UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re:	Chapter 15
	Chapter 12

JustFly Corp., et al., Case No. 20-11204 (JTD)

Debtors in a foreign proceeding. 1 Jointly Ad

Jointly Administered

ORDER GRANTING RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MAIN PROCEEDING AND CERTAIN RELATED RELIEF

Upon the motion (the "Motion")² of FlightHub Group Inc., in its capacity as the duly-appointed authorized foreign representative (the "Foreign Representative") for the above-captioned debtors (the "Debtors"), for entry of an order pursuant to sections 105(a), 1145, 1504, 1507, 1510, 1515, 1517, 1520, 1521, and 1522 of the Bankruptcy Code (a) granting recognition of the Canadian Proceeding as a "foreign main proceeding" pursuant to chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code; (b) granting recognition of the Foreign Representative as the "foreign representative," as defined in section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code, in respect of the Canadian Proceeding; (c) recognizing, granting comity to, and giving full force and effect in the United States to the Canadian Proceeding and the Canadian Orders; and (d) affording the Debtors the protection of the automatic stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code; the People of the State of California, acting by and through San Francisco City Attorney Dennis J. Herrera (the "People"), having filed the Limited Objection by the People of the State of California, Acting by and Through San Francisco City Attorney Dennis J. Herrera, to the Motion for Recognition Regarding the Imposition of Automatic Stay of Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and/or Injunctive Relief Related to San

The Debtors in the chapter 15 proceedings and the last four digits of their identification numbers are: JustFly Corp. (8591), FlightHub Group Inc. (925-1), FlightHub Service Inc. (571-1), JustFly Inc. (602-7), SSFP Corp. (5624), and 11644670 Canada Inc. (467-0). The location of the Debtors' corporate headquarters and the Debtors' foreign representative is: 3333 boul de la Côte-Vertu, Suite 600, Montreal / Saint-Laurent, Québec, Canada H4R 2N1.

² Capitalized terms used but not defined herein shall have the meaning ascribed to such terms in the Motion.

Francisco Litigation [Docket No. 28] (the "People's Objection"); the Foreign Representative, on behalf of the Debtors, having filed the Reply in Support of Recognition of Foreign Main Proceeding and Related Relief and Response to the San Francisco Objection [Docket No. 31], which included (i) as Exhibit A thereto, the Declaration of Christopher Cave in Support of the Reply and in Response to the San Francisco Objection [Docket No. 31-1] (the "Supplemental Cave **Declaration**"), (ii) as Exhibit C thereto, an excerpt of an email from the People's counsel to counsel to the Debtors, and (iii) as Exhibit D thereto, the Demurrer to Complaint and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Demurrer filed by the Debtor-Defendants in the litigation filed by the People against certain of the Debtors (the "People's Litigation"), which is pending in the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco (collectively, the "Reply"); the Bankruptcy Court having held a hearing to consider the relief requested in the Chapter 15 Petitions (the "Hearing"); the Bankruptcy Court having admitted into evidence the Cave Declaration, the Supplemental Cave Declaration, and the Reynaud Declaration without objection; the Bankruptcy Court having offered all entities at the Hearing the opportunity to cross examine Christopher Cave or Joseph Reynaud as witnesses; and upon: the Cave Declaration, the Supplemental Cave Declaration, and the Reynaud Declaration having been admitted into evidence as testimony; upon the record of the Hearing, including, without limitation, the arguments and evidence as set forth in the transcript of the Hearing attached hereto as Exhibit A (the "Transcript"), which are incorporated herein by reference as if set forth herein; and all of the proceedings had before the Bankruptcy Court; and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor,

THE COURT HEREBY FINDS AND CONCLUDES THAT (THIS "ORDER"):

A. The findings and conclusions set forth herein, including, without limitation, the findings and conclusions of the Bankruptcy Court as set forth in the Transcript, which are

incorporated herein by reference as if set forth herein, constitute the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7052, made applicable to this proceeding pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9014. To the extent any of the following findings of fact constitute conclusions of law, they are adopted as such. To the extent any of the following conclusions of law constitute findings of fact, they are adopted as such.

- B. The Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334 and the *Amended Standing Order of Reference* from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, dated February 29, 2012.
- C. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) and the Bankruptcy Court may enter a final order consistent with Article III of the United States Constitution.
 - D. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1410.
- E. The Debtors have property in the United States, and the Debtors are eligible to be debtors in a chapter 15 case pursuant to, as applicable, 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 and 1501.
- F. The Chapter 15 Cases were properly commenced pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504, 1509, and 1515.
- G. The Foreign Representative is a duly appointed "foreign representative" of the Debtors as such term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
- H. The Foreign Representative is a corporation and, thus, an "entity" as such term is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(41).
- I. The Foreign Representative has satisfied the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1515 and Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a)(4).
- J. The Canadian Proceeding is a "foreign proceeding" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(23).

- K. The Canadian Proceeding is pending before the Canadian Court in Canada, where the Debtors have their "center of its main interests" as referred to in 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) and, as such, the Canadian Proceeding is entitled to recognition as a "foreign main proceeding" pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(4) and 1517(b)(1).
- L. The Canadian Proceeding is entitled to recognition by the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515 and 1517(a).
- M. The Debtors and the Foreign Representative are entitled to all of the relief set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1520, without limitation.
- N. The Debtors and the Foreign Representative are entitled to all of the relief set forth herein under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1507 and 1521(a).
- O. The relief granted hereby is necessary and appropriate to effectuate the objectives of chapter 15, to protect the Debtors and the interests of its creditors and other parties in interest, and is consistent with the laws of the United States, international comity, public policy, and the policies of the Bankruptcy Code.
- P. Absent the requested granted herein, the efforts of the Debtors, the Canadian Court, the Foreign Representative in conducting the Canadian Proceeding and effectuating the restructuring, and Canadian law may be frustrated by the actions of individual creditors, a result contrary to the purposes of chapter 15.
- Q. Good, sufficient, appropriate, and timely notice of the filing of, and the hearing on, the Chapter 15 Petitions was given, which notice was deemed adequate for all purposes, and no further notice need be given.

R. All creditors and other parties in interest, including, without limitation, the Debtors, are sufficiently protected by the grant of relief ordered hereby in accordance with section 1522(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

For all of the foregoing reasons, and after due deliberation and sufficient cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

- 1. The Motion is GRANTED as set forth herein.
- 2. The Chapter 15 Petitions are granted.
- 3. The Canadian Proceeding is granted recognition as a foreign main proceeding as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a).
- 4. The Canadian Proceeding is a collective, court-supervised proceeding governed in accordance with applicable Canadian law, as it may be amended from time to time, and is granted recognition as a foreign main proceeding pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) and is entitled to the protections of 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a), including, without limitation, the application of the protection afforded by the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362 to the Debtors and to the Debtors' property that is within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
- 5. FlightHub Group Inc. is the duly appointed foreign representative of the Debtors within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(24), is authorized to act on behalf of the Debtors in the Chapter 15 Cases, and is established as the exclusive representative of the Debtors in the United States.
- 6. The Bankruptcy Court determined that: (a) the People's Objection is, in substance, a motion to have the Bankruptcy Court recognize that the automatic stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the People's Litigation because the People are enforcing police and regulatory powers under section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code; and (b) the interest being

pursued by the People is a pecuniary interest and not a police and regulatory interest, and the Bankruptcy Court found that the exception in section 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code does not apply to the People's Litigation and, therefore, the Debtors have the benefit of the automatic stay under section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code with respect to the People's Litigation.

- 7. All objections to the Motion or the relief requested therein that have not been withdrawn, waived, or settled as announced to the Bankruptcy Court at the Hearing, or by stipulation filed with the Court, and all reservations of rights included therein, are hereby overruled on the merits.
- 8. All persons and entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are permanently enjoined and restrained from taking any actions inconsistent with the Canadian Orders or this Order, including, without limitation, commencing, continuing, or enforcing any action or legal proceeding against the Debtors based on any claims, liabilities, and/or causes of actions against the Debtors, including, without limitation:
 - a. taking or continuing any act to obtain possession of, or exercise control over, including, without limitation, attaching, repossessing, seizing, or disposing of, as applicable, the Debtors, or any of their property (including, without limitation, intangible property or any proceeds thereof (collectively, the "**Property**"));
 - b. transferring, encumbering, relinquishing, or disposing of any Property other than to the Foreign Representative;
 - c. commencing, continuing, or enforcing any action or legal proceeding (including, without limitation, arbitration, mediation or any judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, or regulatory action, proceedings, or process whatsoever), including, without limitation, by way of counterclaim (each, individually, an "Action") against the Debtors or any of the Property;
 - d. any judgment, wherever and whenever obtained, to the extent such judgment is a determination of a liability of the Debtors with respect to any debt or liability cancelled, discharged, or restructured as a result of Canadian law, is unenforceable in the United States;

- e. commencing or continuing any act or Action to create, perfect, or enforce any lien, set-off, or other claim against the Debtors or the Property, including, without limitation, rights under any contracts with the Debtors;
- f. commencing any suit, action, or proceeding against the Debtors, the Foreign Representative, or any of their respective successors, directors, officers, agents, employees, representatives, advisors, or attorneys in respect of any claim or cause of action, in law or in equity, arising out of or relating to any action taken or omitted to be taken in connection with the Chapter 15 Cases or the Canadian Proceeding;
- g. declaring or considering the filing of the Canadian Proceeding or the Chapter 15 Cases a default or event of default under any agreement, contract, or arrangement; and taking any action in contravention to or inconsistent with the Canadian Orders, including, without limitation, against the Debtors, or any of the Property; provided, however, for the avoidance of doubt, this Order shall enjoin persons and entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United States from taking any actions, including, without limitation, the actions enumerated in (a) through (g) above, only to the extent such actions are inconsistent with the Canadian Orders or would otherwise interfere with the enforcement or implementation of the Canadian Orders.
- 9. The administration, realization, and distribution of all or part of the assets of the Debtors within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is entrusted to the Foreign Representative, and the Foreign Representative is established as the exclusive representative of the Debtors in the United States.
- 10. The Foreign Representative, the Debtors, and their respective agents are authorized to serve or provide any notices required under the Bankruptcy Rules, the Local Rules, or orders of the Bankruptcy Court.
- 11. Nothing in this Order shall prevent any persons or entities from submitting a proof of claim and pursuing such claim in the Canadian Proceeding or prejudice any rights of any persons or entities from objecting to any such claim or otherwise participating in any claim process in the Canadian Proceeding.
- 12. Nothing in this Order shall enjoin or otherwise bar the United States Federal government from exercising police and regulatory power (other than the enforcement of a money judgment) as set forth in sections 362(b)(4) or 1521(d) of the Bankruptcy Code; provided that

any claim (as defined in section 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code) of the United States Federal government shall be asserted in the Canadian Proceeding and treated as set forth in the Canadian Proceeding.

- 13. Nothing in this Order prevents any persons or entities from seeking from the Bankruptcy Court relief from any provision of this Order or prejudices the rights of any persons or entities from objecting to any such request, and the Bankruptcy Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction with respect to any such request.
- 14. No action taken by the Foreign Representative, the Debtors, or their respective successors, agents, representatives, advisors, or counsel in preparing, disseminating, applying for, implementing, or otherwise acting in furtherance of or in connection with the Canadian Proceeding, this Order, the Chapter 15 Cases, or any adversary proceeding herein, or any further proceeding commenced hereunder, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the rights or benefits afforded to such persons under 11 U.S.C. §§ 306 and 1510.
- 15. No later than five (5) business days after its entry or as soon as practicable thereafter, the Foreign Representative shall serve, or cause to be served, this Order on the Notice Parties (as defined in the Scheduling Order) in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Order (A) Scheduling Hearing on Chapter 15 Petitions and Recognition and (B) Specifying Form and Manner of Service of Notice (the "Scheduling Order"). Such service and notice is good and sufficient service and adequate notice for all purposes.
- 16. This Order is without prejudice to the Foreign Representative requesting any additional relief in the Chapter 15 Case, including, without limitation, seeking recognition and enforcement by the Bankruptcy Court of any further orders of the Canadian Court.

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17. The Foreign Representative is authorized to take all actions necessary to

effectuate the relief granted by this Order.

18. The Bankruptcy Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all

matters arising from or related to the implementation, interpretation, or enforcement of this

Order.

19. Notwithstanding any applicability of any Bankruptcy Rules or Local Rules, the

terms and conditions of this Order shall be immediately effective and enforceable upon its entry

and shall constitute a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

Dated: June 25th, 2020 Wilmington, Delaware

JOHN T. DORSEY
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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Exhibit A Transcript of the Hearing

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1	IINITED C	TATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
		TRICT OF DELAWARE
2		. Chapter 15
3	IN RE:	•
4	JUSTFLY CORP., et al.,	. Case No. 20-11204 (JTD)
5	0001121 00111, 00 411,	. Courtroom No. 5
6		824 North Market StreetWilmington, Delaware 19801
7		eeding June 17, 2020
8		2:00 P.M.
9		T OF TELEPHONIC HEARING
		HONORABLE JOHN T. DORSEY TATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
10		
11	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES:	
12	For the Foreign Representative:	David M. Klauder, Esquire BIELLI & KLAUDER, LLC
13		1204 N. Market Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801
14		- and -
15		Marc J. Carmel, Esquire
16		Serena G. Rabie, Esquire MCDONALD HOPKINS LLC
17		300 North LaSalle, Suite 1400 Chicago, Illinois 60654
18		<i>,</i>
19	Audio Operator:	Al Lugano
20	Transcription Company:	Reliable
21		1007 N. Orange Street
22		Wilmington, Delaware 19801 (302)654-8080
23		Email: gmatthews@reliable-co.com
24	Proceedings recorded by a produced by transcription	electronic sound recording, transcript n service.
25		

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1	TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES	(Continued):
2	For the People of the State of California:	
3 4		1201 North Market Street, Suite 1001 Wilmington, Delaware 19801
5		- and -
6		Edward J. Tredinnick, Esquire GREENE RADOVSKY MALONEY SHARE
7		& HENNIGH LLP 1 Front Street, Suite 3200
8		San Francisco, California 94111
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1	MATTERS GOING FORWARD:
2	Motion for Recognition of Foreign Main Proceeding and Request
3	for Certain Related Relief (Filed 5/22/202; Docket No. 6)
4	Ruling: 46
5	
6	EXHIBITS: ID Rec'd
7	Declaration of Christopher Cave 9
8	Declaration of Joseph Reynaud 9
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(Telephonic proceedings commenced at 2:01 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. This is

Judge Dorsey. We are on the record in JustFly; Case No. 20
11204.

I'll go ahead and turn it over to debtors' counsel.

MR. KLAUDER: Your Honor, good afternoon. David Klauder, co-counsel to the foreign representative. With me on the line are my co-counsel; two attorneys at McDonald Hopkins, Marc Carmel and Micah Marcus. I believe Mr. Carmel will begin and address the court. He has been admitted pro hac vice.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. CARMEL: Thank you, Your Honor. This is Marc Carmel.

As Mr. Klauder mentioned, with us today is Micah Marcus. To the extent that Your Honor wants to hear live testimony Mr. Marcus will handle that.

In addition, there are some executives from the company. There is Chris Cave, who is the chief operating officer; Marc Ghobriel, who is the chief financial officer; and Sona Bedrossian, the general counsel. They're here because this is an important hearing for this company and this enterprise, Your Honor.

As we will talk about when we get into the details

this case happened abruptly and I'm sure I'm not the first person to be before Your Honor to let you know that the COVID situation has effected, you know, a company that is before Your Honor. This one is one that is an online travel agency with a platform that sells airline tickets. So, you can imagine in light of both the COVID and the quarantine, as a result of that, that that has had a significant impact on JustFly and the FlightHub Enterprise.

So, if Your Honor will indulge me I'd like to give you a little bit of background because this is actually the first time that we're before Your Honor on this matter, and then go into the argument.

THE COURT: Yes. Thank you.

MR. CARMEL: And so before we actually dive into that I'd just like to thank Your Honor and Your Honor's staff. This has been very easy for us in terms of filing the documents and getting the relief we have requested so far and we really appreciate it. So, we filed, what they call, a BIA or Bankruptcy & Insolvency Act for one of the entities on April 30th in Canada. Then on May 8th the entities filed under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, which is the CCAA, in Canadian (indiscernible). That was on the 8th.

The one entity that had filed under the BIA was converted. So, we have all six entities in Canada preceding under the CCAA with the hope of ultimately having a plan of

arrangement, which is similar to a Chapter 11 plan, partly because of the litigation from the City of San Francisco and the desire for the company and the enterprise to have the benefit of an injunction in the United States. The enterprise filed their Chapter 15 petitions on May 22nd and that's what brought these companies in front of Your Honor and to some extent within the jurisdiction of the United States Bankruptcy Court.

Your Honor may remember that we asked for the minimum amount of relief when we filed the case on May 22nd with the hope of giving people time to analyze the situation in the United States and with the hope of not creating an emergency for Your Honor and Your Honor's staff. That worked out to some extent. We did not ask for a provisional relief which is, obviously, something that is specific to a Chapter 15 as opposed to a Chapter 11. The reason we did that is we wanted to give people time if we could.

Ultimately, there was a scare. We thought that the City of San Francisco was going to proceed with litigation and I'll explain as we go into this why that would be particularly problematic. We filed a motion for provisional relief. Upon filing that motion we received sufficient assurances from the City of San Francisco that they would not proceed with their litigation until after Your Honor resolved the issues that are up for today. As a result

of that again not wanting to create any unnecessary 1 2 emergencies and not wanting to tax anyone's resources 3 unnecessarily we put that --(No audio) 4 5 THE COURT: For those who aren't on Zoom, Mr. 6 Carmel lost his audio. We can't hear you, Mr. Carmel. 7 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Your Honor, I think he's 8 talking to someone to try to get connection back. 9 OPERATOR: Mr. Carmel is back on. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Carmel? 11 MR. CARMEL: I apologize for that, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: It's happened to me too. So, not a 13 big deal. MR. CARMEL: Hopefully that will be the last time, 14 15 but if it's not I will rejoin as soon as possible again. 16 So, we didn't want to tax anyone's resources and so we were able to put off that hearing and we're before Your 17 18 Honor today seeking recognition of our foreign main proceedings which were -- the request was filed on May 22nd 19 20 and seeking an injunction related to that. 21 As Your Honor may note we received one objection 22 to the motion that's from the City of San Francisco. We also 23 communicated with the United States Department of Transportation through the Department of Justice and were 24 25 able to resolve all of their concerns with changes to the

proposed order. We provided a modified proposed order in a comparison form as Exhibit B to the reply and served it out on all folks. Your Honor, the changes that are in there reflect changes that were sought by the United States

Department of Justice and will allow the Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation to continue their investigation and they have no objections to the relief we're requesting.

You know, this is going to be something that we're going to repeat throughout today's hearing. We think that this is incredibly important that there is a Department of Justice investigation that is proceeding and they are not prevented from pursuing that investigation and pursuing their police and regulatory powers. We believe that we will ultimately be able to resolve any concerns that they have.

As we'll talk about today we have been working with our regulatory agencies and addressing concerns as they come up. We don't envision that that is going to change, but if it is, Your Honor, they still have whatever police and regulatory powers they are entitled to.

The motion for recognition relies on three declarations, essentially. There's the initial declaration from Christopher Cave, the chief operating officer; that's under Docket No. 3. He filed and submitted a supplemental declaration that was filed with the reply; that's Exhibit A

under Docket No. 31. We're also relying on the declaration 1 2 of Joseph Reynaud. He is a partner at Stikeman Elliott, the company's Canadian counsel; that declaration was filed with 3 4 the motion for recognition at Docket No. 4. Your Honor, the witnesses are available and 5 subject to cross examination as well as redirect and I ask 6 7 you, Your Honor, how would you prefer to deal with this. We'd like to offer those declarations as evidenced today in 9 support of our motion and the relief we're requesting in the 10 revised proposed order that was attached to the reply. And we're fine to proceed with the court accepting the 11 declarations or proffering the testimony or submitting the 12 13 evidence through direct examination. THE COURT: Is there any objection to the 14 introduction of the declarations? 15 16 (No verbal response) 17 THE COURT: Okay. They're admitted without 18 objection. (Declaration of Christopher Cave, admitted) 19 20 (Declaration of Joseph Reynaud, admitted) 21 THE COURT: Does anyone wish to cross-examine the 22 witnesses? 23 (No verbal response) 24 THE COURT: Let the record reflect there was no 25 response.

So, you can proceed, Mr. Carmel.

MR. CARMEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

The San Francisco objection is limited. They've agreed with the debtors that the debtors are entitled to their recognition under the bankruptcy code. We think that's important because we need the relief and they're the only party that had any concerns that were filed. Again, the United States Department of Transportation via the Department of Justice expressed concerns that were also addressed.

We heard from the United States Trustees Office that while they do not plan to be and participate in today's hearing that they also agree with the relief that we're requesting in the proposed order. And so it really comes down to the City of San Francisco's objection and that only relates to the scope of the injunction that we have requested. It would enjoin the City of San Francisco's litigation.

The City of San Francisco can argue their case.

Basically, what they put in the objection was the fact that they believe their exercising police and regulatory powers.

As we talked about in our reply and as I would like to address, we don't believe that's a proper exercise and something that should be carved out from the stay that we're asking for Your Honor as set forth in the revised proposed order.

Your Honor, before we get to that there is, obviously, in terms of seeking recognition of the foreign main proceedings there is a number of requirements that any entity would have to satisfy. We believe we've satisfied those as set forth in the motion and supported by the declarations.

There is no objection to that and while I can go through and talk through piece by piece how we satisfy the required standards I'm also happy to rely on the motion in the declarations which are now in evidence and proceed right to the heart of the matter.

THE COURT: I've reviewed the motion and the declarations. So, you may proceed.

MR. CARMEL: Thank you, Your Honor.

So, San Francisco believes that its actions should proceed because it filed a complaint that it argues is an exercise and regulatory powers. We believe that San Francisco is incorrect and that the action should be stayed.

We -- you will see in the proposed order and as we'll talk about today there's, essentially, three ways to look at this:

There's the automatic stay which is, obviously, given to us under the bankruptcy code, but has a carve-out for police and regulatory powers under 362(b)(4).

Secondly, there's a Canadian order which we define

as the initial order which provides for an injunction currently through July 31st, 2020 in Canada entered in the CCAA proceedings which we intend to get extended at the right time.

Then the third way that we look at the injunctive relief that we're asking for is by asking for an injunction as set forth in the proposed order that would specifically prevent the City of San Francisco from going forward, but also specifically allow the United States Department of Justice and the Department of Transportation to go forward and continue, like I said, their investigation. And if they have other police and regulatory powers to allow them to do that.

There is a number of hurdles for the City of San Francisco to get over before they're objection would be successful and for the reasons we set forth in the reply, as supported by the evidence that we proposed we believed that there are a number of essentially alternative ways in which you can overrule the objection and rule in favor of the injunction that we're asking for.

This is important because I believe that the only evidence that you are going to have today in front of you is evidence from the debtors, JustFly and FlightHub, but notwithstanding that if there is evidence presented by the City of San Francisco we are ready to dispute that.

So, the first issue is looking at Section 105, which provides authority this for bankruptcy court to enter an injunction. Bankruptcy courts issue injunctions that are broader then the automatic stay all of the time. As we set forth in our reply the more typical scenario is an injunction that incorporates parties that are not subject to the automatic stay being subject to the automatic stay. That is not what we're looking for today.

What we're looking for today is for you to enjoin the San Francisco litigation and even if San Francisco is correct and even if you find that their exercising police and regulatory power, Your Honor, we would direct you to the case in <u>W.R. Grace</u> where the court actually found that the governmental unit was exercising police and regulatory power, but nonetheless entered an injunction that prevented that party from going forward.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Carmel. Is it procedurally proper to ask for a 105 injunction based on just a motion? Doesn't that require an adversary proceeding?

MR. CARMEL: Your Honor, we believe that, number one, it is appropriate and is consistent with, at least, some precedent in this jurisdiction to request an injunction via a motion. If you would like we could file a complaint and an adversary proceeding and proceed that way, but it's important

to know in the context of what we're talking about today that the City of San Francisco is well aware and has been well aware of the relief that we're requesting.

We filed our motion on May 22nd. So, we're almost a month into the case. They have had plenty of time to consider the motion and the relief that we're asking for, and so I think that we'd be -- I believe that there's precedent that supports doing this by motion, but more over we would just be putting form over substance to ask us to restart the process and file an adversary proceeding to get the same injunction that we believe is appropriate.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MR. CARMEL: And, there is another case also in this district. So, what we're asking for is not unprecedented. In this same jurisdiction for the same type of relief that we're asking for in situations where the -- in W.R. Grace, for example, the court considered the standards for injunctive relief which we satisfy and I can get to in a minute.

There is also the principle of comity. We're, obviously, in a Chapter 15. This is different from a Chapter 11. We still get some of the benefits of a Chapter 11, but we also get the fact that what we're asking for is an extension of the initial order which provides authority because the initial order was secured by a fair process

consistent with public policy and I'll get into that.

San Francisco is seeking, essentially, a declaratory judgment that it is exercising its police and regulatory powers. So, when we talk about something that is inappropriate I actually think it's inappropriate for them to think that the way they drafted their objection would be sufficient to carve them out of the stay or the injunction that we're asking for.

My fourth point is that San Francisco does not have police and regulatory power for the reasons that we set forth in the demurrer that we attached and that has been filed in the litigation in the City of San Francisco. So, obviously, when dealing with police and regulatory power 364(b)(4) is not written in a way that I can easily quote it, but the bottom line is what it addresses is a governmental unit could exercise its own power. It doesn't have that power. The Department of Transportion has power to regulate us. They are regulating us, but as a result of that the City of San Francisco is trying to exercise a power it doesn't have.

Finally, Your Honor, even if we are not successful on any of the prior four arguments the fifth one knocks this out as well. San Francisco is seeking to protect pecuniary interests not public interests; therefore, it is not exercising police and regulatory power. I understand in

their objection that they cite and reference a statute that they say is an exercise of police and regulatory power.

For the reasons that are set forth in our reply, and I'm happy to address today, the jurisprudence in Delaware and in the Third Circuit specifically looks at a subjective test where you look at the facts and circumstances in front of you, not an objective test which is used in other jurisdictions where you just looked at the law and used that to determine whether someone or a governmental unit is exercising police power versus exercising pecuniary power.

Here, if you look at the facts and our witnesses have presented a significant amount of testimony that, at least, this point is uncontroverted, the City of San Francisco is clearly exercising pecuniary interest. If they try to explain to you something different I think the facts in front of you and the evidence in front of you is important to understand what is at issue here and it's basically a money claim. Whether they dress it up as restitution or penalties the bottom line is its money and it's not fair to the rest of our restructuring and to the rest of our creditors that that would take a seat in front of anyone else and a priority. That's just not the way bankruptcy is meant to be.

So, if I can specifically get into the arguments and given that you have read all the pleadings, and I've

talked about them, I'll try to make this a little bit less in depth, but if you want to talk about any of the cases I'm happy to do it.

So, in terms of the first argument, which is the Section 105 injunction, we rely on two cases; one is the <u>W.R.</u>

<u>Grace</u> case, which I've talked about, and the other is

<u>Panthera</u>, which is a Third Circuit case 733 F.2d 267. These are cases where the bankruptcy court was comfortable enjoining a party that is a governmental agency that was exercising police and regulatory power.

And we think those cases are incredibly important in thinking about the injunction that we're seeking which is to the extent you want to go through the elements of the likelihood of success on the merits the significant harm that the debtors will suffer, the lack of harm to the San Francisco, and the fact that the public interest supports this injunction I'm happy to go through each of those elements.

THE COURT: I've read the papers. You can move past that.

MR. CARMEL: Okay. So, we'll rely on what we put in subject to an ability to readdress this after hearing the City of San Francisco.

The second argument is the principle of comity that supports the injunction that we're asking for. Like I

said, the Canadian court has entered the initial order and provided for a stay that is broader then the automatic stay and includes governmental entities. And for that, in terms of the principles of comity and the fact that they support deference to the foreign court so long as the foreign proceedings are procedurally fair, which they were, and do not contravene the laws or public policy of the United States, which they don't, and for that we cited Victrix, which is a Second Circuit case, and Sino-Forest, which is a Southern District of New York case.

Given that the United States issues injunctions against governmental actors including under the $\underline{W.R.\ Grace}$ case and the Third Circuit case we think that the relief that was granted in Canada is consistent with US law and should be respected here.

The third argument goes without saying. San Francisco's objection reads a lot like a declaratory judgment that San Francisco is exercising police and regulatory power, but they actually don't even provide the context of Delaware and Third Circuit law which follows a subjective test. They spend their objection talking about the statute which is not the way that courts in this jurisdiction make determinations about police and regulatory power.

Then the fourth argument is that San Francisco is not exercising its police and regulatory power. We rely upon

the arguments set forth in the demure to satisfy that.

Then the final point is a very important one; although, we think that you actually don't have to get to this point to rule in favor of us which is that even if San Francisco is not preempted it cannot exercise police or regulatory power because its interests are pecuniary. And, Your Honor, in this jurisdiction the case law is clear that the automatic stay is broadly determined and that police and regulatory power exception is narrow. This is supported by the THG Holding case, and I'm not going to try to summarize that case because that is Your Honor's case and I', sure you know that better than I do. And then also supported by the Nortel Networks decision for District of Delaware. I believe there is also a Third Circuit on Nortel.

Essentially, the exception under 362(b)(4) is meant to prevent debtors from submitting bankruptcy petitions principally to evade impending governmental efforts to invoke police powers and to deter ongoing debtor conduct that would threaten public safety or welfare. That is from the Nortel case. That is clearly not what is happening here. Clearly, this court does not need to be concerned with the fact that the debtors before Your Honor filed these Chapter 15's so that they could evade some sort of governmental efforts. Obviously, the economic situation that has impacted the debtors is laid out in the evidence and the fact that we're

actually continuing to subject ourselves to the correct regulatory agencies with the Department of Transportation to give Your Honor comfort that we are not doing what 362(b)(4) was meant to address.

And in terms of deterrence, there's some cases that address that and think about the police power verse pecuniary interest or public interest verse pecuniary interest with respect to deterrence. Your Honor, we've already made significant changes. Again, the evidence is clear on that and it's not controverted that we've made changes to address whatever issues or the issues that have been raised and, again, continuing to be subject to regulatory impact of the Department of Transportation in the United States and a bureau in Canada.

These are very much pecuniary interest and, like I mentioned earlier, they are subject -- there is the subjective test. So you have to kind of dig deep and look at what's going on. And the San Francisco complaint and their arguments fail under both tests in terms of the public policy test and the pecuniary test. They are clearly pursuing monetary claims.

Now, of course, like every other governmental unit that's in a debate like this they dress up that argument in other ways. They will cite to the statute. They will even talk about their causes of action that are more than just

monetary and that they're trying to change our behavior. But if you get to the facts of the situation here which is what the Delaware jurisprudence requires that you do, you will learn that what's really going on and if you take in the evidence from the declarations, what's really going on here they might have filed something under a broad statute, they might have even pursued causes of action and asked for a number of things, but what we have today and what we're seeking to enjoin is mostly or entirely them pursuing monetary damages, whether it's in the form of fines or restitution.

And they have their rights under the claim process. Now the claim process is going to go forward in Canada. There's actually a hearing on June 19th with the proposed claims bar date of July 30th, 2020. And they'll have an opportunity to assert their rights just like every other creditor, including governmental units in Canada or in the United States. That's the right way for them to protect their rights, not trying to jump in line, not disrupting our restructuring and not putting us in a situation where a successful restructuring is in jeopardy and a potential liquidation is a potential situation.

We cite a number of cases from this jurisdiction that support the relief we're requesting today. I think we ably distinguish the cases that the City of San Francisco

cites. In general, those are cases that are outside of this
jurisdiction. They frequently have situations where the
relief -- the behavior is ongoing. And situations where
there's no another authority, like here the Department of
Transportation, that can protect the rights that the
litigation at issue was intended to protect.

And I think given the facts of this case, the injunction that we're requesting is absolutely appropriate and may ultimately be necessary to ensure a restructuring for the betterment of all constituents as opposed to the City of San Francisco being able to pursue its litigation for what may be the betterment of the state of California and may ultimately not even be in their interest.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carmel.

Okay. Let me hear from counsel for the City of San Francisco.

MR. TREDINNICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John Carroll.

MR. CARROLL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. John Carroll of Cozen O'Connor on behalf of the City of San Francisco.

Your Honor, my colleague, Edward Tredinnick, who's been admitted on a pro hac basis will be presenting the argument today.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carroll.

MR. TREDINNICK: Thank you, Your Honor. Edward Tredinnick of Greene Radovsky Maloney Share & Hennigh appearing on behalf of the people of the State of California, acting through and on behalf of the San Francisco City attorney.

As pointed out by Mr. Carmel, the City and County of San Francisco imitated this action under the Unfair Competition Laws under the Unfair Competition Laws of the State of California which provide for a city attorney to bring an action on behalf of the people of the State of California.

These actions have been determined, both under California state law and in bankruptcy cases has to be an exercise of police powers. They are essentially a law enforcement action on behalf of the people of the State of California.

I would like to address one issue with respect to the request that the foreign representatives are making here in that this is, as they point out, a Chapter 15 proceeding and that they are entitled to the benefits of Section 1520 which gives them access to the automatic stay. We have no quarrel with that.

However, the other provisions for an injunctive relief under 105(a) runs into a bit of a problem for them

because Section 1521 of Chapter 15 provides that injunctive relief may be made except as set forth in 1521(b) that the court may not enjoin police or regulatory acts of governmental units.

So using 105 to get something specified and as is prohibited under 1521(d) runs into a problem that was highlighted by the United States Supreme Court recently in Law vs. Siegel that you can't get something under 105 that is, otherwise, prohibited under the Bankruptcy Code.

The other main issue that I think the that the foreign representative is trying to state is that this action is not a police action. And the reason for that they rely on is the demurrer that is set out which sets forth that this action may be prohibited under a federal preemption theory. And that only the Department of Transportation is able to regulate an entity such as the debtors herein.

Obviously, my client takes issue with that, has filed an extensive brief in that action in response to the demurrer and that matter is set for a hearing two weeks from today. We think it would be inappropriate for this court to decide under a demurrer under California stat law with respect to these issues. And the mere fact that just why here it has a search that the preemption applies should not rule the day.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr.

Tredinnick.

2 MR. TREDINNICK: Yes.

THE COURT: If I recognize the foreign proceeding under 1520, does the automatic stay apply automatically?

That's why they call it an automatic stay.

MR. TREDINNICK: Absolutely, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So what's the proper procedural process for a state or regulatory agency that believes that it is operating under its police and regulatory powers to seek relief from that stay?

MR. TREDINNICK: Well in a normal case, it would be a motion for relief from stay. Actually, not a motion from a relief from stay but a motion for the determination that the stay does not apply, in this instance, because the entity is operating its police or regulatory powers. And that's really the issue, I think, we have here today. And that is that I believe this action is clearly within the exception to the automatic stay for police and regulatory actions. That at (indiscernible) is what this action is about.

The foreign representative also makes a very -- an argument that it has, you know, worked with the Department of Transportation and it's willing to carve them out of the injunction. I find that a little bit strange that the regulated entity gets to decide who gets to regulate them.

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And it's important to note that it was the people in the 1 State of California who initiated these investigations into JustFly prior to the Department of Transportation being involved.

There are issues of California law that impact the people of the State of California in our action that the Department of Transportation is not going to be interested in. And so, this action is important to the people of California who, quite obviously, is probably one of the larger markets that JustFly was operating under.

We think it's important --

THE COURT: isn't it -- do you take any exception to the evidence that they've introduced that in terms of the injunctive relief that you are seeking in California that's become moot because they've already agreed to do all those things?

MR. TREDINNICK: Well they may have agreed to it but they have not entered into any kind of binding obligation that they would have if the State of California was able to enter its injunction. We are not there yet.

They have, as pointed out, in the exhibit that they have submitted which was a settlement communication between one of the city attorneys and JustFly that there has been discussion of modifications of their behavior. But that's all it is at this point is a statement that they will

modify their behavior and whether or not that continues is still of interest to the people of the State of California, particularly since its, at least, according to the petition the intent is for reorganization and a new entity of some manner to come out and start doing business again, hopefully when the pandemic lifts and we're back to normal travel situation.

My clients concerned about that because we don't know, at this point, without some sort of formal injunctive relief that would be available under this litigation that's pending that they would not just revert back to their prior activities.

So, I don't think it solves the problem. The fact that they are acting differently is commendable, but that doesn't take away what had been a rather egregious course of action that caused the initiation of this lawsuit in the first place.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. TREDINNICK: One point with respect to the issue of comity. We recognize that Canada -- the Canadian courts have entered their order and that they have a stay in place. However, it's notable that the Canadian companies Arrangement Act also has an exception for their regulatory agent's bodies to continue their investigation and would not be subject to any stay.

It would, I don't think comity would stretch as far as to allow regulatory actions to continue in Canada and prohibit them from continuing here in the United States. And I don't think that Chapter 15 was designed to do.

THE COURT: Doesn't comity come into play and the idea that, as you said, even the Canadian law, there's prohibitions to prevent an entity or a governmental entity from proceeding with that investigation. And the Canadian Court has already entered an injunction, so why shouldn't I just say, Go back to Canada and ask the Canadian judge to lift it?

MR. TREDDINICK: Well, I would (indiscernible) because I believe that stay doesn't apply to governmental entities of the United States.

THE COURT: Well, it wouldn't, but as a matter of comity, I can say, Look, I understand that Canada is going to be the center of the main proceeding here. The action -- everything is going to be resolved in Canada, not here in the United States.

Canada and its judge has determined that it's appropriate at that point to enjoin everything in Canada until the end of July. There are apparently proceedings that are going to happen in June with a bar date in July.

So, why wouldn't it be appropriate for me to say, I'm just going to allow the automatic stay to stay in place

until the end of July. You can go to Canada and talk to the judge there and if they make the determination that it is a regulatory action that is not subject to a stay in Canada, get the relief there.

MR. TREDDINICK: Well, I just feel that that would be more of an imposition upon United States entities to go into Canada and I don't know that the provisions of Chapter 15, which provide that courts within the United States should not enjoin police or regulatory actions in a Chapter 15, that Congress has taken that into account.

THE COURT: Well, you're still going to have to go to Canada anyway, because even if this action continues here and you're allowed to proceed with your lawsuit, you're not going to be able to collect on it in the United States; you're going to have to go to Canada.

MR. TREDDINICK: Agreed. And we are not taking any kind of position that we would be able to enforce the judgment, only that we would be able to continue with the injunction to conclude the injunctive relief. And to the extent that we can fix any penalty or restitution interest, that that would have to go through Canada and we don't dispute that.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry to cut you off.

You add another point?

MR. TREDDINICK: Yeah. I would just like to

address the issues that have been raised in the reply regarding the standards for the injunction. The <u>W.R. Grace</u> case is instructive in a lot of ways in that -- and, again, it was not a foreign proceeding, but in that instance, the Court clearly stated that 362(b)(4) provides an exception for fixing damages for violation of the police-power matters. So, that was one of the rulings in the case and we cited that case in our brief.

But as Mr. Carmel has stated, there was an injunction that was imposed in that case; again, it was not a Chapter 15 proceeding, but that was an instance where the facts of that case were not like this at all. The case had been going on for several years -- I think it was about eight years when the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection wanted to go forward and establish some punitive claims against the debtor.

However, the Department did not file a proof of claim, so it was barred. So, there was going -- no matter what recovery they got, they were not going to collect it, so they were able to show that they were not going to succeed on the merits and any action was not going to be of any use, and that was the basis for which the Court issued the 105 injunction.

This case is much different. The idea that we are not going to succeed on the merits is based on the statement

of the foreign representative that there's a demurrer on file and we're going to lose and that San Francisco is not going to be able to succeed on that.

As I mentioned, that's hotly disputed. We don't believe we're going to lose and, actually, since it's a demurrer, the more likely result is that we would probably prevail on that issue.

The debtor has also set forth that he's going -that they were going to suffer irreparable harm in their
reorganization issues, that they're going to have to deal
with these types of issues; however, they are saying they're
going to deal with the Department of Transportation. It's
not going to be any more costly to deal with the city of -the People of the State of California on this, and I might
point out that just two days ago, the debtors have
substituted in new counsel in the California action to pursue
that litigation. So, it's not -- it would not appear that
they are unable to do -- to pursue that.

It is -- there would be irreparable harm to the People of the State of California if they were not able to continue to protect themselves under the consumer protection laws that are set forth to protect California residents and that interest would be the factor, I believe, would weigh heavily in favor of the public interest of the People of the State of California. So, in that instance, I don't believe

that any injunctive relief would be appropriate in this action.

Again, I would point out, as Mr. Carmel has mentioned, they have been willing to carve out the Department of Transportation for purposes of the regulation, up to and including any penalties that may be imposed, save the enforcement of that judgment. And we don't understand and we don't believe that the People of the State of California should be treated any differently in this case.

Thank you, Your Honor. Unless you have any questions, I will conclude.

THE COURT: Has there been any or has the People of the State of California come to any conclusion as to the amount of damages they're seeking to recover in this action?

MR. TREDDINICK: No, there have not, Your Honor.

As you may be aware, this action had -- was initiated in September of last year. The demurrer was briefed in December of last year.

And for reasons because of assignment of judges and also issues that the state courts in California are having with the pandemic, the matter was not set for hearing until July 1st. So there has not been any determination there.

We also had discovery requests that were made that have not been complied with as of yet, so we're still in

early stages at this point.

THE COURT: Well, is it to say -- I did see in the complaint that the amount of the fines that could be imposed were \$2500 per debtor; is that right?

MR. TREDDINICK: I believe that's the case. I'm not completely conversant with how that would be applied as to the debtors.

THE COURT: I did see that in the prayer for relief; it is \$2500 per debtor under two different theories.

MR. TREDDINICK: Yeah.

THE COURT: So, I'm assuming that the amount of damages that are being sought to be able to provide restitution to the people who purchased tickets through the debtors would far exceed that amount.

MR. TREDDINICK: That would be accurate, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Carmel?

MR. CARMEL: Your Honor, what I'd like to do with Your Honor's permission is respond to the issues that you discussed with the City of San Francisco and reserve what I would view as kind of my closing until after we address the issues so we can more closely align what I'm responding to with the discussion that was just had between Your Honor and the City's counsel.

Is that okay with Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yeah, go ahead.

MR. CARMEL: So, I want to go through each of these issues and if I miss any, I'm happy to respond.

about was that the -- in the past, there are cases that support the fact that the law that's at issue here is one where the City was determined to be exercising its police and regulatory power. In some ways that's completely irrelevant partly because the courts that have made that determination may have been using an objective test or an objective standard where they look at the statute.

That's not what happens in Delaware; in Delaware there's a subjective test and that subjective test looks at actually the facts of the case as to what is relevant. And in Delaware in the Third Circuit, there is plenty of law that supports that. And when you look at the facts of this case, they absolutely do not support that the City of San Francisco is exercising police and regulatory power.

The second thing that the City's attorney addressed was Section 1520 where he acknowledged that the automatic stay is automatic upon Your Honor's recognizing this case or these cases and then he cites to 1521. And a comment them that I have is that the City of San Francisco's position misses context and this argument absolutely misses

context and, in particular, is misquoting the statute.

If Your Honor looks at Section 1521, what it says is that there are a bunch of rights that are automatic under 1520, upon the recognition of a bankruptcy and then 1521 says there are some rights that are possibilities that you as a bankruptcy judge can enter, including an injunction.

Under 1521, at the end of (d) -- or, sorry -- in

(d), it says an injunction under Section 1521 cannot, "enjoin
a police or regulatory act," and then at the end it says,

"under this section."

Your Honor will notice that our motions does not ask for an injunction under 1521; our motion asks for an injunction under 105 and you're absolutely entitled to enter an injunction under Section 105 in a Chapter 15 because Section 103 makes Chapter 1 applicable in a Chapter 15. So, I think that's important and I think that's the kind of skipping context that the City of San Francisco is doing here to harm our debtor.

The third point they make is -- relates to the demurrer and the fact that the City of San Francisco has a response to the demurrer. Your Honor has a collection of evidence in front of you. None of it provides any response to our demurrer. I think that is relevant. There is no response on the record, no information in front of you that contests anything in the demurrer.

The only thing that you heard in terms of evidence -- and this is a theme that you're going to hear from me as we go through each of these points and as we get to the closing -- the only evidence you have in front of you was presented by the debtors; there's no evidence to suggest that there's anything that contradicts the information in our demurrer.

The fourth point is that -- about the proper procedure and what was important in the answer that you heard from the City of San Francisco is that they acknowledge, they know exactly what type of relief we were requesting in our motion for recognition. They engaged on this topic and they presented the case before you, Your Honor, that they felt was appropriate.

This is a serious issue for my client. As you can see from the people who are participating in the hearing today, as you can tell from the preparation, the declarations we filed, the fact that we were ready to be before you, Your Honor, with witnesses, this is serious. This is a question of whether my client is able to restructure in bankruptcy or if they end up liquidating.

And the City of San Francisco was well aware of this. We filed our initial declarations on May 22nd when we filed our motion and we filed a lengthy reply. And the City of San Francisco knew exactly what we were doing. Their

objection that they filed was against the declaration -- sorry -- was against the injunction that we're seeking.

And to suggest that this isn't serious or that we aren't entitled to the relief because the objection that they filed, which just references that a statute may, in other can cases, have been found to be police and regulatory powers, is unfair to the debtors.

The fifth point is -- was related to a question and I believe a colloquy about the fact that we're working with the Department of Transportation and the fact that we were willing to carve them out. There's nothing unusual about the fact that we acknowledge the Federal Government has authority to regulate our company. And there's nothing unusual about the fact that we're allowing them, and indeed take issue when they called us, in terms of allowing them to continue to exercise their police and regulatory power.

There's nothing about my client that suggests they're not willing to be regulated. The problem is my client is not willing to be harassed and that's what's happening from the City of San Francisco.

Your Honor, while the facts and the explanation that the City's counsel mentioned was about the fact that their complaint was filed first and they somehow clued in the Department of Transportation to this issue, nothing could be further from the truth and irrelevant; again, they are not

able to submit whatever, a meager amount of evidence they're submitting by having a lawyer here. They have no facts to support what they said.

And if you'd like, Your Honor, we could put

Christopher Cave on the stand right now and he would explain
to you that the Department of Transportation engaged with the
company in 2018. Forget about having looked at the
complaint; we've been talking to the Department of
Transportation for an extra year.

And we have engaged with them. We have engaged with the regulatory agency in Canada and we happened to have provided information to the City of San Francisco, because while we don't believe they have any regulatory authority, we also recognize that regulations are important and, Your Honor, we intend to be following the regulations now and we -- our entire purpose of a restructuring is to get out of bankruptcy and continue to operate.

We recognize that to the extent regulatory authorities have the right to regulate us, regardless of what the automatic stay provides, regardless of what today's injunction provides, we're certainly going to be in a situation where we are able to be regulated post-getting out of our restructuring. And so, we're not trying to skirt regulations; we're trying to be regulated by the appropriate people in an appropriate way.

The sixth point that was raised is that we've not agreed to an injunction with the City of San Francisco, even though there's, essentially, an acknowledgment that our behavior was fixed. That acknowledgment comes in multiple forms.

Number one, no one contested any of the evidence that we presented before Your Honor today. The declaration makes clear all the changes that we made to our behavior and there was no one, not even a cross-examination. So it's not a question of whether we were successful at convincing you; there's no alternative, that's the only information that you have before Your Honor.

What the City of San Francisco just argued was they mentioned something about a settlement discussion which we absolutely attached to our reply because we think it's important. It's an acknowledgment from the City of San Francisco that our behavior has changed and it's a statement against interest.

Your Honor, but in addition to that, if that's not sufficient, the testimony that we provided in our declaration that Your Honor accepted today and that we're willing to put on some more is available. There's no evidence to the contrary.

And the fact that they essentially acknowledge and maybe completely acknowledge that our behavior has changed,

but that they kind of wanted to be in an injunction so going forward they feel more comfortable, that's not the way the rules work. This is a monetary issue.

And, again, they will have their rights to regulate any company that is restructured, and so we're not trying to run away from the regulations here either, but we are trying to take the resources we have, put them into our restructuring, and do something that's for the betterment of all creditors.

The next issue was the issue of comity and we believe Your Honor has the right to enforce the Canadian Court's laws, but to be clear, we are asking today for an order that stops the City of San Francisco from pursuing their action. We think it's appropriate. We think we've provided plenty of support.

And what we don't want to be doing is spending a bunch of time and energy dealing with this, and I'll get to that point in a minute.

Your Honor, the next point was the fact that <u>W.R.</u>

<u>Grace</u> was not a foreign proceeding. That is true, but irrelevant. Your Honor, what <u>W.R. Grace</u> stands for, as well as <u>Pintura</u>, which is a Third Circuit case, both of them stand for the proposition that Your Honor has the power to create an injunction under Section 105 to prevent a governmental unit from proceeding even when they have police and

regulatory power.

The fact that this is a Chapter 15 is not only not relevant because you have the power under Section 103 to enter an order under Section 105, but it's also, weakens their argument, not strengthens it.

The point of a Chapter 15, and this goes with our argument on comity, is to allow us to proceed in a bankruptcy in a foreign jurisdiction. So, if anything, you should have more leeway to enter the injunction that we're asking for, but even if you don't buy the argument that you're entitled -- you have (indiscernible) right, you certainly have a road that's been paved by the Court in <u>W.R. Grace</u> and Pintura and notes Third Circuit law.

The next thing is the point that somehow the fact that we've -- that it's not more costly to deal with the City of San Francisco if we're already dealing with the Department of Transportation; again, no evidence to make this point, nothing in the record, but, of course, it's not true.

You, yourself, would, of course, know, having practiced, that dealing with two entities is always going to be more expensive than dealing with one, but what's more important here is the two entities that we're dealing with.

The City of San Francisco filed litigation back in September and Your Honor has not seen us before this Court asking for anything, any relief regarding the Department of

Transportation. Your Honor did not see us file for provisional relief because we were nervous that the Department of Transportation was threatening to pursue a motion to compel.

But if you look at, I believe it's Docket

Number 17, where we filed a motion for provisional relief, we included an email that explains what motivated us to file that motion, which is that the City of San Francisco, notwithstanding the fact that they knew that about 10 days later or two weeks later, we'd be right before Your Honor dealing with a stay, they were threatening to can compel discovery.

This is a completely different animal. It's especially unfortunate because it's an animal that doesn't have the regulatory power, but even if they had the same power as the Department of Transportation, it is more extensive and more work for us to address them, and, again, no evidence to the contrary.

The next point they raised is that there would be irreparable harm to California if they're not able to protect themselves. That was the entire statement.

There's zero -- that's actually not -- there's no facts built into that statement, but even if there were, there's no facts in the record that support that statement.

And then the final statement was that the public

interest weighs in favor of California; again, there's no facts that support that, but in addition to that, there's no facts in the record.

And, Your Honor, if you look at our declarations -- we have witnesses here today -- we are ready to move forward with our restructuring. I'm going to save my closing, but the bottom line is there's nothing before you that provides any facts or any reason for you to deny the relief that we're requesting and enjoin us and allow us to move on to all the different restructuring activities that we highlight in the reply and that are supported by a declaration.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carmel.

Does anyone else wish to be heard on the motion?

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Yes?

MR. CARROLL: -- it's John Carroll. If I may be heard for a moment?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. CARROLL: Your Honor, it's interesting that the debtor relies so heavily on procedure. And I would just direct the Court's attention to Section 1520, indeed, upon recognition, does activate the automatic stay, as has been previously discussed, but as we all know, the automatic stay contains certain exceptions, including 362(b)(4).

And I would just command to the Court's attention, the latter half of (b)(4), which goes into what the police and regulatory powers are, and the ability to continue to pursue even monetary damages under 362(b)(4) under that exception.

It was also addressed that, you know, don't look at 1521; 1521, what it actually provides for is the type of relief which the Court may give, right -- so it's not mandatory; you may get it -- but it also does something else, very importantly, it sets forth what you cannot do. And it does expressly state that:

"The Court may not enjoin a police or regulatory act of a governmental unit, including a criminal action or proceeding, under this section."

So, yes, it does say, "under this section," so once again, under 1520, you're not getting the full injunctive relief because you have an exception under 362. Under 1521, you're also not getting it. So, what they've (indiscernible) is, okay, what we're going to do is we're going to turn to 105.

Well, go ahead and turn to 105, but, procedurally, you're inappropriate because you've got to go under 7001. It should have been an adversary proceeding and you can't just dismiss it (indiscernible) and say, Oh, it doesn't matter that it's not an adversary proceeding, because you do need

discovery on those various issues as to whether or not and to what extent this is a police and regulatory action. So, this is a totally inappropriate extension of the authority under Chapter 15 to put this injunction in place.

That's it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Anyone else wish to be heard?

MR. CARMEL: Can I respond to that, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Very briefly.

MR. CARMEL: So, under the -- I think there were it three points. The first one was citing 362(b)(4), relating to the fact regarding monetary damages can be pursued to some extent; again, we go back to the cites that we put in, the precedent that we put in. Yes, there are situations where monetary damages can be pursued. They can never be collected but pursued.

But, again, in Delaware and in the Third Circuit, the subjective test is relevant. We satisfied the subjective test that they are pursuing pecuniary interests.

Again, 362 doesn't -- isn't the only thing that's relevant; we're asking for an injunction under 105.

Again, the City's counsel kind of sidesteps what Section 1521 says, which includes relevant language under this section.

We're not asking for an injunction under that

section. We've been very clear: we're asking for an injunction under 105.

And then the third thing is the idea that an adversary proceeding is the right way to proceed here. We believe there's sufficient evidence and the parties have sufficiently engaged in this, that the motion that we filed is absolutely appropriate, was filed four weeks ago, and has given everyone enough time to deal with this.

But if Your Honor is not comfortable with that, I would request that we get a 120-day or some sort of an extension or injunction that we've requested and then we'll file an adversary proceeding. I don't think we need to do it. I don't think it's appropriate.

I think it's just the City of San Francisco asking, grasping for another straw and another opportunity, but at a minimum, we ask Your Honor to not allow us to walk out of here without an injunction that gives us a breathing spell and allows us to focus on our restructuring.

We think we've provided more than sufficient evidence to get that permanently and for the City of San Francisco to just file their claim and let us proceed.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

If there's nobody else, I don't need closings.

25 | I'm ready to rule on this issue.

Procedurally, this isn't being pursued in a usual fashion, let me say it that way. The motion by the debtors is for recognition under 1520.

I find that they've met their burden of proof and I do recognize the action under Section 1520. Section 1520 says, specifically, that once recognized, Section 362, among others, the automatic stay applies to the action.

The objection filed by the City of San Francisco or the People of California, however you want to recognize it -- I'll just say the objectors -- the motion filed by the objectors is, in substance, a motion to have the Court recognize that the stay does not apply because they are enforcing its police and regulatory powers under 362(d)(4).

The burden of proof on that issue is the objector's. The movant had to show that it was, in fact, pursuing its police and regulatory powers. The only proof put on by the objector was a reference to the statute that they had brought their action under in the State of California.

As the debtors have pointed out, the Third Circuit and this Court recognize a subjective standard for determining whether or not 362(d)(4) applies, and in this case, the only evidence that I have was put on by the debtors, which shows that the relief actually being sought by the City of San Francisco in the California action is

reimbursement of or damages to reimburse customers of the 1 2 debtors and that, in this Court's view, is a pecuniary interest that is being pursued. 3 4 And because it is a pecuniary interest and not a 5 police and regulatory interest, I find that 362(d)(4) exception to the automatic stay does not apply and, 6 7 therefore, the debtors have the benefit of a stay under 362. And based on 362, I'll enjoin the City of San Francisco from 9 pursuing the action in the state of California at this time until further relief of the Court. 10 And the debtors should confer with counsel for the 11 City and come up with an appropriate form of order and submit 12 13 it under --14 MR. TREDDINICK: Thank you very much. THE COURT: Okay. Any other questions? 15 16 (No verbal response) 17 THE COURT: Anything else for today? 18 (No verbal response) THE COURT: All right. Thank you all very much. 19 20 We're adjourned. 21 COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 (Proceedings concluded at 3:13 p.m.) 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. June 19, 2020
Mary Zajaczkowski, CET**D-531