting leave to appeal in CCAA proceedings, set out in such cases as *Cineplex Odeon Corp., Re* (2001), 24 C.B.R. (4th) 201 (Ont. C.A.), and *Country Style Food Services Inc., Re* (2002), 158 O.A.C. 30 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]), are met. I would grant leave to appeal.

Appeal

6 For the reasons that follow, however, I would dismiss the appeal.

B. Facts

The Parties

7 The appellants are holders of ABCP Notes who oppose the Plan. They do so principally on the basis that it requires them to grant releases to third party financial institutions against whom they say they have claims for relief arising out of their purchase of ABCP Notes. Amongst them are an airline, a tour operator, a mining company, a wireless provider, a pharmaceuticals retailer, and several holding companies and energy companies.

8 Each of the appellants has large sums invested in ABCP — in some cases, hundreds of millions of dollars. Nonetheless, the collective holdings of the appellants — slightly over \$1 billion — represent only a small fraction of the more than \$32 billion of ABCP involved in the restructuring.

9 The lead respondent is the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee which was responsible for the creation and negotiation of the Plan on behalf of the creditors. Other respondents include various major international financial institutions, the five largest Canadian banks, several trust companies, and some smaller holders of ABCP product. They participated in the market in a number of different ways.

The ABCP Market

10 Asset Backed Commercial Paper is a sophisticated and hitherto well-accepted financial instrument. It is primarily a form of short-term investment — usually 30 to 90 days — typically with a low interest yield only slightly better than that available through other short-term paper from a government or bank. It is said to be “asset backed” because the cash that is used to purchase an ABCP Note is converted into a portfolio of financial assets or other asset interests that in turn provide security for the repayment of the notes.

11 ABCP was often presented by those selling it as a safe investment, somewhat like a guaranteed investment certificate.

12 The Canadian market for ABCP is significant and administratively complex. As of August 2007, investors had placed over \$116 billion in Canadian ABCP. Investors range from individual pensioners to large institutional bodies. On the selling and distribution end, numerous players are involved, including chartered banks, investment houses and other financial institutions. Some of these players participated in multiple ways. The Plan in this proceeding relates to approximately \$32 billion of non-bank sponsored ABCP the restructuring of which is considered essential to the preservation of the Canadian ABCP market.

13 As I understand it, prior to August 2007 when it was frozen, the ABCP market worked as follows.

14 Various corporations (the “Sponsors”) would arrange for entities they control (“Conduits”) to make ABCP Notes available to be sold to investors through “Dealers” (banks and other investment dealers). Typically, ABCP was issued by series and sometimes by classes within a series.

15 The cash from the purchase of the ABCP Notes was used to purchase assets which were held by trustees of the Conduits (“Issuer Trustees”) and which stood as security for repayment of the notes. Financial institutions that sold or provided the Conduits with the assets that secured the ABCP are known as “Asset Providers”. To help ensure that investors would be able to redeem their notes, “Liquidity Providers” agreed to provide funds that could be drawn upon to meet the demands of maturing ABCP Notes in certain circumstances. Most Asset Providers were also Liquidity Providers. Many of these banks and financial institutions were also holders of ABCP Notes (“Noteholders”). The Asset and Liquidity Providers held first charges on the assets.

16 When the market was working well, cash from the purchase of new ABCP Notes was also used to pay off maturing ABCP Notes; alternatively, Noteholders simply rolled their maturing notes over into new ones. As I will explain, however, there was a potential underlying predicament with this scheme.

The Liquidity Crisis

17 The types of assets and asset interests acquired to “back” the ABCP Notes are varied and complex. They were generally long-term assets such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables, auto loans, cash collateralized debt obligations and derivative investments such as credit default swaps. Their particular characteristics do not matter for the purpose of this appeal, but they shared a common feature that proved to be the Achilles heel of the ABCP market: because of their long-term nature there was an inherent timing mismatch between the cash they generated and the cash needed to repay maturing ABCP Notes.

18 When uncertainty began to spread through the ABCP marketplace in the summer of 2007, investors stopped buying the ABCP product and existing Noteholders ceased to roll over their maturing notes. There was no cash to redeem those notes. Although calls were made on the Liquidity Providers for payment, most of the Liquidity Providers declined to fund the redemption of the notes, arguing that the conditions for liquidity funding had not been met in the circumstances. Hence the “liquidity crisis” in the ABCP market.

19 The crisis was fuelled largely by a lack of transparency in the ABCP scheme. Investors could not tell what assets were backing their notes — partly because the ABCP Notes were often sold before or at the same time as the assets backing them were acquired; partly because of the sheer complexity of certain of the underlying assets; and partly because of assertions of confidentiality by those involved with the assets. As fears arising from the spreading U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis mushroomed, investors became increasingly concerned that their ABCP Notes may be supported by those crumbling assets. For the reasons outlined above, however, they were unable to redeem their maturing ABCP Notes.

The Montreal Protocol

20 The liquidity crisis could have triggered a wholesale liquidation of the assets, at depressed prices. But it did not. During the week of August 13, 2007, the ABCP market in Canada froze — the result of a standstill arrangement orchestrated on the heels of the crisis by numerous market participants, including Asset Providers, Liquidity Providers, Noteholders and other financial industry representatives. Under the standstill agreement — known as the Montréal Protocol — the parties committed to restructuring the ABCP market with a view, as much as possible, to preserving the value of the assets and of the notes.

21 The work of implementing the restructuring fell to the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee, an applicant in the proceeding and respondent in the appeal. The Committee is composed of 17 financial and investment institutions, including chartered banks, credit unions, a pension board, a Crown corporation, and a university board of governors. All 17 members are themselves Noteholders; three of them also participated in the ABCP market in other capacities as well. Between them, they hold about two thirds of the \$32 billion of ABCP sought to be restructured in these proceedings.

22 Mr. Crawford was named the Committee’s chair. He thus had a unique vantage point on the work of the Committee and the restructuring process as a whole. His lengthy affidavit strongly informed the application judge’s understanding of the factual context, and our own. He was not cross-examined and his evidence is unchallenged.

23 Beginning in September 2007, the Committee worked to craft a plan that would preserve the value of the notes and assets, satisfy the various stakeholders to the extent possible, and restore confidence in an important segment of the Canadian financial marketplace. In March 2008, it and the other applicants sought CCAA protection for the ABCP debtors and the approval of a Plan that had been pre-negotiated with some, but not all, of those affected by the misfortunes in the Canadian ABCP market.

The Plan

a) *Plan Overview*

24 Although the ABCP market involves many different players and kinds of assets, each with their own challenges, the committee opted for a single plan. In Mr. Crawford's words, "all of the ABCP suffers from common problems that are best addressed by a common solution." The Plan the Committee developed is highly complex and involves many parties. In its essence, the Plan would convert the Noteholders' paper — which has been frozen and therefore effectively worthless for many months — into new, long-term notes that would trade freely, but with a discounted face value. The hope is that a strong secondary market for the notes will emerge in the long run.

25 The Plan aims to improve transparency by providing investors with detailed information about the assets supporting their ABCP Notes. It also addresses the timing mismatch between the notes and the assets by adjusting the maturity provisions and interest rates on the new notes. Further, the Plan adjusts some of the underlying credit default swap contracts by increasing the thresholds for default triggering events; in this way, the likelihood of a forced liquidation flowing from the credit default swap holder's prior security is reduced and, in turn, the risk for ABCP investors is decreased.

26 Under the Plan, the vast majority of the assets underlying ABCP would be pooled into two master asset vehicles (MAV1 and MAV2). The pooling is designed to increase the collateral available and thus make the notes more secure.

27 The Plan does not apply to investors holding less than \$1 million of notes. However, certain Dealers have agreed to buy the ABCP of those of their customers holding less than the \$1-million threshold, and to extend financial assistance to these customers. Principal among these Dealers are National Bank and Canaccord, two of the respondent financial institutions the appellants most object to releasing. The application judge found that these developments appeared to be designed to secure votes in favour of the Plan by various Noteholders, and were apparently successful in doing so. If the Plan is approved, they also provide considerable relief to the many small investors who find themselves unwittingly caught in the ABDP collapse.

b) *The Releases*

28 This appeal focuses on one specific aspect of the Plan: the comprehensive series of releases of third parties provided for in Article 10.

29 The Plan calls for the release of Canadian banks, Dealers, Noteholders, Asset Providers, Issuer Trustees, Liquidity Providers, and other market participants — in Mr. Crawford's words, "virtually all participants in the Canadian ABCP market" — from any liability associated with ABCP, with the exception of certain narrow claims relating to fraud. For instance, under the Plan as approved, creditors will have to give up their claims against the Dealers who sold them their ABCP Notes, including challenges to the way the Dealers characterized the ABCP and provided (or did not provide) information about the ABCP. The claims against the proposed defendants are mainly in tort: negligence, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, failure to act prudently as a dealer/advisor, acting in conflict of interest, and in a few cases fraud or potential fraud. There are also allegations of breach of fiduciary duty and claims for other equitable relief.

30 The application judge found that, in general, the claims for damages include the face value of the Notes, plus interest and additional penalties and damages.

31 The releases, in effect, are part of a *quid pro quo*. Generally speaking, they are designed to compensate various participants in the market for the contributions they would make to the restructuring. Those contributions under the Plan include the requirements that:

a) Asset Providers assume an increased risk in their credit default swap contracts, disclose certain proprietary information in relation to the assets, and provide below-cost financing for margin funding facilities that are designed to make the notes more secure;

b) Sponsors — who in addition have cooperated with the Investors' Committee throughout the process, including

by sharing certain proprietary information — give up their existing contracts;

c) The Canadian banks provide below-cost financing for the margin funding facility and,

d) Other parties make other contributions under the Plan.

32 According to Mr. Crawford’s affidavit, the releases are part of the Plan “because certain key participants, whose participation is vital to the restructuring, have made comprehensive releases a condition for their participation.”

The CCAA Proceedings to Date

33 On March 17, 2008 the applicants sought and obtained an Initial Order under the CCAA staying any proceedings relating to the ABCP crisis and providing for a meeting of the Noteholders to vote on the proposed Plan. The meeting was held on April 25th. The vote was overwhelmingly in support of the Plan — 96% of the Noteholders voted in favour. At the instance of certain Noteholders, and as requested by the application judge (who has supervised the proceedings from the outset), the Monitor broke down the voting results according to those Noteholders who had worked on or with the Investors’ Committee to develop the Plan and those Noteholders who had not. Re-calculated on this basis the results remained firmly in favour of the proposed Plan — 99% of those connected with the development of the Plan voted positively, as did 80% of those Noteholders who had not been involved in its formulation.

34 The vote thus provided the Plan with the “double majority” approval — a majority of creditors representing two-thirds in value of the claims — required under s. 6 of the CCAA.

35 Following the successful vote, the applicants sought court approval of the Plan under s. 6. Hearings were held on May 12 and 13. On May 16, the application judge issued a brief endorsement in which he concluded that he did not have sufficient facts to decide whether all the releases proposed in the Plan were authorized by the CCAA. While the application judge was prepared to approve the releases of negligence claims, he was not prepared at that point to sanction the release of fraud claims. Noting the urgency of the situation and the serious consequences that would result from the Plan’s failure, the application judge nevertheless directed the parties back to the bargaining table to try to work out a claims process for addressing legitimate claims of fraud.

36 The result of this renegotiation was a “fraud carve-out” — an amendment to the Plan excluding certain fraud claims from the Plan’s releases. The carve-out did not encompass all possible claims of fraud, however. It was limited in three key respects. First, it applied only to claims against ABCP Dealers. Secondly, it applied only to cases involving an express fraudulent misrepresentation made with the intention to induce purchase and in circumstances where the person making the representation knew it to be false. Thirdly, the carve-out limited available damages to the value of the notes, minus any funds distributed as part of the Plan. The appellants argue vigorously that such a limited release respecting fraud claims is unacceptable and should not have been sanctioned by the application judge.

37 A second sanction hearing — this time involving the amended Plan (with the fraud carve-out) — was held on June 3, 2008. Two days later, Campbell J. released his reasons for decision, approving and sanctioning the Plan on the basis both that he had jurisdiction to sanction a Plan calling for third-party releases and that the Plan including the third-party releases in question here was fair and reasonable.

38 The appellants attack both of these determinations.

C. Law and Analysis

39 There are two principal questions for determination on this appeal:

1) As a matter of law, may a CCAA plan contain a release of claims against anyone other than the debtor company

or its directors?

2) If the answer to that question is yes, did the application judge err in the exercise of his discretion to sanction the Plan as fair and reasonable given the nature of the releases called for under it?

(1) Legal Authority for the Releases

40 The standard of review on this first issue — whether, as a matter of law, a CCAA plan may contain third-party releases — is correctness.

41 The appellants submit that a court has no jurisdiction or legal authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that imposes an obligation on creditors to give releases to third parties other than the directors of the debtor company.¹ The requirement that objecting creditors release claims against third parties is illegal, they contend, because:

- a) on a proper interpretation, the CCAA does not permit such releases;
- b) the court is not entitled to “fill in the gaps” in the CCAA or rely upon its inherent jurisdiction to create such authority because to do so would be contrary to the principle that Parliament did not intend to interfere with private property rights or rights of action in the absence of clear statutory language to that effect;
- c) the releases constitute an unconstitutional confiscation of private property that is within the exclusive domain of the provinces under s. 92 of the *Constitution Act*, 1867;
- d) the releases are invalid under Quebec rules of public order; and because
- e) the prevailing jurisprudence supports these conclusions.

42 I would not give effect to any of these submissions.

Interpretation, “Gap Filling” and Inherent Jurisdiction

43 On a proper interpretation, in my view, the CCAA permits the inclusion of third party releases in a plan of compromise or arrangement to be sanctioned by the court where those releases are reasonably connected to the proposed restructuring. I am led to this conclusion by a combination of (a) the open-ended, flexible character of the CCAA itself, (b) the broad nature of the term “compromise or arrangement” as used in the Act, and (c) the express statutory effect of the “double-majority” vote and court sanction which render the plan binding on *all* creditors, including those unwilling to accept certain portions of it. The first of these signals a flexible approach to the application of the Act in new and evolving situations, an active judicial role in its application and interpretation, and a liberal approach to that interpretation. The second provides the entrée to negotiations between the parties affected in the restructuring and furnishes them with the ability to apply the broad scope of their ingenuity in fashioning the proposal. The latter afford necessary protection to unwilling creditors who may be deprived of certain of their civil and property rights as a result of the process.

44 The CCAA is skeletal in nature. It does not contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred. Judges must therefore play a role in fleshing out the details of the statutory scheme. The scope of the Act and the powers of the court under it are not limitless. It is beyond controversy, however, that the CCAA is remedial legislation to be liberally construed in accordance with the modern purposive approach to statutory interpretation. It is designed to be a flexible instrument and it is that very flexibility which gives the Act its efficacy: *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). As Farley J. noted in *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at 111, “[t]he history of CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation.”

45 Much has been said, however, about the “evolution of judicial interpretation” and there is some controversy over both the source and scope of that authority. Is the source of the court’s authority statutory, discerned solely through application of the principles of statutory interpretation, for example? Or does it rest in the court’s ability to “fill in the gaps” in legislation? Or in the court’s inherent jurisdiction?

46 These issues have recently been canvassed by the Honourable Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis Sarra in their publication “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters,”² and there was considerable argument on these issues before the application judge and before us. While I generally agree with the authors’ suggestion that the courts should adopt a hierarchical approach in their resort to these interpretive tools — statutory interpretation, gap-filling, discretion and inherent jurisdiction — it is not necessary in my view to go beyond the general principles of statutory interpretation to resolve the issues on this appeal. Because I am satisfied that it is implicit in the language of the CCAA itself that the court has authority to sanction plans incorporating third-party releases that are reasonably related to the proposed restructuring, there is no “gap-filling” to be done and no need to fall back on inherent jurisdiction. In this respect, I take a somewhat different approach than the application judge did.

47 The Supreme Court of Canada has affirmed generally — and in the insolvency context particularly — that remedial statutes are to be interpreted liberally and in accordance with Professor Driedger’s modern principle of statutory interpretation. Driedger advocated that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: *Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., Re*, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 (S.C.C.) at para. 21, quoting E.A. Driedger, *Construction of Statutes*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983); *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at para. 26.

48 More broadly, I believe that the proper approach to the judicial interpretation and application of statutes — particularly those like the CCAA that are skeletal in nature — is succinctly and accurately summarized by Jackson and Sarra in their recent article, *supra*, at p. 56:

The exercise of a statutory authority requires the statute to be construed. The plain meaning or textualist approach has given way to a search for the object and goals of the statute and the intentionalist approach. This latter approach makes use of the purposive approach and the mischief rule, including its codification under interpretation statutes that every enactment is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. This latter approach advocates reading the statute as a whole and being mindful of Driedger’s “one principle”, that the words of the Act are to be read in their entire context, in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. It is important that courts first interpret the statute before them and exercise their authority pursuant to the statute, before reaching for other tools in the judicial toolbox. Statutory interpretation using the principles articulated above leaves room for gap-filling in the common law provinces and a consideration of purpose in *Québec* as a manifestation of the judge’s overall task of statutory interpretation. Finally, the jurisprudence in relation to statutory interpretation demonstrates the fluidity inherent in the judge’s task in seeking the objects of the statute and the intention of the legislature.

49 I adopt these principles.

50 The remedial purpose of the CCAA — as its title affirms — is to facilitate compromises or arrangements between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors. In *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C. C.A.) at 318, Gibbs J.A. summarized very concisely the purpose, object and scheme of the Act:

Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders’ investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business.

51 The CCAA was enacted in 1933 and was necessary — as the then Secretary of State noted in introducing the Bill on First Reading — “because of the prevailing commercial and industrial depression” and the need to alleviate the effects of business bankruptcies in that context: see the statement of the Hon. C.H. Cahan, Secretary of State, *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)* (April 20, 1933) at 4091. One of the greatest effects of that Depression was what Gibbs J.A. described as “the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment”. Since then, courts have recognized that the Act has a broader dimension than simply the direct relations between the debtor company and its creditors and that this broader public dimension must be weighed in the balance together with the interests of those most directly affected: see, for example, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), per Doherty J.A. in dissent; *Skydome Corp., Re* (1998), 16 C.B.R. (4th) 125 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re* (1998), 7 C.B.R. (4th) 51 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

52 In this respect, I agree with the following statement of Doherty J.A. in *Elan, supra*, at pp. 306-307:

. . . [T]he Act was designed to serve a “broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees”.³ Because of that “broad constituency” the court must, when considering applications brought under the Act, *have regard not only to the individuals and organizations directly affected by the application, but also to the wider public interest.* [Emphasis added.]

Application of the Principles of Interpretation

53 An interpretation of the CCAA that recognizes its broader socio-economic purposes and objects is apt in this case. As the application judge pointed out, the restructuring underpins the financial viability of the Canadian ABCP market itself.

54 The appellants argue that the application judge erred in taking this approach and in treating the Plan and the proceedings as an attempt to restructure a financial market (the ABCP market) rather than simply the affairs between the debtor corporations who caused the ABCP Notes to be issued and their creditors. The Act is designed, they say, only to effect reorganizations between a corporate debtor and its creditors and not to attempt to restructure entire marketplaces.

55 This perspective is flawed in at least two respects, however, in my opinion. First, it reflects a view of the purpose and objects of the CCAA that is too narrow. Secondly, it overlooks the reality of the ABCP marketplace and the context of the restructuring in question here. It may be true that, in their capacity as ABCP *Dealers*, the releasee financial institutions are “third-parties” to the restructuring in the sense that they are not creditors of the debtor corporations. However, in their capacities as *Asset Providers* and *Liquidity Providers*, they are not only creditors but they are prior secured creditors to the Noteholders. Furthermore — as the application judge found — in these latter capacities they are making significant contributions to the restructuring by “foregoing immediate rights to assets and ... providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes” (para. 76). In this context, therefore, the application judge’s remark at para. 50 that the restructuring “involves the commitment and participation of all parties” in the ABCP market makes sense, as do his earlier comments at paras. 48-49:

Given the nature of the ABCP market and all of its participants, it is more appropriate to consider all Noteholders as claimants and the object of the Plan to restore liquidity to the assets being the Notes themselves. The restoration of the liquidity of the market necessitates the participation (including more tangible contribution by many) of all Noteholders.

In these circumstances, *it is unduly technical to classify the Issuer Trustees as debtors and the claims of the Noteholders as between themselves and others as being those of third party creditors*, although I recognize that the restructuring structure of the CCAA requires the corporations as the vehicles for restructuring. [Emphasis added.]

56 The application judge did observe that “[t]he insolvency is of the ABCP market itself, the restructuring is that of the market for such paper ...” (para. 50). He did so, however, to point out the uniqueness of the Plan before him and its industry-wide significance and not to suggest that he need have no regard to the provisions of the CCAA permitting a restructuring as between debtor and creditors. His focus was on *the effect* of the restructuring, a perfectly permissible

perspective, given the broad purpose and objects of the Act. This is apparent from his later references. For example, in balancing the arguments against approving releases that might include aspects of fraud, he responded that “what is at issue is a liquidity crisis that affects the ABCP market in Canada” (para. 125). In addition, in his reasoning on the fair-and-reasonable issue, he stated at para. 142: “Apart from the Plan itself, there is a need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada and this Plan is a legitimate use of the CCAA to accomplish that goal.”

57 I agree. I see no error on the part of the application judge in approaching the fairness assessment or the interpretation issue with these considerations in mind. They provide the context in which the purpose, objects and scheme of the CCAA are to be considered.

The Statutory Wording

58 Keeping in mind the interpretive principles outlined above, I turn now to a consideration of the provisions of the CCAA. Where in the words of the statute is the court clothed with authority to approve a plan incorporating a requirement for third-party releases? As summarized earlier, the answer to that question, in my view, is to be found in:

- a) the skeletal nature of the CCAA;
- b) Parliament’s reliance upon the broad notions of “compromise” and “arrangement” to establish the framework within which the parties may work to put forward a restructuring plan; and in
- c) the creation of the statutory mechanism binding all creditors in classes to the compromise or arrangement once it has surpassed the high “double majority” voting threshold and obtained court sanction as “fair and reasonable”.

Therein lies the expression of Parliament’s intention to permit the parties to negotiate and vote on, and the court to sanction, third-party releases relating to a restructuring.

59 Sections 4 and 6 of the CCAA state:

4. Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

6. Where a majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors, or class of creditors, as the case may be, present and voting either in person or by proxy at the meeting or meetings thereof respectively held pursuant to sections 4 and 5, or either of those sections, agree to any compromise or arrangement either as proposed or as altered or modified at the meeting or meetings, the compromise or arrangement may be sanctioned by the court, and if so sanctioned is binding

- (a) on all the creditors or the class of creditors, as the case may be, and on any trustee for any such class of creditors, whether secured or unsecured, as the case may be, and on the company; and
- (b) in the case of a company that has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, on the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator and contributories of the company.

Compromise or Arrangement

60 While there may be little practical distinction between “compromise” and “arrangement” in many respects, the two are not necessarily the same. “Arrangement” is broader than “compromise” and would appear to include any scheme for

reorganizing the affairs of the debtor: Houlden & Morawetz, *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, loose-leaf, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Toronto: Thomson Carswell) at 10A-12.2, N§10. It has been said to be “a very wide and indefinite [word]”: *Reference re Refund of Dues Paid under s.47 (f) of Timber Regulations in the Western Provinces*, [1935] A.C. 184 (Canada P.C.) at 197, affirming S.C.C. [1933] S.C.R. 616 (S.C.C.). See also, *Guardian Assurance Co., Re*, [1917] 1 Ch. 431 (Eng. C.A.) at 448, 450; *T&N Ltd., Re* (2006), [2007] 1 All E.R. 851 (Eng. Ch. Div.).

61 The CCAA is a sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest. Parliament wisely avoided attempting to anticipate the myriad of business deals that could evolve from the fertile and creative minds of negotiators restructuring their financial affairs. It left the shape and details of those deals to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive and flexible concepts of a “compromise” and “arrangement.” I see no reason why a release in favour of a third party, negotiated as part of a package between a debtor and creditor and reasonably relating to the proposed restructuring cannot fall within that framework.

62 A proposal under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S., 1985, c. B-3 (the “BIA”) is a contract: *Employers’ Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ideal Petroleum (1959) Ltd.*, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 230 (S.C.C.) at 239; *Society of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Armitage* (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 688 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11. In my view, a compromise or arrangement under the CCAA is directly analogous to a proposal for these purposes, and therefore is to be treated as a contract between the debtor and its creditors. Consequently, parties are entitled to put anything into such a plan that could lawfully be incorporated into any contract. See *Air Canada, Re* (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 4 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 6; *Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co.* (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 500 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at 518.

63 There is nothing to prevent a debtor and a creditor from including in a contract between them a term providing that the creditor release a third party. The term is binding as between the debtor and creditor. In the CCAA context, therefore, a plan of compromise or arrangement may propose that creditors agree to compromise claims against the debtor and to release third parties, just as any debtor and creditor might agree to such a term in a contract between them. Once the statutory mechanism regarding voter approval and court sanctioning has been complied with, the plan — including the provision for releases — becomes binding on all creditors (including the dissenting minority).

64 *T&N Ltd., Re, supra*, is instructive in this regard. It is a rare example of a court focussing on and examining the meaning and breadth of the term “arrangement”. T&N and its associated companies were engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of asbestos-containing products. They became the subject of many claims by former employees, who had been exposed to asbestos dust in the course of their employment, and their dependents. The T&N companies applied for protection under s. 425 of the U.K. *Companies Act 1985*, a provision virtually identical to the scheme of the CCAA — including the concepts of compromise or arrangement.⁴

65 T&N carried employers’ liability insurance. However, the employers’ liability insurers (the “EL insurers”) denied coverage. This issue was litigated and ultimately resolved through the establishment of a multi-million pound fund against which the employees and their dependants (the “EL claimants”) would assert their claims. In return, T&N’s former employees and dependants (the “EL claimants”) agreed to forego any further claims against the EL insurers. This settlement was incorporated into the plan of compromise and arrangement between the T&N companies and the EL claimants that was voted on and put forward for court sanction.

66 Certain creditors argued that the court could not sanction the plan because it did not constitute a “compromise or arrangement” between T&N and the EL claimants since it did not purport to affect rights as between them but only the EL claimants’ rights against the EL insurers. The Court rejected this argument. Richards J. adopted previous jurisprudence — cited earlier in these reasons — to the effect that the word “arrangement” has a very broad meaning and that, while both a compromise and an arrangement involve some “give and take”, an arrangement need not involve a compromise or be confined to a case of dispute or difficulty (paras. 46-51). He referred to what would be the equivalent of a solvent arrangement under Canadian corporate legislation as an example.⁵ Finally, he pointed out that the compromised rights of the EL claimants against the EL insurers were not unconnected with the EL claimants’ rights against the T&N companies; the scheme of arrangement involving the EL insurers was “an integral part of a single proposal affecting all the parties” (para. 52). He concluded his reasoning with these observations (para. 53):

In my judgment it is not a necessary element of an arrangement for the purposes of s 425 of the 1985 Act that it should alter the rights existing between the company and the creditors or members with whom it is made. No doubt in most

cases it will alter those rights. But, provided that the context and content of the scheme are such as properly to constitute an arrangement between the company and the members or creditors concerned, it will fall within s 425. It is ... neither necessary nor desirable to attempt a definition of arrangement. The legislature has not done so. To insist on an alteration of rights, or a termination of rights as in the case of schemes to effect takeovers or mergers, is to impose a restriction which is neither warranted by the statutory language nor justified by the courts' approach over many years to give the term its widest meaning. *Nor is an arrangement necessarily outside the section, because its effect is to alter the rights of creditors against another party or because such alteration could be achieved by a scheme of arrangement with that party.* [Emphasis added.]

67 I find Richard J.'s analysis helpful and persuasive. In effect, the claimants in *T&N* were being asked to release their claims against the EL insurers in exchange for a call on the fund. Here, the appellants are being required to release their claims against certain financial third parties in exchange for what is anticipated to be an improved position for all ABCP Noteholders, stemming from the contributions the financial third parties are making to the ABCP restructuring. The situations are quite comparable.

The Binding Mechanism

68 Parliament's reliance on the expansive terms "compromise" or "arrangement" does not stand alone, however. Effective insolvency restructurings would not be possible without a statutory mechanism to bind an unwilling minority of creditors. Unanimity is frequently impossible in such situations. But the minority must be protected too. Parliament's solution to this quandary was to permit a wide range of proposals to be negotiated and put forward (the compromise or arrangement) and to bind *all* creditors by class to the terms of the plan, but to do so only where the proposal can gain the support of the requisite "double majority" of votes⁶ and obtain the sanction of the court on the basis that it is fair and reasonable. In this way, the scheme of the CCAA supports the intention of Parliament to encourage a wide variety of solutions to corporate insolvencies without unjustifiably overriding the rights of dissenting creditors.

The Required Nexus

69 In keeping with this scheme and purpose, I do not suggest that any and all releases between creditors of the debtor company seeking to restructure and third parties may be made the subject of a compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. Nor do I think the fact that the releases may be "necessary" in the sense that the third parties or the debtor may refuse to proceed without them, of itself, advances the argument in favour of finding jurisdiction (although it may well be relevant in terms of the fairness and reasonableness analysis).

70 The release of the claim in question must be justified as part of the compromise or arrangement between the debtor and its creditors. In short, there must be a reasonable connection between the third party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third party release in the plan. This nexus exists here, in my view.

71 In the course of his reasons, the application judge made the following findings, all of which are amply supported on the record:

- a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- b) *The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;*
- c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- d) *The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;* and
- e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally.

72 Here, then — as was the case in *T&N* — there is a close connection between the claims being released and the restructuring proposal. The tort claims arise out of the sale and distribution of the ABCP Notes and their collapse in value, just as do the contractual claims of the creditors against the debtor companies. The purpose of the restructuring is to stabilize and shore up the value of those notes in the long run. The third parties being released are making separate contributions to enable those results to materialize. Those contributions are identified earlier, at para. 31 of these reasons. The application judge found that the claims being released are not independent of or unrelated to the claims that the Noteholders have against the debtor companies; they are closely connected to the value of the ABCP Notes and are required for the Plan to succeed. At paras. 76-77 he said:

[76] I do not consider that the Plan in this case involves a change in relationship among creditors “that does not directly involve the Company.” Those who support the Plan and are to be released are “directly involved in the Company” in the sense that many are foregoing immediate rights to assets and are providing real and tangible input for the preservation and enhancement of the Notes. It would be unduly restrictive to suggest that the moving parties’ claims against released parties do not involve the Company, since the claims are directly related to the value of the Notes. The value of the Notes is in this case the value of the Company.

[77] This Plan, as it deals with releases, doesn’t change the relationship of the creditors apart from involving the Company and its Notes.

73 I am satisfied that the wording of the CCAA — construed in light of the purpose, objects and scheme of the Act and in accordance with the modern principles of statutory interpretation — supports the court’s jurisdiction and authority to sanction the Plan proposed here, including the contested third-party releases contained in it.

The Jurisprudence

74 Third party releases have become a frequent feature in Canadian restructurings since the decision of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* (2000), 265 A.R. 201 (Alta. Q.B.), leave to appeal refused by (2000), 266 A.R. 131 (Alta. C.A. [In Chambers]), and (2001), 293 A.R. 351 (note) (S.C.C.). In *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* (2006), 25 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Ground remarked (para. 8):

[It] is not uncommon in CCAA proceedings, in the context of a plan of compromise and arrangement, to compromise claims against the Applicants and other parties against whom such claims or related claims are made.

75 We were referred to at least a dozen court-approved CCAA plans from across the country that included broad third-party releases. With the exception of *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re*, however, the releases in those restructurings — including *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re* — were not opposed. The appellants argue that those cases are wrongly decided, because the court simply does not have the authority to approve such releases.

76 In *Canadian Airlines Corp., Re* the releases in question were opposed, however. Paperny J. (as she then was) concluded the court had jurisdiction to approve them and her decision is said to be the well-spring of the trend towards third-party releases referred to above. Based on the foregoing analysis, I agree with her conclusion although for reasons that differ from those cited by her.

77 Justice Paperny began her analysis of the release issue with the observation at para. 87 that “[p]rior to 1997, the CCAA did not provide for compromises of claims against anyone other than the petitioning company.” It will be apparent from the analysis in these reasons that I do not accept that premise, notwithstanding the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*,⁷ of which her comment may have been reflective. Paperny J.’s reference to 1997 was a reference to the amendments of that year adding s. 5.1 to the CCAA, which provides for limited releases in favour of directors. Given the limited scope of s. 5.1, Justice Paperny was thus faced with the argument — dealt with later in these reasons — that Parliament must not have intended to extend the authority to approve third-party releases beyond the scope of this section. She chose to address this contention by concluding that, although the amendments “[did] not authorize a release of claims

against third parties other than directors, [they did] not prohibit such releases either” (para. 92).

78 Respectfully, I would not adopt the interpretive principle that the CCAA permits releases because it does not expressly prohibit them. Rather, as I explain in these reasons, I believe the open-ended CCAA permits third-party releases that are reasonably related to the restructuring at issue because they are encompassed in the comprehensive terms “compromise” and “arrangement” and because of the double-voting majority and court sanctioning statutory mechanism that makes them binding on unwilling creditors.

79 The appellants rely on a number of authorities, which they submit support the proposition that the CCAA may not be used to compromise claims as between anyone other than the debtor company and its creditors. Principal amongst these are *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*; *NBD Bank, Canada v. Dofasco Inc.* (1999), 46 O.R. (3d) 514 (Ont. C.A.); *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd. v. Air Canada* (2001), 19 B.L.R. (3d) 286 (B.C. S.C.); and *Stelco Inc., Re* (2005), 78 O.R. (3d) 241 (Ont. C.A.) (“*Stelco P*”). I do not think these cases assist the appellants, however. With the exception of *Steinberg Inc.*, they do not involve third party claims that were reasonably connected to the restructuring. As I shall explain, it is my opinion that *Steinberg Inc.* does not express a correct view of the law, and I decline to follow it.

80 In *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.*, Tysoe J. made the following comment at para. 24:

[The purpose of the CCAA proceeding] is not to deal with disputes between a creditor of a company and a third party, even if the company was also involved in the subject matter of the dispute. While issues between the debtor company and non-creditors are sometimes dealt with in CCAA proceedings, it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company.

81 This statement must be understood in its context, however. Pacific Coastal Airlines had been a regional carrier for Canadian Airlines prior to the CCAA reorganization of the latter in 2000. In the action in question it was seeking to assert separate tort claims against Air Canada for contractual interference and inducing breach of contract in relation to certain rights it had to the use of Canadian’s flight designator code prior to the CCAA proceeding. Air Canada sought to have the action dismissed on grounds of *res judicata* or issue estoppel because of the CCAA proceeding. Tysoe J. rejected the argument.

82 The facts in *Pacific Coastal Airlines Ltd.* are not analogous to the circumstances of this case, however. There is no suggestion that a resolution of Pacific Coastal’s separate tort claim against Air Canada was in any way connected to the Canadian Airlines restructuring, even though Canadian — at a contractual level — may have had some involvement with the particular dispute. Here, however, the disputes that are the subject-matter of the impugned releases are not simply “disputes between parties other than the debtor company”. They are closely connected to the disputes being resolved between the debtor companies and their creditors and to the restructuring itself.

83 Nor is the decision of this Court in the *NBD Bank, Canada* case dispositive. It arose out of the financial collapse of Algoma Steel, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dofasco. The Bank had advanced funds to Algoma allegedly on the strength of misrepresentations by Algoma’s Vice-President, James Melville. The plan of compromise and arrangement that was sanctioned by Farley J. in the Algoma CCAA restructuring contained a clause releasing Algoma from all claims creditors “may have had against Algoma or its directors, officers, employees and advisors.” Mr. Melville was found liable for negligent misrepresentation in a subsequent action by the Bank. On appeal, he argued that since the Bank was barred from suing Algoma for misrepresentation by its officers, permitting it to pursue the same cause of action against him personally would subvert the CCAA process — in short, he was personally protected by the CCAA release.

84 Rosenberg J.A., writing for this Court, rejected this argument. The appellants here rely particularly upon his following observations at paras. 53-54:

53 In my view, the appellant has not demonstrated that allowing the respondent to pursue its claim against him would undermine or subvert the purposes of the Act. As this court noted in *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 at 297, the CCAA is remedial legislation “intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both”. It is a means of avoiding a liquidation that may yield little for the creditors, especially unsecured creditors like the respondent, and the debtor company shareholders.

However, the appellant has not shown that allowing a creditor to continue an action against an officer for negligent misrepresentation would erode the effectiveness of the Act.

54 In fact, to refuse on policy grounds to impose liability on an officer of the corporation for negligent misrepresentation would contradict the policy of Parliament as demonstrated in recent amendments to the CCAA and the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. Those Acts now contemplate that an arrangement or proposal may include a term for compromise of certain types of claims against directors of the company except claims that “are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors”. L.W. Houlden and C.H. Morawetz, the editors of *The 2000 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) at p. 192 are of the view that the policy behind the provision is to encourage directors of an insolvent corporation to remain in office so that the affairs of the corporation can be reorganized. I can see no similar policy interest in barring an action against an officer of the company who, prior to the insolvency, has misrepresented the financial affairs of the corporation to its creditors. It may be necessary to permit the compromise of claims against the debtor corporation, otherwise it may not be possible to successfully reorganize the corporation. The same considerations do not apply to individual officers. Rather, it would seem to me that it would be contrary to good policy to immunize officers from the consequences of their negligent statements which might otherwise be made in anticipation of being forgiven under a subsequent corporate proposal or arrangement. [Footnote omitted.]

85 Once again, this statement must be assessed in context. Whether Justice Farley had the authority in the earlier Algoma CCAA proceedings to sanction a plan that included third party releases was not under consideration at all. What the Court was determining in *NBD Bank, Canada* was whether the release extended by its terms to protect a third party. In fact, on its face, it does not appear to do so. Justice Rosenberg concluded only that not allowing Mr. Melville to rely upon the release did not subvert the purpose of the CCAA. As the application judge here observed, “there is little factual similarity in *NBD Bank, Canada* to the facts now before the Court” (para. 71). Contrary to the facts of this case, in *NBD Bank, Canada* the creditors had not agreed to grant a release to officers; they had not voted on such a release and the court had not assessed the fairness and reasonableness of such a release as a term of a complex arrangement involving significant contributions by the beneficiaries of the release — as is the situation here. Thus, *NBD Bank, Canada* is of little assistance in determining whether the court has authority to sanction a plan that calls for third party releases.

86 The appellants also rely upon the decision of this Court in *Stelco I*. There, the Court was dealing with the scope of the CCAA in connection with a dispute over what were called the “Turnover Payments”. Under an inter-creditor agreement one group of creditors had subordinated their rights to another group and agreed to hold in trust and “turn over” any proceeds received from Stelco until the senior group was paid in full. On a disputed classification motion, the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that they should be in a separate class from the Senior Debt Holders. Farley J. refused to make such an order in the court below, stating:

[Sections] 4, 5 and 6 [of the CCAA] talk of compromises or arrangements between a company and its creditors. There is no mention of this extending by statute to encompass a change of relationship among the creditors vis-à-vis the creditors themselves and not directly involving the company. [Citations omitted; emphasis added.]

See *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 297 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 7.

87 This Court upheld that decision. The legal relationship between each group of creditors and Stelco was the same, albeit there were inter-creditor differences, and creditors were to be classified in accordance with their legal rights. In addition, the need for timely classification and voting decisions in the CCAA process militated against enmeshing the classification process in the vagaries of inter-corporate disputes. In short, the issues before the Court were quite different from those raised on this appeal.

88 Indeed, the Stelco plan, as sanctioned, included third party releases (albeit uncontested ones). This Court subsequently dealt with the same inter-creditor agreement on an appeal where the Subordinated Debt Holders argued that the inter-creditor subordination provisions were beyond the reach of the CCAA and therefore that they were entitled to a separate civil action to determine their rights under the agreement: *Stelco Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) (“*Stelco II*”). The Court rejected that argument and held that where the creditors’ rights amongst themselves were sufficiently related to the debtor and its plan, they were properly brought within the scope of the CCAA plan. The Court said (para. 11):

In [*Stelco I*] — the classification case — the court observed that it is not a proper use of a CCAA proceeding to determine disputes between parties other than the debtor company ... [*H*]owever, the present case is not simply an inter-creditor dispute that does not involve the debtor company; it is a dispute that is inextricably connected to the restructuring process. [Emphasis added.]

89 The approach I would take to the disposition of this appeal is consistent with that view. As I have noted, the third party releases here are very closely connected to the ABCP restructuring process.

90 Some of the appellants — particularly those represented by Mr. Woods — rely heavily upon the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, *supra*. They say that it is determinative of the release issue. In *Steinberg*, the Court held that the CCAA, as worded at the time, did not permit the release of directors of the debtor corporation and that third-party releases were not within the purview of the Act. Deschamps J.A. (as she then was) said (paras. 42, 54 and 58 — English translation):

[42] Even if one can understand the extreme pressure weighing on the creditors and the respondent at the time of the sanctioning, a plan of arrangement is not the appropriate forum to settle disputes other than the claims that are the subject of the arrangement. In other words, one cannot, under the pretext of an absence of formal directives in the Act, transform an arrangement into a potpourri.

.....

[54] The Act offers the respondent a way to arrive at a compromise with its creditors. It does not go so far as to offer an umbrella to all the persons within its orbit by permitting them to shelter themselves from any recourse.

.....

[58] The [CCAA] and the case law clearly do not permit extending the application of an arrangement to persons other than the respondent and its creditors and, consequently, the plan should not have been sanctioned as is [that is, including the releases of the directors].

91 Justices Vallerand and Delisle, in separate judgments, agreed. Justice Vallerand summarized his view of the consequences of extending the scope of the CCAA to third party releases in this fashion (para. 7):

In short, the Act will have become the Companies' *and Their Officers and Employees* Creditors Arrangement Act — an awful mess — and likely not attain its purpose, which is to enable the company to survive in the face of *its* creditors and through their will, and not in the face of the creditors of its officers. This is why I feel, just like my colleague, that such a clause is contrary to the Act's mode of operation, contrary to its purposes and, for this reason, is to be banned.

92 Justice Delisle, on the other hand, appears to have rejected the releases because of their broad nature — they released directors from all claims, including those that were altogether unrelated to their corporate duties with the debtor company — rather than because of a lack of authority to sanction under the Act. Indeed, he seems to have recognized the wide range of circumstances that could be included within the term “compromise or arrangement”. He is the only one who addressed that term. At para. 90 he said:

The CCAA is drafted in general terms. It does not specify, among other things, what must be understood by “compromise or arrangement”. However, it may be inferred from the purpose of this [A]ct that these terms *encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to it to fully dispose of his debts*, both those that exist on the date when he has recourse to the statute and *those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself* ... [Emphasis added.]

93 The decision of the Court did not reflect a view that the terms of a compromise or arrangement should “encompass all that should enable the person who has recourse to [the Act] to dispose of his debts ... and those contingent on the insolvency in which he finds himself,” however. On occasion such an outlook might embrace third parties other than the debtor and its creditors in order to make the arrangement work. Nor would it be surprising that, in such circumstances, the third parties might seek the protection of releases, or that the debtor might do so on their behalf. Thus, the perspective adopted by the

majority in *Steinberg Inc.*, in my view, is too narrow, having regard to the language, purpose and objects of the CCAA and the intention of Parliament. They made no attempt to consider and explain why a compromise or arrangement could not include third-party releases. In addition, the decision appears to have been based, at least partly, on a rejection of the use of contract-law concepts in analysing the Act — an approach inconsistent with the jurisprudence referred to above.

94 Finally, the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* seems to have proceeded on the basis that the CCAA cannot interfere with civil or property rights under Quebec law. Mr. Woods advanced this argument before this Court in his factum, but did not press it in oral argument. Indeed, he conceded that if the Act encompasses the authority to sanction a plan containing third-party releases — as I have concluded it does — the provisions of the CCAA, as valid federal insolvency legislation, are paramount over provincial legislation. I shall return to the constitutional issues raised by the appellants later in these reasons.

95 Accordingly, to the extent *Steinberg Inc.* stands for the proposition that the court does not have authority under the CCAA to sanction a plan that incorporates third-party releases, I do not believe it to be a correct statement of the law and I respectfully decline to follow it. The modern approach to interpretation of the Act in accordance with its nature and purpose militates against a narrow interpretation and towards one that facilitates and encourages compromises and arrangements. Had the majority in *Steinberg Inc.* considered the broad nature of the terms “compromise” and “arrangement” and the jurisprudence I have referred to above, they might well have come to a different conclusion.

The 1997 Amendments

96 *Steinberg Inc.* led to amendments to the CCAA, however. In 1997, s. 5.1 was added, dealing specifically with releases pertaining to directors of the debtor company. It states:

5.1(1) A compromise or arrangement made in respect of a debtor company may include in its terms provision for the compromise of claims against directors of the company that arose before the commencement of proceedings under this Act and that relate to the obligations of the company where the directors are by law liable in their capacity as directors for the payment of such obligations.

Exception

(2) A provision for the compromise of claims against directors may not include claims that

(a) relate to contractual rights of one or more creditors; or

(b) are based on allegations of misrepresentations made by directors to creditors or of wrongful or oppressive conduct by directors.

Powers of court

(3) The court may declare that a claim against directors shall not be compromised if it is satisfied that the compromise would not be fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Resignation or removal of directors

(4) Where all of the directors have resigned or have been removed by the shareholders without replacement, any person who manages or supervises the management of the business and affairs of the debtor company shall be deemed to be a director for the purposes of this section.

1997, c. 12, s. 122.

97 Perhaps the appellants’ strongest argument is that these amendments confirm a prior lack of authority in the court to sanction a plan including third party releases. If the power existed, why would Parliament feel it necessary to add an amendment specifically permitting such releases (subject to the exceptions indicated) in favour of directors? *Expressio unius*

est exclusio alterius, is the Latin maxim sometimes relied on to articulate the principle of interpretation implied in that question: to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other.

98 The maxim is not helpful in these circumstances, however. The reality is that there *may* be another explanation why Parliament acted as it did. As one commentator has noted:⁸

Far from being a rule, [the maxim *expressio unius*] is not even lexicographically accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or privilege in other kinds. Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not depends on the particular circumstances of context. Without contextual support, therefore there is not even a mild presumption here. Accordingly, the maxim is at best a description, after the fact, of what the court has discovered from context.

99 As I have said, the 1997 amendments to the CCAA providing for releases in favour of directors of debtor companies in limited circumstances were a response to the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal in *Steinberg Inc.*. A similar amendment was made with respect to proposals in the BIA at the same time. The rationale behind these amendments was to encourage directors of an insolvent company to remain in office during a restructuring, rather than resign. The assumption was that by remaining in office the directors would provide some stability while the affairs of the company were being reorganized: see Houlden & Morawetz, vol.1, *supra*, at 2-144, E§11A; *Royal Penfield Inc., Re*, [2003] R.J.Q. 2157 (C.S. Que.) at paras. 44-46.

100 Parliament thus had a particular focus and a particular purpose in enacting the 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA. While there is some merit in the appellants' argument on this point, at the end of the day I do not accept that Parliament intended to signal by its enactment of s. 5.1 that it was depriving the court of authority to sanction plans of compromise or arrangement in all circumstances where they incorporate third party releases in favour of anyone other than the debtor's directors. For the reasons articulated above, I am satisfied that the court does have the authority to do so. Whether it sanctions the plan is a matter for the fairness hearing.

The Deprivation of Proprietary Rights

101 Mr. Shapray very effectively led the appellants' argument that legislation must not be construed so as to interfere with or prejudice established contractual or proprietary rights — including the right to bring an action — in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intention to that effect: *Halsbury's Laws of England*, 4th ed. reissue, vol. 44 (1) (London: Butterworths, 1995) at paras. 1438, 1464 and 1467; Driedger, 2nd ed., *supra*, at 183; Ruth Sullivan, *Sullivan and Driedger on the Construction of Statutes*, 4th ed., (Markham: Butterworths, 2002) at 399. I accept the importance of this principle. For the reasons I have explained, however, I am satisfied that Parliament's intention to clothe the court with authority to consider and sanction a plan that contains third party releases is expressed with sufficient clarity in the "compromise or arrangement" language of the CCAA coupled with the statutory voting and sanctioning mechanism making the provisions of the plan binding on all creditors. This is not a situation of impermissible "gap-filling" in the case of legislation severely affecting property rights; it is a question of finding meaning in the language of the Act itself. I would therefore not give effect to the appellants' submissions in this regard.

The Division of Powers and Paramountcy

102 Mr. Woods and Mr. Sternberg submit that extending the reach of the CCAA process to the compromise of claims as between solvent creditors of the debtor company and solvent third parties to the proceeding is constitutionally impermissible. They say that under the guise of the federal insolvency power pursuant to s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867*, this approach would improperly affect the rights of civil claimants to assert their causes of action, a provincial matter falling within s. 92(13), and contravene the rules of public order pursuant to the *Civil Code of Quebec*.

103 I do not accept these submissions. It has long been established that the CCAA is valid federal legislation under the federal insolvency power: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada)*, [1934] S.C.R. 659 (S.C.C.). As

the Supreme Court confirmed in that case (p. 661), citing Viscount Cave L.C. in *Quebec (Attorney General) v. Bélanger (Trustee of)*, [1928] A.C. 187 (Canada P.C.), “the exclusive legislative authority to deal with all matters within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency is vested in Parliament.” Chief Justice Duff elaborated:

Matters normally constituting part of a bankruptcy scheme but not in their essence matters of bankruptcy and insolvency may, of course, from another point of view and in another aspect be dealt with by a provincial legislature; but, when treated as matters pertaining to bankruptcy and insolvency, they clearly fall within the legislative authority of the Dominion.

104 That is exactly the case here. The power to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement that contains third-party releases of the type opposed by the appellants is embedded in the wording of the CCAA. The fact that this may interfere with a claimant’s right to pursue a civil action — normally a matter of provincial concern — or trump Quebec rules of public order is constitutionally immaterial. The CCAA is a valid exercise of federal power. Provided the matter in question falls within the legislation directly or as necessarily incidental to the exercise of that power, the CCAA governs. To the extent that its provisions are inconsistent with provincial legislation, the federal legislation is paramount. Mr. Woods properly conceded this during argument.

Conclusion With Respect to Legal Authority

105 For all of the foregoing reasons, then, I conclude that the application judge had the jurisdiction and legal authority to sanction the Plan as put forward.

(2) The Plan is “Fair and Reasonable”

106 The second major attack on the application judge’s decision is that he erred in finding that the Plan is “fair and reasonable” and in sanctioning it on that basis. This attack is centred on the nature of the third-party releases contemplated and, in particular, on the fact that they will permit the release of some claims based in fraud.

107 Whether a plan of compromise or arrangement is fair and reasonable is a matter of mixed fact and law, and one on which the application judge exercises a large measure of discretion. The standard of review on this issue is therefore one of deference. In the absence of a demonstrable error an appellate court will not interfere: see *Ravelston Corp., Re* (2007), 31 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]).

108 I would not interfere with the application judge’s decision in this regard. While the notion of releases in favour of third parties — including leading Canadian financial institutions — that extend to claims of fraud is distasteful, there is no legal impediment to the inclusion of a release for claims based in fraud in a plan of compromise or arrangement. The application judge had been living with and supervising the ABCP restructuring from its outset. He was intimately attuned to its dynamics. In the end he concluded that the benefits of the Plan to the creditors as a whole, and to the debtor companies, outweighed the negative aspects of compelling the unwilling appellants to execute the releases as finally put forward.

109 The application judge was concerned about the inclusion of fraud in the contemplated releases and at the May hearing adjourned the final disposition of the sanctioning hearing in an effort to encourage the parties to negotiate a resolution. The result was the “fraud carve-out” referred to earlier in these reasons.

110 The appellants argue that the fraud carve-out is inadequate because of its narrow scope. It (i) applies only to ABCP Dealers, (ii) limits the type of damages that may be claimed (no punitive damages, for example), (iii) defines “fraud” narrowly, excluding many rights that would be protected by common law, equity and the Quebec concept of public order, and (iv) limits claims to representations made directly to Noteholders. The appellants submit it is contrary to public policy to sanction a plan containing such a limited restriction on the type of fraud claims that may be pursued against the third parties.

111 The law does not condone fraud. It is the most serious kind of civil claim. There is therefore some force to the appellants’ submission. On the other hand, as noted, there is no legal impediment to granting the release of an antecedent

claim in fraud, provided the claim is in the contemplation of the parties to the release at the time it is given: *Fotinis Restaurant Corp. v. White Spot Ltd* (1998), 38 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) at paras. 9 and 18. There may be disputes about the scope or extent of what is released, but parties are entitled to settle allegations of fraud in civil proceedings — the claims here all being untested allegations of fraud — and to include releases of such claims as part of that settlement.

112 The application judge was alive to the merits of the appellants' submissions. He was satisfied in the end, however, that the need "to avoid the potential cascade of litigation that ... would result if a broader 'carve out' were to be allowed" (para. 113) outweighed the negative aspects of approving releases with the narrower carve-out provision. Implementation of the Plan, in his view, would work to the overall greater benefit of the Noteholders as a whole. I can find no error in principle in the exercise of his discretion in arriving at this decision. It was his call to make.

113 At para. 71 above I recited a number of factual findings the application judge made in concluding that approval of the Plan was within his jurisdiction under the CCAA and that it was fair and reasonable. For convenience, I reiterate them here — with two additional findings — because they provide an important foundation for his analysis concerning the fairness and reasonableness of the Plan. The application judge found that:

- a) The parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- b) The claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the Plan and necessary for it;
- c) The Plan cannot succeed without the releases;
- d) The parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the Plan;
- e) The Plan will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditor Noteholders generally;
- f) The voting creditors who have approved the Plan did so with knowledge of the nature and effect of the releases; and that,
- g) The releases are fair and reasonable and not overly broad or offensive to public policy.

114 These findings are all supported on the record. Contrary to the submission of some of the appellants, they do not constitute a new and hitherto untried "test" for the sanctioning of a plan under the CCAA. They simply represent findings of fact and inferences on the part of the application judge that underpin his conclusions on jurisdiction and fairness.

115 The appellants all contend that the obligation to release the third parties from claims in fraud, tort, breach of fiduciary duty, etc. is confiscatory and amounts to a requirement that they — as individual creditors — make the equivalent of a greater financial contribution to the Plan. In his usual lively fashion, Mr. Sternberg asked us the same rhetorical question he posed to the application judge. As he put it, how could the court countenance the compromise of what in the future might turn out to be fraud perpetrated at the highest levels of Canadian and foreign banks? Several appellants complain that the proposed Plan is unfair to them because they will make very little additional recovery if the Plan goes forward, but will be required to forfeit a cause of action against third-party financial institutions that may yield them significant recovery. Others protest that they are being treated unequally because they are ineligible for relief programs that Liquidity Providers such as Canaccord have made available to other smaller investors.

116 All of these arguments are persuasive to varying degrees when considered in isolation. The application judge did not have that luxury, however. He was required to consider the circumstances of the restructuring as a whole, including the reality that many of the financial institutions were not only acting as Dealers or brokers of the ABCP Notes (with the impugned releases relating to the financial institutions in these capacities, for the most part) but also as Asset and Liquidity Providers (with the financial institutions making significant contributions to the restructuring in these capacities).

117 In insolvency restructuring proceedings almost everyone loses something. To the extent that creditors are required to compromise their claims, it can always be proclaimed that their rights are being unfairly confiscated and that they are being

called upon to make the equivalent of a further financial contribution to the compromise or arrangement. Judges have observed on a number of occasions that CCAA proceedings involve “a balancing of prejudices,” inasmuch as everyone is adversely affected in some fashion.

118 Here, the debtor corporations being restructured represent the issuers of the more than \$32 billion in non-bank sponsored ABCP Notes. The proposed compromise and arrangement affects that entire segment of the ABCP market and the financial markets as a whole. In that respect, the application judge was correct in advertent to the importance of the restructuring to the resolution of the ABCP liquidity crisis and to the need to restore confidence in the financial system in Canada. He was required to consider and balance the interests of *all* Noteholders, not just the interests of the appellants, whose notes represent only about 3% of that total. That is what he did.

119 The application judge noted at para. 126 that the Plan represented “a reasonable balance between benefit to all Noteholders and enhanced recovery for those who can make out specific claims in fraud” within the fraud carve-out provisions of the releases. He also recognized at para. 134 that:

No Plan of this size and complexity could be expected to satisfy all affected by it. The size of the majority who have approved it is testament to its overall fairness. No plan to address a crisis of this magnitude can work perfect equity among all stakeholders.

120 In my view we ought not to interfere with his decision that the Plan is fair and reasonable in all the circumstances.

D. Disposition

121 For the foregoing reasons, I would grant leave to appeal from the decision of Justice Campbell, but dismiss the appeal.

J.I. Laskin J.A.:

I agree.

E.A. Cronk J.A.:

I agree.

Schedule A — Conduits

Apollo Trust

Apsley Trust

Aria Trust

Aurora Trust

Comet Trust

Encore Trust

Gemini Trust

Ironstone Trust

MMAI-I Trust

Newshore Canadian Trust

Opus Trust

Planet Trust

Rocket Trust

Selkirk Funding Trust

Silverstone Trust

Slate Trust

Structured Asset Trust

Structured Investment Trust III

Symphony Trust

Whitehall Trust

Schedule B — Applicants

ATB Financial

Caisse de dépôt et placement du Québec

Canaccord Capital Corporation

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation

Canada Post Corporation

Credit Union Central Alberta Limited

Credit Union Central of BC

Credit Union Central of Canada

Credit Union Central of Ontario

Credit Union Central of Saskatchewan

Desjardins Group

Magna International Inc.

National Bank of Canada/National Bank Financial Inc.

NAV Canada

Northwater Capital Management Inc.

Public Sector Pension Investment Board

The Governors of the University of Alberta

Schedule A — Counsel

- 1) Benjamin Zarnett and Frederick L. Myers for the Pan-Canadian Investors Committee
- 2) Aubrey E. Kauffman and Stuart Brotman for 4446372 Canada Inc. and 6932819 Canada Inc.
- 3) Peter F.C. Howard and Samaneh Hosseini for Bank of America N.A.; Citibank N.A.; Citibank Canada, in its capacity as Credit Derivative Swap Counterparty and not in any other capacity; Deutsche Bank AG; HSBC Bank Canada; HSBC Bank USA, National Association; Merrill Lynch International; Merrill Lynch Capital Services, Inc.; Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation; and UBS AG
- 4) Kenneth T. Rosenberg, Lily Harmer and Max Starnino for Jura Energy Corporation and Redcorp Ventures Ltd.
- 5) Craig J. Hill and Sam P. Rappos for the Monitors (ABCP Appeals)
- 6) Jeffrey C. Carhart and Joseph Marin for Ad Hoc Committee and Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc., in its capacity as Financial Advisor
- 7) Mario J. Forte for Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec
- 8) John B. Laskin for National Bank Financial Inc. and National Bank of Canada
- 9) Thomas McRae and Arthur O. Jacques for Ad Hoc Retail Creditors Committee (Brian Hunter, et al)
- 10) Howard Shapray, Q.C. and Stephen Fitterman for Ivanhoe Mines Ltd.
- 11) Kevin P. McElcheran and Heather L. Meredith for Canadian Banks, BMO, CIBC RBC, Bank of Nova Scotia and T.D. Bank
- 12) Jeffrey S. Leon for CIBC Mellon Trust Company, Computershare Trust Company of Canada and BNY Trust Company of Canada, as Indenture Trustees
- 13) Usman Sheikh for Coventree Capital Inc.
- 14) Allan Sternberg and Sam R. Sasso for Brookfield Asset Management and Partners Ltd. and Hy Bloom Inc. and Cardacian Mortgage Services Inc.
- 15) Neil C. Saxe for Dominion Bond Rating Service
- 16) James A. Woods, Sebastien Richemont and Marie-Anne Paquette for Air Transat A.T. Inc., Transat Tours Canada Inc., The Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., Aéroports de Montréal, Aéroports de Montréal Capital Inc., Pomerleau Ontario Inc., Pomerleau Inc., Labopharm Inc., Agence Métropolitaine de Transport (AMT), Giro Inc., Vêtements de sports RGR Inc., 131519 Canada Inc., Tecsys Inc., New Gold Inc. and Jazz Air LP
- 17) Scott A. Turner for Webtech Wireless Inc., Wynn Capital Corporation Inc., West Energy Ltd., Sabre Energy Ltd., Petrolifera Petroleum Ltd., Vaquero Resources Ltd., and Standard Energy Ltd.
- 18) R. Graham Phoenix for Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments III Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments V Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XI Corp., Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments XII Corp., Quanto Financial Corporation and Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corp.

Application granted; appeal dismissed.

Footnotes

- * Leave to appeal refused at *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.).
- ¹ Section 5.1 of the CCAA specifically authorizes the granting of releases to directors in certain circumstances.
- ² Justice Georgina R. Jackson and Dr. Janis P. Sarra, “Selecting the Judicial Tool to get the Job Done: An Examination of Statutory Interpretation, Discretionary Power and Inherent Jurisdiction in Insolvency Matters” in Sarra, ed., *Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2007* (Vancouver: Thomson Carswell, 2007).
- ³ Citing Gibbs J.A. in *Chef Ready Foods*, *supra*, at pp.319-320.
- ⁴ The Legislative Debates at the time the CCAA was introduced in Parliament in April 1933 make it clear that the CCAA is patterned after the predecessor provisions of s. 425 of the *Companies Act 1985* (U.K.): see *House of Commons Debates (Hansard)*, *supra*.
- ⁵ See *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 192; *Ontario Business Corporations Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16, s. 182.
- ⁶ A majority in number representing two-thirds in value of the creditors (s. 6)
- ⁷ *Steinberg Inc.* was originally reported in French: *Steinberg Inc. c. Michaud*, [1993] R.J.Q. 1684 (C.A. Que.). All paragraph references to *Steinberg Inc.* in this judgment are from the unofficial English translation available at 1993 CarswellQue 2055 (C.A. Que.)
- ⁸ Reed Dickerson, *The Interpretation and Application of Statutes* (1975) at pp.234-235, cited in Bryan A. Garner, ed., *Black’s Law Dictionary*, 8th ed. (West Group, St. Paul, Minn., 2004) at 621.

2008 CarswellOnt 5432
Supreme Court of Canada

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.

2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337, 257 O.A.C. 400 (note), 390 N.R. 393 (note)

Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. et al. v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. and Other Trustees of Asset Backed Commercial Paper Conduits Listed in Schedule "A" to this application et al.

Charron J., Fish J., LeBel J.

Judgment: September 19, 2008
Docket: 32765

Proceedings: Leave to appeal refused, 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811 (Ont. C.A.); Affirmed, 2008 CarswellOnt 3523, 43 C.B.R. (5th) 269 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: None given

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Per Curiam:

1 The motion to expedite the applications for leave to appeal brought by the Respondents on August 27, 2008, is granted. The applications for leave to appeal and other relief sought from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Number C48969 (M36489), 2008 ONCA 587, dated August 18, 2008, are dismissed without costs.

Tab 2

2017 ONSC 3070, 2017 ONSC 3237
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Innovative Coating Systems Inc., Re

2017 CarswellOnt 7607, 2017 ONSC 3070, 2017 ONSC 3237, 279 A.C.W.S. (3d) 249, 48 C.B.R. (6th) 278

In the matter of the Proposal of Innovative Coating Systems Inc., a company duly incorporated under the laws of the Province of Ontario, having its head office in the town of Tecumseh, County of Essex and Province of Ontario (Bankrupt / Moving Party)

M.A. Garson J.

Heard: May 12, 2017
Judgment: May 19, 2017*
Docket: 35/2185695

Counsel: Benjamin Blay, for Innovative Coating Systems Inc.
Thomas Robson, for Business Development Bank
Sean Zeitz, for Eli Mogil, for Uni-Select Eastern Inc.
John Leslie, for Proposal Trustee, S. Funtig & Associates Inc.
Timothy Hogan, for Royal Bank of Canada

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

VI Proposal

VI.4 Approval by court

VI.4.b Conditions

VI.4.b.iii Interests of creditors

Bankruptcy and insolvency

VI Proposal

VI.4 Approval by court

VI.4.f Costs

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by M.A. Garson J.:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Eagle Mining Ltd., Re (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 1291, 42 O.R. (3d) 571, 9 C.B.R. (4th) 34 (Ont. Bkcty.) — considered

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 234, 2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (Ont. S.C.J.)

[Commercial List]) — followed

Lofchik, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 194, 1 C.B.R. (4th) 245, 52 O.T.C. 220 (Ont. Bkcty.) — referred to

Sumner Co. (1984), Re (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 218, 79 N.B.R. (2d) 191, 201 A.P.R. 191, 1987 CarswellNB 26 (N.B. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 58 — considered

s. 59(1) — considered

s. 59(2) — considered

s. 61(2)(a) — considered

s. 187 — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

APPLICATION by debtor for approval of proposal under s. 59(2) of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*.

M.A. Garson J.:

Introduction

1 Innovative Coating Systems Inc. ("the debtor") brings an application for approval of its proposal, dated December 5, 2016 accepted by creditors at a meeting of January 18, 2017, pursuant to s. 58 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"). The debtor also seeks directions from this court regarding next steps.

2 Uni-Select Eastern Inc. ("Uni-Select") and the Business Development Bank of Canada ("BDC"), secured creditors of the debtor, oppose the proposal because it contains a release of the guarantors.

3 Wayne Brady ("Brady"), the principal of the debtor, executed personal guarantees in favour of both Uni-Select and BDC.

4 For the reasons that follow and in accordance with s. 59(2) of the BIA, I am of the opinion that the terms of the proposal are not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors and accordingly refuse to approve the proposal.

Preliminary Matters

5 Royal Bank of Canada, a secured creditor and senior lender of the debtor and the holder of a personal guarantee by Brady, takes no position on the motion on the basis that they are not affected by the proposal and their security, including the guarantee of Brady, is unaffected by its terms.

6 Pursuant to s. 187(a) of the BIA and unopposed by the parties, BDC is granted leave to amend its Proof of Claim to extend to both Loan No. 060562-02 and No. 60562-04.

Background and Facts

7 Innovative, an industrial coatings and chemical company in Tecumseh, Ontario, filed a Notice of Intention to File a Proposal under the BIA.

8 S. Funtig and Associates Inc., in its capacity as trustee ("the Trustee"), prepared a proposal, including a clause in the proposal that released guarantors from liability from future actions.

9 Uni-Select, a secured creditor that supplied auto parts and services to the debtor, also holds a guarantee from Brady and his numbered corporation ("2067195").

10 Upon counsel for Uni-Select realizing how this clause would compromise their ability to pursue Brady, they reached out to the Trustee to request that the first creditor's meeting scheduled for December 28, 2016 be adjourned. It was rescheduled for January 18, 2017 at 10:00 a.m.

11 Due to an administrative error, no one from counsel for Uni-Select attended at this meeting. The Trustee delayed the start of the meeting for 20 minutes to allow time for counsel for Uni-Select to attend by phone. No one appeared either in person or by phone.

12 BDC executed a proxy in favour of the proposal.

13 Having determined sufficient voting letters and proxies were received from both secured and unsecured creditors to form a quorum, the meeting was held and the proposal was passed by 100 percent of creditors of both classes that voted at the meeting. The Trustee, Brady and counsel for the debtor were the only persons in attendance at the meeting. The Trustee exercised proxies or relied on voting letters to form a quorum.

14 Counsel for Uni-Select emailed the Trustee the day after the meeting inquiring about whether the proposal had been updated. She was then advised of the outcome of the meeting and the fact the Trustee called the Official Receiver's Office which confirmed the process they followed was correct.

15 Both Uni-Select and BDC now appear before this court and oppose the proposal.

Positions of the Parties

16 The Trustee seeks approval of the proposal and argues he acted honestly and in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of the BIA. He submits the proposal is reasonable in the circumstances and that his release of Brady as guarantor is as a *quid pro quo* for the assistance Brady will offer in liquidating the assets of the debtor which will ultimately benefit the general body of creditors.

17 BDC candidly admits that it erred by misconstruing the meaning of the proposal and not initially understanding that it contained a release of the guarantee BDC personally holds against Brady. BDC argues that it is entitled to change its position before this court and now opposes the proposal because it will not benefit them as a secured creditor.

18 Uni-Select goes further and argues that the proposal is drafted in a way that is misleading and violates the principles of the BIA and of commercial morality required in the drafting of such documents. Uni-Select suggests that the proposal does not benefit them as the largest secured creditor but rather enures to the benefit of Brady. They oppose the proposal and submit their earlier omission in failing to attend the creditor's meeting does not affect their ability to oppose approval of the proposal by this court.

Discussion

19 Section 59(1) of the BIA provides that the court shall, before approving the proposal, hear from the debtor.

20 In *Eagle Mining Ltd., Re*, 1999 CarswellOnt 1291 (Ont. Bkcty.) the court made clear that there is no impediment to a creditor taking different positions at a creditor's meeting and before the court. Ultimately, it is the court that must determine whether the proposal benefits the general body of creditors.

21 Accordingly, the fact that BDC earlier voted to support the proposal is of no consequence given the position they now take.

22 Section 59(2) of the BIA provides that if the terms of the proposal are not reasonable nor calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, the court shall refuse to approve the proposal.

23 In *Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Morawetz J. at para. 19 confirms the three-pronged test under s. 59(2) that the proposal:

- (i) is reasonable;
- (ii) is calculated to benefit the general body of creditors; and
- (iii) is made in good faith.

24 This test includes consideration of whether the terms of the proposal meet the requirements of commercial morality and maintaining the integrity of the bankruptcy system: *Re Kitchener* at para. 22. I will address each part of the test separately.

(i) Reasonableness

25 None of the parties contest the reasonableness of the terms of the proposal, save and accept the release of Brady as guarantor.

(ii) Calculated to Benefit the General Body of Creditors

26 Uni-Select and BDC combine to represent 100 percent of the secured creditors under the proposal. Uni-Select has a claim for \$254,765.82 and BDC has a claim for \$130,636.40. They constitute more than two-thirds of the admitted claims.

27 There is little doubt that if approved, this proposal would potentially harm and prejudice both Uni-Select and BDC to the extent that their personal guarantees would be compromised. After all, one of the primary purposes of a personal guarantee is to permit the creditor to look to the guarantor when the principal debtor defaults — precisely the situation before this court.

28 The Trustee suggests the release of Brady as guarantor is both permissible and reasonable in the circumstances. I disagree.

29 In *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, 2008 ONCA 587 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal outlined the requirements that must be satisfied to justify a third-party release (in the context of a plan under the CCAA). In *Re Kitchener*, Morawetz J. applied these criteria in the context of approving a proposal under the BIA. They include:

- (a) the parties to be released are necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;
- (b) the claims to be released are rationally related to the purpose of the proposal and necessary for it;
- (c) the proposal cannot succeed without the releases;

(d) the parties who are to have claims against them released are contributing in a tangible and realistic way to the proposal; and

(e) the proposal will benefit not only the debtor companies but creditors generally.

30 I have difficulty accepting that the criteria have been met. There is little to satisfy me that the release is necessary or essential to the liquidation of the debtor's assets. Although the affidavit of Brady suggests he would be unwilling to assist with the liquidation in the absence of being released from his guarantees, this assertion rings hollow. Common sense dictates that it is in the best interests of Brady to maximize every dollar of potential earnings from the proposal. After all, each dollar achieved is one less dollar of potential personal liability. In the end, he would be ill-advised to let such potential returns slip away due to his unwillingness to assist with the liquidation.

31 I am also not satisfied that the release of Brady's personal guarantees are neither rationally related to the purpose of the proposal or necessary for it.

32 As referenced above, the proposal can succeed without his release, given the inherent self-interest he has in maximizing the liquidation of the assets.

33 As both Uni-Select and BDC point out, this proposal benefits neither of them and compromises their guarantees.

34 I place little weight on the fact that Uni-Select failed to attend the rescheduled creditors meeting and BDC wishes to retract its vote. Section 59(2) provides each creditor with a fresh opportunity to make submissions on the proposal. Their administrative error, inadvertence or oversight speaks to the reason this matter is before the court but not to whether they meet the test under s. 59(2).

35 There is no need for a *quid pro quo* for Brady in these circumstances.

(iii) Good Faith

36 I agree with the submissions of Uni-Select that the terms of the proposal are drafted in a way that does not clearly disclose that the personal guarantees of Brady and 2067195 are being compromised. These releases should have been front and centre. In Article 2.2, the proposal states that it affects

...all claims existing against Innovative.

37 There is no mention of Brady's personal guarantees nor of the *quid pro quo* analysis.

38 The accompanying letter to the proposal at Tab 1(d) of the Responding Motion Record is also silent as to Brady's personal guarantees.

39 Although I do not accept the characterization of the proposal as intentionally misleading, I agree that the breadth of the release was tucked away in Article 3.4 in a manner that caused BDC to initially misread the proposal and misunderstand the implications with respect to the guarantees. Simply put, the proposal was not drafted in a manner that properly reflects the interest of creditors and the requirements of commercial morality and integrity. Rather, it is a carefully tailored proposal that appears to better serve the interests of Brady, but is not calculated to benefit the general body of creditors: *Lofchik, Re, 1998 CarswellOnt 194* (Ont. Bkcty.) and *Sumner Co. (1984), Re, 1987 CarswellNB 26* (N.B. Q.B.).

40 At the end of the day, a court must be satisfied that the creditors are getting more advantage from the terms and the proposal than would arise from a bankruptcy. I am not so satisfied on the record before me.

41 The Trustee should have expressly and clearly stated both within the terms of the proposal and the covering letter that the proposal benefits Brady and 2067195 and he should have done an analysis of the extent of such benefits.

42 I am aware of a very limited power under the BIA to make alterations or amendments to a proposal. However, none of the parties has sought this remedy and it is not appropriate to grant same in these circumstances.

Conclusion

43 For the above reasons the proposal shall not be approved. In light of the provisions of s. 61(2)(a) of the BIA and with the consent of the parties, leave is granted to the debtor to file an amended proposal if it so chooses with the deemed release removed therefrom. In accordance with the requirements of the BIA, the amended proposal shall be filed within ten days.

Costs

44 Uni-Select seeks costs on a partial-indemnity scale of \$14,336.59, inclusive of HST and disbursements. Uni-Select suggests Brady ought to be jointly and severally liable for such costs because this type of conduct stood to personally benefit Brady and the Trustee's conduct in not disclosing same in a more prominent manner ought to be sanctioned with costs.

45 BDC seeks costs of \$7,203.55 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of HST and disbursements. The trustee seeks costs of \$14,044.77 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

46 Innovative seeks costs of \$5,030.31 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

47 I agree with Innovative that this motion would not have been necessary if Uni-Select had not missed the meeting that was rescheduled at its request. Similarly, had BDC not misread the proposal, they would have cast their vote in a manner that would have obviated the need for this motion.

48 Further, BDC served no factum or cases in advance and showed up on the day of the motion with a single case in hand.

49 Although the Trustee also bears some responsibility for this motion, but for the actions or inactions of Uni-Select and BDC, this court appearance would not have taken place. In all of the circumstances, this is one of those rare occasions where the court will exercise its discretion to award no costs.

Application dismissed without costs.

Footnotes

* A corrigendum issued by the court on May 25, 2017 has been incorporated herein.

Tab 3

2016 ONSC 3651
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Target Canada Co., Re

2016 CarswellOnt 21083, 2016 ONSC 3651, 274 A.C.W.S. (3d) 259, 42 C.B.R. (6th) 330

**In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,
as amended**

In the Matter of a plan of compromise or arrangement of Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC

Morawetz J.

Heard: June 2, 2016
Judgment: June 2, 2016
Docket: CV-15-10832-00CL

Counsel: Jeremy Dacks, John MacDonald, Shawn Irving, for Applicants, Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC

Jay Swartz, for Target Corporation

William Sasso, Sharon Strosberg, Jacqueline Horvat, for Pharmacy Franchisee Association of Canada

Susan Philpott, for Employees of Applicants

Alan Mark, Melaney Wagner, Graham Smith, Francy Kussner, for Monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Inc.

Jane Dietrich, for Merchant Retail Solutions ULC, Gordon Brothers Canada ULC and G.A. Retail Canada ULC

Andrew Hodhod, for Bell Canada

Harvey Chaiton, for Directors and Officers

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.2 Initial application](#)

[XIX.2.b Grant of stay](#)

[XIX.2.b.vii Extension of order](#)

Bankruptcy and insolvency

[XIX Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act](#)

[XIX.3 Arrangements](#)

[XIX.3.b Approval by court](#)

[XIX.3.b.i "Fair and reasonable"](#)

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt

4811, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. *Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re*) 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 234, 2012 CarswellOnt 1347, 86 C.B.R. (5th) 274 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Sino-Forest Corp., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 7050, 2012 CarswellOnt 15913 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re (2013), 2013 ONSC 2519, 2013 CarswellOnt 7670, 3 C.B.R. (6th) 83 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Target Canada Co., Re (2015), 2015 ONSC 303, 2015 CarswellOnt 620, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Target Canada Co., Re (2016), 2016 ONSC 316, 2016 CarswellOnt 589, 32 C.B.R. (6th) 48 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36
Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) “debtor company” — considered

s. 6 — considered

s. 6(1) — considered

s. 6(2) — considered

s. 6(5) — considered

s. 6(6) — considered

s. 6(8) — considered

MOTION by applicant companies for approval of amended plan of arrangement under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* and for extension of stay.

Morawetz J. (orally):

1 Target Canada Co. (“TCC”), the other applicants listed above and certain related partnerships, (collectively, the “Target Canada Entities”), obtained relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, (the “CCAA”) by an Initial Order dated January 15, 2015, (the “Initial Order”). Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. was appointed in the Initial Order to act as the Monitor in this proceeding (the “Monitor”). The reasons which gave rise to the Initial Order are reported as *Target Canada Co., Re*, 2015 ONSC 303 (Ont. S.C.J.) . Those reasons set out the factual background giving rise to the CCAA filing. The Initial Order granted a stay of proceedings until February 13, 2015, which was later extended eight times, most recently to June 6, 2016.

2 Today the Applicants bring this motion for Court sanction of their Second Amended and Restated Joint Plan of Compromise and Arrangement dated May 19, 2016 (the “Amended Plan”) and to obtain an order extending the Stay Period until September 23, 2016 to allow for the implementation of the Amended Plan and the continuation of the Claims Process for the benefit of all stakeholders.

3 The facts with respect to this motion are set out in the Sanction Affidavit of Mark J. Wong. Additional facts, including the background to, and mechanics of, the Amended Plan are described in the Meeting Order Affidavit of Mark J. Wong. In addition, factual information is also contained in the 28th Report of the Monitor.

4 Counsel for the Applicants submits that the Amended Plan is the product of extensive negotiations and consultations with key stakeholders, including Landlord Guarantee Creditors, Landlord Non-Guarantee Creditors, Target Corporation and the Consultative Committee, all with the assistance of the Monitor.

5 Noteworthy, each of the Monitor, the Landlords and the Consultative Committee of creditors support the Amended Plan.

6 The Amended Plan has been designed to isolate and address Claims against Propco and Property LP, on one hand, and TCC and the remaining Target Canada Entities on a consolidated basis, on the other. The Amended Plan provides for the consolidation for Plan purposes of the Target Canada Entities other than Propco and Property LP. The Monitor has commented on the impact of the substantive consolidation of the estates of the Target Canada Entities for the purposes of this proceeding. Such commentary contained in Monitor's 27th report.

7 I note that there is no opposition to the proposed consolidation, which has been brought to the attention of the affected creditors and I am satisfied that the effect of such consolidation is not prejudicial to the position of any creditor or creditor group.

8 The primary features of the Amended Plan are summarized in Meeting Order Affidavit, the Sanction Affidavit and the Monitor's Report. Some of the more significant features include:

- a. Affected Creditors voted on the Amended Plan as a single class.
- b. Affected Creditors with Proven Claims that are less than or equal to \$25,000 (the "Convenience Class Creditors") will be paid in full. Affected Creditors with Proven Claims in excess of \$25,000 had the option to elect to be treated for all purposes as Convenience Class Creditors.
- c. Landlord Guarantee Creditors will be paid the full amount of their Proven Claims on the Initial Distribution Date.
- d. Landlord Non-Guarantee Creditors will be paid, in addition to their Pro Rata Share of their Proven Claims, a Landlord Non-Guaranteed Creditor Equalization Amount.
- e. Other Affected Creditors with Proven Claims will receive their Pro Rata Share of the remaining TCC Cash Pool.
- f. All CCAA Charges will be discharged, except the Directors' Charge and the Administrative Charge.
- g. The Target Canada Entities will transfer their remaining IP assets to Target Corporation's designees and the Pharmacy Shares to the Pharmacy Purchaser.
- h. The Employee Trust will be terminated in accordance with the Amended Plan and any surplus funds returned to Target Corporation.

9 On November, 27, 2015 the Target Canada Entities brought a motion to file their original Plan of Compromise and Arrangement, ("the Original Plan"), and an Order authorizing the Target Canada Entities to call and hold a creditors' meeting to vote on it. I dismissed the motion on January 13, 2016, for reasons released on January 15, 2016 (the "January 15 Endorsement"). The reasons are reported as *Target Canada Co., Re* (2015), 2016 ONSC 316 (Ont. S.C.J.). Among other things, the Applicants' motion was dismissed as the Original Plan violated paragraph 19A of the Initial Order by seeking to compromise the Landlord Guarantee Claims without the consent of such affected Landlords.

10 After the January 15 Endorsement was issued, the Target Canada Entities continued their negotiations with the Landlords to develop framework for a consensual resolution that would preserve Target Corporation's agreement to maintain

the subordination contained in the Original Plan, while the same time addressing certain Landlords' concerns and complying with the January 15th Endorsement.

11 On March 4, 2016 the Target Canada Entities announced that agreements had been entered into with all of the Landlord Guarantee Creditors and all of the Landlord Non-Guarantee Creditors.

12 The terms of these Agreements were disclosed and explained to Affected Creditors and to this Court prior to Creditors' Meeting.

13 The Landlord Guarantee Creditor Settlement Agreement and the Landlord Non-Guarantee Creditor Consent and Support Agreements are conditional upon (a) the Amended Plan's approval by the Affected Creditors; (b) sanction by this Court; and (c) Plan Implementation.

14 On April 13, 2016 an order was issued permitting the Applicants to put the Amended Plan before the Affected Creditors for approval at the Creditors' Meeting.

15 On April 14, 2016 the Monitor published the Meeting Materials on its website. The Meeting Materials were sent to Affected Creditors on April 19, 2016. In addition, notices were published in major national and US newspapers at the end of April.

16 The Creditors' Meeting was held on May 25, 2016. The required quorum was present and the meeting was properly constituted.

17 According to the Monitor's tabulation, 100% in number representing 100% in value of the Affected Creditors holding Proven Claims that were present in person or by proxy and voting at the Meeting, voted (or were deemed to vote) to approve the Resolution in favour of the Amended Plan. According to the Monitor's tabulation, 1246 Affected Creditors representing approximately \$554 million in value voted (or were deemed to vote pursuant to the Meeting Order) at the Creditors' Meeting.

18 Based on the most up-to-date information from the Monitor, the Target Canada Entities expect that, subject to certain exceptions, Affected Creditors will be paid in a range from 71% to 80% of their Proven Claims.

19 The issue on this motion is:

- a. Should this Court approve the Amended Plan as fair and reasonable?

20 Pursuant to section 6(1) of the CCAA, the court has the discretion to sanction a plan of compromise or arrangement where the requisite double-majority of creditors has approved the plan.

21 The general requirements for court approval of the CCAA Plan are well-established:

- a. there must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;
- b. all materials filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if there has been anything done or purported to have been done, which is not authorized by the CCAA; and
- c. the plan must be fair and reasonable.

22 See *SkyLink Aviation Inc., Re*, 2013 ONSC 2519 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

23 Having reviewed the record and hearing the submissions, I am satisfied that the foregoing test for approval has been met. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the following:

- (a) In granting the Initial Order, it was determined that the Applicants qualified as debtor companies under section 2 of

the CCAA and that the Applicants were insolvent;

(b) Affected Creditors were classified for the purposes of voting and receiving distributions under the Amended Plan and they voted on the Amended Plan as a single class; and

(c) The Monitor published the required notices and provided copies of the Meeting Materials to Affected Creditors;

(d) Affected Creditors were provided with Target Canada's letter to creditors containing an overview of the terms of the Amended Plan, as well as a letter from the Consultative Committee of creditors communicating the Consultative Committee's support of the Amended Plan and recommendation that Affected Creditors vote in favour of the Amended Plan;

(e) the Creditors' Meeting was properly-constituted;

(f) 100% in number representing 100% in value voted in favour of the Plan. Such unanimous approval of the Amended Plan far exceeds the required statutory majority under section 6(1).

24 Sections 6(2), 6(5) and 6(6) of the CCAA provide that the Court may not sanction the plan unless the plan contains specified provisions concerning crown claims, employee claims and pension claims. I am satisfied that all of these requirements have been met.

25 The claims of Affected Creditors are not being paid in full. In compliance with section 6(8) of the CCAA, the Amended Plan does not provide for any recovery for equity holders. In addition, Target Corporation, the indirect shareholder of TCC and the largest single creditor of TCC, has agreed to subordinate the majority of its Intercompany Claims.

26 I also note that the Monitor is of the view that the Amended Plan complies with the requirements of the CCAA, including the requirements under section 6 of the CCAA.

27 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that the statutory prerequisites to sanction the Amended Plan have been satisfied. I am also satisfied that no unauthorized steps have been taken in placing the Amended Plan before the Court to be sanctioned.

28 In assessing whether a proposed plan is fair and reasonable, the Court will consider the following:

- a. whether the claims have been properly classified and whether the requisite majority of creditors approved the plan;
- b. what creditors would receive on bankruptcy or liquidation as compared to the plan;
- c. alternatives available to the plan;
- d. oppression of the rights of creditors;
- e. unfairness to shareholders; and
- f. the public interest.

29 (See to *Sino-Forest Corp., Re*, 2012 ONSC 7050 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) ("Sino-Forest").

30 I am satisfied that each of these factors supports approval of the Amended Plan.

31 In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the following:

- a. Classification and Creditor Approval: The Amended Plan was unanimously approved.

b. Recovery on Bankruptcy: The Monitor has expressed the view that recoveries under the Amended Plan are well in excess of those that would have been received on a bankruptcy of the Target Canada Entities. Recoveries against TCC in a bankruptcy would be 30%, as compared to the expected range of 71 to 80% under the Amended Plan.

c. Alternatives to the Amended Plan: The Amended Plan is the only alternative to bankruptcy.

d. No Oppression of Creditors: I am satisfied that the pre-insolvency rights and priorities of Affected Creditors are respected under the Amended Plan.

e. No Unfairness to Shareholders: Given that Affected Creditors are not being paid in full, there is no unfairness to shareholders in receiving no recovery.

f. Public interest: The Amended Plan resolves the Proven Claims against Target Canada Entities in a manner that is efficient and timely, and which avoids costly litigation.

32 Article 7.1 of the Amended Plan provides for full and final releases in favour of:

a. The Target Canada Released Parties;

b. The Third-Party Released Parties (which includes the Monitor and its affiliates, their directors, officers, employees, legal counsel, agents and advisors, as well as the Pharmacists' Representative Counsel and members of the Consultative Committee and their advisors;

c. It also provides a released in favour of the Plan Sponsor Released Parties, (Target Corporation and its subsidiaries other than the Target Canada Entities and the NE1, the HBC Entities and their respective directors, officers, employees, legal counsel agents and advisors), except in respect of the Landlord Guarantee Claims.

33 Finally, there is also release of the Employee Trust Released Parties.

34 It is accepted that Canadian courts have jurisdiction to sanction plans that containing releases in favour of third parties. In *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 92 O.R. (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) the Court of Appeal held that the CCAA Court has the jurisdiction to approve a plan of compromise or arrangement that includes third-party releases, stating that a release negotiated in favour of a third-party as part of the "compromise" or "arrangement" that reasonably relates to the proposed restructuring falls within the objectives and flexible framework of the CCAA.

35 There must be a reasonable connection between the third-party claim being compromised in the plan and the restructuring achieved by the plan to warrant inclusion of the third-party release in the plan.

36 In considering whether to approve releases in favour of third parties, the factors to be considered by the court include:

a. Whether the parties to be released from claims were necessary and essential to the restructuring of the debtor;

b. Whether the claims to be released were rationally connected to the purpose of the plan and necessary for it;

c. Whether the plan could succeed without the releases;

d. Whether the parties being released were contributing to the plan;

e. Whether the release benefitted the debtors as well as the creditors generally;

f. Whether the creditors voting on the plan had knowledge of the nature and the effect of the releases or;

g. Whether the releases were fair and reasonable and not overly broad.

37 (See *Metcalfe, Cline Mining Corp.*, 2015 ONSC 662; and *Kitchener Frame Ltd., Re*, 2012 ONSC 234 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).)

38 In determining whether to approve a third-party release, the Court will take into account the particular circumstances of the case and the objectives of the CCAA. No single factor set out above will be determinative.

39 (See *Skylink and Cline Mining*.)

40 Courts have approved releases that benefit affiliates of the debtor corporation where the *Metcalfe* criteria is satisfied. In *Sino-Forest*, the subsidiaries of the debtor company were entitled to the benefit from the release under the plan as they were contributing their assets to satisfy the obligations of the debtor company for the benefit of affected creditors. It is not uncommon for CCAA courts to approve third-party releases in favour of person, such as directors or officers or other third parties, who could assert contribution and indemnity claims against the debtor company.

41 (See *Skylink and Cline Mining*.)

42 In my view, each of the Released Parties has contributed in tangible and material ways to the orderly wind down the Target Canada Entities' businesses. I accept that without the Releases, it is unlikely that all of the Released Parties would have been prepared to support the Amended Plan. The Releases are a significant part of the various compromises that were required to achieve the Amended Plan. They are a necessary element of the global, consensual resolution of this CCAA proceeding.

43 In particular, the economic contributions by Target Corporation, as Plan Sponsor, have demonstrably increased the available recoveries for Affected Creditors, as attested by the Monitor. Target Corporation's material direct and indirect contributions as Plan Sponsor include:

- a. subordinating a number of Intercompany Claims against TCC;
- b. partially subordinating various other Intercompany Claims;
- c. a cash contribution of approximately \$25.45 million towards the aggregate Landlord Guaranteed Enhancement;
- d. a net cash contribution of approximately \$4.1 million to fund the Landlord Non-Guaranteed Creditor Equalization;
- e. a cash contribution of \$700,000 towards costs of certain Landlord Guaranteed Creditors;
- f. funding the Employee Trust in the amount of \$95 million.

44 I am satisfied that the Releases are appropriately narrow and rationally connected to the overall purposes of the Amended Plan. The Plan Sponsor Released Parties are not released from the Landlord Guarantee Claims, which are separately resolved in the Landlord Guarantee Creditors Settlement Agreement. Nor will Target Corporation be released under the Amended Plan from any indemnity or guarantee in favour of any Director, Officer or employee.

45 I am also satisfied that the Releases apply to the extent permitted by law and expressly do not apply to liability for criminal, fraudulent or other willful misconduct, or to other claims that are not permitted to be compromised or released under the CCAA.

46 Full disclosure of the Releases was made to the Affected Creditors in the Meeting Order Affidavit, in the Amended Plan and in the Letter to Creditors. The terms of the Release were also disclosed to creditors in the Original Plan. No party has objected to the scope of the Releases as contained in the Amended Plan.

47 Having considered the Record and the applicable law, I am satisfied that the Amended Plan represents an equitable balancing of the interests of all Stakeholders in accordance with the provisions and obligations of the CCAA and I find that the Amended Plan is both fair and reasonable to all Stakeholders. The Amended Plan is sanctioned and approved.

48 The Applicants have also requested an extension of the stay period to September 23, 2016. It is clear that the CCAA proceedings have to be extended so as to permit Plan Implementation to occur and to provide sufficient time to complete post implementation details. I am satisfied the parties are working in good faith and with due diligence in this matter and that there are sufficient resources available to fund the Applicants during the proposed extension period. The extension of the stay period is approved. In order to accommodate my schedule, the stay period is extended to September 26, 2016, being three days longer than the requested period. The Applicants also request an extension of the Notice of Objection Bar Date to the Plan Implementation Date. This request is reasonable in the circumstances and it is ordered that the Notice of Objection Bar Date expire on the Plan Implementation Date.

49 The motion is therefore granted and the Sanction Order has been signed by me.

50 In closing, I would like to thank all parties and their representatives for the manner in which this proceeding has been conducted. All parties and their counsel, by working in a constructive and cooperative manner, have made a contribution to the Amended Plan. It is very rare to have a CCAA plan of this magnitude supported by 100 percent of the affected creditors who voted at the creditors' meetings. This Sanctioned Amended Plan represents the best outcome from this unfortunate commercial venture.

Motion granted.

IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY

IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSAL OF FT ENE CANADA INC., OF THE CITY OF BRANTFORD, IN THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO

Court File No. 32-2480036
Estate File No. 32-2480036

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto, Ontario

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF FINETEX ENE, INC.
(Motion returnable September 26, 2019)

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